PROBLEMS OF THE

MASS MOVEMENT

BY

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BEING PART II OF P.C. JOSHI'S LETTER TO FOREIGN COMRADES ENTITLED "ARE WE ONLY STUPID ?"

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FOR PARTY MEMBERS AND SYMPATHISERS ONLY

CONTENTS

		Pages
1.	Introduction	 1
2.	Analysis of Post August 15 India	9
3.	Working Class Unity	31
4.	Telengana	66
5.	Democratic liberties	79

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I. INTRODUCTION.

In the first part I tried to analyse and quote the teachings of our teachers against the main tactical postulate of our leadership. It is very proud of these postulates. It thinks, they stand sharply demarcated from the earlier Trotskyite position and are cast-iron guarantee against the party in recoil slipping into the reformist mire. It claims that they are a correct application of the Lenin-Stalin teachings on the subject and inevitably follow from accepting the lessons of the Chinese revolution. It is so convinced of their soundness that it calls upon the Party ranks to start implementing it and lose no more time. It is so self-confident itself that it takes International endorsement for granted.

I have tried to demonstrate that these are false claims and on every point the opposite is true:

- that on all important problems, its formulations are the same as the Ranadive leadership's;
- that its anti-Trotskyism is a mask to carry on with its own version of the same old Trotskyite policy;
- that its anti-reformism is Trotskyite demagogy to suppress criticism, paralyse thought and exploit the natural anxiety of cadres not to go reformist while making a turn from sectarianism;
- that its fundamental postulates constitute a fundamental repudiation of the Lenin-Stalin precepts, as given in the very quotations it gives and in the writings with which it is quite familiar;

that its claim to give the Indian Communist Party the true lessons from the Chinese Revolution is on a par with Trotsky's attempt to give the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist International the true lessons from the Russian Revolution.

The overwhelming majority of party members have already rejected its lead by sitting upon it and successfully forcing it to concede the demand for a Party Congress to discuss out its line before implementing it.

I have no doubt that our brother Parties must have already informed it to do its thinking all over again and that they would be discussing the concrete form which their own direct intervention should take to help our Party out of the mess which our old leadership is only multiplying.

From every possible angle and on every single count, the policy of our leadership is pure and simple sectarianism.

Against Sectarianism

I can find no better words to express the present attempts of our leadership and to generalise the outlook of our new Leadership than to recall the words of Dimitrov at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in which he thus described the period following the Sixth Congress of the International.

"Less successful and frequently entirely lacking, was the fight against sectarianism.

"Sectarianism manifested itself no longer in primitive, open forms as in the first years of the existence of the Communist International, but under cover of a formal recognition of the Bolshevik thesis, hindered the development of a Bolshevik mass policy.

"In our day this is no longer an infantile disorder as Lenin wrote, but a deeply rooted vice, which must be shaken off or it will be impossible to solve the problem of establishing the United Front of the proletar-

iat and of leading the masses from the positions of reformism to the side of revolution.

"In the present situation, self-satisfied sectarianism,more than anything else impedes our struggle for the realisation of the United Front; sectarianism, satisfied with its doctrinaire narrowness, its divorce from the real life of the masses; satisfied with its simplified methods of solving the most complex problems of the working class movement on the basis of stereotyped schemes; sectarianism which professes to know all and considers it superflous to learn from the masses, from the lessons of the labour movement. In short, sectarianism, to which as they say, mountains are mere stepping-stones." (United Front, p. 84.)

For Bolshevik Mass Policy

It behoves us today to recall that great teaching of Stalin which Dimitrov made the basis of his clarion call for the Communist Parties adopting a Bolshevik mass policy:

"It is necessary that the Party be able to combine in its work the greatest adhesion to principle (not to be confused with sectarianism!) with a maximum of contacts and connections with masses (not to be confused with "tailism"!), without which it is not only impossible for the Party to teach the masses and raise them to the level of the Party but to listen to the voice of the masses, and divine their sorest needs." (Quoted by Dimitrov in *United Front*, page 86).

In the struggle for a new Marxist outlook which must form the foundation of new Party tactics, one can do no better than give Dimitrov's own explanation of the above Stalin precept, his own explanation of Bolshevik mass policy:

"We are enemies of all cut and dried schemes. We want to take into account the concrete situation at each moment, in each place, and not act according to a fixed

stereotyped form anywhere and everywhere; not to forget that in varying circumstances the position of the Communists cannot be identical.

"We want soberly to take into account all stages in the development of the class struggle and in the growth of the class consciousness of the masses themselves, to be able to locate and solve at each stage the concrete problems of the revolutionary movement corresponding to this stage.

"We want to find a common language with the broadest masses for the purpose of struggling against the class enemy, to find ways of finally overcoming the isolation of the revolutionary vanguard from the masses of proletariat and all toilers, as well as of overcoming the fatal isolation of the working class itself from its natural allies in the struggle against bourgeoisie, against Fascism.

"We want to draw increasingly wide masses into the revolutionary class struggle and lead them to the proletarian revolution, proceeding from their vital interests and needs as the starting point and their own experience as the basis.

"We want to eradicate from our ranks all self-satisfied sectarianism, which above all blocks our road to the masses and impedes the carrying out of a truly Bolshevik mass policy. We want to intensify in every way the struggle against all concrete manifestations of right-opportunism, realising that the danger from this side will increase precisely in the practice of carrying out our mass policy and struggle.

"We want the Communists of each country promptly to draw and apply all the lessons that can be drawn from their own experience as the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. We want them as quickly as possible to learn how to sail on the turbulant waters of the class struggle, and not to remain on the shore as spectators and registrars of surging waves in the expectation of fine weather.

"This is what we want."

These historic words of Dimitrov should serve as our guide, help us to guard against making ourselves political monkeys aping the Chinese Communist Party. They also give us the positive guiding lines for a new orientation to our minds.

Break with the Sectarian Understanding.

We cannot even start groping our way towards correct tactics unless we FIRST break decisively with those key postulates which constituted the base of the Trotskyite policy of the Ranadive leadership and which have been bodily taken over by the Rajeshwar Rao leadership. They are the following:

- (1) Demagogy about "revolutionary perspective" in place of an objective estimate of the concrete class situation in our country. This constituted the Trotskyite exploitation of the revolutionary subjective sentiments of our cadres. This damned our leadership of being crudely dogmatist. It came in the way of the Party learning from practical experience and listening to the voice of the masses, and learning from the masses and thus, it became an intellectual hindrance to learning from our own practice, from the decisive verdict of the masses against our Trotskyite policy. This made us blindly subjective and paralysed the mind.
- (2) Counterposing the basic demands of the platform of the democratic revolution to the immediate demands of the masses. This constituted the mistake of denying the difference between the general and the concrete and mixing up the two. In strategy, our leadership adopted the strategy of the socialist revolution for our democratic revolution and masked it with the Titoite phrase "intertwining of the two stages of revolution." The tactical counterpart of the same outlook was to demagogically assert that all sectors of the movement have to fight to realise here and now the basic demands outlined in the programme of the Democratic

Front, and the decisive argument given was that in the "existing revolutionary situation" the difference between the immediate and the general demands had disappeared, the general basic demands were themselves the immediate demands of the people! The conclusion clinched was that any attempt to formulate immediate demands of the masses for their immediate mobilisation and struggle, if they were any less or different than the basic demands to be realised through the victory of the Democrate Revolution, constituted evidence of "the old reformist outlook", which did not have faith in the present revolutionary policy of the Party, lacked faith in the revolutionary power of the proletariat, which did not learn from its militancy but which could only today compromise the Party before the struggling masses and lead to the betrayal of all struggles instead of developing them to the highest pitch.

This mistaken outlook cost the Party very dear, and enabled reaction to smash up very easily all the mass bases built up after years of toil and sacrifice.

Internationally, we were looking forward to "the world revolution" sweeping all before it, including the reformist leaderships of the brother parties that came in its way! Hence the C.P.I. first did not take the Peace Movement seriously and later made it so narrow as to make it ineffective. Hence we have not even popularised the main facts of the liberation struggles of the South-East Asian peoples and have run no countrywide campaigns of solidarity with really concrete demands. Naturally enough we did not do anything concrete to checkmate the Anglo-American moves in our country, or to popularise the achievements of the anti-Imperialist democratic camp headed by the U.S.S.R. The result has been that nothing has been done to counter the Anglo-American moves in our country; the imperialists and the Indian reactionaries have had a free run to confuse the people and indoctrinate them with Anglo-American propaganda and

the Indian anti-imperialist democratic elements have been left to fend for themselves.

Naturally, by the utter failure to concentrate upon the defence of civil liberties, as the supreme political task of the Party, after the Party Congress, in face of the provocation and the attacks of the Government, meant disarming the Party itself instead of its rallying the people in its own defence and building such a powerful mass movement in defence of democratic liberties as would frustrate the drive of the Government towards Fascism and throw back its attempt to liquidate the Party through repression. Our leadership counterposed its "revolutionary struggle" to the struggle for democratic liberties, and damned the demand for the latter as having legalist illusions, etc. It talked of suppression of democratic liberties only as an argument to expose and denounce the Government and not to build a movement to defend them against its attack. The Party leadership by indulging in such demagogy rendered inestimable service to Patel's Home and Information Departments. Patel had no need to brother about the popular opinion and only asked the police to go ahead and be done with the C.P.I. This led to the Party losing and Patel winning a major political battle.

On the Trade Union front, we systematically counterposed the immediate demands to what we called the 'basic demands', which were later formulated in the Bombay session of the AITUC (May, 1949). Instead of formulating such immediate demands as the working class itself would regard as practical of realisation, we exploited their faith in us as their traditional Trade Union leadership to arbitrarily plant these "basic demands" over every strike struggle and generally condemned all efforts to settle the strikes for anything less than these demands. This led to the defeat of all strikes led by us, smash-up of our Trade Unions, workers becoming frustrated and a good section looking upon the Socialist leadership as being "more practical" than the Reds.

On the Kisan Front also, we counterposed the demand of land to the tiller to the immediate necessity of organising resistance to large-scale evictions and getting the share-croppers a larger share of the crop and the labourers a better wage. During the 1949-50 agricultural season, our Bengal Party leadership in a Circular denounced the Tebhaga demand (1/3 of the produce for the landlord and 2/3 for the tenant) as reformism. In every province our line was that the immediate job was to organise the peasants to seize land, divide it up and defend it as in Telengana. Through such tactics, the slogan of 'land to the tiller' was not realised as promised by our leadership, but the organised Kisan Sabha movement was successfully liquidated under the influence of this Trotskyite outlook.

(3) Building the Democratic Front was not considered any difficult and complicated job needing hard thinking, but the Party was given the simple recipe: start struggles and go on struggling and this is itself building the Democratic Front. Sometimes the same formula was varied a bit and it was said that the struggles will ultimately build the Front. This has been the traditional Trotskyite outlook against the Communist United Front tactics the world over. The only specific difference is that our leadership used the phrase 'Democratic Front' only to cover up such a really adventurist outlook which could never lead to building the Democratic Front, but only to isolating the Party itself from the other democratic elements and helping the enemy to weaken the Party and keep the anti-imperialist democratic forces divided.

The failure to pick out and concentrate upon those live issues which would give the maximum mass mobilisation on the basis of broadest democratic unity, led to our ranting about Party leadership and never going anywhere near realising it.

The outlook, that never bothered to discuss and deliberate what forms of organisation would be most

In the section on Armed Guerilla Struggle, I have already shown how our Trotskyite outlook led to terrorist tactics. But I did not indicate there that the mistake of regarding the Armed Guerilla Struggle as the main form in our present conditions also led to the mistake of "anti-parliamentarism" and that it was writ large over the policy both of our old and new leaderships.

The struggle to purge our minds of the above Trotskyite conceptions is only the negative aspect of the positive task to formulate what Dimitrov called a Bolshevik mass policy in consonance with the Lenin-Stalin teachings on tactics as applied to our concrete conditions. In this part I propose to express my own opinion on some of the concrete tactical problems.

II. ANALYSIS OF POST-AUGUST 15 INDIA

(a) There was a distinct revolutionary rise in the first post-war years. The revolt of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) and Telengana showed that our national liberation movement had reached a new stage, the stage of armed struggle.

The RIN revolt itself symbolised at once the strength and the weakness of the new situation. The courage of the RIN heroes and the active solidarity of the Bombay working class (through a 3-day General Strike) showed the new mood of our people including

the armed services; but the acceptance by the RIN Strike Committee of the Gandhi-Jinnah advice to "surrender" to the British masters and trust the Congress and League leaders' word not to let them be victimised showed the dominant influence of the compromising bourgeois leaders over the people.

The RIN Mutiny was also the peak point of the first post-war tide; after that set in the steady ebb with the arrival of the Cabinet Mission and the decision of the Congress and the League leaders to go in for negotiations and hold the masses in check against the British but use them as pressure against each other which gave golden opportunities to the imperialist agents to let loose the orgy of communal riots.

Looking back it should be patent enough to any serious Communist that to confuse the revolutionary rise of the first two post-war years with the entire period we have passed through and regard it as one of continuous rise is to be a subjectivist petty-bourgeois gone mad enough to lose the use of his senses because of the bourgeois betrayal which he could not resist, and who is hugging an early memory to escape thinking over developments that have taken place despite his revolutionary desire and for which he was not mentally prepared.

(b) The period from the arrival of the Cabinet Mission to the "transfer of power" on the 15th of August is one of manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres and initiative passes back to Imperialism and the revolutionary rise is partly diverted into communal pogroms and partly paralysed,

Imperialism puts forward proposals which the Congress leadership dares not reject off hand and thus strengthen the rise of the anti-imperialist upsurge. These proposals enable imperialism to set the Congress and the League against each other.

Imperialism is able to use the Congress leadership itself to hold in check the rise of the mass movement.

The acceptance of the British plan as the basis for discussion leads to the Congress leadership itself holding the masses in check. The faith of the mass of the people in their bourgeois leadership as the traditional national leadership, makes them wait behind the leadership to see what follows from negotiations with the British Government.

This weakening of the mass movement coincides with the imperialist effort to drive the Congress leadership towards the Right before Hindu communalists and lean upon Imperialist support against the League. From one side, the League leadership is let loose against the Congress objection to the proposal of "grouping" in the Cabinet Mission Plan and to press home the Pakistan demand and crack-up the Congress leadership's objection to League demand. From the other side the Mahasabha, the RSS, and the Akalis are used to provoke and corrupt the mass following of the Congress with anti-muslim communalist demagogy.

The Party of the proletariat was too weak and immature to play any effective role except trying to act the honest broker between the warring Congress and League leaderships.

Meaning of August 15

The significance of August 15 lies in the following factors:

(1) That the basic Imperialist plan to keep India under its indirect domination succeeded till the proletariat becomes wise and influential enough to win the leadership of the anti-imperialist elements and is able to liquidate the Imperialist plan.

The acceptance by the Congress and the League of the British Plan meant that both Pakistan and Indian Union will be under British influence and the existing British interests will be safe inside both territories and can go on increasing.

The acceptance of the partition by the Congress meant immense political and economic weakening of both the States On the basis of the mutual animosity of Pakistan and India Governments, it meant creation of such new problems as Kashmir which implied that the British Imperialists could not only manoeuvre better than in the first post-war years but also get the chance to act as advisers and arbiters in matters pertaining to Indo-Pakistan relations.

- (2) That the acceptance of the British plan by the Congress leadership meant that the big bourgeoisie had betrayed the national cause in its own narrow class interests and before the threat of the post-war revolutionary rise of the popular movement. The traditional national leadership split the old united national front and went traitor.
- (3) The acceptance of the August 15 betrayal by the people in general as the advent of "Indian independence" showed the extent to which they were under bourgeois political influence. A people that hail treachery as liberation can only learn through bitter experience and hard struggles. When the majority of the people themselves were at this stage of political development, there could not but ensue a break, however temporary, in the post-war revolutionary rise followed by a period of confusion.

The break in the post-war rise

The reality of this break in the post-war revolutionary tide expresses itself in the following forms:

- (1) The early rising working class strike wave itself begins to register a decline. When the working class could not even keep its own daily struggles on the same level as before, it was far from being in a position to lead the other classes to a rapid regrouping of forces and launching a frontal assault against the treacherous leadership.
- (2) All petty-bourgeois left parties recovered from their early naive enthusiasm over August 15 and came out in opposition to the Congress Government but they are all of the opinion that the people are in the grip-

of frustration. Thus, they are primarily expressing the helplessness of the petty-bourgeoisie, but at the same time, they are also reflecting the stage to which mass discontent has reached; critical of the old Congress leadership but not yet indignant enough to rise in open revolt and lacking faith in an alternative leadership.

(3) The Congress leadership is of the opinion that the people have become corrupt and passive after August 15 and expect the Government to spoonfeed them. The very fact that the top Congress leaders can aggressively put forward such nonsense in mass rallies and suffer no greater punishment at the hands of the masses than a smaller audience in their next rally, shows that big bourgeois insolence and self-confidence can not yet be punctured easily and at one stroke with such low political consciousness among the people themselves.

Our Party leadership admitted the temporary setback in the post-war revolutionary upsurge; but this admission, contained in the Party Thesis itself was so temporary as not to last beyond the session of the Second Congress. There were statements enough in the same Party Thesis relying on which the Ranadive leadership could go on preaching unquestioned its anti-Leninist Trotskyist concept of a never-receding, always-rising revolutionary upsurge, even against the growing evidence of political developments and the reality of working class verdict against its unrealistic understanding. Our new Rajeshwar Rao leadership finds the concept of revolutionary upsurge inadequate and comes to the conclusion (in May-June 1950) that the "revolution is actually on", minus the proletariat, minus the people, and despite the Trotskyite-Titoite Ranadive leadership having been at the head of the C. P. I.

Such nonsense, of course, is neither common sense, nor Leninist analysis.

Reasons of the British Success

It is not enough to admit that the British Plan has temporarily succeeded, but it is also the task of our Party to analyse the reasons for this success, because without doing so we will understand neither the concrete difficulties of the situation, nor the extent of our own responsibility.

- (1) Lenin had referred to the traditional cunning of the British bourgeoisie, we have seen in action, in post-war India and especially in its political manoeuvres to save itself from the elemental revolutionary rise which rose from within our traditional united national movement, the maturity, the elasticity and the adaptability of the British Imperial bourgeoisie. It put through a series of deliberately calculated moves and saved its biggest colony, our country, for its future domination when all had thought that the game was up with the British in India. It kept and used its head when faced with death and rescued itself by exploiting all the weaknesses of our national situation.
- (2) The British Plan could never have succeeded without its acceptance by the Congress leadership and to achieve this became the central British objective.

The Congress leadership accepted the British Planbecause the alternative was to head the rising revolutionary upsurge which it feared more than it hated the British Imperialists.

The British Imperialist statesman Mountbatten, backed by the Labour Government, was able to convince the Congress leadership of "British bonafides", because the big bourgeoisie got, in the economic sphere guarantees of its crumbs and of British "aid" in the joint exploitation of India; and in the political sphere, it got the transfer of the administrative apparatus into its own hands (the age-old dream of the Congress leadership to which anti-Imperialism and complete

Independence were merely slogans to serve as pressure on the British and necessary to keep the masses under its political influence).

It was compelled to accept partition through communal riots, with the hope (turned illusory) of achieving civil peace in the territory of the Indian Union.

In reality, it got the load of millions of refugees, the acute headache of Kashmir and the problem of loss of food and raw materials bases of the country, all of which are such new and long-term problems under which it is staggering and cannot look up.

It finds itself bound hand and foot, vis-a-vis the British but completely free to deal with the people just as the joint counter-revolutionary interests of the two partners (the Indian big bourgeoisie and the British Imperialism) demand.

despite the treachery of the Congress and League leaderships, IF the political influence of the Party was a hundred times more than it was and IF the Party leadership was unbelievably more mature so as not to tall behind the bourgeoisie just when it was leading the people on to the path of compromise, so that it would not later only swing over to accepting a Trotskyite leadership which gambled with the Red mass bases just when they could be immensely enlarged and which corrupted the Party with Trotskyism-Titoism just when it had to be purified of long-standing and accumulating reformist mistakes, through Marxist-Leninist education and patient and correct use of the Lenin-Stalin weapon of criticism and self-criticism.

The political-ideological weaknesses of the Party of the proletariat meant not only that the British Plan could not be effectively resisted at the moment, but that even the exposure of the treachery of the bourgeoisie could not be done in a manner as to re-group the national forces on the initiative of the Party, in a manner as to create the pre-conditions to realise the

hegemony of the proletariat through the experience of the people and by heading their struggles.

To realise the then and subsequent weaknesses of the Party is to get both, our mistakes of the past and our present tasks, in the right perspective.

This is not what our Trotskyite leadership did. Ranadive cashiered Joshi as the arch-criminal but for whom the Indian Revolution would have succeeded, despite the cunning of the British Plan, despite the bourgeois influence. Now Rajeshwar Rao does the same. He has bundled out Ranadive after tamely surrendering to him when he FIRST placed and pressed his unalloyed Trotskyism (Report on Strategy and Tactics) before the PB meeting of September-December, 1948 and promises to make the C.P.I., under his leadership as successful as the Chinese Communist Party has become in China under Mao leadership.

It is not only necessary for our Party to put an end to self-glorification in our struggle to evolve a correct policy and keep on checking up and improving our policy. It is not only necessary for our Party to give up all attempts to invent scape-goats to esape serious self-criticism whenever old mistakes get decisively revealed. It is equally necessary to realise that Leninism does NOT teach that correct policy by itself can lead to immediate victory. It is necessary for us to grasp the full meaning for ourselves, and especially in our postwar period, of the following rich formulation by Stalin:

"A correct policy must not at all lead always and necessarily to an immediate victory over the opponent.

"Immediate victory over the opponents is determined not only by a correct policy, but above all, and in the main, by the co-relation of class forces, by the obvious preponderance of the forces on the side of the revolution, by the disintegration in the camp of the opponent and a favourable international situation.

"A correct policy of the proletariat can lead to immediate victory only under these conditions.

"Can one assert that the maximum favourable conditions for the immediate victory of the Revolution in China exist in the present period? Clearly it is impossible to assert this". (Comments on Current Affairs in China).

One has only to substitute India for China, in the above paras and get Stalin's own help to get plenty of the rubbish preached by the Ranadive and the Rajeshwar Rao leaderships out of our heads and understand the role of correct policy and need to study the real possibilities in our given situation and hence our immediate tasks really correctly.

Features of situation after August 15, 1947.

The most important single feature of our situation from which alone can result a correct new orientation, a new policy and new tactics is the new class alignment that came into being with the big bourgeoisis splitting away from the anti-imperialist national forces and joining the camp of Imperialism and its traditional feudal allies.

The historic prophecy of Lenin-Stalin about the treacherous role of the compromising section of the colonial bourgeoisie was, thus, fulfilled in our national life.

Two different paths of struggle opened up, with the above new class alignment.

The path of the Indian big bourgeoisie which in the face of the opening of the new, higher-than-ever, armed

stage of our national struggle in the post-war international context of the mighty growth of the world democratic forces under the Soviet leadership, betrayed the united national front and the interests of its people, came to a compromise with Imperialism, and along with it began fighting the democratic forces and disrupting the new national revolutionary rise. accepted the leadership of the Anglo-American Imperialist rulers in world affairs and guaranteed it the safety of the existing stranglehold on our economic life. This is the path of a new period of national slavery, involving economic disintegration instead of development, ideological-moral corruption of the people through the revival of all that is reactionary and rotten in our cultural pattern and neglect or suppression of all that was healthy, vigorous and life-giving. This is the path that leads to the establishment of an Indian Police State, in place of the old British Raj, under the auspices of the National Congress which was once the main united national organisation of the Indian people. This is the path which mortgages our vast territories and immense man-power to the Anglo-American powers to be used for their imperialist world aims, which makes India the main Imperialist colonial base in the Imperialist world war against the U.S.S.R. and the People's China. It is the path of shameless traitors, selfish exploitors, and servile reactionaries. It is the path of bourgeois nationalist leaders turned Anglo-American puppets.

The second alternative path is the path of the proletariat, pursuing the aim of consolidating its hegemony, which involved regrouping the national democratic forces in a manner as to bring behind the proletariat millions of toilers in order to overcome the resistance of the big bourgeoisie and achieve the victory of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution and gradually lead it on to the path of Socialist Revolution.

The history of post-August 15 India could only be the unfolding of these two paths, a living demonstration of the relative maturity of these two classes, standing on two poles of the Indian society and pursuing these two different aims.

Regrouping of forces of reaction.

The history of the last three years is the history of the regrouping of the forces of rection. The manoeuvres have been complicated but two features stand out.

Firstly the opportunist manoeuvres of the national bourgeois leadership inside the national camp to isolate, discredit and provoke the Communist vanguard were remarkably successful.

Soon after their release and during the General Election Campaign, the Congress Right-wing leadership flattered all sections of its own Left-wing (Socialists, Forward Blocists, "August" cadres organised in various local groups) and used them and their slogan of "betrayal of the August Revolution" to smear our Party on a national scale. It successfully exploited the political jealousy of these Left-wing groups, their panic at the growth of the C. P. I. despite all their theories. that it would be politically sinking itself by opposing the "August Revolution". The Right-wing glorified these 'Left' groups for their "heroism" during and "contribution" to the August Revolution, designated them as their natural heirs to Congress and national leadership, and made anti-Communist struggle (ideological and practical) their specific "revolutionary" assignment during the first post-war years. The Leftwing fell into the Right-wing trap because as colonial petty-bourgeois elements, they were incapable of seeing through, on their own, the political bankruptcy of their war-time policy, and saw in the C. P. I. nothing more than their main rival, when they found on their release that the C. P. I. during the war-years had emerged as the main Left Party while their August Revolution had not only failed but left them high and dry, themselves frustrated, their cadres scattered, with no independent political influence except as Congress Lefts.

As real negotiations began with the Britsh and the Congress leaders got into the Ministries in the Provinces, they on the one hand, began the use of police measures against the C. P. I. and on the other, initiated the plan to split the Trade Union movement through the I. N. T. U. C. and pressed all Congress Lefts and "Congress Labour workers" to leave the A. I. T. U. C. and come into the I. N. T. U. C. It did not stop here. Within the Congress, it exploited the jealousy between the Socialists and the Forward Blockists and panicked the former with the strength of the latter if they kept up their grip over the I. N. A. men and their organisation. The Right-wing also tried to split the professional I. N. A. leaders from the Forward Block and corrupt them with jobs while dallying with the demands of the rank and file soldiers.

After using the Socialists against the C. P. I. to create a split in the AITUC, and also to isolate the Forward Block when the Socialist rank and file successfully pressed its leadership to sanction the line of starting and leading struggles to defend the daily interests of the toilers (and not leave the "struggle line" as the monopoly of the C.P.I.), the Right-wing successfully manoeuvred the Socialists themselves out of the Congress.

Simultaneously with its efforts to divide the Left and isolate and suppress the C.P.I. went its efforts to reorganise the Congress, make it the docile hand-maid of the Central and Provincial Governments, on the basis of a new anti-democratic, authoritarian constitution and through factional consolidation of the Rightwing leadership and liberal doses of administrative nepotism and financial corruption.

One cannot objectively review the last post-war vears of the Indian national liberation movement and fail to characterise the Congress leadership as the most mature and successful bourgeois leadership of any colony in the post-war world, while fulfilling its treacherous disruptive role.

Secondly, it shall be noted that if the Congress. leadership had very easy sailing controlling, disrupting, and repressing the national democratic forces, in the manoeuvres inside the imperialistfeudal-big-bourgeois combine, it did not act the "leader" as our Ranadive leadership alleged ("Stragegy and Tactics") but its position of a subordinate ally of Imperialism stood confirmed and revealed for

all those who had eyes to see.

The manoeuvres inside the camp of reaction have been far less simple. A continuous push and pull has gone on all the while but their net outcome has been that the British Imperialism which was completely thrown on the defensive in the early post-war years has gained such mastery of the situation by successfully using the Congress leadership as its Indian agency that world reactionaries consider India as relatively the most stable spot in a world full of trouble-spots for them. The Indian bourgeois leadership had bargained hard. for terms, all along the line, but ultimately it is the British Imperialist terms that have been accepted and it is the British Imperialist proposals for India's future, both international and strategic as well as internal political and economic that have on the whole prevailed.

Our Party leadership never related the British Imperialist utilisation of early Princely recalcitrance, and later on the murderous game of the Razakars and the Nizam in Hyderabad, of the Pakistan created deadlook over Kashmir and of the communal reactionaries and their organisations, etc., to the attempts of imperialism to drive the Indian Government to a closer identification with its ideological-political line in the international struggle between the two camps, and to make it practically agree to plan Indian defence and "develop" communications etc., as part of the Imperialist world strategic plan for the third world war.

Our Party leadership has exposed the Congress deal with the Princes as "surrender" which does not strike the common man as even formally true and is a crude and involved formulation. The answer to Patel's claim

that he has achieved "national unification" and liquidated British-created Princely independence is not to create the impression as if nothing has changed but to indicate clearly what the change is and what it implies. Patel's Indian unification is feudal unification ("New Times" formulation) and not democratic unification. Patel's "liquidation" of British puppets is in the form of their assimilation as important elements in the Indian state structure, at all its levels, and in all branches of the administration (diplomatic, military and civil services). This is real integration with Indian feudalism and not its liquidation. It means not only the strengthening of reaction as against the democratic elements but also the strengthening of the pro-Imperialist as against the anti-Imperialist elements in our national political life, as it is sought to be patterned under the new constitution, under Congress leadership and with Anglo-American blessings.

The more the Congress leadership has stalled in carrying out its pledged agrarian reforms and bungled in food policy, the more the landlord elements have gone on the offensive both on the economic and political fronts. Economically, through mass evictions of tenants and successfully pressing in a more reactionary direction the agrarian policy of the Congress Ministries, and through large-scale hoarding of food, disrupting even the very unsatisfactory food plans of the Governments and pushing up food prices. The landlords are influencing procurement to shove its main burden on the peasantry and are themselves retaining their maximum produce for the blackmarket. The more economic concessions they secured from the Congress leadership, the more courage they got to go on the offensive in the political sphere. They are the main support of the R.S.S. in the northern, the central and the western Provinces and all their social influence in the countryside has gone to building up semi-secret R.S.S. organisation. They are also backing the reemergence of the Mahasabha as a political Party and their efforts are to see that it becomes organised and

influential enough to become the main opposition to the Congress through the next Elections. A section of them have entered the Congress to influence it from within and openly keep their contacts with their anti-Congress Communalist class brothers. Both are operating together to start local daily and weekly papers and to influence traditional social, cultural and literary organisations and also starting new ones.

The compromising policy of the Congress leadership bred this new aggressiveness of feudal reaction and it has no other policy except to practically appease them and take over their ideological-political slogans. It is distinctly disturbed over their new consolidation and well-planned activities but is relying upon the traditional loyalty of the people to the Congress to see it through the next elections.

The economic policy of the Government has been one long and unending tale of growing concessions to the Indian big capitalists till there is not one item of the time-honoured and oft-repeated Congress pledges to the people that has not been betrayed. The Government has even gone back on its own policy announcements made after it "got into power".

The Indian big capitalists have not only made the Indian Government act like their obliging and obedient political tool, but they have themselves become the main protagonists of getting foreign capital into India and they are pressing it hard to meet the demands of foreign Imperialist capital, not only accepting enthralling economic terms, but also lining up India more thoroughly and openly with the Anglo-American camp than it already is.

The economic collaboration of the Indian big bourgeoisie with the British capitalists and the American contact with the top Indian capitalists have meant that the Anglo-American Imperialists have no need to decisively exercise their power of economic sabotage beyond stressing the fact that the power exists in their hands and will be used in "self-defence", if the Indian Government attacked their privileged position. The Imperialists get more than half their job done through their Indian class brothers and let them convince the Indian Government how Anglo-American demands are "fair" and not against India's "national interests", and that quickly accepting foreign capitalists' demands is the only way to face the present economic crisis and build up the tottering economy of India.

Slowly but steadily the post-war pattern of Indian economy is being revealed. It is going the Chinese way. There are some specific features of our own but the general line of development is the same: in the countryside, the strengthening of the feudal elements and rapid disintegration of agrarian economy; over the country as a whole the growing grip of a handful of Indian big capitalists becoming very influential with the India Government, getting in-charge of all its development projects, and functioning in close alliance with and as junior partners of Imperialist Capital, i.e., in brief all round intensification of the colonial features of our national economy.

Thus, in the camp of reaction, the post-August 15 record of the Indian bourgeois leadership is one of compromise with the feudalists at the cost of its pledges and risking its old influence over the people, especially the peasantry, and growing subservience to Imperialist demands at the cost of national sovereignty and of the very stability of Indian economy. It is happily and willingly agreeing to act as the native agency of Imperialism. The Imperialists have on the whole every reason and are in fact satisfied with their own performance and their present prospects in India, and to this position they have come to from a point from where they appeared to be on the run in the first post-war years.

The Regrouping of the Democratic Forces.

As against the above regrouping of the forces of reaction to disrupt and forestall the forces of Revolution and keep India in their grip, how did the Party

regroup the forces of democracy to rally the people to continue the anti-imperialist struggle? This alone could disrupt the Imperialist plans, avenge bourgeois betrayal and pave the path to victory.

The historic turning point in our national liberation movement symbolised by the bourgeois treachery of August 15, 1947, brought the Party face to face with the task of realising the hegemony of the proletariat. Already in 1920, Lenin had pointed out that "in the initial stages the revolution in the colonies will not be Communist, but if from the very beginning a Communist vanguard stands at its head, then the revolutionary masses will be brought on the correct path towards the achievement of the set aim by the gradual acquisition of revolutionary experience."

The tasks of the Indian Communists, sketched out by Stalin, as early as 1925, in his speech to the students of the University of the Toilers of the East, had acquired for us now a new urgency.

"The fundamental and new feature in the conditions of existence of such colonies as India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, but primarily that the compromising section of this bourgeoisie has already managed in the main to come to an agreement with Imperialism. Dreading revolution more than Imperialism, concerned more about its money-bags than about the interests of its own country, this section of the bourgeoisie, the wealthiest and most influential section, is completely going over to the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution, having entered into a bloc with Imperialism against the workers and peasants of its own country.

"The victory of the revolution cannot be achieved unless this bloc is broken.

"But in order to break this bloc fire must be concentrated on the compromising national bourgeoisie,

its treachery must be exposed, the toiling masses must able of rapid realisation in the post-August 15 period. be emancipated from its influence, and the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat must be systematically prepared.

"In other words, it is a question of preparing proletariat of such colonies as India for the role of leader in the liberation movement and of dislodging, step by step, the bourgeoisie and its spokemen from this honourable position.

"THE TASK IS TO CREATE A REVOLUTIONARY ANTI-IMPERIALIST BLOC AND TO ENSURE THE HEGEMONY OF THE PROLETARIAT WITHIN THE BLOC'

("Marxism and the National and Colonial question," Lawrence and Wishart Edn., p. 217).

Any job that means going "step by step", was classed as impermissible reformist tactics by our leadership. There was no question of "preparing the proletariat" for the role of the leader, it was taken for granted that it was already prepared just because it was the proletariat. The role of consciounsess, organisation and even the need of tactics and sense of time and any necessity for the masses to go through practical experience to live down their illusions, all were denied.

Naturally enough, our Party leadership did not prepare the proletariat to become the leader of the national liberation movement in its new phase, but only liquidated whatever organised strength it had, and by exploiting its faith in the Party and making it follow adventurist tactics, made it, at the most critical time, lose faith in itself.

This is how our Party has not been building an "anti-imperialist bloc", but finds itself utterly isolated from the anti-imperialist elements.

The hegemony of the proletariat remains a phrase instead of being transformed into a reality, as was our urgent task and as it was objectively rendered cap-

The traditional bourgeois leadership had turned traitor. Was the proletariat, under Indian Communist initiative capable of emerging as the new leader of the Indian liberation movement?

The collaborationist leadership was out to disrupt the democratic forces. Was the Party capable of consolidating them?

The bourgeois leadership was out to keep the people paralysed. Could the proletariat activise them?

The bourgeois leadership went all out to provoke the vanguard, our Party, and put it out of action through concentrated pressure of police repression. Was our Party leadership capable of that political patience which never permits taking recourse to actions that will detach the Party from its "mother, the masses" and of that maturity which could systematically work up, and make the treacherous leadership face the mounting wrath of the people, whose trust it had betraved?

These were the simple but vital questions involved "in praparing the proletariat" for the role of the leader.

Our leadership considered it its "revolutionary" duty to teach the Party to brush aside these questions and offer instead its own neck to Patel.

Naturally enough. the door was opened wide for the Socialists to penetrate the proletariat and the peasantry, and the advanced elements of petty-bourgeoisie were left to impotently sulk against the treachery of the Congress leadership and bemoan the stupidity of the C. P. I. and sneer at the ineffectiveness of other Left Parties.

On the one hand, the Indian movement is faced with the consequences of bourgeois betrayal and on the other, it is facing the grim consequences of the Party of the proletariat having smoked itself out. And this smoking out was done in the name of realising the hegemony of the proletariat!

Having missed the opportunities that were ours, and after creating new difficulties, the results of pursuing a Trotskyite liquidationist policy, the historic task of creating the *pre-conditions* for realising the hegemony of the proletariat, preparing the proletariat for the leadership of the national movement, by exposing the collaborationist bourgeoisie as traitor to the national cause, by rallying the people through "the gradual acquisition of revolutionary experience", by building the anti-imperialist bloc and breaking the pro-Imperialist bloc, remains the too long-neglected task of the Party and becomes its ONLY AND MOST URGENT TASK.

New opportunities before the Party.

Against the regrouping of the forces of reaction, the regrouping of the forces of Revolution has yet to be worked for from deep down the precipice where Ranadive's Trotskyism hurled the Party and where Rajeshwar Rao's semi-Trotskyism keeps it pinned. It is an arduous climb, in conditions when not many comrades have the strength left to carry on and fewer still the conviction that they will reach the summit, with the people organised in battle array, under the leadership of our own purified and rejuvenated Party.

In such a moment of black depression strong-willed cadres can derive added confidence by a correct appreciation of the increasing weaknesses of the bourgeois-leadership and the live opportunities before the Party.

The long accumulated national-political influence of the bourgeois leadership is rapidly diminishing.

(a) Under the traditional influence of Gandhism, it could mask its treachery of August 15 as "independence through mutual settlement" between the British Government and the Congress. But with time, the evidence of its subservience to the Anglo-American

Imperialist bloc in the world struggle is being revealed more and more, as also the true colour of the "independence from the British", which means within the country the same Police Raj as before.

- (b) As the traditional leadership it could in the beginning plead for time to carry out its pledges. Over three years are gone by, but the conditions of life of the people have only worsened and through their own stomach they can see who has gone thinner and who has become fatter, within the Indian Society.
- (c) The Congress in opposition kept together as a loose but very broad organisation. The Congress in power is being tightened up from top, democratic critics of the Government silenced and purged, top leaders losing patience in patching up quarrels between their lieutenants. The universally respected national organisation is being generally sneered at for it own inner life, as exposed through its own factional squabbles and as revealed through the corruption of its own leaders.

The results of the national treachery and the betrayal of people's trust are bearing fruit and people cannot but see them and ponder over them because they constitute the very problems of their daily lives and concern the destiny of our country.

Old memories are still alive.

The opportunities before the proletariat come not only from the above new and inevitable weaknesses of the Congress leadership, but the historic record of the Party of the Red Flag has left an indelible impression on the mind of our nation and the advanced sections of the people recall it more poignantly after witnessing the recent havoc under the Trotskyite-Titoite policies.

(1) During three decades of the modern Indian working class movement our Party showed by organising Trade Unions and teaching the working class the

peoples' enemies on the defensive and enable the people movement." (Dimitrov, "United Front," pp. 137). to rise on their feet.

- (2) The more the inner corruption of the Congress machine gets revealed, the more the tall talk but practical impotence of the petty-bourgeois parties demonstrates itself, the more the forward elements from all sections of the people ask: when will the self-sacrificing, hard working, disciplined cadres of the C. P. I. see better sense, adopt a policy that will be at once practical and effective and emerge into the political field and make the country pulsate with new hope, and get the needed faith against the darkening gloom of spiritual popular forces under its leadership. Following frustration and material miseries.
- (3) The strength of Soviet diplomacy in the international sphere and the miracle of the Soviets changing nature for the greater happiness of their people and advancing the bounds of human knowledge, coupled with the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the daily news from China showing to all patriotic Indians how a fellow Asian nation is rapidly reaching the goal that was our own dream, while we ourselves are helplessly going down-hill,—these have made Communism widely popular on an unprecedented scale and these events have also helped to lessen to a considerable extent the results of our own Trotskyite crimes.

The objective conditions for the hegemoney of the use of the weapon of organised strikes how to defend proletariat were created through the new class alignment the daily interests of the toilers against seeming odds, that followed the August 15 set-up and the subjective and rally them effectively in the cause of national conditions too have matured through the people having struggle. Despite mistakes of the "Left" or the Right lasted the fruits of Nehru-Mountbatten brand of "freeand periodic ups and downs, our Party had a record of dom" and become sick to death of them, and through all-round growth, having achieved more successes than the achievements of the U.S.S.R., the People's China, suffered losses. In today's economic political condi- and Communism the world over. The greatest need to tions every section of the democratic people, peasants, capitalise the situation and supply the needed spark is students, petty-bourgeois employees, town poor and correct leadership by our own Party, and that we adopt above all the working class recalls the best days of the and pursue "a definite, active, Bolshevik policy on all Red Flag, awaiting its leadership for their own mass internal and foreign political questions, on all urgent unionisation, for initiating united actions, and for problems that effect the vital interests of the working planning concerted solidarity moves that will put the class of our own nation and the international labour

III. WORKING CLASS UNITY

Lenin and Stalin in all their writings have made working class unity the bedrock of proletarian hegemony. After the bitter experience of the rise of Nazium, the world labour movement learnt its value annw and the Seventh Congress of the Communist International brought about a new tactical reorientation and taught the Communist vanguard how to apply the tactics of United Front so as to unify the working class and be able to achieve the unity of thin, in the various turns and twists of subsequent years, during the Peace Front days, throughout the World War II, and the following post-war period, the major Communist Parties of the world rose to fame and eminence within their countries and all grew to manly height and made World Communism the decisive force against the American Imperialist drive to World War III and for world domination. All this was achieved by the consistent and successful application of the tactics of united front in varying circumstances and at different stages of the movement. The Ranadive leadership taught the Party to consider the line of the Seventh Congress a deviation from pure Marxism-Leninism! And the subsequent activities of the Communist Parties as their increasingly going reformist and social-democratic!!

Naturally enough the Ranadive leadership paid no heed to the general Trade Union unity line of the W.F.T.U., did not even bother to study, concretise and implement the decisions of the Milan World Congress.

And when the Hungarian Conference of the Information Bureau was held and it adopted decisions based on the urgent need of forging working class unity to defend the interests of the working class, of the people against the American Imperialists and their native agents, to broaden the peace movement to cope with the tasks of the coming critical phase and thus fulfil its leading role, what was the attitude of our leadership? It suppressed Togliatti's and Suslov's reports and did not print them in the Party Press!

Results of the Ranadive policy.

Such was the general attitude of the Ranadive leadership. What is the legacy left behind by it?

(a) By counter-posing the basic demands to the partial, it greatly damaged the reputation of the Party as the most effective leadership of the working class. The situation was vividly described by a Firozabad worker-leader, one of the founders of the famous Glass Workers Union: "The mazdoor was strong enough to carry one maund, but the Party put upon him a 4 maunds load, and the inevitable has happened. Our Mazdoor Sabha got finished and worker does not think he can today carry even a few seers! Banish all tall talk, lead us back to Trade Unionism and tell us how to face up to the new type of repression". Under the influence of such Trostskyite insanity the mass of the workers stopped for the time being looking to our Party for "practical lead" in defence of

their day to day interests and a good section went under the Socialist influence. We have lost day to day contact with the working class and our Trade Union leadership over it, and the Socialists have entered the vacuum created by our Trotskyite mistakes on the one hand and the Government repression on the other.

(b) Our strike strategy and tactics were alien to all conceptions of Trade Union democracy and to the proletarian traditions. They were those of petty-bourgeois revolutionists and political adventurers.

Adventurist strike tactics

The outstanding features of adventurist strike tactics were the following:

Strike-decision was taken by one or more underground leaders (blindly loyal agents of the Trotskyite leadership) even without consulting the Executive of the Trade Union concerned, leave aside having a strike ballot where it was possible, or at least freely debating the issue in secret or semi-secret meetings of militants. Even all the known experienced and trusted, employed and loyal worker-leaders were not drawn into consultation. Only such "worker-leaders" were consulted who, the leadership knew, would support its decisions to give the call for strike.

It shows the great fidelity of the rank and file militant workers to the Red Flag and the Party that when handbills giving the call to go on strike were issued in the name of their Union and the decision for the same taken in the above arbitrary manner. they did not come out publicly denouncing the misues of their Union's name and authority and did nothing more than express their bewilderment at such calls and either quietly went to work with heads down or

waited at home a shift, or a day or two, to see if the strike at all took place.

The mandatory directives to all Trade Union cadres and worker Party members and all cadres from outside the industry or locality thrown in to bring about the strike, were:

—to develop every strike into a general strike of the industry and the locality (spread every strike the widest you can and the fastest too), and to overcome all reformist resistance (i. e., to report back for disciplinary measures the names of cadres who raised objections against such mad gambling with their own Trade Union.

—to take the offensive the moment the police force is sighted and not wait for it to start lathi-charge or firing (i. e., the moment the police squad is sighted throw stones, brick-bats and crackers if any have been made available).

—the only way to make the strike successful in the present situation was to strike terror into the heart of 'dalals' (bosses' agents). This became in practice regarding every important worker who objected to such strike-calls and provocative methods, as a 'dalal' and in Calcutta alone I have met quite a number of old worker Party members and experienced militants who were thus denounced as 'dalals' and who became terribly demoralised over it, went inactive and are waiting for better days to come when they will again be summoned by the Party for duty and given comprehensible directions which carry conviction and which will move their class.

Quite a large number of such "dalals" were brutally beaten up producing very bad reaction in the mass of the workers.

When the majority of the workers began going back to work, crackers were used against the mass of them, the majority, to create panic and thus keep up the appearance of the workers being on strike. (I

know of this, for certain, about Calcutta Tram and ear prove it in any Party investigation).

The results of such strike-tactics were:

- (a) All known worker-leaders who could be got at by the police were arrested and locked up in jails and the remaining few became demoralised and inactive.
- (b) All the known militants (cadres below the leaders inside the factory) were victimised and those who managed to retain their jobs became inactive and demoralised.
- (c) Among the non-Party militants-workers, the old experienced Union activists were denounced as "dalals" or as gone demoralised, and young, raw, inexperienced worker-youth pushed up to leadership and glorified, but soon the number of these worker-youths too began dwindling and they also were not available to carry out suicidal tactics.

In short, the result of such strike-tactics was to behead the Trade Union leadership, demoralise the worker-activists of the Union and uproot the Party among the working class.

Trotskyite attitude towards Trade Union Unity

As in other aspects of the Trade Union policy so on the issue of Trade Union unity the outlook and practice of our leadership was typically Trotskyite.

The necessity for Trade Union unity was not only ignored but plainly denied. The "theory", systemmatically preached in oral propaganda, was that the more strike-struggles the Party can launch and the more militant forms are adopted, the sooner we will succeed in liquidating all shades of reformists from the Trade Union movement. The "theory" on paper was that struggles itself will unite, workers are boiling over for action, the Party (after getting rid of reformists within) has only to give the lead for action and

the workers will sweep all before them and cast aside reformists of all shades and hues.

After the Milan W.F.T.U. Session and the silent grumbling from the rank and file, a year after the Party Congress in the second half of 1949, it was considered permissible to make appeals from below to the rank and file of the Socialists.

The nearer a particular "reformist" had been to the A.I.T.U.C., the more he was denounced and attacked. And in general all the reformists were lumped together. N. M. Joshi, Mrinal Kanti Bose, the Socialists and the critical Communists, all were indiscriminately called "traitors", "cowards" and "agents of the bourgeoisie". There was no attempt at differentiated approach even in denunciatory exposure, nor any attempt at being concrete and factual.

We went on asserting that the A.I.T.U.C. was the only representative central Trade Union organisation and the I.N.T.U.C. and the Socialist Hind Mazdoor Sabha (H.M.S.) are bogus organisations and the Trade Union affiliated to them are mere paper unions despite the growing evidence of events that proved us to be wrong. They had begun as top organisations no doubt, but soon they succeeded in building up a mass base for themselves, mostly as a result of our mistakes, but partly as a result of relying upon more backward sections or going to areas where there were no old unions or where the Red Flag tradition was weak.

After the Second Party Congress, in face of the I.N.T.U.C. and the Socialist offensive against the A.I.T.U.C., instead of becoming more anxious to retain the non-Communist Trade Unionists inside the latter and using them as a bridge to built unity of action with the Socialists through healthier elements in local and provincial Socialist Trade Union leadership, we began flaunting our new-found "revolutionariness" at them and moved by the outlook that "days of concession to reformists must go with our own reformism".

We made it known to the "reformists that they were free to walk out of the United organization if they objected to our leading the working class through the A. I. T. U. C. and demanding due share in A.I.T.U.C. representation. The Socialists were already in touch with the opportunist elements like Ruiker inside the A.I.T.U.C. and we did everything in our power to drive the rest of the non-Communist Unionists into his arms. The result was the split in the A.I.T.U.C. and our leadership defended it before the Party cadres with the slanderous lie that N. M. Joshi and Mrinal Kanti Bose etc., were all cowards and they split because Nehru had warned N. M. Joshi that the Government was going to ban the A.I.T.U.C. and go all-out against the C. P. I. and the non-Communists will not be spared if they stuck to their association with the Communists. So N. M. Joshi and Co. have quit betimes! Such was our "explanation" of the split in the A.I.T.U.C.

After this split the A.I.T.U.C. ceased being a broad organisation at top, and at its bottom, the affiliated unions were knocked out one by one by the Trotskyite Trade Union policy thrust on them in the name of Party leadership. The victims of purges were now no more non-Party Unionists (for none were left) but Party Trade Union cadres themselves and it must be said to their credit that not one Party Trade Union leader of Provincial or district status ever tried to use his old contacts or personal influence and rally the local Trade Union against the Party and its policy. Such was their sense of loyalty and discipline. The nemesis however came when Comrade Ranadive met his own match in Comrade Dange who had no scruples regarding sticking to Party ways and had struggled to keep intact and strengthen his hold over the Girni Kamgar Union (G. K. U.). When Com. Ranadive tried to grab the G.K.U. after expelling Com. Dange's lieutenants, he got the famous G.K.U. itself openly defy the Party and after the F.L.P.P.D. Editorial the G.K.U. leadership came out with a handbill with the heading: "Down with the Trotskyite Ranadive & Co." and expelled G.K.U. Executive Committee members who remained loyal to the Party (i.e., to the Ranadive group) directions.

Such have been the slogans, the practice and the results of the Ranadive Trotskyism in our Trade Union

movement-it has been liquidated.

The Rajeshwar Rao Policy

Has the Rajeshwar Rao leadrship taken it as its FIRST task to give the Party a Trade Union policy that will lead to the revival of the Trade Union movement and the activisation of our Trade Unions? No! On the other hand its Trade Union policy stabilises the present situation and seeks to make it worse through its slogans of action and hides the fact that it is only rationalising and carrying forward the Ranadive heritage by use of new revolutionary jargon borrowed from the Chinese Communist Party literature.

(1) In its Letter to Ranks of June 1, 1950, it promised among various documents, one on "Tactics and Tasks on the Trade Union Front". It has not yet published it. That is, the Party is without any Trade Union tactics, ten months after the F.L.P.P.D. Editorial after five months of discussion between our old and new leadership, and after five months of our new leadership at the head of the Party. Is it only a case of unbelievable irresponsibility on itself the evidence of there being really no difference between the old and the new leadership on Trade Union policy? If the new leadership felt very strongly against the mistakes of the past and had a new policy to correct them, its first job was to give the Party of the proletariat its Trade Union policy. The Party is, therefore, left "leadless" so far as the working class front is concerned. Is this the way to rebuild Party links with working class or on the contrary the way to stabilise the situation as left by the Ranadive leadership?

(2) Under the false analysis that a situation of "white terror" prevails in all our industrial cities, just as it

did in the Chinese towns under the Kuomintang regime, the Rajeshwar Rao leadership rationalises out what Ranadive's Trotskyism produced, and more, helps to hide the damage done by the Ranadive policy.

Under its adventurist slogan that "armed guerilla struggle in rural areas is the main form of struggle," and villages are the main centres of intense and widespread activities of the Party, the Rejeshwar Rao leadership demands that militant workers (who are themselves the cadres to keep functioning the Trade Unions themselves) and revolutionary intellectuals (non-proletarian Trade Union organisers in new areas and industries in association with newly rising militants) be sent as volunteers, organisers and educators to the rural areas to strengthen armed guerilla struggle. The armed guerilla struggle itself is such an unreal slogan of action that we shall not see the birth of any guerilla areas because the peasants themselves will NOT respond, but to the extent Party discipline is used or Party loyalty exploited by the new leadership and these worker militants and revolutionary intellectuals taken away from the towns, to that extent the Trade Union front will be weakened and these valuable cadres sent to jail or got shot at trying to organise armed guerilla struggle. This is certainly NOT liquidating Ranadive's liquidationism on the Trade Union front but objectively having a new plan to carry it forward, in the only practical from that is left possible.

The Rajeshwar Rao leadership's analysis of "white terror in towns," its insistence on completely illegal organisations in towns despite the phrase about using both legal and illegal forms, its appeal for "worker-volunteers" for armed guerilla struggle in rural areas, when all these things are borne in mind and the only specific document it has produced for the towns (the relevant sections in the Andhra Party Letter of February 1950, "Present Revolutionary Situation and New Forms of Struggle") is studied, then its own policy for working class appears in its true menacing significance. Then

it becomes crystal clear that the only lead the Rajeswar Rao leadership has to give to the worker cadres who do not offer themselves as volunteers to go to villages for armed guerilla struggle, is to get organised as urban armed guerilla units and go all out to deal with "the local appressors" in record quick time. How is this any different than realising the unrealised dream of Comrade Ranadive, except giving it a new organisational form and making individual terrorism regular Party activity? Comrade Ranadive and his trusted followers used to cry themselves hoarse, only during the strikes, to finish off the dalals (bossess' agents) by all means. Comrade Rajeswar Rao wants to organise individual terrorism as regular Party activity and he wants it done on a systematic and planned basis while Comrade Ranadive's were amateurish efforts, casual, unplanned and unco-ordinated. This is not Trade Unionism, either legal or illegal, nor a combination of the legal and illegal, but pure and simple terrorism being thrust on the working class. Ranadive liquidated our mass Trade Union bases, Rejeshwar Rao wants our individual militants to become terrorists and thus carry forward the liquidationist role. The first had mass Trade Union bases to gamble with, the second has only individual militants left and he plays with them. The slogans of action of both are Trotskyite liquidationist, the difference lies in just what is possible in the two stages of the movement to play the role of the disorganiser and liquidator of the Trade Union movement.

(3) Comrade Ranadive justified his Trotskyite-liquidationist tactics exploiting the indignation of the cadres against the treachery of the bourgeoisie and turning their revolutionary ardour into adventurist tactics in the name of establishing the hegemony of the proletariat.

If Comrade Rajeshwar Rao's documents are carefully studied, and especially his defence of armed guerilla struggle as the main form of struggle and the

place he has assigned to the working class in his composite "Chinese" plan of action are considered, it will be seen that he exploits the adventurist mistakes of our Ranadive leadership which liquidated the mass Trade Union movement, only to suggest a tactical plan of action which denies the leading role of the working class in our national liberation struggle and thus repudiates one of the essential principles of Leninism.

Underestimation of the role of working class

In Comrade Rajeshwar Rao's plan of action the working class has to play the subsidiary role of serving as a reservoir of volunteers for armed guerilla struggle in rural areas where the main body of the Liberation Army is to be formed and it will come and liberate the englaved proletariat and the rest of the population in towns. The class whose role in Marxist-Leninist teachings is to act the liberator of the other oppressed classes is reduced to the class that will itself be liberated.

In his plan of action the working class has on the whole to play a passive role, remain mostly lying low. Sometimes it can also organise Trade Union actions, if it thinks them possible under conditions of Fascist white terror; it should, however, see that its militants are organised for individual terrorism against individual enemy agents. And this is supposed to be the lesson for the Indian working class from the history of the Chinese Communist Party! The three former members of the C.C. (A. K. Ghosh, S.V. Ghate and S. A. Dange) in their thesis correctly point out this is a denial of the lessons of the history of the Indian working class, that its anti-imperialist protest actions, its solidarity actions with other sections fighting for their day to day demands have played the role of rousing other sections of the people and have served as a model of organisation and action for the peasantry, students, employees etc., and have helped to galvanise and raise to a higher level the national liberation movement. itself.

Lenin's eagle eye spotted the significance of the first known anti-imperialist political action of the working class against Tilak's arrest. Lenin hailed the strike and action of the working class during the first non-cooperation movement of 1919-20. During 1926-27, even during the infancy of the Party, the rallying by the Party of the working class against Simon Commission and the radicalising effect it had on the entire national movement and especially, on the student youth and the Congress rank and file, together with the systematic campaign for the adoption of a platform of clear-cut anti-imperialist struggle, complete independence, working class and peasant demands, allying with the USSR and revolutionary labour movement as Indian Freedom movement's anti-imperialist allies, all this made British Tory Government and the Indian bureaucracy shake in their boots and the Meerut Conspiracy Case was their vindictive answer. The Leftsectarian mistakes of the Party during the 1930 Civil Disobedience Campaign which ultimately resulted in splitting the Party were openly and publicly criticised in the Three Parties' Letter (of the Parties of China, Britain and Germany) to the Indian Communists, followed a year later by another open Letter of the Chinese Party. After the Seventh Congress, in the "Dutt-Bradley Thesis" our Party was directed to make the start with achieving Trade Union unity to be able to make a success of the United National Front (UNF) suggested therein. The successes of the Party in carrying out the policy of the UNF (1935-39) were internationally acclaimed and enabled the Party not only to re-unite the AITUC but win back and expand its Trade Union base, penetrate the peasantry and start their independent class organisations, organise the All India Students' Federation as a mass students' movement and win its leadership, and win over the vast majority of Congress Socialist Party Units and cadres, and a good section of Congress workers and middle leaders in the most advanced districts in almost every province.

During the war days it was the reliance upon and the successful mobilisation of the working class that enabled the Party to stand firm against 9th August provocation and save the country, at least Eastern and Southern India, from the horrors of Japanese aggression. In different ways this was realised and admitted both by the British Government and the Congress leadership. This was the FIRST time when the Party and the working class stood between two fires, imperialist terror let loose from one side to provoke and smash the popular forces, and from the other side the Congress frantically calling for such a form of "national struggle" which would have meant national suicide and invitation to Japs to walk in. We and the working class successfully stood our own ground and kept our flag flying. It was a negative contribution to the anti-Fascist war but a historic contribution nevertheless.

The country-wide Bengal Famine Relief Campaign and the Food Campaign of 1943-45, despite utopian-reformist mistakes, helped to revive the political life in the country after the terror-regime that followed the 1942 struggle and which seemed to have smashed up every thing. This contribution of the Party and the working class was publicly recognised by all honest elements of various political trends till the slogans of anti-Communism were brandished for the purpose of winning the General Elections.

After the war, the rapid Trade Unionisation of petty-bourgeois employees, both commercial and in Government Departments, was the direct result of the war-time Trade Union expansion and post-war strike leadership by the Party. The solidarity campaign for Kashmir in 1946-47 gave courage to local fighters to carry on despite the severe repression and at a time when Congress pressure on them to "stop struggle and atart negotiations" had been keyed up. The working class rally for the release of the INA men and the Bombay worker's General Strike and solidarity actions in other industrial Centres in support of the RIN mutiny

wiped out the effect of anti-Communism widely and intensively preached by the Congress Right and Left wings under the slogan that the CPI had betrayed the August Revolution, the smear that it was a traitor Party, pro-imperialist and unreliable in the national cause. Advanced elements of all anti-imperialist classes began seeing that when the Congress has taken to the path of negotiations and compromise and will soon be forming Governments, the CPI will form the much needed opposition; it will effectively lead struggles and supply the needed pressure upon the Congress to implement its pledges or alternatively lead "another round of national struggle" if and when it becomes necessary. This was common talk in students' hostels, Commercial and Government offices, and the advanced villages during their "political discussion."

All this is the living history of our class till the Ranadive leadership came in, and temporarily liquidated its organized strength. However, to the Rajeshwar Rao leadership our working class seems to be without a past from which we might draw lessons for our own and our liberation movement's future. In its policy, our working class has only the task to patiently wait till it is liberated by Rajeshwar Rao's armed guerillas from rural areas and go on supplying volunteers to his High Command in the meanwhile.

Teachings of Masters ignored

Lenin never seems to have written "What is to be done?" on the democratic tasks to be actively fulfilled by the working class in defence of its own daily life and of the interests of all other oppressed classes to enable it to become the leader in the democratic revolution.

Lenin and Stalin seem to have no teachings for us on the role of the colonial working class in the antiimperialist revolution. The Rajeshwar Rao leadership has deliberately ignored the following teachings of the masters:

(1) that the colonial working class can play the most consistent anti-imperialist role; and to win the

leadership of the national liberation movement from the compromising bourgeoisie it must appear before all anti-imperialist classes as their tircless mobiliser on all anti-imperialist issues and thus rally them to resist the imperialist plans at all stages and go on gathering strength to liquidate the imperialist hold over the country;

(2) that the colonial working class, as the most advanced and organised detachment of the Indian movement, has not only to fight in defence of its own interests, but also for the daily interests of other toiling people and thus it has to help to heighten not only its own democratic consciousness but also build democratic unity from the bottom, through the experience of the masses themselves, and build a solid popular foundation for the anti-imperialist struggle under its leadership.

From the Rajeashwar Rao leadership, however we get:

No specific issues for the working class to initiate nation-wide anti-imperialist campaigning;

No Trade Union platform through which the Party may unite the working class and help it to fight for its daily interests;

No plan of campaigning over vital issues (food, oloth, wages, employment, housing, education etc.) to improve the daily life of the common people and get the working class to take the initiative and move other oppressed stratas in their own self-defence and in solidarity with the rest of fellow-sufferers against their common enemies.

Who would call such a leadership a Communist leadership? How can such leadership ever repair the liquidationist damage done by the Ranadive leadership and put the working class on its feet, on the path of winning leadership of the people?

In the meanwhile the situation has not stood still.

The cost of living has been constantly rising. The bosses are refusing wage-increases and cutting down even

earlier bonuses. Under the threat of retrenchment, intense speed-up and rationalisation is being put through. Retrenchment is a daily and growing phenomenon both in the factories and the offices.

Under our Trotskyite leadership, the best and the most militant Trade Unions have been liquidated and exist only as names, e.g., S.I.R. Labour Union, the Calcutta Tram and Port Unions, the Bombay Girni Kamgar Union, the Kanpur Mazdoor Sabha, the Coimbatore Textile Workers' Union, etc. The A.I.T.U.C. is without its organised base of local Unions.

The bosses are driving home the advantage, not only turning a deaf ear to working class demands, but also imposing worsened conditions on the working class. The Government and the Congress boast of having broken the back of the Communists in the working class and are openly contemptuous of us, its representatives do not even agree to meet our Trade Union representatives.

The Socialists are reaping a rich harvest over the ashes of our old mass TUs, e. g., they have successfully penetrated our one-time strongholds, the Calcutta Tram, the Bombay Textiles, the Kanpur Textiles, the Hyderabad labour, etc.

The only, but very important, ray of hope is that the mass of Red Flag militants have remained loyal to the Flag though they have lost confidence in themselves after getting demoralised under the Trotskyite policy and are patiently waiting "for better days", by which they mean a practical policy for day to day Trade-Union work and unity inside the Party. They have heard with dismay and deep sorrow the news of the inner-Party mess, want the leaders to make up and once again come before them as a united team. They ask the simple question: if the Party itself is a house divided, how will they get any lead?

Another distinct sign that the working class is finding its worsening conditions unbearable and is eager to-

act, is visible in the 1950 strikes. These strikes took place over our heads and despite us, mostly in new places but also in places where Red Flag Unions existed. A new strike mood is not only rising but a new strike wave is rumbling deep and far and wide (Bombay Textile General Strike, the Socialists and other Railwaymen's Federation leaders being forced to talk of strike ballot, the Bengal I.N.T.U.C. giving notice of provincewide General Strike against retrenchment and for wage-increase etc.) With a lead based on Trade Union unity and concrete demands to meet the worsening situation and united and vigorous initiative and campaigning from the Party, the rumbling strike-wave will burst forth into a new rise of working class and popular upsurge.

Trade Union Tasks of the Party

In such a situation, in my opinion, the concrete Trade Unions tasks of the Party are the following:

- (1) Formulating a Trade Union platform.
- There are two main trends on the subject:
- (a) The old Trotskyite trend which related the bunde demands of the working class to realising the programme of and struggling for the victory of the People's Democratic Revolution here and now and the immediate establishment of the People's Democratic Government when alone these demands would be realised. The analysis was that capitalism was in its last ditch and could not afford to make any concessions and would go on attacking the working class more and more, while the situation was so revolutionary that if struggles on any immediate demands started they could be easily and spontaneously raised to the highest stage and so the task was to educate the working class on its own basic demands as a part of the Programme of People's Democratic Revolution and inspire it to fight for their realisation right away.

This outlook and these tactics have not been specifically denounced as Trotskyism on the Trade Union front in the Self-Critical Report of the old or in the line of the new leadership. On the other hand, this very outlook has been carried forward by our new leadership in a slightly new form, masked in new phrases from the literature of the Chinese Party. The new leadership states that there can be no fundamental improvement in the life of the working class unless the agrarian revolution is completed and hence argues that if the working class wants to improve its lot, it must promptly and actively aid the armed guerilla struggle in rural areas and send its best sons to villages as guerillas, etc.!!

Both our old and new leaderships denied that ours was a transitional phase and needed transitional tactics and transitional slogans. Hence there was the denial of the main Trade Union task itself, the necessity to formulate immediate demands that will rally the working class as a whole against the offensive of the bosses and the policy of the Nehru Government and create the pre-conditions (strengthen the working class and weaken the bosses, etc.) for going over to the offensive. The difference between the immediate and the basic demands was eleminated, in place of "defensive-offensive" tactics provocative-liquidationist tactics were adopted. The result was, instead of advancing towards realising the hegemony of the proletariat the existing Trade Union movement itself was split and the militant Trade Unions suffered the most in the bargain.

(b) There has been the invisible recoil from such an outlook, after the F.L.P.P.D. Editorial and because the new leadership has offered no suitable Trade Union tactics except a rehash of the old Ranadive tactics, the dominant trend among our Trade Union eadres is towards "economism" pure and simple, Trade Unionism in practice and revolutionary demagogy in words. Their real views are:

The Trade Union organisation has been liquidated. Therefore, we have to begin all afresh from the very beginning with the A.B.C. of elementary trade unionism on the basis of factory grievances and build up groups of militants and try to re-start our Trade Union offices.

Generally they take an opportunist stand on the question of guerilla struggle, do not directly oppose it as inapplicable and harmful, but state that their area is not ready for it and it will take time.

Comrade Dange represented and echoed this very outlook after his release. The opportunist demagogy is present in his press statements and the damnable reformist practice in his "lead" in the Bombay Textile General Strike.

So great is the ideological backwardness of our Party and so wide-spread the opportunist corruption of our cadres by the unprincipled ways of our leadership, and equally unprincipled ways of those leaders who seek to replace them, that I do not know of any Trade Union leading cadre of the Party, except Comrade Jyoti Basu, who has produced a self-critical document recounting his experience under Trotskyism and what it cost the Trade Union movement. Everybody is now as loudly denouncing in words and in general terms the Trotskyism of the past, but NOT sitting down to write out what it cost our big Trade Unions or industrial centres. After the exposure of petty-bourgeois revolutionism our Trade Union cadres are slowly sinking into Economism in their outlook and reformist tactics in practice. They do not see how the worsening conditions are already leading towards a new strikewave. They forget that the Trade Union organisations may be liquidated by adventurism but the Red Flag tradition, the desire for mass organisation and Trade-Union unity not only lives but has got strengthened and their need is being more acutely felt by a working class that knew them and had built them because of the very fact that the average militant finds today that his trade union is not there to defend him when he needs it most.

Both the above wrong trends have yet to be admitted by our Party to be wrong, as hindering the discussion and the adoption of a Platform of Immediate-Economic Demands by the working class.

In my opinion the main ideas behind such a platform should be the following:

It is an interim platform for the present critical transitional phase of the movement. It is NOT the full programme of the People's Democratic Revolution nor is it a catalogue of some of the urgent demands of the working class as a whole.

It should embody all the main immediate demands of the working class as a whole that will successfully stop the present trend of its worsening conditions of life and labour and mean all round improvement in its condition.

The demands should be no more radical than what appear as urgent and practical to the mass of working class, capable of immediate realisation through the united strength of the working class to be rallied in a manner as appears the only way out of the situation to the active militants of various political trends, under all the three Trade Union centres, i.e., they should be demands which will lead to maximum mass mobilisation through maximum united efforts of the best in the working class.

It should be frankly based on turning the present offensive of the bosses against themselves. The bosses are making the working class and the people (as consumers) pay for the economic crisis of their own creation and are mortgaging national economy more and more to Anglo-American imperialist capitalists. The working class through its platform or demands seeks to protect itself as the most advanced and productive

class and makes parasitic profit-gorged capitalists themselves pay for the crisis and thus helps to save the national economy from worsening further and disrupt the consolidation of Imperialist grip over our economy.

Such a platform seeks to resist and reverse the present labour and industrial policy of the Nehru Government, force it to make concessions in the opposite direction which is, however, the same as going some way to implement the traditional pledges of the Congress to the working class and about National Planning.

Such a programme must be based on an all-round industrial expansion, with a view to making the country economically independent of the Anglo-American imperialism, through the instrument of economic alliance with the USSR and the Peoples Democracies. It must popularise the Sino-Soviet Economic Pact as the model of economic alliance between two anti-imperialist and democratic countries in their mutual interests, and contrast the same with our present plight, our dependence on Anglo-American Imperialism, and the terms which the imperialist foreign Capital is demanding.

Such a platform should be modelled on the approach etc, of the Memorandum of the WFTU to the United Nations Economic Council. Such transitional programme have also been formulated by the Italian and the French Trade Union organisations and are being pressed by them on their Governments and made the basis of forging broadest working class unity of action.

Such a platform must embody specific demands on the Indian Government for legislative and administrative action.

The sanction behind such a platform must be clearly recognised to be the united strength of the working

class in action. This is necessary to escape the reformist mistakes which were rightly associated with my name and which embodied the mistake of a utopian outlook with regard to the concept of National Planning. It led to the danger of class-collaborationist tactics, when reliance was placed on the sanity of our arguments and practicability of our proposals to win us the intermediate stratas as allies and convince the "liberal elements" in the Government to get us our demands, and the working class was assured that the more it held on to its organised strength and did not get provoked into premature actions, the sooner the acceptance of our plan, from above, will come to its rescue! This bankruptcy today is embodied in the Socialist leadership. There must be no reformist illusions, but living faith that the working class can turn the scales through its own united actions, which will win it democratic allies and isolate its enemies and put them on the defensive.

The initiative for formulating such a platform must come from an urgently summoned Emergency Session of the General Council of the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) to which representatives of the Chinese Federation of Labour and the World Federation of Trade Unions should be particularly invited.

Such a platform must be offered by the AITUC to the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), the Socialist Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) and the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) as the basis for joint front in action, for joint campaigning among the working class from below and for exerting joint pressure on the Government from above.

The AITUC must demand that all democratic organisations and individuals declare their support for its Platform of Self-defence of the Working Class and for for saving national economy from worsening catastrophe, as embodying a sound solution of the most pressing problems of the economic crisis and opening the round to national economic development for people's welfare.

The AITUC must declare that it will advise the working class to east its vote in the next general elections only for such parties and democratic leaders as pledge active support to its platform now and agree to work for its implementation by the Government in power.

Such a platform alone can re-link the Party with mass of old Red Flag militants and enable the Party to unleash the widest and most intensive working class campaign of its life.

Besides a general Platform for the whole working class, we need to formulate separate industrial platforms of Immediate Demands and Action for the workers of individual industries beginning with the major industries where the Trade Unions have been a force, e. g., Railways, Post and Telegraph, Cotton Textiles, Jute, etc. This will mean paying specific attention to the specific problems of these industries and giving our efforts at Trade Union revival and a start from the living concrete situation, with the most advanced section as the first detachment.

Such specialised industrial efforts should lead to:

—unifying the Railway Unions inside the All India Railwaymen's Federation (A.I.R.F.);

—unifying the Postal and Telegraph Unions inside one Federation;

activising the All India Textile Workers' Federation;

-seeking co-ordination of all Jute Unions; and

—going towards one All India Union for each industry either centralised or federated as per circumstance.

The problem of forging Trade Union Unity

Formulating such a platform is the first essential condition of Trade Union unity.

And such a platform will remain a paper platform without Trade Union unity.

Before the Party can undertake the struggle for Trade Union unity, it must correctly and clearly understand the following:

- —wherein lay the Trotskyism of the Ranadive leadership on this question?
- —How serious is the correction made by the Rajeshwar Rao leadership?
 - -What is the scope of Trade Union unity.
 - -What should be its terms?
- —Where to start to get going on the job of building it in practice?
- (a) The Trotskyism of the Randaive leadership consisted in its disruptive practice that considered everyone in the Trade Union movement except itself and its trusted lieutenants as "enemy agents". The INTUC and Socialist Trade Union organisations were lumped together as bourgeois agencies trying to disrupt the working class Trade Union organisation from without, non-communist elements inside the AITUC were treated as enemy within. Party members who objected in various ways to this and similar nonsense were concentrated upon as the worst enemies because they were inside the highest organisation of the working class, the Party.

No attempt was made to differentiate between the INTUC, the Socialists who were outside and the non-communist elements who were inside the AITUC, nor between the leaders and their rank and file. None except ourselves were supposed to have any rank and file.

During 1948 and the first half of 1949, the theory was that the AITUC represented the real unity of the working class; let our Unions unleash struggles and the non-Unionised workers will follow and come into our Union and greater class unity wil follow. Struggle itself would lead to unity; the slogan of unity for struggles was reformist, because others are anti-struggle

reformists and their organisations are paper organisations. In colonial conditions we can not have broad based and stable Trade Unions; we can have only militant Trade Unions based on the advanced elements in the class. If these Red Flag Unions fight, the rest of the workers will follow and come inside the Unions. Such an outlook could never lead to the building of Trade Union unity but only to playing into the hands of its opponents.

Later during the second half of 1949, after the Milan Session of the WFTU, and pressing demands (though in confused terms) for Trade Union unity from our cadres, (after their own experience of miserable failures of the strikes conducted according to the Ranadive tactics), it was stated (without any justification) that our leadership had always stood for unity, but it must be unity for struggle. Approach for unity from below to the Socialist workers was permitted but only from below and from a distance. The approach and arguments permitted were such as to repel the Socialist-minded workers. The INTUC was, of course, to be considered as the worst enemy organisation. We, thus, not only isolated ourselves from the INTUC following, but left our own militants to be jeered at by the INTUC leaders and cadres over failure of our policy as revealed in strike after strike. Such tactics in real life did not put us on the offensive, but on the defensive vis-a-vis the INTUC.

The net result of such anti-working class unity stand was that we corrupted our own militants to such an extent that they did not think it a crime to suggest that strikes launched by the Socialists or threatened by the INTUC should not be supported by us. The agrument was that they cannot do without us, they have abused us in the past and betrayed us when we went on strike; let them try without us, they would come to their senses and let the workers see that their strike turns out to be a worse flasco when led by them. Calcutta Engineering Strike of 1948 on a call

by the Socialists is one specific case I know of and more examples will be available from other places and industries. Such is the familiar result of the Trotskyite outlook on Trade Union unity. It makes the most advanced section isolate itself and sneers at the rest of its own class!

The Party needs to uproot the last remnants of this degenerate and disruptive outlook and recall not only the slogans of the past to reject them for today, but closely study the damage done by them and carefully plan how to undo them, how to get the ear of workers under other Trade Union centres and inspire confidence in our own militants in the task of building Trade Union unity.

(b) The Rajeshwar Rao leadership has done nothing more than permit the Party IN WORDS to make United Front appeal for Trade Union unity not only from below but also from obove. It has given no concrete directions how to build unity from below and how to make the approach from the top, on what basis and to whom. Its own practice is "do-nothing" and this is how it perpetuates the damage done by Ranadive. It took the problem of Trade Union unity so lightly that the initiative for it came from the U.T.U.C. instead of the A.I.T.U.C.

If the efforts of Comrade S. A. Dange, on behalf of the AITUC, are under the direction of our C. C., or P. B., they are not only very inadequate but wrongly directed.

It was correct of the AITUC to respond positively to the approach of the UTUC, but it was certainly wrong to accept without even a question or attempt at discussion the bureaucratic demand that no political or strike resolution would be passed without a 75% majority. This is changing the very constitution of the AITUC in an anti-democratic direction and giving the right of veto to vacillating elements at the top to sabotage the growth of any movement from below

by depriving it of a central lead and the aid of the AITUC.

The only United Front approach "from above" that has been made is to respond to the UTUC and do nothing more, except a few joint mass meetings in Bengal which have been held on local initiative. There has been no serious attempt to contact other Trade Union organisations or individual Trade Union leaders.

Failure of the AITUC to adopt a Trade Union Platform of Demands to serve as basis for the United Front, has meant that there is no mass campaigning by us, no pressure from below.

In practice 'at the bottom' the situation remains as it was left by Comrade Ranadive and is allowed toworsen, while at the top opportunist concessions are readily made. This is the familiar feature of Trotskyism, revoluntionary words and reformist practice, in the present and different (than Ranadive's time) phase when adventurist actions cannot just be carried out. The liquidationist role of Trotskyism remains intact; formerly it was done the Left way, now it is being tried the Right way.

(c) Scope of Trade Union Unity—The interests of working class unity demand today that the banner of Trade Union unity must be all-embracing. The AITUC must raise the slogan that it seeks to unite with all Trade Union organisations: the UTUC, the Socialist HMS, the Congress INTUC; and that will tirelessly explore all possibilities of uniting the Indian working class into one Trade Union Centre in place of the present four Centres.

To make the scope of Trade Union unity broad and its appeal all-embracing is not the same thing as to consider them all on par. In fact, a correct understanding of the specific features of these various Trade Union organisations will enable the Party to adopt a correctly differentiated approach (eliminating the old mistake of lumping them all together) and base itself

on the relative importance of these Trade Union organisations in working class life.

The United Trade Union Congress--Its leadership is of traditionally important non-Party individuals who may be called honest liberal trade unionists, whose links with the Congress leadership were always weak or non-existent and who had great respect for the devoted .work of our Party cadres in the Trade Union movement. They stuck by the AITUC in the difficult days following August, 1942 campaign when utmost pressure was exerted on them to split with the Communists. Then again after the War, they successfully resisted Congress and Socialist pressure to line up with them on the anti-Communist platform, and split the AITUC or capture it, squeezing out the Communist Unionists. They are typical centrists. Their outlook is expressed in N. M. Joshi's words in 1947-48: "The Communists are going too Left and Socialists too Right and we neutrals are helpless, and so the split of AITUC may become inevitable. Let the two extremes get their experience and when they have learnt the lesson of Trade Union unity the hard way, we can play some useful role as unifiers of the two groups inside one TUC."

Their individual names matter on an All-India scale, even in Bombay where they are weaker, but more so in Bengal where they have real influence over the employees and also over some industrial workers.

This group is nearest the AITUC and our FIRST endeavour should be to get it inside the AITUC as soon as possible and use the contacts of leaders like N. M. Joshi and M. K. Bose to make United Front approaches to Socialist HMS on specific issues, both on local and national scale.

Socialist Hind Muzdoor Sabha—It demarcates itself from the INTUC by claiming to be Left, critical of the Government and as being pro-strike whenever necessary. It also demarcates itself from the AITUC on the typical platform of anti-Communism, being

truly national and not alien and Moscow-controlled, being democratic and not authoritarian, supplying responsible strike leadership and not indulging in terrorist adventurism.

It bases its appeal not only on national demagogy like the INTUC, but, to stand its ground against the Csmmunists it claims to be truly Socialist and democratic and for a policy of responsibly conducted struggles. It thus makes a Left and pro-struggle appeal.

The cadres of the INTUC are like paid employees of the top leaders who mechanically carry out their individual routine duties. The Trade Union cadres of the Socialists are just like ours—either socialistically-minded young intellectuals going to the working class at the call of the Party, or Left-minded young workers awakened to political life during war days and caught by the Socialists through the "August Revolution" demagogy. Its cadres and militants function like ours, from day to day, and keep fairly close contact with the working class.

Its leadership is skilful and very cunning. Their Ashok Mehta did outmanoeuvre our veteran S.A. Dange during the recent Bombay Textile Strike.

They have exploited, on the one hand, the discontent of the mass of workers with Congress Government policies and, on the other, they have capitalised on the adventurist mistakes of our Party leadership. During the last 3 years their influence and organisations have been constantly growing. Today if the Communist Party's Trade Union influence is at its nadir the socialist Party's influence is at its zenith. Of all the Trade Union Centres the socialist HMS is the strongest today.

The problem of Trade Union Unity with HMS is difficult and complicated.

Top approach to its leadership is necessary to express our earnest desire for Trade Union unity, but

the anti-Communist leadership of the Socialist HMS will never agree to organisational unity with the AITUC and will even resist joint action as long as it can.

With our proposals for joint actions leading to the formation of one Trade Union Centre we have to tirelessly and systematically campaign among the mass of workers and run an intensive explanatory campaign among its militants and hold serious discussions with its cadres and middle leaders. In face of the recalcitrance of the bosses and the Government and growing repression against the Socialist Trade Union cadres, whenever they go in for strikes, the desire for joint action is arising among its worker-militants and its cadres would be willing to talk over their differences with us. Our negative attitude has been so far enabling the anti-communist leadership to ideologically poison its rank and file against the Communist Party and our practical mistakes have strengthened its gripover its own cadres. But the healthy elements among its own following have begun to see through the anti-Communism of their leaders.

In such a set up we must

- —begin by immediate appeal and campaign for joint action for democratic liberties and defence of workers' standard of living.
- —go on preaching the need for organisational Trade Union unity.

Joint action in localities is immediately possible after initial prejudices are wiped out by our correct campaigning and it will pave the path for Trade Union unity which is not possible without completely isolating the Socialist leaders from their followers.

Our Unity Campaign must help the growth of a pro-Unity trend inside the Socialist Party. We have to clearly realise that the Socialist worker is our class brother and there can be no successful defence of the

interests of our class without class unity, and we can never achieve really broad-based Trade Union Unity unless we help the Socialist workers to see, from his own experience, that his leaders are the enemies of class unity, foul slanderers of his own class brothers, the Communists and of the mighty USSR etc., that their policy is anti-working class and pro-Imperialist and must be changed.

Trade Union Unity with the Socialist HMS will take as much time as it takes its following to see through the disruptive and treacherous character of its own leadership and the measure in which we, as the most advanced elements in the working class, can make this knowledge, the living experience of the class and real to the Socialist rank and file.

The Indian National Trade Union Congress—Its appeal is mostly based on national demagogy and its activities are directed towards the backward sections of the working class who go to its office with their individual and sectional grievances because Congress leaders head the Government and are most likely to to listen to INTUC representation.

From day to day, it functions as a Company Union. In times of strikes, it functions in co-operation with the police against the reds and all militants. But to state only this would be to suppress a part of the reality. Its leaders are clever demagogues and realise the growing discontent of the working class and are not averse to threatening working class action to press the bosses and get part of the demands fulfilled or seize the initiative from Socialists and Communists.

It would be completely wrong to think that it is only a top paper organisation. It has a mass following, though dwindling and discontented, and it also has worker-militants who however function through reliance on existing traditional agencies, caste organisations, 'Akhadas' (physical culture clubs), through foremen

in shops and jobbers in mills, clerks in head offices. etc.

A really broad working class mobilisation is not possible without moving into joint action the section of the backward working class loosely associated with the INTUC and living in isolation both from the AITUC Unions and the HMS.

We have to make formal approach for joint action and Trade Union unity to INTUC too as an organisation, but we have to realise that to the extent the democratic Trade Unionists stand united, to that extent will it be possible to stir the backward strata under the INTUC. The leadership of INTUC will resist both joint action and TU Unity to the last but the unity campaign can and must successfully wear away from it its entire mass following and the best of its militants, especially the cadres drawn from the working class itself.

If we visit the sins of INTUC leaders on their rank and file, we would be only playing into their own hands and isolating ourselves from the backward elements and fail to build broad working class unity for action over day to day issues, the greatest need of to-day.

Basis of Trade Union Unity

As I have said earlier, by sleeping over the issue the Party lost initiative to the UTUC whose Platform holds. the field (See Cross-Roads of October 6, 1950, p. 1 and p. 3). It is a platform that puts the non-Communist minority in a strategic place, and gives it almost the right of veto inside the united working class organisation, the AITUC, with the aid of the clause that suggests that 3/4 majority would be needed for political and strike resolutions. This is clearly making the AITUC constitution bureaucratic and incapable of giving centralised lead to the class over vital issues.

I think the only practical way to work for Trade Union unity and evolve suitable terms is the following:

We propose (as outlined above) a Trade Union Platform of Demands as basis for Joint action, to pave

the way for Trade Union Unity.

We express to all Trade Union organisations our earnest desire to enter into discussion with them to thrash out the terms for Trade Union unity consistent with the principles of Trade Unionism and the role of the working class in the struggle for democracy and independence.

As a preparation for such a Conference, we must get to know the mind of Trade Union leaders and cadres of various trends and define our attitude to the same.

We should be prepared to give all moral guarantees (and not constitutional vetoes demanded by UTUC) that we will abide by democratic discipline and never exploit our majority in any narrow interest.

We should frankly admit before the working class our mistakes of the past.

We should never sacrifice our right to strike-leadership or compromise the principles of Trade Unionism in the supposed interest of Trade Union unity. If any group makes unreasonable demand, it will only mean that joint action of the class and our own explanatory campaign needs more time.

We can take UTUC terms as basis but must resist its bureaucratic clauses.

We should demand that the AITUC, as the original united organisation should form the basis of the united Trade Union organisation.

Joint Action

Joint action by various sections of the working class over vital economic, political and international issues is the only path to build Trade Union unity on any serious and abiding basis.

But this is just what has not been attempted by any section of our Party leaders, whether those "in leader --

ship" or those "in opposition."

Our new C.C. has done nothing more than state in the C.C. Letter that it is permissible to make approaches for Trade Union unity both from below and from above.

Camrade S. A. Dange on behalf of the AITUC has accepted the platform of the UTUC and asked for some "liaison machinery" to be established (Cross Roads, October 6, 1950—Appendix I).

Neither the C.C., nor the AITUC has offered any platform of Trade Union Unity, nor has our Party or TU leadership given any lead for joint action on any single issue, whether economic or political or international.

In plain words, we have become the tail of the UTUC leadership and do not even think in terms of moving the working class into action over day to day issues and of fraternising with the cadres of different political beliefs.

From going ultra-left under the Ranadive leadership, we are either lying low under the Rajeswar Rao leadership, or under Dange leadership doing nothing more than waiting to be received in audience by M.K. Bose etc. There is no mass campaigning for joint action over issues that are of immediate concern to the working class.

The problem of Trade Union unity is not being seriously and squarely faced and hence the Party is unable to move its own class. This means isolation of the Party from the working class, instead of supplying it the needed leadership.

The shift in the position of our leadership is from the petty-bourgeois revolutionism (under Ranadive) to petty-bourgeois reformism (Trade Union bureaucratism under S. A. Dange), from sectarian adventurism to servile passivity.

The Party of the Indian working class has yet to evolve the lead for building working class unity and give its own cadres the right start for the job.

ON TRADE UNION UNITY

(From Cross-Roads Vol. 2, No. 23, October 6, 1950.)

AITUC AND UTUC FOR UNITED FRONT

The first step toward working class unity in India has been taken with the AITUC's acceptance of the UTUC formula for "United Front and Trade Union Unity." The formula was suggested recently by Coms. Mrinal Kanti Bose and R. S. Ruikar for UTUC and USO respectively, proposing united working in the trade union movement by the AITUC, UTUC and the Hind Mazdoor Sabha.

Comrade S. A. Dange on behalf of the AITUC has sent a reply which says: "The formula that you proposed is generally acceptable to us. It can well serve as a basis of understanding to establish joint machinery to give shape to our day to day work in the trade union movement without permitting differences on political matters to intervene.

"I do not not know if you have received any reply rom the Hind Mazdoor Sabha.....However, our two rganisations can take steps to establish some liaison achinery to begin work on the lines suggested."

UNITY FORMULA

Following is the formula suggested by Coms. Mrinal (anti Bose and R. S. Ruikar:

- (a) All the constituent Central Trade Union Orunisations which desire to work in the United Front hould agree to work in spirit of goodwill and coopertion.
- (b) There should be no malicious and unfair critim of each other, on the part of the constituent ganisations in the United Front. Honest and fair thicism and expression of views on the Party line

will be permitted, however, to all constituent organisations.

- (c) It should be free and frankly recognised that Trade Union work should be apart and distinct from political work of each Party; nor should there be any desire or attempt on the part of any party to make Trade Unions an instrument or forum for Party work.
- (d) Every attempt should be made to arrive at decisions by common agreement; and only as a last resort, decision on major political question or in respect of strike should be taken by three-fourth majority.
- (e) If the United Front works satisfactorily for the next six months, then the question of organisational unity should be taken up in hand.
- (f) At present the United Front should be restricted to oppose the Black Bills, or such other important Trade Union questions.
 - (g) A joint machinery should be evolved.

IV. TELENGANA

The claim of the Andhra Members of the Central Committee to Party leadership is based on their leadership of the Telengana struggle. They claim that on their own they led the Telengana struggle, by-passing the Trotskyite Ranadive line and correctly applying the Chinese experience. If this claim were true then Indian Communists have every reason to get the necessary self-confidence for having evolved a Bolshevik leadership. The fact, however, is that the claim is false and very dishonestly made.

Ranadive leadership also tried to build its revolutionary prestige by exploiting the name of Telengana.

(1) Strategy and Tactics:

It is General Secretary Ranadive's Report, made to the P.B., Session held from September to December, 1948 and has a whole section devoted to Telengana. It proves the following:

—The new leadership that talked so much and soloudly about Telengana at and after the Party Congress did not move its little finger to help Telengana, kept no contact with the movement, did not even seriously discuss the reports received, sent no directions and ran no solidarity campaign in the rest of the country. It was a case of criminal political irresponsibility and in the true tradition of a Trotskyite bureaucratic leadership that does not go to the field of revolutionary action to guide the Party, but lives by exploiting the martyrdom of its cadres whom it does nothing to help.

—The necessary result was great deal of discontent and confusion. Important comrades of Telengana saw not only the people in general, but a part of the people under our own leadership, welcoming the Indian Army. They suggested a change of policy.

—The first and the longest P.B. Session, held while the Indian Army marched in, took no note of the change in situation and called upon the Party to carry on in the old unchanged form the policy of armed struggle, as we were doing before. If the P.B. was so far only guilty of irresponsibily neglecting Telengana, it now made itself responsible for its gradual liquidation.

(2) What is Happening in Hyderabad (A.P.P.H. Publication)

This contains two reports from Hyderabad which give to some extent the situation as it prevailed a few months after the march of the Indian Army, the P.B's.

own characterisation and forecast of Congress Government policy and the Party line for advancing the struggle.

A glance at this pamphlet will show how incorrect were its forecasts and how stupid our line.

—In our analysis the main purpose of the march of the Indian Army was the destruction of the Telengana struggle which the poor Nizam himself was unable to tackle. Hence we took it for granted that Patel's States Ministry will try to combine ALL against us, set up a Congress Ministry, convene a Constituent Assembly and hold elections etc.

Nothing of the sort happened.

Patel put Major General Chowdhury as the Military Governor in-charge of Hyderabad and after about a year, an ICS top bureaucrat Vellodi was made the Chief Minister. No Congress Ministry was set up.

General elections for a Constituent Assembly were pressed by democratic Congressmen but the demand was ignored by the Congress Government.

What does our being false prophets prove? That in the name of giving a revolutionary lead we were only mouthing sectarian "anti-parliamentarism."

—In our analysis we bunched up all the Congress groups together as one solid reactionary mass, when we had the least justification for doing so.

Left Congress leaders who conducted the struggle under the "Council of Action" had maintained informal United Front relations with us during 1947 and who used to be denounced by the Right-wing for being pro-Communist,

Swami Ramanand, the President, had demanded after his release and the entry of the Indian Army the deposition of the Nizam, the establishment of Responsible Government, a Constituent Assembly to decide regarding the Union of different national regions of

Hyderabad with their corresponding contiguous linguistic regions in the Indian Union.

The extreme Right-wing was for retaining Hyderabad as a separate State and the Nizam as a Rajpramukh and forming a Ministry in alliance with pro-Nizam Jagirdars. We took no note of these differences and so rushed headlong into the blind alley.

Our purblind outlook left the field clear for Sardar Patel to operate.

What was his line?

Sardar Patel called upon Swamiji to get his Left keep off the Communists and he insisted that Swamiji unite with his extreme Right-wing rivals against the advice and pressure of his Leftist lieutenants. Patel's line was that as long as Hyderabad Congress leaders do not unite (i. e., Swamiji and the Lefts, the official majority of State Congress), with the treacherous minority, already out of State Congress under pro-Nizam Ramchandra Rao, no Congress Ministry will be set up and the Military Governor will rule Hyderabad.

Swamiji and the Lefts refused to go that far, the deadlock continued and we just played no role in shaping events.

Our vigorous attempts to denounce all Congress groups in the same breath together with the pressure from Patel led Swamiji to come out more and more against us and the Congress Lefts also began taking particular care to demarcate themselves from us. The Congress Centre and Left thus made themselves impotant against their own Right, and we successfully isolated ourselves.

The more Left we went, the more we isolated ourselves and paved the way for the Socialists to emerge as the sensible "Lefts" on the Hyderabad scene. During 1949 they penetrated our urban bases and emerged as

Trade Union leaders of Hyderabad workers, who used to be under our leadership before.

The Ranadive leadership and the Andhra members of the C.C. were together responsible for a political line by which we helped Patel to realise his tactical aims, i.e.,

-Using the Congress Right against the Centre-Left

leadership;

—Using the Centre (Swamiji) to detach the Congress Left from United Front with the Communist Party; and,

-Helping the Socialists to penetrate the urban and

Trade Union bases of the Communist Party.

How was this a revolutionary policy instead of being the line that aids counter-revolution from within the revolutionary Party?

(3) The next lot of Party documents are:

(a) "Telengana Documents", a booklet printed by the new C.C. in August, 1950 containing the following documents.

—In Part I, "Critical Problems Facing the Heroic Telengana Resistance Movement: The Way to Solve

Them", Feb., 1950.

"—In Part II, "Criticism of the Andhra Provincial Sectt. on the Deviations regarding Armed Resistance in Telengana" Sept., 1949.

(b) Andhra Party Letter dated Feb., 1950, entitled "Present Revolutionary Situation and New Forms of Struggle," circulated by the new C.C. in August 1950, as explanation for and in defence of its slogan of armed guerilla struggle for our country as a whole.

The importance of these documents is:

(a) That they have been drafted by the Andhra CCMs and endorsed by the Andhra PC which they personally and directly led. These constitute the model of the line which they, as the new leadership of the Party, want the entire Party to follow.

(b) that they were drafted during 1949 and even as late as Feb., 1950, i. e., they should reveal whether the Andhra CCMs faithfully carried out the Ranadive's Strategy and Tactics which they had willingly accepted or did they on their own, through their own experience, come to adopt a line more in tune with the Chinese experience. Their last documents were written as late as Feb., 1950, with plenty of material of the Chinese Party available in "China Digest" and "People's China."

The contents of these documents themselves conclusively prove the following:—

- (1) That the claim of the Andhra CCMs (in the Letter to Ranks, June, 1950) that they by-passed the old Ranadive line, groped their way towards correctly applying the lessons of the Chinese Revolution and hence successfully developed the Telengana struggle and expanded, consolidated, and raised it to a higher level, is literally a BOGUS CLAIM. These documents, themselves, show that these comrades faithfully stuck to and ruthlessly carried out the Ranadive line in Telengana, and that therefore, they are unprincipled liars.
- (2) That the Andhra CCMs not only applied the Rana dive line to Telengana but more, they applied the Ranadive line in Ranadive's own typical Titoite manner. One has to recall the Self-critical Report of the Bengal Provincial Committee and the Reports of major Bengal District Committees to realise how the Trotskyite line was enforced through the Party despite the objections of experienced and responsible Comrades. After that if one reads these Andhra and Telengana documents, he will immedialely realise that the Andhra CCMs carried out the Ranadive line just as ruthlessly, bureaucratically and blindly inside Telengana, as Bhowani Sen and Somnath Lahiri, etc., did inside Bengal.

The opinion of two major District Committees— Kristna and Guntur was ignored. It is like the CC of pre-revolutionary Russia enforcing a practical line despite the objection of Moscow and Petrogard Party Committees.

The opinion of individual leading comrades both of Telengana and Union Andhra was ignored.

All Comrades who raised objection were denounced as reformists, cowards and traitors.

—Loyalty and faith of the ranks was exploited to push through from the top a line to which a majority of the responsible Party Committees had objection.

And these Comrades, who practised such Titoite ways inside the Party organisation they themselves led, claim to be anti-Titoite just because they want to exploit the inner-Party crisis against their old Titoite Chief, in a factional manner.

(3) That the struggle in Telengana was growing with elemental force as long as it was directed against the Nizam alone and all the democratic forces were in opposition to his autocratic rule, but this earlier spontaneous rise was split with the march of the Indian 'Army and Hyderabad's accesssion to India and after that our slogan that we must carry on as before, made no sense to a large number of our own cadres and supporters.

These documents give no evidence whatsoever of continued, leave aside increasing, mass activity, after the entry of the Indian Army, i.e., of any large-scale popular support to the guerilla struggle.

These documents, on the other hand, themselves, give evidence that it needed a lot of explanation, appealing to Party loyalty etc., for these Party leaders to get guerilla bands reorganised and those too in fewer numbers, and that these guerilla bands had no policy of rousing, organising and activising the masses for their own day to day demands but they were organised as small armed units for terrorist activities, glorified as dispensing popular justice to enemies of the people.

In isolation from the masses, all the pre-conditions of their degenerating into dacoit and murder gangs were created. And this is the final stage of Trotskyism in practice.

Conclusion

In any serious inner-party self-criticism, the Andhra CCMs in particular, and the entire old and new CC in general, has to be charged of the following crimes;

(1) Failure to submit any objective Report of Telengana to the people and the Party.

The Ranadive leadership lied when it talked of the area of struggle continuing to grow despite the entry of the Indian army, when the struggle sentiment was actually cooling off.

The Rajeswar Rao leadership lied when it preached the myth that it has made Telengana struggle grow by by-passing the Ranadive line and by correctly applying the Chinese experience. It went on applying Ranadive's line and in Ranadive's way.

Both our old and new leaderships are equally guilty of sabotaging the most significant struggle of our poeple through exaggeration and lies, a typical Trotskyite trick.

(2) Both the Ranadive and the Rajeshwar Rao leaderships are guilty of failing to mobilise the entire Party to run a solidarity campaign for Telengana. They talked big about Telengana, to exploit the martyrdom of our comrades there to buttress their own bankrupt leadership, but they did not move their little finger to get the rest of the Party move patriotic and democratic opinion in the rest of the country in defence of Telengana. The result is patent today. There is more campaign abroad for victims of terror in Telengana than inside our country.

The new CC in its resolution of greetings to Telengana and Hajangs passed as late as June, 1950, does

not call upon the Party to run a solidarity campaign, but pledges to the fighting warriors there that soon enough the rest of the country will rise behind them and follow their example of armed guerilla struggle. This again is another Trotskyite trick: indulge in revolutionary demagogy to keep active revolutionary sectors isolated and fail to rally the rest of the people in their support. In the estimate of our leadership, a solidarity campaign would be a reformist diversion from the immediate implementation of the line of Armed Guerilla Struggle. No armed guerilla struggle has begun in the rest of the country but the comrades of Telengana are left all alone to face all the odds, suffer and sacrifice all in utter isolation.

(3) Both the Ranadive and the Rajeshwar Rao leaderships had ample opportunities to review the results of their Trotskyite policy in Telengana and adopt a Leninist policy. They failed to correct themselves.

The old (Ranadive) PB met for the FIRST time AFTER the march of the Indian troops and it refused to change that line. It knew I that was talking in informal discussions with the leading comrades in terms of a Coalition Government. It held my views (based on Lenin's own slogan from "Two Tactics") as the evidence of my incorrigible reformism and one of the grounds for my suspension. It knew that the mass of the peasants and a large number of our cadres thought that the new situation demanded a new line. By sticking to the policy in a new situation, it aided the counter-revolutionary design of Patel.

Under the Ranadive leadership, the Party took an equivocal if not a hostile stand on the question of Hyderabad's accession to India. It stood for the free verdict of the people, after the realisation of People's Democracy. In practice in meant that there was no practical difference between our stand and the Razakar "Azad Hyderabad" slogan. The Congress leaders exploited this position to slander us as Nizam's men and thus prejudiced the patriotic people against the armed

peasant struggle of Telengana and hence there was hardly any spontaneous recoil when the Indian Military and police launched their offensive against Telengana. Ranadive's slogan aided the Nizam and paved the way for Patel to put through his terror without any resistance from his own patriotic following.

The Andhra CCMs were personally responsible for guiding the Telengana struggle. They were younger Party leaders and it would have been unfair to hold acquiescence in Ranadive's Trotskyism against them IF they had taken initiative to chuck over-board Ranadive's Telengana policy and adopted a Leninist policy at the May, 1950 session of the CC after Ranadive's policy stood condemned by the international Communist leadership and when the entire Party had started howling against the Ranadive leadership and was demanding a new policy.

In my documents I had suggested the slogan of Coalition Government for Hyderabad. They rejected is unceremoniously.

They claim to follow International Communist experience and Mao Tse-Tung had something to say on "Coalition Government".

They claim to follow International Communist experience and the slogan of Coalition Government was successfully implemented by the Communist Party of every East European country in the war and post-war period.

They claim to follow the teachings of our masters on tactics and Lenin had, himself, given and explained the slogan of Coalition Government in his "Two Tactics."

They ignored it all, made no change in the old policy and yet want us to believe that they are anti-Trotskyites, true Leninists, eager to learn from International experience in general and the Chinese in particular.

Under Ranadive, the failure to adopt the slogan of Coalition Government could be called a mistake, very hard to justify but understandable. After the FLPPD Editorial and after the inner-Party discussion, for the Rajeshwar Rao leadership to reject the slogan of Coalition Government meant carrying the old Trotskyite policy and delibetately refusing to change it.

The Ranadive and the Rajeshwar Rao leaderships will have to be charged before the Party Court as Trotskyite LIQUIDATORS of Telengana struggle.

Let them not supply any reports from Telengana. The very fact, that Ranadive talked of Liberated Zones, while, after a year the Rajeshwar Rao leadership talks of the lower stage of "guerilla zones" and the "guerilla areas" whose population is told to us, by just counting up the relevant figures from the Government Gazeteers, this is itself, the most devasting evidence of the fact that "Telengana guerilla struggle" is as much the 1950 myth manufactured by the Rajeshwar Rao leadership as "Bengal's Revolutionary upsurge" was Ranadive's myth in 1949.

These criminal misleaders of the Party have to be faced with the concrete evidence of their having liquidated Telengana.

One of the most urgent tasks of the Party today is for the Provincial Committees and District Committees to take initiative that a delegation of 6 to 8 HONEST, responsible and experienced comrades go to Telengana to bring back an objective report of the situation and publish it for the information of the entire Party. I have no doubt that such a report will deal the last and decisive blow to the Trotskyite tactics of the Rajeshwar Rao leadership and release the entire Party from the grip of revolutionary demagogy which has been systematically inculcated these last there years.

(4) Both the Ranadive and the Rajeshwar Rao leaderships are guilty of conducting Telengana struggle on the basis of the tactical line personally given by the

Titoite Yugoslav delegates to our Party Congress. I have already given the details in my note on "Titoism in India."

The Ranadive leadership did not check upon its Telengana line even after the Information Bureau's Resolution on the Yugoslav Party, i.e., it went in for no serious self-criticism, did not discard Titoite liquidationist line for the major popular struggle the Party was leading.

Our General Secretary in his statement expressed agreement with the Resolution of Information Bureau, but he did not call a P. B. or C. C. meeting and get it to change the line for Telengana given by Tito agents to our Party leadership at the time of our Party Congress. The History of CPSU (B) teaches us that Trotskyites always sweared in words, loyalty to the decisions of the International, but in practice carried out Trotskyite-liquidationist line. The Ranadive leadership functioned in the traditional Trotskyite ways.

The Andhra CCMs (P. Sundarayya, at least, was present in the talk with Tito delegates over Telengana) did not pull up the P. B. when it failed to change the Telengana line even after the Information Bureau Resolution. So blindly sectarian were these Andhra Comrades and they had the highest reputation for honesty, loyalty and nearness to the people. They were guilty not only of acquiescing in Ranadive carrying on the Titoite line on Telengana, but were themselves the leading local agents for carrying it out.

In the May, 1950, meeting of the CC held to discuss the FLPPD Editorial and change the Party policy, the Andhra CCMs led the attack on the Ranadive leadership and characterised it as a Trotskyite-Titoite leadership.

How amazing is it that even in this meeting they did not recall the Titoite delegate's advice regarding Telengana, did not call upon Comrade Ranadive to explain why he had failed to take initiative to change

the Telengana line and they themselves also did not give an honest explanation how they themselves had failed to get the Telengana line changed, for it was nothing more nor less than the Titoite tactical line. This is the least that was expected of them, IF their criticism about Ranadive's Trotskyism-Titoism was at all honest.

How amazing is it that even in this meeting the Andhra CCMs give an exaggerated, distorted, and lying picture of the Telengana struggle, tried to hide the fact that our armed bands had become isolated from the people, and instead of suggesting a new policy for Telengana, stood for the practical intensification of Ranadive's old Telengana line which was nothing else than the line personally suggested by Tito's agents.

The Ranadive leadership disowned and denounced Tito when the Information Bureau spoke against his leadership of the CPY but carried out the Titoite policy in practice in our country and on all fronts.

The Rajeshwar Rao leadership disowned the Ranadive leadership after the Information Bureau Organ had indicated that its policy was wrong. It characterised the Ranadive leadership as Trotskyite and Titoite, but hid from the rest of the Party the specific advice given by Tito agents for the conduct of Telengana struggle. More, it is out to apply the old advice of Tito agents, that has successfully liquidated our once fighting Telengana base, to the rest of the country also. What else is this but denouncing Trotskyism-Titoism in words, but consistently carrying it out in practice and with real vengeance? How is this not following Ranadive's own ways and the traditional methods of Trotskyite the world over?

Hiding the Titoite hand in glorious Telegana's bloody liquidation and trying to repeat the foul game in our remaining rural bases and trying to mobilise the Party for this nefarious task is the charge against which the Rajeshwar Rao leadership has to be made to

defend itself if it can. I do not see how it can escape the wrath of the rank and file once all the facts get known to it and real self-criticism starts.

V. DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES

Situation After the Party Congress

The situation after the Party Congress was very critical.

The reactionary press and the Patel-Nehru Government took the opportunity to exploit the change of Party policy and of Party leadership to bait the Party. A compaign to cloud the public mind was undertaken with the propaganda that the Party under "Cominform guidance" had adopted a policy of economic sabotage and political terrorism. This was part of a general shift towards policy of armed overthrow of nationalist regimes in India, Pakistan, Burma and China, because they were friendly with the "democratic West" and were not willing to become satellites of USSR "after winning their independence."

This constituted only psychological preparations to justify the use of Government terror against the Party and its activities which soon unfolded itself.

—The Party was banned in West Bengal, Madras, and Travancore-Cochin.

The Party press was suppressed in the above and other places.

-Large scale detentions took place.

-Ban on meetings and demonstrations was ruthlessly enforced.

The functioning of mass organisations was rendered very difficult.

The Government aim was to behead the vanguard before the popular movement became strong and unified enough to menace the Government, i.e., break the links of the Party with the people and try to smash it as an organisation.

In such circumstances, a dogged defence of democratic liberties became the supreme political task of the Party for the following reasons:

It meant defending the political existence of the Party, its right to function openly as a normal political party.

It meant resisting the drive towards a Police State in our country.

It meant defending the elementary political rights of the Indian people and fighting to preserve and create such conditions in which a wide popular movement could most easily grow.

Our Party leadership elected at the Party Congress instead of foiling the reactionary game, played into the hands of reaction.

The Policy of Ranadive Leadership

What was the attitude of the Ranadive leadership on the issue of defending democratic liberties?

It declared that the situation was so ripe that the Party had to work for last ditch revolutionary action, that we had to lead the people straight to the Victory of People's Democratic Revolution and not think of democratic liberties.

It declared that the Government was in utter panic and completely isolated, and that all we needed to do was to go over to the final offensive and it will collapse.

It declared that in such a situation to talk of democratic liberties was to express constitutional illusions and divert the revolutionary movement to minor demands, that it was evidence of having faith in the treacherous bourgeoisie instead of confidence in the strength of the people, that it was a refusal to go militant and insist on remaining reformist.

An active campaign with a view to beating back the reactionary offensive and pressure and enlarge democratic liberties was ruled out of serious consideration.

The demand for democratic liberties could be voiced but only to expose the Nehru Government and rouse the hatred of the people so that they see the necessity of overthrowing it.

The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) was allowed to go defunct and its non-Party leaders were slandered aspetty-bourgeois vacillators, reformist cowards, unwanted brakes on the Party, relics of old reformist days.

Comrade Ranadive's "Open Letter to Congressmen'' (April, 1948) is the FIRST example of the above outlook and a classic example of how fellow democrats who differ from us and are under reformist influence should NOT be talked to.

All this constituted Trotskyite policy and practice on the issue of democratic liberties.

All this was adhered to despite the absolutely different treatment of the same issue in the International Communist Press in general and despite specific policy statements of CPGB and WFTU on suppression of democratic liberties in India, which also clearly called upon the C.P.I. to fight for democratic liberties in alliance with all democratic and patriotic elements.

What was the result of this Trotskyite mistake?

The intoxication of revolutionary demagogy was: short-lived and soon enough the Party cadres became politically paralysed. This bred the outlook of fatalism and made our cadres passive. The enemy forces hit us and we failed to defend ourselves, and they won, we lost. The enemy slandered us and we endorsed his contentions in different words; in pseudo-Marxist, Trotskyite jargon. The enemy got away with his terror as being "unfortunately necessary" to defend Indian democracy, against Communist Anarchism!

The Party lost its best democratic allies, the most advanced non-Party elements, while we should have

been utilising them to extend the circle of democratic allies around the Party.

The Socialists leaders exploited the situation to link up with the non-Party democratic elements and preach anti-Communism with an air of justification and selfrighteousness.

A negative attitude towards the issue of democratic liberties coupled with adventurist practice led to:

—disrupting the links of the Party with the people;

-liquidation of the mass organisations; and

democratic stratas that had been organised by us.

Situation under Rajeshwar Rao leadership and

Did the situation change with the change of Party leadership?

Not for the better, but only for the worse.

The Ranadive analysis of (non-existent) "rising revolutionary upsurge" was replaced by a new exaggeration, the existence of supposed fascist white-terror. Empty Revolutionary phrases were replaced by a cowardly panic-mongering. The circle was closed with avowed fatalist defeatism.

One can read through the new CC Letter to Ranks and even use a microscope, but he will not find in it the lead to start a campaign for democratic liberties.

The damage under the Ranadive leadership is not being repaired but perpetuated, links with the people are not being forged but the problem itself ignored.

Such a situation cannot but breed a very unhealthy atmosphere of inner-Party life, leading to the growth of factionalism. The new leadership thought that its wordy denunciation will get it the support of the Party ranks. The leading victims of Ranadive's terror

regime in the top and middle Party leadership are banding themselves into mutually inter-linked factions to give it a dose of its own medicine.

It is noteworthy that the "Veterans" of the "anti-CC opposition" do not see the urgent necessity of doing what they can, to start a campaign of democratic liberties despite the failure of the new CC to give any concrete lead on the subject. The major provincial unit of the Party, the Bengal Provincial Organizing Committee, which has rejected the new CC's political policy (embodied in Letter to Ranks) has not itself done anything to initiate a campaign for democratic liberties.

The basis for a broad based campaign

Such a basis not only exists, but has grown during the last 3 years the Party has been sinking deeper and deeper into the pit of Trotskyism.

General discontent against the Congress Government has grown among all democratic classes.

Terrorist measures that were first used against the Party are now used against all Left elements who came out to defend the struggling masses. During the last one year or more, police measures have been used against all strikes, all peasant and student agitation and actions irrespective of the Party or group that led them. Thus, in the experience of the people themselves, the Government is out not only to suppress the Communist Party but any organisation that dares defend the people and resist the reactionary policies of the Government.

Anti-Communist panic-mongering has failed. People see that the Communist Party cannot lead an armed insurrection, but has been successfully suppressed. The more advanced elements see that it got provoked, others say that it tried to organize an insurrection but failed. All democratic elements consider us stupid and not dangerous as the Government propaganda points. They

recall our old good mass record and the fine qualities of our cadres and want us to get legality so that the camp of anti-Congress Government democratic opposition may get strengthened.

Hence with a correct approach and bold initiative, a really broad-based and powerful mass movement for democratic liberties can be successfully launched which will win legality for the Party, restore elementary rights of holding meetings, etc., and help to galvanise the political situation in favour of the people.

Immediate Tasks

It is not enough to agitate for democratic liberties in general terms, but specific demands must be formulated as the basis of a most intensive mass campaign after a preliminary round of fraternal explanatory campaign among the democratic organisations and leading individuals, e.g.,

- (a) Legalise the Communist Party.
- (b) Withdraw ban on mass meetings. Pledge to defact the imposition of Section 144 in any town or rural areas.
- (c) Restore the security of all Communist and democratic journals and newspapers and make their restarting possible. Remove from the Statute Book the Patelite measures against the press.
- (d) Release all detenus. The advantage gained under recent High Court decisions under which a large number of detenus have been released, must be pressed home to win the release of ALL detenus.
 - (e) Release all political prisoners.
- (f) Repeal the Central and Provincial Security Acts and withdraw the proposed Labour Black Bills.
- (g) End the Terror regime in Telengana and restore full democratic liberties.

We must work for sending a representative and influential delegation to Telengana to bring back an objective report to serve as an effective basis for nation-wide solidarity campaign to end the police-military torture of the best sons and daughters of our people.

Broaden the Civil Liberties Union

The campaign for democratic liberties must be initiated and led by the Civil Liberties Union (CLU). It is not only necessary to restart it but leaders of all democratic Congressmen, eminent men from the world of art, science, and the liberal professions must be seriously contacted and invited into its leadership.

The organisation of CLU must be broadened. It must not only remain a top committee, issuing Press statements and sometimes holding small, symbolic mass protest meetings, but its branches should be formed every where and activised and made to lead a nation-wide growing mass campaign.

Form Iocal United Front

Simultaneously with the efforts to organise the ChU, the Party directly and through proper contacts must take the initiative to form local United Front with all democratic organisations and individuals and thus pave the way for a really representative CLU in localities where there are difficulties over old misunderstandings, local factionalism, etc.

Every day's delay counts. The longer Party leaders drift over this issue, the more they expose themselves as being incorrigibly corrupted by Trotskyism. The longer Party cadres acquiesce in this neglect of democratic liberties campaign, the more helpless they will feel and get more demoralised and depoliticalised and factionalism will disintegrate whatever remains of the Party.

DOCUMENTS FOR DISCUSSION

Editor: P.C. JOSHI

- (1) Telengana and the Rajeshwar Rao Leadership by O.P. Sangal
- (2) Party Crisis and the Way Out by P.C. Joshi
- (3) On Party History by P.C. Joshi
- (4) On Politics of Com. A. K. Ghosh by O. P. Sangal
- (5) जन-श्रान्दोलन की समस्याएँ लेखक पी॰ सी॰ जोशी (Shortened Version in Hindi of the two parts of "Are We Only Stupid?" by P.C. Joshi)

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