

Ivan Potekhin (1903-1964), eminent Soviet scientist who studied African history, ethnology and contemporary economic, social and political problems, was the author of the books "Formation of the National Community of the South-African Bantus", "Ghana Today", "Africa Looks Ahead", "Emergence of the New Ghana", and many articles. He was one of the contributors and editors of the fundamental "Peoples of Africa". A number of his books and articles were translated and published abroad during his lifetime.

Prof. Potekhin was the founder and first director of the Institute of Africa, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, and the first president of the Soviet Association for Friendship with the Peoples of Africa.

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AFRICAN PROBLEMS

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FROM THE EDITORS

The present and future of Africa are the main subjects of this collection of articles by Ivan Potekhin, eminent Soviet scientist and the author of many works on the history, ethnography and contemporary problems of Africa.

In the last years of his life Prof. Potekhin studied mainly present-day African problems and tried, by analysing them, to peer into the morrow of the peoples of this continent. In mid-1964, shortly before his death, he selected some of the published articles intending to issue them in book form. The present volume is in fulfilment of this idea of a compact collection and, therefore, includes only some of Potekhin's works on this theme.

A few years have passed since the articles and papers offered here have been written. Naturally, many of the facts and figures adduced by the author can now be supplemented with additional data shedding at times new light on the events and issues discussed. Some of the ideas which were novel when first expounded by the author have now become generally known truths or, on the contrary, have to be revised and interpreted in a new way. Life marches on swiftly and inexorably and its test is the most gruelling and trustworthy. But even now we think that the author has steered the right course in his scientific explorations and his ideas will strike a lively response among all who take to heart the future of Africa and its peoples.

The book opens with "Africa: Ways of Development" (first published in English and French in 1964), which includes Prof. Potekhin's report at the First International Congress of Africanists (Accra, 1962), entitled "Problems of Economic Independence of African Countries," and the

article "On African Socialism" published in January 1961 in the Russian, English and French editions of *International Affairs*. The same journal carried in March 1963 the article "Legacy of Colonialism in Africa". The article "Pan-Africanism and the Struggle of the Two Ideologies" was carried in the journal *Kommunist* (No. 1, 1964).^{*} It was reprinted in *International Affairs* (April 1964). The article "Land Relations in African Countries" was written for the journal *Narody Azii i Afriki* (No. 1, 1962) and was repeatedly reprinted in English (*The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1963; *The African Communist*, No. 15, 1963; *The Third World in Soviet Perspective. Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1964).

Two works are given in English translation for the first time. "Advance and Reconstruction of Agriculture in Independent African Countries" was written in the summer of 1963. It is the concluding chapter of the collective work *The Agrarian Question and the Peasants of Tropical Africa*,^{**} prepared by the staff of the Institute of Africa, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Prof. Potekhin headed the group of authors and was chief editor of the volume. "Study of African History: Present State and Main Tasks" is a paper read in June 1961 at a scientific session on problems of the history of the African peoples.

The book has been prepared for the press by a commission of the Institute of Africa of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, charged with the publication of Prof. Potekhin's works, together with the daughter of the late scientist Gera Potekhina. The compilers did not consider it possible to make essential changes. They confined themselves to some abridgements to avoid repetition and delete obsolete passages. Moreover, explanatory editorial footnotes have been given in some instances.

^{*} This article also appeared in *The African Communist*, 1964, No. 19.

^{**} *Аграрный вопрос и крестьянство в Тропической Африке*, Москва, 1964.

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AFRICA: WAYS OF DEVELOPMENT

Five hundred years of slave trade and colonial dominion by the imperialist powers have made Africa one of the most retarded areas of the globe. For several centuries its manpower, the main component of the productive forces of a society, was shipped out of that continent. Then it began to be shorn of the values created by the labour of the African people. It was a case of systematic plunder; to perpetrate it, the full power of the metropolitan countries' state machinery was used.

Now that gloomy period in the history of the African peoples is drawing to a close. One can hardly fail to see the truly momentous historical import of the fact that the beginning of the dark period of African history coincided with the beginning of the capitalist mode of production, and its end with the emergence of the world socialist system.

The peoples of Africa now face a very difficult task, namely, the speediest possible eradication of that retardation and the attainment of the same level of development as that of all the other nations of the world. How is that to be accomplished? By what means? What path leads to the great goal? A fierce political struggle has unfurled around those questions. It is raging not because the correct answer is hard to find; social science has already presented a perfectly clear and definite answer to it. The struggle is raging because the imperialists do not want to let Africa eradicate its retardation, which is the source of their enrichment. That political struggle has naturally given rise to a heated debate in the world press, with the result that an otherwise perfectly obvious problem has been incredibly confounded.

The purpose of this article is to set forth the only correct answer which social science gives us. The problem of Africa's further development is many-sided and varied of aspect. In this article we shall deal with only two of the most important and mutually interlocked questions: economic independence and "African Socialism".

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

By this time all African statesmen and political leaders with few exceptions admit that political independence cannot be complete unless it is reinforced by economic independence.

What, then, is meant by economic independence? Professor Frenkel, a well-known expert on the economy of Africa, claims, for instance, that no country can have an independent economy, and that, as he puts it, "in the economic sense, absolute 'independence' means absolute isolation."¹ Accordingly, Prof. Frenkel assumes that economic independence is impossible and that, consequently, no country can set itself the goal of attaining economic independence. That view suits the imperialists perfectly and coincides completely with the ideas of colonialism. There is nothing the imperialists would like better than for the African states to give up the idea of economic independence as being impracticable. In the light of the above, it is important to go seriously into the real meaning of the concept of economic independence.

What Is Economic Independence?

No one believes that any country can exist in the world of today unless it maintains economic ties with other countries. The smaller the country, the more it needs such ties and the greater is the part played in its economy by foreign trade. Most African countries belong to the category of small countries, and it would be absurd to think that any of them could exist in isolation from the rest of the world.

The international division of labour and the world commodity market took shape over the centuries. The national economy of each individual country is an integral part of

¹ *International Affairs*, No. 4, 1960, p. 441.

the existent world economy. The idea of economic independence does not at all mean economic isolation, as Prof. Frenkel asserts. The international division of labour and the necessity of economic relations it predicates are realities no one can ignore.

But the nature of these economic relations between countries varies. In some cases they are voluntary relations between equal partners, as, for instance, relations between the socialist countries and the rest of the world. In other cases such relations are imposed by force, as by a metropolitan country on its colony. Sometimes they take the form of mutually advantageous economic cooperation, as between the countries of the socialist system and many countries of the African continent, or they may take the form of the exploitation of one country by another. When we speak of the achievement of economic independence by the African countries, what we mean is not that they should break off their economic ties with the outside world, but that the nature of those ties should be changed so that they accord with the interests of the African countries and their development.

This is how the French journal *Economie et politique* defines economic independence:

"The two most general criteria of economic independence may be defined as follows: the possibility to put an end to imperialist plunder; the possibility to choose one's own way of development.

"Unless these two closely linked and basic criteria are present, self-determination will lack a real foundation and will look more like a 'neo-colonialist trick'. The relationship between them may be expressed very simply: if imperialism continues to exercise its habitual methods of plunder, it will be in a position to appropriate the fruits of the people's efforts towards progress; if it retains its political and economic sway, it will resist any development that might prevent such appropriation of the people's gains."²

The problem under consideration may be formulated briefly as follows: achievement of economic independence means the establishment of a system of economic relations with foreign countries which precludes, first, the possibility of dictate on the part of any country or group of countries,

and, secondly, the possibility of some part of the national income leaving the country without its equivalent in one form or another being received in return. In other words, the achievement of economic independence strengthens a country's sovereignty and delivers it from plunder by other countries.

And now let us examine these two aspects of the problem of economic independence.

How To Be Freed of Foreign Political Pressure

One of the typical features of colonialism is that the economy of the colony finds itself tied to the economy of the metropolitan country. Much has been written about the nature of colonialism, and all kinds of things have been said about it. It has even been claimed that colonialism was a blessing to the colonial countries. We shall not argue with such contentions; the question is sufficiently clear. We shall confine ourselves to an economic analysis of colonialism in the context of the scientific problem with which we are dealing. In setting up the colonial system the European powers intended to supply their industries with cheap raw materials and provide markets for their finished goods.

We need only recall the utterance of the French politician Léon Michel Gambetta dating to the period of the emergence of the colonial system. Addressing Parliament in 1881 (he was Prime Minister at the time), he said: "Can not you see that the nations are suffocating on this old continent? Aren't you trying to create distant markets and encourage the necessary expansion everywhere? What do we need this expansion for, gentlemen? It is necessary for the improvement of our material welfare."³

A little later these two economic motives of colonial expansion, sources of raw materials and markets, were supplemented by a third—the search for profitable spheres of capital investment. All that is common knowledge. But it does no harm to mention it again for the light it sheds on the problem of economic independence.

The African countries were involved in the world economy and the international division of labour forcibly and at a rapid pace. A definite role was imposed on them: to

² *Economie et politique*, juillet-août, 1960.

³ Chambre des Députés, 1 décembre, 1881.

supply industries of the metropolitan country with raw materials and to purchase its manufactured goods. That state of affairs continued throughout the colonial period right up to the proclamation of political independence. The African countries exported cotton and imported textiles, exported hides and imported footwear, exported iron ore and imported metal articles, and so on. The former metropolitan countries would like to perpetuate that relationship, to make it hold even after their colonies have become sovereign states. They do not hide the fact. The authors of *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, published in the U.S.A. in 1956, make a clean breast of it: "Another major interest of the West in its relations with the underdeveloped countries is its concern for expanding the sources of primary products and increasing the markets for industrial exports."⁴

The colonial powers jealously guarded their monopoly rights to exploit the colonies, admitting other powers into them only to the extent that it was to their own interest. For example, in 1959, the last year of the existence of the French colonial system in Africa, France accounted for 83.4 per cent of the exports of Mauritania, Senegal and the so-called French Sudan, 85.3 per cent of those of Niger, 75.2 per cent of the imports of Upper Volta, etc. The situation in every colonial country on the eve of the declaration of independence was such that the bulk of the invested capital belonged to the monopolies of the respective colonial power. The latter owned the mining industry and the key enterprises of the manufacturing industries; they controlled most of the foreign trade and the credit and banking system. This implied lasting economic dependence on the metropolitan country and one-sided economic attachment to it.

The proclamation of political independence could not of itself change the picture. Proclamation of political independence means that state power passes into the hands of the national forces of the former colony which thereby regains state sovereignty. That is a great victory, an event of historic moment heralding the beginning of a new period in the life of the country. But it does not as yet do away

⁴ *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy*, New York, 1956, p. 227.

with economic dependence on the former metropolitan state. Economic dependence does not disappear automatically the moment political independence is proclaimed. In fact, the main branches of the economies of nearly all the African countries, such as industry, the plantations, foreign trade, etc., are owned to this day by European or American monopoly firms. Nor are they just random firms. All of them are interlinked through the machinery of their respective governments and exert a great influence on their policies. Such is the nature of the intricate system of state-monopoly capital, and until the backbone of that tremendous force is broken and the domination of the foreign monopolies in the newly independent African states is ended, complete national independence is out of the question.

Some people think that the preservation of the privileged position of the former colonial power in the country that has been freed from its direct political domination, is of no vital importance. President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic puts it this way, for instance: "We shall stand in need of aid from the more developed countries for some years to come, and it will only be right if France retains her privileged position in that respect."⁵

The selfsame people are in the habit of pointing out that today relations with the former metropolitan countries are regulated by treaties. This is quite true, but when one of the contracting parties happens to be economically dependent on the other, it is quite obvious that what we have is not a treaty between equal partners. As we know, politics is the concentrated expression of economics. It is not a matter of the good or bad intentions of the government of the metropolitan country, but of the economic interests of the monopolies the government is obliged to protect. We also know that commercial interests and the urge to extract the maximum profits rank highest in the world of so-called free enterprise with its frantic competition. Such is the law of life of the capitalist world. Consequently, negotiations that look equitable in form cannot be genuinely equitable if one of the parties is economically dependent on the other. That is a stern reality which rides roughshod over good intentions.

Economic dependence is bound to limit a government's

⁵ *Le Monde*, 30-31 octobre, 1960.

freedom of action, to tie its hands and make it reckon with the interests of the former metropolitan country. Sometimes the governments of economically dependent countries are forced to waive their own national interests in favour of the former metropolitan power. That holds for both foreign and domestic policy. Economic dependence restricts a country's freedom in choosing its path of further development. Which is just another way of saying that its political independence cannot be complete while the country remains economically dependent, whether on one country or many countries. Hence, to consummate the anti-colonialist national revolution it is essential for the young African states to do away with economic dependence, i.e., to alter their systems of foreign economic relations in such a way that no other country can dictate to them.

The experience the young African states have already accumulated as well as their development programmes show that they have extensive possibilities for achieving economic independence. Let us consider those possibilities.

The first is by establishing their own industries, above all manufacturing industries. There are many reasons why it is wrong for those countries to go on basing their national economies, as before, on the production of raw materials. Here are the main reasons.

Sir William Petty, the founder of the English classical school of political economy, pointed out in his day: "The earth is the mother of wealth and labour is its father." Indeed, wealth is created by labour, but labour can be more productive or less productive. It is an axiom that industrial labour is more productive than agricultural labour. That is true even when agricultural production employs machinery. Industrial development means that a part of the population turns from less productive labour in agriculture to more productive labour in industry, with the immediate result of a rise in the national income. The way to eliminate poverty and then to attain to abundance lies in developing industry. There is no other way.

Another aspect of the problem of productivity levels in agricultural as against industrial labour must also be kept in mind. Although it does not bear immediately on economic independence, it is directly related to the problem of industrialisation. The average level of the productivity of social labour in an industrially developed country is

higher than in a country where the bulk of social labour is expended on agriculture. Consequently, an industrial country expends less labour on the same unit of output than an agrarian country. When commodities are exchanged between two such countries, the exchange is not equivalent: in return for a definite amount of labour spent on the production of the goods it exports, the agrarian country receives a smaller amount of labour in the form of the goods it imports from the industrialised country. In other words, in trading with an industrial country, the agrarian country gives the latter free of charge a part of its social labour, which William Petty tells us is the father of wealth. While its magnitude cannot be expressed statistically, it is a factor which obviously stems from Adam Smith's theory of labour value, later elaborated by Karl Marx, the founder of Marxist political economy.

Karl Marx spoke of the exploitation of village by town. And were the colonies not the same kind of world countryside in relation to the industrially developed West? To stop the exploitation of the African countries by the industrial countries of Europe and America, the former must catch up with the latter in level of industrial development. Non-equivalent exchange is a stern, objectively-operating economic factor, and nothing, not even full political equality, can deliver the agrarian countries, under conditions of free enterprise and competition, from exploitation by the industrial countries.

A grave warning to the countries whose economies are based on the production of agricultural raw materials is implicit in the lagging demand perceptible over the past few decades for those raw materials, as against the growth in industrial output. That is the result of a number of factors, primarily of the advancement of the chemical industry and the substitution of synthetic products for natural products. As science and engineering advance, natural products will be increasingly replaced by artificial products, with the inevitable contraction of the world market for primary materials and fall in their prices. A discrepancy in the price indices for raw materials and manufactured goods is in fact already apparent.

And so we read in the 1956 Report of the Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): "Those countries which would be affected by the reduction

in world trade in agricultural commodities would find their export proceeds, their capacity to import, and their ability to carry out their development programmes severely curtailed."⁶

These trends of world economic development make the industrialisation of the African countries a vital task. Exactly what is meant by industrialisation?

The development of the extracting industries enters into the concept of industrialisation, but does not exhaust it. The mining industry must be developed, of course, but it alone cannot create the prerequisites for the attainment of economic independence. The increased production of consumer goods is also part of the concept of industrialisation, but that is not the whole story either. The development of such branches of industry as food, textiles, etc., is of tremendous importance to the creation of a sound national economy in the African countries. It raises the value of the products they export—not in the form of raw materials now, but of semi-finished and finished goods. It reduces imports of consumer goods, which eases the balance of payments. It draws part of the population into more productive industrial labour, immediately augmenting the country's national income.

Those are very important gains, but the tasks of industrialisation do not stop there. In order to develop mining and the production of consumer goods, one needs machines, equipment, plant. Who is to supply them? The industrially developed countries of the West would like to keep their monopoly on the sale of machinery to the African countries. "Development leading toward economic independence based on a balanced industrialisation", say the American economists H. Olden and P. Phillips, "is not a part of the American definition. Such development would conflict with American exports of manufactured goods and American control of underdeveloped areas."⁷

"Balanced industrialisation" entails the establishment of an industry that produces the means of production. The American economists are quite right when they say that industrialisation of that kind runs counter to the interests of

⁶ *GATT, International Trade 1956, 1957*, p. 35.

⁷ *Economic Notes* (published by Labour Research Association), New York, September 1952, p. 10.

the U.S.A. and of the other industrially developed countries of the West, depriving them of the opportunity to control the less developed areas.

The establishment of an industry that puts out machines and other industrial equipment is a difficult task, essentially beyond the power of any one African country by itself. Only a big country like the Soviet Union, which has an abundance of all kinds of raw materials, could create a self-sufficient industrial set-up in the course of socialist construction. Most of the African countries, as already noted, belong among the small and as yet very poor countries. It would be impossible for each of them separately to create complete industrial set-ups. But the same task is quite feasible for Africa as a whole, and even for certain of its regions.

We shall not dwell here on Africa's potentialities, for everyone knows how rich and diversified its natural resources are. Essential to the solution of the above difficult task are such measures as the division of labour among countries, cooperation on the basis of long-term economic agreements, and the establishment of all-African or regional economic organisations. The idea of economic cooperation among the African countries is gaining in popularity. There can be no doubt that this idea will be realised, and then Africa will be in a position to export equipment as well as raw materials. Only then will it attain to the level of economic development of the other countries of the globe.

In speaking of the advisability of organising all-African or regional economic organisations, we must not overlook the possibility of such organisations falling under the control of the former metropolitan countries and being used to jeopardize the attainment of economic independence by the African countries. When we speak of unity, the question that naturally arises is: unity for what purpose? There are different kinds of unity, and not every kind is beneficial to the development of the African countries. That holds for the formation of the all-African or regional economic organisations as well. It is a matter that calls for caution and vigilance, lest the former metropolitan powers or the United States try to exploit the popular idea of unity in order to achieve imperialist and colonialist ends.

Another important task bearing on the problem of economic independence is that of the reconstruction of agriculture.

Economic dependence is particularly flagrant when the country's agriculture is specialised in the cultivation and exportation of only one or two crops. That is exactly the situation that obtains in most of the African countries. The colonial powers deliberately pursued a policy of specialising their colonies in the production of one or two crops, in order to provide their own industries with raw materials. Some of the colonies supplied them with cocoa beans, others with cotton, still others with rubber. . . . The African countries will have to overcome this legacy of the colonial past, do away with the narrow specialisation of their agriculture, and branch out into mixed farming. By going over to mixed farming, they will solve three important tasks at once: lessen their economic dependence, stabilise their economies, stop importing foodstuffs and thereby improve their balance of payments.

There are certain difficulties and temporary losses involved in setting up a diversified agriculture. The introduction of new crops previously unknown to the peasants is bound to result in a temporary drop in labour productivity. But it soon repays. World prices of primary goods are extremely unstable. In 1954 cocoa beans fetched 430 pounds a ton, and two years later 209 pounds; peanuts were sold at 78 pounds in 1956 and 60 pounds in 1958. The countries engaged in the production of these raw materials incurred tremendous losses, far in excess of the temporary losses involved in the transition to mixed farming. In his article "Practical Contribution to the Development of Africa's Underdeveloped Countries", the West German economist Allardt points out that in 1958 U.S., British and French aid to the developing countries came to 3,500 million dollars, while the losses incurred by those countries due to the slump in prices on their raw products ran into 5,000 million dollars.⁸

It must also be noted that the introduction of new crops immediately improves the diet of the people, a paramount consideration, without doubt, for the governments. A policy calculated to satisfy the material and cultural needs of the population to the utmost is the best indication of the progressive nature of any state.

To achieve economic independence, it is extremely important to increase the range of contracting parties with

which a given country develops economic ties. Bluntly speaking, that enables the country to bargain, play on competition, and arrive at the most favourable business terms. From that standpoint, the decision of some African governments to join a narrow and closed group like the European Economic Community (Common Market) cannot be considered rational.

It is useful to recall that the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, moving spirit of the European Coal and Steel Association which was the precursor of the Common Market, himself described that organisation as "collective colonialism". The term "collective colonialism" was invented not by the opponents of the Common Market, but by its initiators. What they had in mind in setting up the Common Market was precisely the joint colonial exploitation of their African domains. Nor has that trend of E.E.C. policy changed any within the past few years: it remains the same "collective colonialism" it started with. As stated by one of the experts at the conference on the policy of the E.E.C. in the developing countries, held in October 1961 at Bari, their sole purpose in granting credits and aid is to ensure markets for their goods. Many African statesmen correctly see a menace to independent development in association with the Common Market. Opposing the idea of affiliation with the Common Market, the Finance Minister of Sierra Leone said: "We have just gained independence and we are not going to renounce it."⁹

There are two economic systems in the world: capitalist and socialist. This is not the place to argue which is superior—for us, of course, the superiority of the socialist system is incontestable; but it must be noted that the two systems differ in the approach to economic cooperation with the newly independent countries. And it does not depend on the good or evil will of the governments; their approach is determined by the difference between the social and economic character of those systems.

The capitalist system is a system of private, or, as it is sometimes called, free enterprise, where the law of cutthroat competition prevails. Private owners, and that includes companies, are obliged to seek the highest possible profits, for otherwise they will be ruined by their rivals. Disinterested

⁸ *Aussenpolitik*, No. 10, 1960, p. 669.

⁹ *The African Communist*, No. 10, 1962, p. 9.

aid is impossible under such conditions. "Capital eschews no profit or very small profit, just as Nature was formerly said to abhor a vacuum. With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10 per cent will ensure its employment anywhere. . . , 100 per cent will make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300 per cent, and there is not a crime at which it will scruple. . . ."¹⁰

Such is the nature of capital, and only the very naive can let themselves think that the capitalist is capable of charity or disinterested aid.

Added to that are the political interests of the governments of the imperialist states. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, J. Satterthwaite, once said, in answer to a question in the Senate Committee as to why North Africa was being given special consideration in America's plans of economic aid to the African countries, that the reasons lay in the special political and military interests of the United States in that area. U.S. economic aid to Libya, he added, was important because Libya still agreed to the placing of American military installations on its territory.¹¹ That hardly sounds like disinterested aid, does it?

Matters stand differently when it comes to the socialist countries, where the means of production are socially owned and there is no place for competition and profit hunting. That is why a socialist country, unlike the capitalist countries, is in a position to render selfless aid. The above, of course, is not a call for the severance of economic ties with the capitalist world. It is the actual picture of the world today with which we must reckon.

The reconstruction of the national economy by setting up industry and mixed farming and developing economic relations with all countries irrespective of their social systems is therefore the principal way to rule out the possibility of dictation by any country or group of countries.

How To Prevent Plunder by Other Countries

Now let us consider another aspect of the problem of economic independence: prevention of the outflow of a part of a country's national income without the inflow of its

¹⁰ T. J. Dunning, *Trades' Unions and Strikes: Their Philosophy and Intention*, London, 1860, pp. 35-36.

¹¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, April 18, 1960, p. 608.

proper equivalent. The term "national income" is variously interpreted in political economy. Space does not permit us to go into a critical analysis of the varied interpretations of the concept. There is no passing over the fact, however, that the way the national income is calculated in the capitalist countries makes for the artificial overestimation of its size and camouflages the exploitation inherent in capitalist relations. The very method of calculating the national income chiefly on the basis of taxation statistics tends to inflate its size, as it includes income from trading operations, services and other spheres where no material values are actually created. Soviet economists have estimated that the resultant increment is about 25 per cent on the average.

Marxist political economy endows the concept of national income with the following content. The aggregate value of the gross national product put out in a given country in a year consists of two parts. The cost of primary products, fuel and other materials used up in the process of production plus the sinking fund of the means of production constitutes the first part of the value of the gross national product; this value was created earlier, i.e., in the course of previous years, and then transferred to a new product in the process of labour. The second part comprises the value newly created by the labour of people engaged in material production. Such a division of the aggregate value of the product goes back to Adam Smith' *Wealth of Nations* (1776).

It is this second part, the newly created value, that constitutes the country's national income. It, in turn, is divided into two parts, the consumption and accumulation funds. The latter serves as a basis for reproduction on an extended scale—the material basis of progress. The rate of development of any society or country depends on what share of the national income goes into the accumulation fund.

The economic essence of colonialism, whatever form it may take, consists in the export of a part of a colony's national income to the metropolitan country without the reciprocal import of an equivalent value. That explains why the metropolitan countries were able to get so far ahead in economic development over the past century, while the colonies lagged behind.

There are many theories explaining the poverty of the African countries. In his book entitled *The Economy of Af-*

rica, published in 1961 in the Oxford Press *New Africa's Library*, Arthur Hazlewood explains that self-evident fact as follows: "The economy of Africa does not produce enough goods and services for the Africans. . . . The amount produced is low because the productivity of people in Africa is low. . . . Natural conditions are generally not very favourable for high productivity. . . . In Africa capital is very scarce. . . . Compared with the rich countries of the world, the countries of Africa use very little capital in almost all economic activities. . . . The hoe is the main agricultural tool. . . . Many African workers lack the skills. . . ." ¹²

Thus, according to Hazlewood, the cause of poverty lies in the Africans themselves, and in their natural environment. But, scientifically, the question of why the African workers are unskilled, why their labour productivity is low, why the hoe is the main agricultural tool, and why capital is scarce in Africa is left open. Until all those why's are answered, the reason for the poverty of the African people remains obscure.

The main question for the economist is why there is a scarcity of capital in Africa. The answer to that question is plain: because a considerable part of the national income which should go into the accumulation fund and serve as the material basis of progress flows out of Africa without any equivalent coming back. Some estimates place that part at approximately a quarter of the national income. This is the principal reason for the economic retardation of Africa. The inevitable conclusion is that Africa cannot get on its feet and secure normal economic development until the outflow of its national income is checked. "Financial haemorrhage", it was aptly termed by Mr. Mathieu Ekra, Minister of Information in the Ivory Coast Republic. He backed up his contention by the following shocking figure: the inflow of foreign capital into his country in 1961 amounted to 14 million pounds, while the profits pumped out of it stood at 28 millions. ¹³

The task is to block up all the channels through which the national income leaks out of Africa. The governments of many of the African countries have already tackled that problem. Let us see what the chief ways of stopping the

"financial haemorrhage" are: nationalisation of the enterprises belonging to foreign companies; compulsory reinvestment of a part of the foreign companies' profits; higher taxes on profits; the establishment of national banks and insurance companies and of the country's own navy and air force; regulation by the state of exports and imports and currency operations. Little has been done so far in that direction but we can understand why, considering that the majority of the African states only achieved political independence several years ago. The important thing is that a start has been made and ways found of solving that task. How soon it will be fulfilled, depends on the governments and their consistency in implementing the above measures.

This brings us to the question of the interdependence of two of the main aspects, mentioned earlier, of the problem we are considering. Measures aimed at checking the non-equivalent outflow of part of the national income are bound to encounter the resistance of the foreign investors, the foreign trading and banking corporations and the foreign governments behind them. That was strikingly borne out by what happened in Ghana in 1962. No sooner did the government announce its intention of making the foreign companies reinvest 60 per cent of their profits in Ghana's economy than bombs began to fly at the President of the Republic. The forms of pressure used in other countries may not be so extreme, but the fight is on everywhere between the foreign companies and the governments of the African countries. Exploiting the economic dependence of these countries and the dearth of foreign capital investments, the imperialists are squeezing concessions out of the governments, to the detriment of Africa's economic development.

The governments of the African countries can be the more consistent and firm in checking the export of profits, the less their economy is dependent on foreign states and, consequently, the fewer the loopholes for foreign dictate. But for that, as we have already said, they must develop their own industry and agriculture and ensure the balanced development of their national economies. And the tighter they close the channels along which their national income leaks out, the sooner they can accomplish the above task. Hence these two fundamental aspects of the problem of economic independence—precluding the possibility of dictate by other countries and ruling out the possibility of the

¹² A. Hazlewood, *The Economy of Africa*, London, 1961, pp. 73-79.

¹³ *West Africa*, February 10, 1962, p. 157.

leakage of part of their national incomes—are inseparable and organically interlocked. Their organic interdependence is the crux of the problem.

But here is a question relating to both aspects of the problem: which is to be preferred—private capitalist enterprise or the establishment of state-owned enterprises? In our view, the second course has every advantage over private enterprise. Briefly its advantages boil down to the following: the establishment of state-owned enterprises ensures an incomparably higher rate of economic development than private enterprise; it is the surest way of closing the channels through which the national income leaks out to other countries; it is the best method of doing away with domination by the foreign monopolies. Considering the extreme weakness of private national capital in practically all the countries of the African continent, it must be admitted that only the creation of a state sector in the economy can guarantee the achievement of economic independence in a short space of time.

Economic Independence and the Position of the People

In conclusion, it is necessary to consider still another condition which promotes the most rapid achievement of economic independence. As already stated, the national income consists of two parts: accumulation and consumption funds. The consumption fund takes in the costs of the production and reproduction of labour-power, which is to say, the maintenance of the working man and his family, as well as the private or non-productive expenditures of the capitalists (where they still exist); the maintenance of the state machine; outlays for education, health and other social services; defence outlays. The last item should and could be eliminated, provided a decision were adopted on general and complete disarmament and the exclusion of wars from the life of society.

The distribution of the consumption fund is closely linked to the problem of economic independence. The amount of the national income and the corresponding amount of the accumulation fund as the basis of economic development are in direct proportion to the level of labour productivity, for the higher labour productivity is, the higher are the rates of accumulation and development. Labour productivity depends on a number of subjective and objective factors.

The most important subjective factor is the workers' desire to do all in their power for the prosperity of their country. The objective factors include the workers' technical know-how and the extent to which their material and spiritual requirements are satisfied. Other things being equal, higher standards of literacy and professional skill, and fuller satisfaction of the workers' material needs (food, housing, etc.) make for higher productivity of labour.

The art of governing a state in the interests of progress lies in establishing and maintaining the proper correlation—first, between the accumulation and the consumption funds, and, second, between the components comprising the consumption fund. History has shown that the wider the participation of all sections of the population in the administration of state affairs, the more successfully the task is solved.

THE PROBLEM OF "AFRICAN SOCIALISM"

Africa and socialism—that is an extremely popular subject today. A number of books specially devoted to that subject have already appeared, and it is being widely discussed in the world press. A special section which took the name of "African Socialism" was set up at the annual conference of the African Studies Association of the U.S.A. held in October 1962. In December 1962 an international colloquy was held in Dakar on the African road to socialism. The numerous and diversified views voiced in the course of that discussion, which assumed a worldwide character, may be reduced to these two fundamental questions:

1) Can the African countries go over to socialism directly without passing through the capitalist stage of development?

2) What is "African Socialism", and what relation does it bear to the scientific theory of socialism?

To clarify the first question, it is expedient to divide it into two parts: the theoretical possibility of non-capitalist development for the African countries, and the practical possibility and advisability of that path of development.

On Theoretical Possibility of Non-Capitalist Development for African Countries

A book with the presumptuous and misleading title of *Marxism, Communism and African Socialism* appeared in

Paris in 1962.¹⁴ The author set himself the task of proving that Africa could not bypass the capitalist stage of development in order to reach socialism, and that it would absolutely have to go through the capitalist stage. Taking cognizance of the wide currency of Marxist ideas in Africa, as everywhere else, and of the tremendous appeal Marxism has for the people, the author quotes Marx and his theory of historical materialism.

"Marx has always maintained", he writes, "that socialism could not be built in a society which has not been previously transformed and made ready by capitalism, which has left it as a legacy a powerful apparatus of industrial production and a numerous working class comprising the majority of the population. . . . Thus, according to Marx, socialism must inevitably succeed capitalism, just as capitalism succeeded feudalism, and feudalism ancient society (slavery.—*I.P.*). . . . Capitalism must precede socialism, just as feudalism preceded capitalism. . . ." And further, Marx allegedly "affirmed that socialism was unattainable, and that any attempts to hasten its coming were doomed to failure, until the capitalist system should reach the highest stage of its development."¹⁵

In order to lend credence to his views on the theory of historical materialism, René Milon cites the following lines from Marx' Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*: "No social formation ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself."¹⁶

But in quoting Marx, Milon slips into an inaccurate expression which makes all the difference in this argument. Instead of "social formation" he writes "society." There is reason to believe that this substitution of concepts was intentional on Milon's part. The German original says "Gesellschaftsformation", and the French edition "formation sociale".¹⁷

¹⁴ René Milon, *Marxisme, Communisme et Socialisme Africain*, Paris, 1962.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 14.

¹⁶ К. Маркс и Ф. Энгельс, *Сочинения*, т. 13, Москва, 1959, стр. 7.

¹⁷ *Œuvres complètes de Karl Marx* (« Contribution à la critique de l'économie politique », Paris, 1954, p. 30).

"Social formation" and "society" are different concepts. The concept "society" has two meanings: a particular society (of a given country or people; in this case, "African society"), or society in general, at a specific stage of its development, as feudalism, capitalism, etc. In order to be explicit, Marx said not "society", but "social formation", inasmuch as he had in mind a definite mode of production—slave-owning (ancient), feudal, bourgeois or capitalist.

It is a known fact that peoples and countries develop unevenly. In the contemporary capitalist world there are highly advanced, advanced and developing countries. The countries of Africa belong to the latter group. There is no need to explain why they lagged behind in their development; the reasons are now clear to all unprejudiced persons. Adhering precisely to the principle set down by Karl Marx, the question should be put as follows: have the material conditions ripened sufficiently in contemporary bourgeois society for the transition to a new and higher form of organising social production—to socialism? This is no longer a question of theory. It is one of practice, for the world socialist system already exists.

Another question arises in this connection: what about those countries in which the capitalist form of organising social production has not as yet reached its highest stage of development? Must they continue to develop along the capitalist road? Does it follow from Marx' teachings that every country and every nation must pass through all the stages of development: slavery, feudalism, capitalism? That, too, is a question of practice and not theory.

Many peoples of Europe, among them the English, did not know the slave-owning mode of production, but went over from primitive-communal society to feudalism, bypassing the slave-owning formation. No one can deny that the peoples of the Soviet Far North, for example the Nentsi, Evenki, Chukchi and others, now live in socialist conditions. But they did not know either the slave-owning, or the feudal, or the capitalist formations; consequently they went over to socialism bypassing all those formations. The whole course of history shows that it is by no means essential for every people to pass through all the stages of historical development.

The founders of Marxism were perfectly aware of man's historical past, and could not have overlooked that peculiari-

ty of historical development. Anyone who studies their writings closely will easily find in them statements showing that they acknowledged the possibility of certain peoples and countries bypassing one or another stage of historical development in the future.

Marx and Engels maintained that there is a definite sequence of socio-economic formations, and that it is impossible for feudal society to succeed capitalism. But nowhere and never did they write that all peoples must inevitably pass through all the stages of historical development. The works of Marx and Engels do not present a detailed and fully elaborated theory of the non-capitalist development of backward nations to socialism without passing through capitalism. Such a possibility did not as yet exist in their lifetime and so there was no practical need for such a theory. It is to Lenin and his successors that the credit for evolving such a theory goes. René Milon knows it and reproduces Lenin's statement on the question, but proclaims it "a deviation from Marxism". Behold the apologist for capitalism in the role of a "defender" of Marx against those who "distort" him!

The deliberate distortions of Marxism found in René Milon's book might well be ignored, were it not for the currency they have gained in certain intellectual circles in Africa. It is noteworthy that even during the colonial period, the classical Marxist work, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, was included in the programmes of Africa's universities. The colonialists did not want the students to read that work themselves and understand its meaning correctly. They only included it in the curriculum to be able to present it in a light favourable to the interests of colonialism.

The colonialists tried to imbue educated Africans with the idea that Marxism was outdated in general and could not be applied to the specific conditions of Africa. Even today there are African intellectuals as well as statesmen and political leaders who continue to say that Marxist-Leninist theory "is not suited to African realities". But no sooner are such claims carefully analysed than it appears that they stem from a dogmatic approach to Marxism-Leninism. The founders and classics of Marxism never regarded their theories as fixed dogmas, each tenet of which was suitable for all times and circumstances. "The truth is concrete," they told their followers. Marxist-Leninist theory is a scientific

theory; it does not mark time, but develops along with the development of society, and is continually enriched with new facts and theses. V. I. Lenin said: "The Marxist must think in terms of real life, of the exact facts of *reality*, and not go on clinging to yesterday's theory, which, like all theory, at best merely indicates what is basic and general, merely *approximates* the complexity of life."¹⁸ Marxism-Leninism is a universal theory in the sense that it serves as a guide to action in all circumstances provided one knows how to apply it correctly. It is the only scientific theory on the transformation of contemporary society into socialist society. Those who reject it are inevitably led astray by sundry bourgeois theories designed to justify the capitalist system and obstruct the transition to socialism. The question stands sharply: either socialism or capitalism; there is no third way.

René Milon is therefore wrong in claiming that according to the teaching of Karl Marx the African peoples are bound to pass through the capitalist stage of development. He deliberately distorts Marxism and misleads African readers for the sole purpose of forcing the capitalist road of development on them.

On Practical Possibility and Advisability of Non-Capitalist Development for African Countries

The colonial policy of plunder has made Africa the most backward region of the world. We shall not weary the reader with statistics on the state of industry and agriculture in Africa—they are too well known. We shall simply give a few figures on the living conditions of the masses. Average annual per capita national income for 1952-1954 was 740-780 dollars in Britain and France, but in Kenya it was 60 dollars, and in Uganda 50 dollars. Average annual consumption of meat per head of population in Britain and France is 41-54 kilogrammes, but in the former Belgian Congo it is 0.9 and in Ghana 2.5 kilogrammes. Life expectation ranges from 30.5 (Guinea, 1958) to 40 years (Congo, 1950-1952), as compared with about 60 years in Europe, which means that in France there are 250 adults for every 100 children, but in Upper Volta only 87. In other words, every

¹⁸ В. И. Ленин, *Полное собрание сочинений*, т. 31, Москва, 1962, стр. 134.

adult in Upper Volta has to feed three times as many dependents as a French adult. The circle tightens: widespread chronic malnutrition, protein hunger, disease, extremely low labour productivity. What is the way out of this vicious circle?

The former masters of the colonies—the West European imperialists, U.S. imperialists, and their allies, the African capitalists, urge the capitalist road of development. But, may we ask, how much time would it take Africa to catch up with Britain and France if it followed the capitalist road? The whole world now knows that the socialist system ensures rates of economic development which are much higher than the capitalist rates. That is amply substantiated by two figures: in the U.S.S.R., the per capita rise in industrial output was 48 per cent in the five years from 1958 to 1962, and in the United States, the richest country in the capitalist world, only 8 per cent. Besides, who will say that in the advanced capitalist countries all the members of society are guaranteed a high standard of living, that there is no poverty, mass unemployment and hunger there?

We could quote plenty of evidence. But we shall content ourselves with one example—Liberia, which the American press likes to describe as the show-window of capitalism in tropical Africa. The London *Times* has said of it: "Liberia is a country of free enterprise and if at one end of the scale people appear shabby and rather farouche, at the other there is considerable wealth."¹⁹

"Capitalism is the road of suffering for the people," says the Programme of the Soviet Communist Party. "It will not ensure rapid economic progress nor eliminate poverty; social inequality will increase. The capitalist development of the countryside will ruin the peasantry still more. The workers will be fated either to engaging in back-breaking labour to enrich the capitalists, or to swelling the ranks of the disinherited army of the unemployed. The petty bourgeoisie will be crushed in competition with big capital. The benefits of culture and education will remain out of reach of the people. The intelligentsia will be compelled to sell its talent."

After a close examination of the economic activity of the imperialist powers in Africa, one cannot help asking

¹⁹ *Times*, January 10, 1958.

whether the African countries can ever be expected to overtake Britain, the U.S.A. and France if they remain within the capitalist system. The evidence points to a negative answer. The foremost people of Africa realise it, and are speaking out in favour of the socialist road of development. There is no need here to quote all the statements to that effect that have been made by outstanding African statesmen and political figures like Sékou Touré, Modibo Keita, Leopold Senghor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Julius Nyerere and others. We shall limit ourselves to recounting the speech made by the Tanganyika Minister of Trade and Industry, Kahama, in Parliament in June 1962.²⁰ Tanganyika, he said, had been part of the British Empire for more than forty years. Soviet Russia, too, had been in existence for somewhat over forty years. Before the Revolution, Russia had been a state with an extremely backward economy and an illiterate population. Now, he said, compare the Tanganyika and Russia of our days. Although Russia had gone through two devastating wars, she had become a leading world power, while Tanganyika had remained almost as she was forty years ago. How could this startling contrast be explained? By the fact that a socialist system of social production had been created in Russia, Kahama declared.

The capitalist road is not closed to the African peoples and countries, of course. All the prerequisites for the development of capitalism are at hand. That is the course the imperialists and their ideological crusaders like René Milon want to foist on them. A mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development worked in Tanganyika in 1959-1960 and published a thick volume on *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*. One of its many recommendations was the abolition of communal ownership of the land, partitioning of the communal land among the peasants and its conversion into private property. As they are honest people, the authors point out in the same breath that a reform of the above nature would entail "eventual concentration of ownership of land in the hands of those who have money to lend, and the creation of a destitute landless class."²¹

²⁰ *Sunday News*, June 17, 1962, p. 7.

²¹ *The Economic Development of Tanganyika. Report of a Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*, Baltimore, 1961, p. 95.

That is what development along capitalist lines means: a small section of rich farmers and big landowners separates off, while the mass of the peasantry are ruined and become farm labourers. Is that prospect to the liking of the African peasants? That is a question they must decide for themselves. In general, the choice between the capitalist or the non-capitalist roads of development is for the African peoples themselves to make. The socialist system of social production cannot be forced on a nation, and no intentions of doing so are entertained in any quarter. Revolutions cannot be exported, as we all know. The African peoples themselves must decide which path of development suits them best. Progressive Africans have already given their opinion, and it is against the capitalist road of development.

The matter stands then as follows: theoretically it is possible for Africa to go over directly to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, and the desire to do so is also present. What about the objective conditions? Any honest person will admit that they also exist.

What are those conditions?

First, there exists the world socialist system. That is a most important prerequisite; without the world socialist system, there could be no question of socialist development for nations that had not passed through the capitalist stage. The significance of the existence of the world socialist system for their direct transition to socialism lies in the following:

1) Besides the socialist system, there still exists in the world the capitalist system—imperialism. The imperialist countries are violently opposed to the former colonies and semi-colonies taking the socialist path. They will resort to any means to prevent it, not exclusive of intervention and the obliteration of those countries' political independence.

The world socialist system guarantees the independence of those countries. The defeat of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt and the U.S. aggression against Cuba is proof enough of the fact. The existence of the world socialist system ties the imperialists' hands and keeps the imperialist powers from resorting to extreme measures.

2) The socialist countries are extending all-round economic, technical and cultural aid to the countries that have freed themselves from colonialism and embarked on the independent construction of their life. "The C.P.S.U. regards it as its internationalist duty", says the Soviet Communist

Party Programme, "to assist peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence, all peoples who are fighting for the complete abolition of the colonial system." Everyone knows that this aid has no political strings attached, and is extended to all countries no matter which road they have chosen, the capitalist or the socialist. The fundamental importance of their aid is that it compels the imperialist powers to be more compliant in granting credits and loans and to offer less fettering terms. Its fundamental importance lies, again, in that the socialist countries' aid promotes the development of the branches of the economy which can best ensure economic independence, that vital condition for the consolidation of state sovereignty. African statesmen greatly value their aid.

3) The building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries provides enormously rich experience of economic, cultural and socio-political construction along socialist lines. Each socialist country has its own special features in building socialism; each has made its great contribution to this store of experience in socialist upbuilding. It is for each nation that embarks on the socialist path to decide what to take from that experience, and what to discard.

The existence of the world socialist system is a most important prerequisite for the non-capitalist development of the African peoples. The decisive prerequisite, however, is the condition of African society itself.

With respect to the latter, a differentiated approach is essential. The Republic of South Africa, for instance, is a capitalist country, with the peculiar feature that its capitalist enterprises in industry and agriculture belong to the European minority. The first need here is a national-democratic revolution to do away with the system of racial discrimination and give the African population political rights on a par with the European minority. The victory of the people's democratic revolution would pave the way for the construction of a socialist society. But the Republic of South Africa cannot bypass the capitalist stage, as capitalism already exists there. For South Africa, therefore, it is not a question of non-capitalist development, but of transition from capitalism to socialism.

In the countries of North Africa, capitalist relations are also fairly developed by now, and the classes of bourgeois society—the national bourgeoisie and working class—have

already emerged, alongside the old feudal social classes. But the extent of class differentiation is still far less than in the advanced capitalist countries. The victory of the anti-imperialist revolution and the attainment of independence have given these countries the choice of either continuing their capitalist development, or calling a halt to it and embarking on the creation of the socialist system of social production.

Thus, when we speak of the possibility of non-capitalist development we have in mind largely the countries of tropical Africa. The most typical feature of the social structure of the nations of this part of Africa is the absence of clearly defined class divisions, and the incomplete state of the process of formation of antagonistic classes. There is no class of big landlords exploiting a dependent peasantry. Some exceptions to this rule can be found in the northern parts of Nigeria and Cameroun, Ethiopia and Buganda. Neither does the national bourgeoisie exist as a class. There are semi-feudal, patriarchal-feudal forms of exploitation, and there are capitalist elements which exploit wage labour, but there is no class of feudal lords opposed to the peasantry, and there is still no class of bourgeoisie opposed to the working class.

Peasants living in dire poverty form the bulk of the population. In the colonial period they were subjected to brutal exploitation by the foreign companies and rich European farmers and planters. That is still the case even under conditions of political independence. For them the capitalist path has meant the further intensification of exploitation, destitution, reduction to the status of hired labourers. Only the establishment of the socialist system of social production can guarantee the possibility of building a happy and prosperous life for themselves to the peasants of Africa.

Disproportion between the development of the national bourgeoisie and the working class characterises all the colonial countries. Imperialist subjugation of the colonies was bound to impede the formation of a national bourgeoisie. But to extract the raw materials they wanted, the colonialists had to found a mining industry, plantations, railways and ports, with the resultant need for hired labour. The number of wage labourers in tropical Africa is still small compared with the advanced capitalist countries. In Britain, 89 per cent of the gainfully-employed population were wage labourers in the 1950's, in France 67 and in Belgium 71 per

cent, but in the French colonies the figure was less than 8 per cent and in Tanganyika and the Gold Coast about 16. Only in Northern Rhodesia was the number of wage labourers about 60 per cent of the adult male population.²² And those were mainly migrants, stemming not only from Northern Rhodesia but from neighbouring countries as well. Migrant labour is a mass phenomenon common to all the countries of tropical Africa, where these semi-peasants and semi-proletarians constitute the greater part of the working class. But throughout Africa, in every country, there is also a considerable skilled and stable proletariat which forms the backbone of the numerous trade unions.

There are no reliable statistics to tell us exactly how many workers are employed at establishments belonging to Africans as against those owned by foreign companies. Nevertheless, it is quite patent that the overwhelming majority of the workers are employed at the foreign-owned establishments. The exploiter of the working class is not the national, but the foreign bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie and working class formed a united front in the fight for independence, and since the aims of anti-imperialist revolution have still not been fully achieved, the basis still exists for joint action in the near future.

The countries that have thrown off all direct political domination by the imperialists are building new industries and large agricultural undertakings. Private national capital, being weak, has a trifling share in this process. The new enterprises are being built either with government funds or by foreign companies. Which means that at least for the immediate future the working class will have to deal not with private African employers, but with foreign companies or the government. And that in turn means that the working class will grow more quickly than the national bourgeoisie.

That is a circumstance of the highest significance for the transition to the socialist path of development. The socialist system of social production cannot arise without the socialisation in one form or another of the means of production. The working class is the only class in contemporary society which is not involved in private ownership of the means of production. The African peasantry also has a vital

²² *International Labour Review*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 3, September 1956, pp. 242-243.

stake in socialisation of the means of production, for that is its only chance of extricating itself from its poverty. But the peasant does own certain means of production, however modest, and he is attached to his small plot of land; that stands in the way of his realising that socialisation of the means of production by forming cooperative farms is the only way to a better life. Thus a distinct historic mission devolves upon the working class, to take the initiative in establishing a socialist system of social production, and lead the peasantry along that road.

The working class, peasantry, intellectuals and numerous petty bourgeoisie of the towns (artisans, small tradesmen, etc.) who form the bulk of the population have no reason to favour the capitalist path of development. Socialism is their only road to happiness.

"Socialism is the road to freedom and happiness for the peoples," says the Programme of the C.P.S.U. "It ensures rapid economic and cultural progress. It transforms a backward country into an industrial country within the lifetime of one generation and not in the course of centuries. Planned socialist economy is an economy of progress and prosperity by its very nature. Abolition of the exploitation of man by man does away with social inequality. Unemployment disappears entirely. Socialism provides all peasants with land, helps them to develop farming, combines their labour efforts in voluntary cooperatives and puts modern agricultural machinery and agronomy at their disposal. Peasant labour is made more productive and the land is made more fertile. Socialism provides a high material and cultural standard of living for the working class and all working people. Socialism lifts the people out of darkness and ignorance and gives them access to modern culture. The intelligentsia is offered ample opportunities for creative effort for the benefit of the people."

The workers and peasants of Africa may not yet understand that but they are being helped to such understanding by their patriotically-minded intellectuals. Africa has such intellectuals, who have mastered the foundations of the scientific theory of socialism and are eager to dedicate their energies and knowledge to the welfare of their people. Unlike René Milon, the ideologists of imperialism often dress themselves up in "socialist" clothing. They speak for socialism, but misrepresent its nature to such an extent that

their "socialist" ideas are nothing but a veiled apology for capitalist development. We may take Rita Hinden's *Principles of Socialism. Africa and Asia*, as an example.²³ Under the guise of "democratic socialism" the author defends the principles of contemporary capitalist society. Progressive sections of the African intelligentsia oppose that kind of camouflage. They are helping the wide masses to distinguish the true advocates of socialism from all kinds of false socialists, and in so doing are performing a great historic mission.

Socialism cannot be built without a struggle. In each country there are unpatriotic forces drawn from the feudal and semi-feudal elements and certain representatives of the national bourgeoisie connected with foreign firms, etc., who place their personal selfish interests above the welfare of their people. They ally themselves with the imperialists, those inevitable and irreconcilable foes of socialism. The most reliable support of a government that has espoused the goal of building socialism lies in those who toil, above all the working class. Welded by their trade unions, the workers constitute the most organised force in contemporary African society. Due to their social position, they are highly dedicated to the idea of socialism, and that is the most important thing.

"African Socialism" or the African Road to Socialism

It has become a widespread tendency among African socialists to erroneously counterpose the scientific theory of socialism to "African Socialism". Scientific socialism is not suited to African reality, they say; let us build our own "African Socialism".

What is "African Socialism"? No whole, in any way integrated theory of "African Socialism" exists. Every advocate of "African Socialism" has his own ideas on the subject, and invests it with different content. Nevertheless, all share the same general wish: to see the exploitation of man by man eradicated. That, too, is the basic content of scientific socialism. There is no divergency on this basic point between the advocates of scientific and "African" socialism.

²³ Rita Hinden, *Principles of Socialism. Africa and Asia*, London, 1961.

How is the great and noble aim to be achieved, however? That is where the differences begin.

Scientific socialism holds that the decisive prerequisite for the eradication of the exploitation of man by man is to abolish private ownership of the means of production and socialise them. The history of mankind proves that the exploitation of man by man dates from the appearance of private ownership of the means of production, which brought into being a category of people who possessed no means of production and therefore had to work for those who did have them. Exploitation cannot be abolished until the means of production become the common property of all.

There are two kinds of private ownership of the means of production: capitalist ownership, and ownership by small producers (peasants, artisans) who do not use hired labour. Accordingly, there are two ways of abolishing private ownership of the means of production. Capitalist private ownership is abolished by nationalisation. There again, either of two possible ways may be chosen: nationalisation without compensation to the former owners, or nationalisation involving the payment of compensation. Karl Marx admitted the possibility of the proletariat compensating the capitalists whose private property they take over. The private property of the small producers is socialised by setting up production cooperatives. It must be stressed, however, that we are not talking about the socialisation of all or every kind of private property, but solely and exclusively the means of production. That is the only basis on which the socialist system of social production, which excludes the very possibility of the exploitation of man by man, can rest.

Advocates of "African Socialism" ignore that cardinal question, leaving us in the dark as to how they intend to end the exploitation of man by man. Some of them openly admit the possibility of private capitalist enterprises existing under socialism. They are obviously labouring under the influence of "democratic socialism". Rita Hinden says, for instance: "Public property has not proved a panacea for all social ills."²⁴ She believes exploitation can be eradicated while private ownership of the means of production remains. But that is a false, utopian idea aimed at preserving capitalism.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Some advocates of "African Socialism" imagine socialist society as a society of equal petty producers. They conjure up the following picture: everyone will have his own means of production but in the quantity necessary to supply his own vital necessities; everyone will manage his own farm or business independently of others and will trade the products of his own labour for those of others'; if one man suffers a misfortune, others will help him.

That kind of society, however, is simply impossible at the present stage of technical development which requires large-scale production (factories, mills, railways, etc.). In effect it would mean a return to the past, the rejection of all the achievements of mankind. And there is still another reason why this "ideal" petty bourgeois society is impossible of realisation: so long as private ownership of the means of production persists, it is inevitable for people to polarize into rich and poor, for some to grow rich and others destitute; in the final count, that polarization is what gives rise to the exploitation of man by man and the appearance of antagonistic classes of exploiters and exploited.

It may well be asked why people who sincerely wish to build a socialist society and abolish the exploitation of man by man are unwilling to accept the scientific theory of socialism, which has been tested in practice, and instead go about looking for some other kind of socialist society. The reasons are many.

The main reason is anti-communist propaganda and the effect it produces; the theory of scientific socialism was put into practice first in the Soviet Union and then in a number of other European and Asian countries. The Soviet Union is correctly considered the chief example of the application of that theory. To undermine the Soviet Union's influence on the peoples of the countries that still belong to the capitalist system, the imperialists have been furiously campaigning against it and slandering it. All the propaganda means at their disposal—the press and radio and cinema—have been used to that end. Christian missions acting on the instructions of the imperialists have been playing on the religious feelings of the Africans to set them against socialism. The Soviet Union, where the scientific theory of socialism has been put into practice is depicted by the imperialist propaganda machine as a terrible prison of the peoples where religion is banned, personal freedom denied, the fa-

family and ties of kinship repudiated, the individual made the slave of the totalitarian state, etc., etc. As the African people are drawn to socialism, realising that it is the only path to happiness, but have been frightened by anti-communist propaganda, they are trying to discover some special kind of socialism.

The imperialists skilfully exploit the perfectly legitimate desire of the African peoples for independence to their own ends. The African peoples have suffered long at the hands of foreign oppressors. They are afraid of losing their hard-won independence. Imperialist agents keep drilling it into their minds that they are menaced from the East, that is, by the socialist countries, and have invented the legend of Soviet expansion. Acceptance of the ideas of scientific socialism is portrayed as the opening of ideological expansion, allegedly to be followed by political expansion. Paradoxically, it is deemed natural and safe for them to keep forcing the bourgeois ideology of the West on the African people while propaganda of the ideas of scientific socialism is termed ideological expansion dangerous to the African people.

Propagation of false socialist theories, like the "democratic" socialism of the British Labour Party, has done much to confuse the true concept of socialism. The French Right-wing Socialists and British Labour Party leaders have enjoyed unlimited opportunities to spread their ideas in the African colonies; far from standing in their way, the colonial authorities even abetted them. That in itself is highly revealing; anxious to perpetuate their domination over the enslaved peoples of Africa, the colonialists even helped to spread these "socialist" ideas. Surely it proves that the "socialism" propagated by the British Labour Party leaders and French Right-wing Socialists is fully acceptable to the colonialists.

The latest invention of imperialist propaganda is "pragmatic socialism",²⁵ which even at a cursory glance is nothing but a fancy title for capitalism.

Africa's statesmen and political leaders are educated and mature people. They understand the real purpose behind anti-communist propaganda quite well. Yet among

them are a few who seem to be rather susceptible to that kind of propaganda, and for two reasons. Some of them are connected through ties of kinship and in some cases economic interests, with the privileged exploiting upper echelons of society. They think of the good of their people, of overcoming the backwardness of their country, and realise that it is impossible to accomplish that along the capitalist path of development. They think of socialism. Inasmuch as the establishment of a socialist system of production based on socialisation of the means of production, contradicts the interests of the privileged exploiting circles which are close to them, they begin to look for some form of socialism which would make it possible to overcome the backwardness and raise the living standards of the people, and at the same time not touch the interests of the top circles. Of course, such a form of socialism does not and cannot exist.

Other African leaders make the mistake of exaggerating the specific features of the African way of life.

The advocates of "African Socialism" often assert that African society was socialist in the past, before the arrival of the colonialists. The colonialists destroyed that socialist society, and the task now is to restore it. Reference is made to the fact that the countries of tropical Africa never had private ownership of the land, and that even today the land is the joint property of the peasant community, that mutual aid has always been widely practised there, etc. That is true enough. But it is also true that for many centuries private production has been conducted on the commonly-owned land, and for many centuries there has been inequality in property. Tropical Africa did not go through the slave-owning mode of production, but slavery existed there before the appearance of the European slave traders. Tropical Africa did not go through the feudal formation, but for many centuries feudal exploitation has existed; in some regions feudal exploitation was more highly developed, and in other less so, but it was fairly widespread. Many African peoples lived in primitive-communal society before the colonialists came, and knew neither exploitation nor the class division of society. If there was equality among these peoples, it was the equality of poverty; socialist society, on the other hand, is a society of abundance.

Advocates of "African Socialism" usually maintain that contemporary African society is a classless society. They

²⁵ See John Marcum's article "Many Roads to Pan-Africanism" (*Africa Today*, January 1963, pp. 7-8).

follow this up by the argument that the Marxists preach class struggle; inasmuch as Africa has no classes, Marxism cannot be applied to it. There are two holes in that argument. It is wrong to say that Marxism preaches class struggle. Marx said the honour of discovering classes and the class struggle did not belong to him. Classes and the class struggle existed long before Marxism. The Marxists simply presented a scientific explanation of the existence of classes and the class struggle. In contemporary capitalist society the class struggle is inflamed not by the Marxists or the working class, but by the bourgeoisie—by its refusal to satisfy the legitimate demands of the exploited, by its opposition to social progress.

Earlier we noted that although the process of the formation of classes has not been completed as yet in tropical Africa, there are feudal, semi-feudal and capitalist exploiting elements in those countries. Now with independence, the national bourgeoisie has gained certain new opportunities to develop. A new stratum is emerging which may be called the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, made up of the high-salaried civil servants. It is quite impossible to describe contemporary African society as classless.

There is indeed much in Africa that is peculiar to it and sets it apart from the other, non-African countries. That is not simply the result of its retardation, caused by colonial oppression. It is the result of the many distinctive features of the historical development of the African peoples. What bearing has that on the question of socialism? The bearing is that it necessitates special paths of transition to socialism. But, of course, there cannot be different kinds of socialism; socialism is one definite kind of system of organisation of social production and social life. Its characteristic features have been theoretically elucidated in the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and their followers. They are not the fruit of the dreams of a philosophical recluse, but the scientific summation of profound analysis of modern society. Capitalism can only be replaced by a system of social production whose basic features were outlined by the founders of Marxism.

However, the paths of transition from modern society to socialism and the means of transforming modern society into a socialist society may vary greatly. Ready-made patterns are impermissible in this matter, for everything depends

on the concrete conditions. The opponents of the socialist development of Africa often resort to the dishonest trick of identifying the call to take the road of scientific socialism as a call to follow every detail of the Soviet pattern in building socialism.

Marxists have never said that all the peoples of the world must make the transition to socialism in faithful imitation of everything that has been done in the Soviet Union. One need only study socialist upbuilding in the countries of Eastern Europe to understand the fallacy of that claim. Those countries made the transition to socialism in an entirely different way than the Soviet Union, although their level of socio-economic development was much like that of pre-revolutionary Russia.

It is one of the remarkable features of Marxist-Leninist theory that it makes consideration of the concrete historical conditions under which the basic premises of that theory are put into practice, an imperative demand.

Lenin always fought against a dogmatic approach to theory and demanded its creative application. In his speech at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, he said:

"You are now confronted with a task which has not faced the Communists of the world before: while relying on general communist theory and practice, you must adopt yourselves to particular conditions which do not exist in European countries and prove able to apply this theory and practice in conditions when the great mass of the people are the peasantry, when it is necessary to accomplish the task of the fight not against capital, but against survivals of the Middle Ages."²⁶

The Soviet Communist Party Programme says: "The development of the countries which have won their freedom may be a complex multi-stage process. By virtue of varying historical and socio-economic conditions in the newly-free countries, the revolutionary effort of the masses will impart many distinctive features to the forms and rates of their social progress." And here is an utterance by B. N. Ponomarev, a prominent figure in the world Communist movement: "The liberated countries (former colonies.—I.P.)

²⁶ В. И. Ленин, *Полное собрание сочинений*, т. 39, Москва, 1963, стр. 329.

may and will proceed to socialism both along the tried and tested paths and also the paths discovered by the popular movements."²⁷

Advocates of "African Socialism" often confuse two different issues: that of the ultimate goal and that of the way to its achievement. The ultimate goal is one: the construction of a new system of social production based on socialisation of the means of production, whose main law of development is not the extraction of profits by the capitalists through exploitation of the working people but maximum satisfaction of the material and spiritual requirements of man. The ways to the achievement of that great goal may vary widely.

There are no grounds therefore to oppose "African Socialism" to scientific socialism if all that is meant by "African Socialism" is the specific paths and means of proceeding to socialism that correspond to African reality.

That is the only correct understanding of the question and it is finding ever wider acceptance in Africa. Thus, at the latest congress of the Sudanese Union, the ruling party of the Mali Republic, scientific socialism was recognised as the party's ideological foundation. The congress resolution on organisational questions spoke of the need to set up a Higher Party School whose syllabus would take account of "the specific historical, economic, cultural and social features of the Mali Republic, Africa and the whole world, the history and principles of the Party, and the principles of scientific socialism, being ignorant of which no leader can effectively solve the problems of building socialism in our country."

The great historical service rendered by the founders of scientific socialism is that "they substituted science for dreams".²⁸ Socialist ideas sprang up long before the appearance of Marxism. But they were the utopian dreams of noble minds distressed by the hard, downtrodden position of the masses under capitalism. Today millions of exploited people dream of socialism. It is not enough to dream. One must know how to make the transition from present-day society to socialism. The sole guide in this great task is scien-

tific socialism. The imperialists who sense their pending doom and impotence before the forces of progress, are mad with fury. They are sparing no energies, no resources to defame or falsify that theory. But the truth of scientific socialism is gradually taking hold of the minds of the people. New forces able to master the scientific theory of socialism and apply it to the highly concrete and specific conditions of contemporary African society are rising on that continent.

* * *

In conclusion we should like to call the reader's attention to a significant feature of the contemporary stage of world history without due consideration of which the problem before us, of the African countries' ways of development, cannot be properly understood. There have been many revolutions in the history of society which have led to certain forms of social and political life being supplanted by others. Today mankind is going through the most important revolution of all. As a result, capitalist society with its concomitants of the exploitation of man by man and oppression of one nation by the ruling class of another, will give way to communist society, which will ensure peace on earth, and labour, freedom, equality, fraternity and happiness for all the peoples.

The struggle to renew the social structure bears the character of a worldwide revolutionary process. The anti-imperialist national-liberation revolutions are part of that universal process. We are living in an age when the struggle being waged against imperialism—by the peoples of the countries where socialism, as the first phase of communist society, has already triumphed and by the working class of the countries where capitalism is still entrenched—has converged with the national-liberation movements of the oppressed nations to form one revolutionary tide.

The three forces of that converging revolutionary tide interact with, reinforce and supplement one another. The working class of the metropolitan imperialist countries has always given the national-liberation movement of the African peoples staunch support, and is continuing to do so. The aims and scope of the present work do not permit of a detailed account of the heroic efforts of the Communists of France to promote Algeria's victory over French imperial-

²⁷ *Правда*, 18.XI.1962.

²⁸ В. И. Ленин, *Полное собрание сочинений*, т. 2, Москва, 1958, стр. 6.

ism, or the activities of the Communists of Britain in support of the so-called Mau Mau movement in Kenya. When that story is written, it will form one of the glowing pages of world history. In turn, the national-liberation movement of the African peoples, by weakening the positions of imperialism, is facilitating the struggle of the working class and all the progressive forces in the imperialist countries. It is a case of complete interaction and mutual support.

The victory of the 1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia shattered the unity of the imperialist system which held the whole world in its grip, and so weakened that system. The latter was dealt another crushing blow by the emergence of the world socialist system after the Second World War. When the peoples of the colonies rose up to fight for their independence, imperialism was no longer strong enough to crush the national-liberation movement and had to give in and grant them political independence.

Such, in broad outline, is the present world alignment of social forces: on the one hand—imperialism; on the other—an alliance of three forces represented by the world socialist system, the working-class movement in the capitalist countries, and the anti-imperialist movement in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The imperialists realise that they cannot withstand such an alliance of revolutionary forces, and so they are trying to split that revolutionary alliance, to sever and isolate from it the anti-imperialist forces of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. As a rule they effect that policy with the help of their agents and puppets inside those countries, recruited from the mercenary, unpatriotic elements. The answer of true champions of progress must be—vigilance. And here is the note on which we want to conclude our analysis of Africa's ways of development: essential to progress is unity with all the anti-imperialist forces of the world.

LAND RELATIONS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES¹

Agriculture is the main sphere of material production in all African countries, for all of them, except the Republic of South Africa, belong to the group of less developed agrarian countries. It is impossible to define the exact share of agriculture in the total annual output because of the predominance of the subsistence economy, and the almost total absence of statistics in this field. As a rule, the available statistics underestimate the share of agricultural output. Some idea of the role of agriculture in African economies can be gained from the data on the rural and urban population. Though in the past 20 years there has been considerable movement from villages to towns, the rural population still constitutes from 67 per cent in Egypt (1957) to 96 per cent in Togo (1956). Only in the Republic of South Africa is the urban population nearly half (46.6 per cent in 1951) of the entire population.²

Peasants constitute the bulk of direct producers in African agriculture. The share of large-scale capitalist farming in the agricultural output is small, and what there is belongs principally to foreign companies or European settlers. In the great majority of African countries, the class differentiation of the peasantry is still insignificant. Agricultural labourers or proletarians who have broken all their ties with the land are few in number. Land relations have thus a direct bearing on the vital interests of the vast majority of the population.

¹ This article was written at the beginning of 1962. — Editors.

² *United Nations. Economic Survey of Africa since 1950*, New York, 1959, p. 14.

All African countries who have won political independence face the urgent task of reconstructing and developing their agriculture. How quickly this task can be implemented depends largely on the prevailing land relations, which may either hamper or contribute to the development of agriculture. The reorganisation and upsurge of agriculture are organically linked with the general task of overcoming economic backwardness and dependence. Therefore the question of providing the direct producer—the peasant—with land, and the question of forms of land ownership and land tenure merit the most careful study. At the same time it must be stressed that this is a very difficult task. Characteristic of Africa is an intricate interdependence of diverse forms of landownership (state, communal and private) and of land tenure. The available printed material gives no answer to many questions. This article therefore represents only an attempt to summarise the existing data; it is a programme for research rather than its result.

* * *

The problem of providing the direct producer with land has two different aspects. V. I. Lenin distinguished two kinds of land monopolies, "the monopoly of land ownership based on property rights and the monopoly of land economy".³ Monopoly of the second kind means that all land is taken up by individual farms, so that the establishment of new farms or expansion of the area of the existing ones is impossible because of the lack of vacant land. Monopoly of this kind demands special study, which should, moreover, be related to specific areas. Here we shall confine ourselves to general remarks.

For the whole of the African continent the average density of population is eight persons per sq. km. Compared to Europe, this is very low: in France, for instance, the corresponding figure is 80, and in England, more than 200. But in the case of Africa the average density is not characteristic. Egypt is a striking example: the average density of population for the entire territory is 25 persons per sq. km., but in the cultivated oasis zone it exceeds 700.

³ В. И. Ленин, *Полное собрание сочинений*, т. 5, Москва, 1959, стр. 114.

In Morocco the agricultural lands, including forests, pastures and areas under alfa-grass, account for 48 per cent of the entire country, the remaining 52 per cent being unfit for farming.⁴ In Algeria there are 47 million hectares of agricultural lands (20 per cent of the country's territory), of which 39 million hectares are meadows and pastures. The ploughed area is just a little over three per cent of all the land.⁵ In Libya, out of the whole territory of 175 million hectares, only 15 million can now be considered productive, but of this area only about half a million hectares can be used as arable land.⁶

Books and articles dealing with this question reveal great confusion in such concepts as "agricultural", "arable" and "cultivable" land. That is why the published statistics call for critical analysis, comparison and verification.

Vast spaces of the African continent consist of deserts, marsh lands, and dense tropical forests. In some tropical countries a considerable area is affected by the tsetse fly to such a degree that people cannot live there. In certain regions an acute need is felt for land suitable for farming, but in the great majority of countries there is no shortage of such land. In tropical Africa, the areas under agricultural crops constitute only a fraction of all available land. It should also be remembered that some lands unsuitable for farming today may be suitable tomorrow. Thus, for instance, the construction of the Aswan Dam, implemented with the aid of the Soviet Union, will at once increase the tilled area in the United Arab Republic by one-third. At present tropical Africa still makes widespread use of the system of shifting agriculture, on account of which large tracts cannot be cultivated for many years. Transition to a rational system of crop rotation will enable Africans to enlarge considerably the area under cultivation.

The African peasants do not suffer so much from shortage of suitable land as from colonial enslavement, and from its far-from-liquidated survivals in countries where Afri-

⁴ See F. Joly, A. Ayache, J. Fardel, L. Suech, *Géographie du Maroc*, Paris, 1949.

⁵ Н. А. Кравец, *Алжир. Приложение к карте «Алжир»*, Москва, 1960, стр. 2.

⁶ *United Nations. Technical Assistance Administration. A General Economic Appraisal of Libya*, New York, 1952, pp. 1, 9.

cans have already restored their state sovereignty. One of the manifestations of colonialism is inequality in the right to possess land. And here we come to the other aspect of monopoly of land, "the monopoly of land ownership based on property rights", which is the essence of land relations.

The colonisation of Africa by the European imperialist powers was accompanied by land expropriation for the benefit of European settlers, mining and plantation companies. The extent of land expropriation in various countries was determined by geographical and socio-economic factors, the character of colonisation, and the degree of resistance of the aboriginal population. The peasants of those countries which were converted into settlers' colonies fared the worst. These are South Africa and, to a lesser degree, the British colonies in Central and East Africa, the Portuguese colonies and French North Africa.

The European population in the Republic of South Africa (2.9 million) comprises one-fifth of that country's entire population (13.9 million in 1956). About one-fifth of the gainfully-employed European settlers are engaged in agriculture (including forestry and fishing). Among Europeans engaged in farming, there are landowners, leaseholders, farmhands with allotments, and proletarians. A handful of big European landlords holds a tremendous amount of land. In 1947, six per cent of the landlords, each having more than 3,000 morgens (one morgen equals 0.85 hectares) owned 43 per cent of the land belonging to Europeans. In addition, there were many small landowners and landless farmers.

In some cases by force of arms, in others by deceit, the European colonialists seized almost all the land. By the time the South African Union came into existence in 1910 the African aboriginal population held only 7.83 per cent of the land, the so-called reserves. Today, as the result of the purchase of more land by the Native Trust Fund and some other measures, this figure has risen to 12.⁷ Masses of peasants were left totally without land; and those who have been driven into the reserves suffer from land hunger.

⁷ А. Б. Давидсон, *Апартхейд — система расового порабощения*. In: «Расовая дискриминация в странах Африки», Москва, 1960, стр. 36; *Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland*, No. 2, 1948, Pretoria, 1950, p. 848.

At present the African peasants in the Republic of South Africa may be divided into four groups. The first group (about half of the entire population) consists of peasants in the reserves, in most of which communal land ownership has survived. The second group (approximately six per cent of the rural African population) comprises peasants living outside the reserves on land which is their collective or private property. The third group (nearly five per cent of the African population) is made up of peasants living on land belonging to missions, crown lands, and European private lands which are not cultivated by the owners. These peasants lease the land, for which they pay a money rent. The fourth group (about 40 per cent of the entire African rural population) consists of peasants living on farms and plantations owned by Europeans. As a rule, these are big capitalist estates, where the capitalist hiring system is intertwined with statutory labour requirements and outright corvée. The African farmhand with an allotment is a typical figure here.⁸

Southern Rhodesia was meant to become a settlers' colony like the Republic of South Africa but it so happened that there was a smaller flow of settlers to that colony. In 1956 the population of European descent comprised only 7.8 per cent of the country's total population (178,000 out of 2,481,000). Nearly 13 per cent of the gainfully-employed European population are engaged in farming. There are no data concerning its class structure. However, it is known that 7.7 per cent of European landowners possess 52 per cent of all the land belonging to Europeans. On the average, the size of an estate in this group is over 16,000 hectares. Judging by some indirect evidence it may be presumed that side by side with the big capitalist farm owners there are many poor farmers.⁹

Lands of every kind secured for the native population of Southern Rhodesia come to over one-half of the country's

⁸ For further details about agrarian relations in the Republic of South Africa see: И. И. Потехин, *Формирование национальной общности южноафриканских банту*, Москва, 1955, стр. 122—138.

⁹ «Африканский этнографический сборник», II, Москва, 1958, стр. 116.

According to estimates made at the close of 1964, the African population was 3,970,000 and the European population, 217,000 (*Monthly Digest of Statistics*, June 1965, p. 1).—Editors.

entire land area. It is impossible, however, to define in statistical figures the extent to which the African peasants are provided with land. In the first place, one must take into consideration the land's economic value. In the opinion of B. Mnyanda, Southern Rhodesian research worker, "the reserves area is absolutely useless for purposes of settlement and sustenance of the African people by reason of its being deficient in water supply and fertility or being rocky or sandy."¹⁰

The best land has been seized by European settlers. One must bear in mind that the majority of African peasants still practise the shifting system of agriculture, which requires large areas of land. African peasants are unable to maintain themselves and their families using the land at their disposal. The proof of that is their mass migration to towns and mining centres. Over 200,000 Africans work on farms and plantations belonging to Europeans, most of them employed as farmhands with allotments.

Some significant facts have been published in a United Nations report, which found that 78 per cent of the money income of African peasants in Southern Rhodesia was earned income not derived from their own farms.¹¹

Thus in Southern Rhodesia two-thirds of the best land in the country was seized by Europeans. The bulk of this land is concentrated in the hands of a small group of the richest landlords; only three per cent of land privately held by Europeans is being cultivated. The land taken away from Africans lies fallow, while the Africans suffer from lack of land. To keep alive they are compelled to work for European capitalists.

The Maghreb—Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia—is another part of Africa where mass expropriation of land took place. The lot of the peasants in Algeria, where European companies and settlers owned 2.7 million hectares of the best land,¹² is particularly hard. The aboriginal population feels an acute land hunger, with a considerable proportion of

Algerians having no land at all. In 1946 the colonial administration admitted that nearly 500,000 families had no land; by 1956 the number of landless peasant families had grown to 625,000—approximately one third of the country's African population. The landless peasants work in enterprises belonging to Europeans, swell the ranks of the huge army of unemployed, or go to France in search of work.

To justify their unwillingness to grant Algerians the right to national self-determination, the French imperialists asserted that this would be detrimental to the interests of French land-owning settlers. But it is well known that nine-tenths of the land taken away from Algerians is concentrated in the hands of a small group of big landowners, each possessing from 50 to 100 (or more) hectares. Some European estates have from 3,000 to 5,000 hectares, and some of them employ up to 2,000 farm labourers. Consequently the French imperialists are concerned not with the interests of French settlers in general, but the big landowners' interests.¹³

When the independence of Morocco was proclaimed, one million hectares, or one-fifteenth of all the arable land, belonged to foreigners. If we take only cultivated land, then the foreigners owned one-eighth of it. This included the best coastal land, held primarily by big landowners (900 of them, holding more than 300 hectares each, owned 60 per cent of all the land seized by Europeans).¹⁴ In 1949 the foreigners residing in Tunisia had 20 per cent of the country's cultivated land (760,000 out of 3,800,000 hectares).¹⁵ In 1949 the Italian settlers in Libya had 224,000 hectares of cultivated land.¹⁶ There is very little land in Libya that is fit for agriculture: deserts account for approximately 98 per cent of her territory. The people's main occupation is cattle breeding. At the present stage of irrigation, agriculture is possible only in the coastal area, which is farmed mainly by Italian settlers.

¹⁰ B. Mnyanda, *In Search of Truth*, Bombay, 1954, p. 65.

¹¹ *United Nations, Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa*, New York, 1954, p. 26.

¹² *World Marxist Review*, No. 2, 1958, pp. 62-68. (The lands which belonged to the Europeans, were nationalised. In 1963 they were turned over to the state sector and are worked collectively.—Editors).

¹³ *Положение сельского хозяйства и крестьянства в колониях и других слаборазвитых странах*, Москва, 1958, стр. 80—82, 137—139; Н. Г. Поспелова, *Алжир*, Москва, 1959, стр. 22—23.

¹⁴ See A. Ayache, *Le Maroc. Bilan d'une colonisation*, Paris, 1956.

¹⁵ Н. А. Иванов, *Современный Тунис*, Москва, 1959, стр. 41.

¹⁶ *United Nations, Technical Assistance Administration. A General Economic Appraisal of Libya*, New York, 1952, p. 10.

The geographical conditions in tropical Africa are less favourable for European settlers. There is little or no permanent European population engaged in agriculture; Kenya, with its highland area, which has attracted European settlers, is an exception: there were 46,000 Europeans in Kenya in 1954. The European settlers and companies owned only seven per cent of all the land, but it should be kept in mind that a considerable part of Kenya's territory is totally unfit for human habitation. Land belonging to Europeans lies in the highlands. The majority of the peasants are landless. As a rule, the European landowners in Kenya have been big farmers and planters, exploiting the labour of African peasants dispossessed of land. There are also several vast estates (100,000 hectares each and more)¹⁷ which belong to plantation companies and private persons.

In the former Belgian Congo the European settlers and companies had 20 million hectares of land, or nine per cent of the entire territory. However, these 20 million hectares included some huge agricultural concessions where African peasants continued to live and work. It is difficult to define just how much land has been expropriated for the benefit of Europeans. In 1955, there were 2,865,000 hectares in the Congo under crops, of which the European companies and settlers owned 399,000 hectares, or 14 per cent.¹⁸

Not enough is known concerning the extent of European land ownership in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. There are big European concessions in these colonies, and also European farmers and planters. Many Africans have been deprived of land, but it is impossible to determine the exact number.

No colony escaped land expropriation for the benefit of the colonialists; everywhere the African peasants were driven off the land which had been theirs since time immemorial. In some colonies all lands were declared to be owned by the respective imperialist powers. This gave the colonial authorities the "legal" basis for expropriating any land at any time. But in many colonies, particularly in West Africa, the scale of land expropriation was comparatively small

¹⁷ For greater detail on land expropriation in Kenya see: «Африканский этнографический сборник», I, Москва, стр. 118—219.
¹⁸ В. А. Мартынов, *Конго под гнетом империализма*, Москва, 1959, стр. 10.

and has not resulted in any considerable dispossession of the peasants. Private feudal land ownership is a different kind of land ownership. It also includes the church and monastery lands, insofar as the conditions on which the direct producers use them do not differ substantially from those pertaining to the landlords' lands. The relations between the European landowners and African peasants in many regions of Africa are similar to, or even identical with, feudalism, but these lands have been classed by us separately. Here we shall consider only lands belonging to African landowners. The Maghreb countries, with Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Uganda, constitute the region where this kind of land ownership prevails.

In 1949, before the land reform, there were 2,706,000 Egyptian and 3,800 foreign owners of land in Egypt. The latter held 233,000 feddans (one feddan equals 0.42 hectares) or less than three per cent of the country's total land area. *Wakf* land (belonging to religious bodies) made up 592,000 feddans or 7 per cent of the land. Of all Egyptian owners of land, 1,950,000 or 72 per cent had less than one feddan. They held only 15 per cent of the land area. The bulk of the land belonged to landlords, some of whom possessed more than 2,000 hectares. The land-hungry peasants leased land from the landlords, or worked as farmhands on their estates; they were cruelly exploited and led a beggarly life.¹⁹

In Morocco big landowners, possessing hundreds and even thousands of hectares of land, owned one-quarter of all the cultivated land,²⁰ whereas the landless share-croppers and farm labourers comprised in 1952 more than half of the rural population.²¹ In Algeria the aboriginal population owns 7,672,000 hectares; of this total area, 24 per cent belongs to small landowners whose average farm is 4.7 hectares and who account for 74 per cent of the total number of landowners; and 21 per cent belongs to people who hold on an average 282 hectares of land each; they make up just one per cent of the number of landowners.²²

We were unable to determine the total figures of the landlords' estates in Tunisia. The country has landlords

¹⁹ See A. Ayrout, *Fellahs d'Egypte*, Le Caire, 1952.

²⁰ See A. Ayache, *Le Maroc*.

²¹ Н. С. Луцкая, *Марокко вновь обретает независимость*, Москва, 1958, стр. 42.

²² *Cahiers Internationaux*, No. 64, 1954, p. 48.

possessing from 4,000 to 5,000 hectares of land. Before Tunisia's independence was proclaimed, the Muslim religious bodies owned 1,600,000 hectares (the so-called *habus lands*).²³ Of the 1,800,000 rural population on the eve of the Second World War more than one million were landless peasants and farm labourers.²⁴ In 1956, 80 per cent of peasants had no land.²⁵

Ethiopia is a country of large-scale feudal land ownership; but there are no agrarian statistics, therefore it is impossible to specify land relations in term of figures. Formally all the land is owned by the emperor, but actually a major part belongs to feudal lords and monasteries.

In Buganda private feudal land ownership for Africans was established by English colonialists. In 1900 they concluded a protectorate agreement with the kabaka, the feudal chief of Buganda. According to this agreement, the kabaka appropriated 100,000 hectares of land, his mother 4,000 and the four princes 2,000 hectares each. His other relatives received in all nearly 25,000 hectares. The kabaka's ministers and deputies received as gifts some large estates and were given others for temporary use. Today 230 landowners hold almost three-quarters of the land. Most of the peasants have lost the right to own land and become leaseholders.²⁶

There is much in common between the European and the African private feudal land ownership: in both cases the direct producer is deprived of the right to own land and gives to the landowner, in return for the right of cultivating the land, part of the produce of his labour (in money or in kind). Still, there is also quite a substantial difference between the European and the African private feudal land ownership. To begin with, their origin is different. European land ownership is the direct result of the establishment of the colonial regime. African landlord ownership arose (with the exception of Buganda) before the colonisation era, as a result of the spontaneous historical development of the given societies. Its only tie with colonialism is that the colonial autho-

rities guarded the landlords' rights and privileges against the masses of people exploited by them; and the landlords, in their turn, served as the colonialists' social pillars. Basically, European land ownership is bourgeois, but local landlords' ownership is feudal. The methods of their abolition also vary. European land ownership may be abolished following victory in the anti-imperialist revolution, in which local landlords sometimes also take part. The abolition of local landlords' ownership is connected with the anti-feudal revolution.

Feudal land ownership by the state is the third kind of land ownership. Its most characteristic feature is that the rent coincides with the tax: the direct producer pays nothing but the tax.²⁷ It is extremely difficult to define the regions where this category of land ownership exists, because of the variety of transitional forms from communal to feudal land ownership, and from state to private feudal ownership.

The most typical example of state feudal land ownership can be seen in the Muslim emirates of Northern Nigeria. British colonialists set an example in Nigeria of the "indirect rule" policy. Before the colonial regime was established there were several feudal states in existence. Most of them offered no resistance to the colonialists; the feudal chiefs voluntarily accepted the British protectorate, and the British Government pledged itself to protect their rights and privileges. A political alliance was concluded between British imperialists and African feudal lords for the purpose of the joint exploitation of the people. Where feudal states had not yet been formed, individual feudal rulers and chiefs of tribes became the agents of British colonialist policy and made up an integral part of the colonial administration. In keeping with the British colonial legislation they began to be called "Native Authorities". Lugard, the Governor-General of Nigeria, who established the system of indirect rule there, stressed that "there are no two sets of rulers, British and Native, working either separately or in cooperation, but a single Government, in which the Native Chiefs have well-defined duties and acknowledged status equally with the British officials".²⁸

²³ *La Tunisie au travail. Publication du secrétariat d'État à l'information du gouvernement Tunisien*, 1960, p. 80. — N.A. Ivanov's book on Tunisia gives another figure for *habus lands*—700,000 hectares (see p. 43).

²⁴ Н. А. Иванов, *Современный Тунис*, стр. 45.

²⁵ «Проблемы востоковедения», № 1, 1961, стр. 16.

²⁶ *Народы Африки*, Москва, 1954, стр. 446.

²⁷ К. Маркс, *Капитал*, т. III, Москва, 1955, стр. 804.

²⁸ Quoted from R.L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, Vol. I, New York, 1928, p. 688.

Before independence Northern Nigeria had 119 Native Authorities, their populations ranging from several thousand to over two million people. Let us take as an example the Kano Emirate. The emir stood at the head of 2.5 million subjects. In theory he was elected, but then a candidate for the post of emir had to be a member of the reigning family (the eldest son, brother, etc.). Furthermore, the members of the electoral committee were appointed by the emir himself with the approval of the British Resident. In actual fact the emir was a hereditary feudal ruler. The emirate was divided into 24 districts, the heads of which were appointed by the emir. In 1951, 13 of the district heads were members of the emir's family.²⁹ The emir had at his disposal all the attributes of state power: police, courts, jails—and the budget. He was a sovereign ruler for his subjects, but in regard to the British governor he was a puppet who implicitly did what he was told to do. Thus British imperialists became accomplices of a typically feudal form of exploitation.

Systems similar to this one arose in Western Nigeria, in Barotseland (Northern Rhodesia)³⁰ and in some French colonies of tropical Africa (Upper Volta and the northern regions of Cameroun). It was pointed out above that it is difficult to define the regions where this sort of landownership took shape. With some reservations, we can attribute it to all areas the direct administration of which the colonial authorities entrusted to tribal chiefs.

The level of socio-economic development of the peoples of tropical and southern Africa has not been fully studied as yet. The specific features of the historical development of African peoples (the slave trade, etc.) have given rise to some peculiar forms—not very clear to this day—of the transition from the pre-class era to the class society. Attempts to apply our habitual European evaluation do not give reliable results. Considerable research in the pre-colonial history of individual nations and countries is needed, inasmuch as ignorance of the social and economic development level of African peoples prevents us from estimating

properly the influence which the colonial regime exercised on the development of land relations.

However, it may be considered that as a rule, with the permission and protection of the colonial authorities, the tribal chiefs (whether traditional or appointed does not matter) were actually administrators of the land which had not been expropriated for the benefit of the Europeans. The forms and methods of the implementation of the chiefs' control over the land were quite varied. They varied not only from colony to colony, but also in different regions and tribes within one colony. But in the face of all this diversity the common factor was that the chiefs made use of their control over land to enrich themselves and to exploit their tribesmen. In some cases, besides extracting the tax established by the colonial administration, they collected also the feudal rent (*corvée*, rent in kind or in cash). In other cases the tax was the only form of rent. In all instances the colonial administration appropriated part of the feudal tribute collected from the peasants, i.e., it acted as a feudal owner of land. In this context it makes no difference whether the land was formally declared the property of the colonial power or not.

In almost all African countries communal land ownership has been preserved to this day (Egypt is probably the only exception). Communal land ownership in itself does not determine the mode of production in agriculture, since this form of land ownership exists in the primitive-communal system, in the slave-owning and feudal societies and even in the preliminary stages of capitalism. However, typical of the capitalist mode of production is not communal but bourgeois private land ownership. "But the form of landed property with which the incipient capitalist mode of production is confronted," Karl Marx pointed out in *Capital*, "does not suit it. It first created for itself the form required by subordinating agriculture to capital. It thus transforms feudal landed property, clan property, small-peasant property in mark communes—no matter how divergent their juristic forms may be—into the economic form corresponding to the requirements of this mode of production."³¹

The future destinies of communal land ownership in Africa depend on what route of development—capitalist or

²⁹ See Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Colonies*, Part III, London, 1951.

³⁰ On feudal relations in Barotseland see: И. А. Сванидзе, *Сельское хозяйство Северной Родезии*, Москва, 1963, стр. 67—78.

³¹ К. Маркс, *Капитал*, т. III, Москва, 1955, стр. 630.

non-capitalist—the African countries will follow. The existence of communal land by itself does not decide this question yet, though the degree of preservation or disintegration of communal land relations may substantially influence this decision. According to Marx, the dualism of rural communities, the existence of collective land ownership together with private production on the land allows an alternative: either the proprietary element will vanquish in it the collective element, or the latter will gain the upper hand over the former.

Examining the development tendencies of African farming on communal land in the recent decades we may arrive at a definite conclusion: the proprietary principle is beginning to prevail over the collective principle. This can be seen in the growth of social differentiation among the peasantry and the emergence of capitalist elements, in the development of mortgages, lease and the purchase and sale of land. However, the important thing is to ascertain how far this process of disintegration of the peasantry and separation of land ownership from actual farming has gone? It is difficult to answer this question because of the imperfection or total absence of statistics for Africa as a whole and for individual countries. Therefore we may use as the basis for our judgment only separate, uncoordinated, frequently quite accidental data and indirect evidence.

The commodity and money relationships have already penetrated into African villages. But then we must take into consideration the following circumstances. In the first place, the average per capita annual income in the village is very small. According to U.N. figures relating to the early 1950's, even in the Gold Coast where the exchange economy was more advanced than in any other country of tropical Africa, the average income per head equalled only \$ 45;³² assuming that on the average a family consisted of five persons, we get \$ 225 per year for the whole family. The earnings of a farm labourer on an estate belonging to the colonial authorities in 1953-1954 ranged between 4 s. 3 d. and 4 s. 9 d. a day,³³ which makes about £70, or \$ 200 a year.

The average peasant family thus had a money income equal to the earnings of one farm labourer. But this is an average figure, which may conceal wide variations due to property differentiation. It is quite obvious (without taking into account the subsistence part of the economy) that the money incomes of the absolute majority of peasants are considerably lower than farm labourers' earnings.

Moreover, it is necessary to take into account the uneven development of the commodity and money relationships in various countries. According to the same U.N. source, the average annual income of a peasant in countries of French Equatorial Africa was only \$ 6, in Kenya \$ 8, and in Tanganyika \$ 9. Thus we see that masses of African peasants are still little affected by the development of the exchange economy.

And finally, analysing the money incomes of the African peasants, we ought to differentiate between the incomes received from the sale of their own farm produce and incomes earned on the outside, e.g., money earned by migratory labourers. Here we come across striking figures. According to U.N. figures, 95 per cent of the incomes of peasants in Northern Rhodesia were the earnings of migratory labourers;³⁴ in Southern Rhodesia the corresponding figure was 78 per cent, in Kenya 73 per cent, in the Belgian Congo 55 per cent, etc. Thus the growth of money incomes in African villages cannot be considered evidence of the development of production for the market. There may still be a "natural", subsistence economy, although the family has money earned from outside.

Undoubtedly the African rural community already includes a stratum of planters and rich peasants managing their farms on a capitalist basis. It is they who control the bulk of the commodity output. One can hardly regard the African peasantry as some homogeneous mass of people, undifferentiated in class structure. There is no such peasantry in Africa today. But at the same time it is unquestionable that the peasant economy of most African countries remains

³² *United Nations, Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa*, p. 26.

³³ *Gold Coast Government, Report of the Ministry of Labour for the Year 1953-1954*, Accra, 1955, p. 25.

³⁴ These estimates correspond with the official figures for the distribution of national income in Northern Rhodesia in 1959, when the proportion of peasants' money income received from the sale of agricultural produce was 5.3 per cent (*National Accounts of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1954-1959*, Salisbury, 1960).

fundamentally a subsistence economy, and petty peasants, with a beggarly, semi-starvation mode of life prevail in the countryside.

The development of the money economy and the emergence of capitalist elements could not but be reflected in the norms of land ownership. However, no radical break-up of the communal order has taken place as yet. The main land tracts are still owned by peasant communities.

The methods of using communal land are characterised by exceptional multiformity. They are determined by many geographical and social factors: the density of population, the type of cultivated crops, the degree of preservation of tribal relations, the degree of development of the money economy and capitalist relations, etc.

Many areas still preserve the "free" form of land tenure, under which the peasant may cultivate any plot of land after obtaining the permission of the village or tribal elder. There is no division or re-allotment of land plots here—a phenomenon characteristic of the classical communal land tenure. In the recent past such an order of things was characteristic of most regions of tropical Africa. Sometimes it was violated due to the growing population, sometimes by the introduction of perennial export crops, and in a number of cases, by both.

The patterns typical of the classical communal system of land tenure, especially the regular redistribution of land allotments, are almost unknown in these regions. In the densely populated areas the communal bodies regulate somehow the distribution of cultivated land, but there is no practice of regularly redistributing allotments. Ethiopia is probably the only country where communal lands are redistributed after definite intervals. In most countries we witness a direct transition from the "free" form of land tenure to the conversion of tilled plots into hereditary holdings.

A considerable part in this transition is played by the cultivation of perennial crops, which in the last few decades have become widespread. The planting of perennial crops (cocoa, coffee, etc.) naturally turns the land planted with them into a hereditary holding. This is one of many ways whereby communal land is converted into privately-owned. According to customary law, the owner of such a plot makes use of it during his lifetime and can hand it down as inhe-

ritance, but has no right to sell it. However, he can sell the trees grown on his land. Here the economic content of the transaction comes into conflict with the norms of customary law and gradually undermines it. The development of suburban farming is another method of converting communal land into privately-owned. This, a rule, requires intensive farming, the land has to be fertilised and cultivated each year. Here customary law is powerless against capitalism's economic laws: such land plots are sold and bought. Nevertheless, a great number of diverse restrictions is preserved: in almost every case the permission of the village elder or the head of the clan is required, and sometimes it is necessary to obtain the consent of all the relatives. In many regions the sale of land to non-members of the given community is prohibited. The top stratum of the clan or tribe stubbornly resists the sale and purchase of land, which undermines the economic basis of their domination over their tribesmen. Colonial legislation did not recognise till lately any transactions in communal land. Only recently have the colonial authorities found it possible to make some concessions to the capitalist element in African villages.

Private ownership of land by peasants has become widespread in a number of countries. In Egypt it is the prevailing form of ownership. In the Maghreb countries, in Ethiopia, and in the northern part of the Sudan, there are now many peasants who are private landowners. Private ownership of land by peasants exists also in tropical and South Africa.

There are several different ways in which this form of private ownership has come about. In the Republic of South Africa until the 1913 agrarian law was adopted, African peasants had the right to purchase land from the Boer and British landowners, i.e., to redeem the land that had been taken away from them by the European settlers. Some Africans made use of this right, and now their lands comprise nearly five per cent of the country's area. The sale of land to African peasants is also practised in Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Kenya. In 1930 a law was passed in Southern Rhodesia (Land Apportionment Act, No. 30, 1930; amended in 1941 and 1950) under which a special fund of nearly two million hectares was set up for sale to Africans. By the close of 1950 Africans had purchased 2,637 plots of

land (average size 88 hectares).³⁵ By 1955 there were already 5,000 African farmers owning land outside the reserves. On the average, each farmer had 70 hectares. However, that was not yet full ownership.

Forcible destruction of the communal system of land ownership by the colonial administration was another method of securing private land ownership for the peasants. In some South African reserves the entire ploughland was divided into small allotments and converted on certain terms into the peasants' possession. Today forcible destruction of communal ownership is taking place in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya. As far back as 1951 a law was passed in Southern Rhodesia (the Native Land Husbandry Act) according to which the land allotments in the reserves should be assigned to those who till them.³⁶ These are countries in which there are European settlers, and where, consequently, masses of peasants were deprived of land. Here the colonial authorities interfered actively in land relations with the aim of mitigating somewhat the acute agrarian crisis.

As for the countries where the mass of the African population was not deprived of land—and such countries constitute a majority—the colonial administration interfered very little in the land affairs of the aboriginal population. However, in these countries, too, efforts were made to shift from communal to private land ownership. In the French colonies, under the law of 1906, a peasant could get a certificate for a plot cultivated by him and thus make it his property. It is true that very few people wanted to make use of this right.³⁷ Peasant private property was introduced on the irrigated lands of the present delta of the Niger River, which was under the French government organisation, Office du Niger,³⁸ now nationalised by the Mali Republic Government. Analogous attempts were made by the Belgian authorities in the Congo, where the so-called *paysannat* system was introduced. By January 1, 1955, 135,000 allotments had been distributed among the Congolese peasants.³⁹

³⁵ Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*. (Revised, 1956), London, 1957, pp. 779-780.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 780-781.

³⁷ See «Народы Африки», стр. 309.

³⁸ Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, ..., p. 798.

³⁹ For further details see: В. А. Мартынов, *Конго*, стр. 104-105; Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, ..., pp. 799-800.

It should be noted that almost everywhere peasant property in land was not absolute, with the colonial authorities restricting it in different ways. Their purpose was clear: on the one hand, to make the peasant economy more intensive so as to bring up the raw materials output; on the other, they wanted to maintain a hold on the peasants, preventing the free development of capitalist relations and the break-up of the old, pre-capitalist pattern.

Peasant private land ownership exists in all African countries. It is impossible to define its extent; however, we can safely assert that this type of land ownership has not yet spread to any considerable degree.⁴⁰

* * *

Such in general outline is the extremely variegated and complex picture of land relations in African countries. In reality it is even more complicated. In almost every country, side by side with peasants using communal lands, there are peasants who are full owners of the land, peasants who are incomplete owners, leaseholders of state-owned lands, leaseholders of privately-owned lands, share-croppers, and farmhands with allotments. Land relations are incredibly entangled and need to be radically straightened up.

The multiformity of land ownership naturally predetermines a diversity of solutions for the agrarian question, i.e., the content of land reforms.

For the Republic of South Africa, for instance, the most expedient decision of the agrarian question was formulated in the Freedom Charter adopted by the Congress of the People in July 1955: The land must be distributed among those who till it. This applies to Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, and in general to all countries with large land ownership by Europeans. Some people assert that such a solution of the problem affects the interests of the whole European population of those countries. In reality it affects the interests of only an insignificant group of big landowners. The slogan of the Freedom Charter fully corresponds to the interests of the working part of the population of European descent.

The progressive forces of the African continent are in favour of abolishing private feudal land ownership and trans-

⁴⁰ Tropical Africa is meant here. —Editors.

ferring the landlords' lands to the direct producers, the peasants. The governments of many African states have already set to work in this direction.

In Egypt the first agrarian reform law was passed in 1952. According to this act, a landowner could not hold more than 200 feddans. The surplus was purchased by the state to be added to the land reserve for distribution among the landless and land-hungry peasants. Two hundred feddans (84 hectares) of irrigated land is quite a lot, if we take into account that the landless peasants received only from two to five feddans. The 1952 act did not abolish landlord ownership. Payments of redemption money, too, were a heavy burden on the peasantry.⁴¹ In 1961 the United Arab Republic went further in this respect: the new ceiling for land ownership was set at 100 feddans, and the redemption payments were lowered. This eased substantially the position of the peasants. Though landlord ownership is undermined, it nevertheless still exists.

A number of measures have been implemented in Tunisia with the aim of mitigating land hunger. After the fall of the monarchy, the Bey's huge estates were confiscated, and also those of some feudal lords who had collaborated with the colonialists. As in Egypt, a land maximum has been established in Tunisia, which is 50 hectares; all surpluses are subject to nationalisation. The *habus* lands were confiscated, the government maintains religious institutions at the expense of the state. Gradually it is buying up the land of the French settlers.⁴²

As yet, no substantial land reforms have been carried out in Morocco. The estates of those who had collaborated with the colonialists were confiscated, and some landless peasants were given land. A law was passed for the return to Moroccan peasants of 40,000 hectares held by French landowners. Projects to open up new lands that might alleviate land hunger to some extent have been devised.⁴³

Little has been achieved in Ethiopia in the field of agrarian relations. In 1947 a progressive land tax was introduced, the sum depending on the size and fertility of land plots.

⁴¹ See D. Warriner, *Land Reforms and Development in the Middle East. A Study of Egypt, Syria and Iraq*. London-New York, [s.a.].

⁴² *La Tunisie au travail...*, p. 87. —In May 1964, all land belonging to the French and Italian settlers was nationalised. —Editors.

⁴³ *New Times*, No. 36, 1959.

Some feudal lords were compelled to transfer to the state a part of their uncultivated land. Small plots of land were apportioned from the state reserves to those who had taken an active part in the war of liberation against the Italian colonialists. Some of the peasants are being moved from the central provinces to Kaffa (coffee plantations area), where they receive land plots with hereditary user-right.

Land reforms are being implemented in various countries in different ways. However, they have not been carried through to the end. Even in Egypt, where the land reform is being realised most consistently, the landlords still retain land holdings of up to 100 feddans, and this at a time when many peasants have no land at all or own plots of less than one feddan. The interests of the development of productive forces require the fundamental reconstruction of land relations and total abolition of the medieval feudal land ownership. To use Lenin's words, "the whole land must be 'cleared' of all medieval lumber".⁴⁴

In those countries where feudal land ownership by the state exists, the solution of the agrarian question coincides with the task of democratisation of the social and state structure. The rent/tax, exacted by the emirs, sultans and other feudal lords, must go into the budget of the democratically-elected government and be expended not for the maintenance of the feudal nobility, but to increase the people's welfare. In some countries, for example in Nigeria, a popular movement aiming at this has already begun. But that is not all. Usually feudal land ownership by the state is coupled with private land ownership by feudal lords. Being supreme owner of the country's entire land, each feudal ruler possesses considerable private landed property. Therefore, in conformity with progressive African public opinion, the democratisation of the state structure must be accompanied by the nationalisation of the feudal lords' private holdings and the abolition of intermediary rent collectors.

What will be the destiny of communal land ownership? There may be these alternatives: the preservation of communal land ownership or a transition to private ownership by peasants. Many bourgeois economists insist on the second solution, the liquidation of the communal land-own-

⁴⁴ В. И. Ленин, *Полное собрание сочинений*, т. 16, Москва, 1961, стр. 406.

ing system and the transfer of land to private peasant owners. Thus a mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which visited Tanganyika in 1959-1960 declared itself in favour of abolition of the communal system, and even elaborated recommendations on how to implement the transition from communal land ownership to private ownership by peasants.

Such a solution corresponds to the interests of capitalist development. But for the majority of peasants it may lead to dispossession of land and final ruin. Even the International Bank mission does not conceal that the transition to private land ownership "raises the risk of excessive indebtedness, eventual concentration of ownership of land in the hands of those who have money to lend, and the creation of a destitute landless class."⁴⁵ This course leads to the rapid and deep class differentiation of the peasantry, the emergence of rich farmers, and the conversion of the bulk of the peasantry into landless farmhands.

Many African political leaders express themselves in favour of preserving communal land ownership, and against the implanting of private land ownership.

The communal system of peasant ownership need not by any means be an indispensable precondition for the socialist way of development, but in certain circumstances the preservation of communal land ownership may facilitate the cooperation of peasant households and in that way the transition to socialism. Today, however, the peasant land-owning community in many African countries serves as a screen for the semi-feudal exploitation of the peasants by the tribal aristocracy. In the opinion of many prominent figures of the national-liberation movement, the peasant community would be able to play its progressive role if it were freed from all medieval survivals. Management of communal affairs and of the land must be in the hands of the community, as a form of democratic self-government.

The governments of the young African states have not yet decided on their attitude to the question of communal ownership. No corresponding legislation exists yet. The Guinea Republic, whose government prohibited all sorts

of land transactions, is an exception. The future will show what decisions will be made by the governments of other countries.

In various countries the programmes of land reform are different. But with all the diversity of these programmes, their aim is the same: to straighten up the old land relations, medieval in substance, and to adjust them to new conditions and new tasks. As a foundation for land reforms, the progressive forces in African countries are putting forward demands which will ensure the speediest of the basic historical problem: the overcoming of the backwardness produced by colonialism.

⁴⁵ *The Economic Development of Tanganyika: the Report of a Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*, Baltimore, 1961, p. 95.

ADVANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION OF AGRICULTURE IN INDEPENDENT AFRICAN COUNTRIES¹

The economic backwardness inherited by young African states from colonialism confronts them with many intricate problems. It is generally recognised that a change of the economic pattern by building up a national industry is the paramount task in economic development. The general trend of prices on the world capitalist market—the steady widening of the gap between prices of organic raw materials and manufactured goods—leaves no other alternative for the agricultural countries remaining in the capitalist system: either a change in their economic pattern or further impoverishment. De Seynes, assistant U.N. Under Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, stated at a session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa that African countries as a result of the drop in raw-material prices lost between 1957 and 1961 three-fourths of all the sums received by them as "aid" from other countries, or 30 per cent of the sum of all foreign state investments.²

The need for the accelerated development of industry is recognised by all African statesmen and political leaders. But they face another, absolutely pressing task—the wiping out of starvation. Chronic undernourishment is the lot of the overwhelming majority of the African rural population. In recent years the food balance of the tropical African countries has become more and more strained. According to FAO

¹ This article deals with tropical Africa. For similar material on North Africa, see the article "Land Relations in African Countries" (pp. 45-67).—Editors.

² See *West Africa*, February 23, 1963, p. 223.

statistics, in 1961-1962 per capita agricultural production was below the prewar level.³

The production of food in African countries is lagging behind population growth. In Senegal, for example, the harvest of rice, millet and sorghum, the basis of the population's diet, increased from 390,000 tons in 1950-1951 to 474,000 tons in 1961-1962,⁴ that is, by 21 per cent, while the population grew by 43 per cent in ten years (1950-1960). In 1959, Senegal imported food for 12,000 million African francs, a huge sum equal to the country's adverse trade balance.

Ghana imported in 1961 wheat flour for more than £3 million; rice, £1.5 million; fish, £1 million; sugar, £2,750,000; onions, £16,000. Altogether the food imports amounted to nearly £25.3 million.⁵ The situation is about the same in many other countries. Nigeria, for example, imported foods for £8.2 million in 1958, while in 1948 these imports amounted only to £1 million. In 1958, Nigeria imported wheat flour for £2.1 million, sugar for £3.5 million and fish for £7.5 million.⁶ In 1961, imports of foodstuffs of agricultural origin reached the sum of £22.7 million.⁷ The Ivory Coast is spending on food imports 15 per cent of the export receipts, Somalia 33 per cent and the Congo (Brazzaville) as much as 78 per cent. Imports of food and manufactured consumer goods absorb all or almost all export revenue, leaving nothing or very little for the imports of industrial equipment. Young African states are finding a way out of this difficult situation by buying industrial equipment on credit. But the backwardness of agriculture presents another, much more difficult task.

Even during the colonial period there was a shifting of population from rural localities to the towns, a growth of the urban population at the expense of the rural, known as urbanisation. Here are figures on population growth in some towns of tropical Africa.⁸

³ *West Africa*, March 23, 1963, p. 335.

⁴ *Annuaire statistique de l'AOF*, Paris, 1956, pp. 145-149; *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, 1962, No. 1960, p. 997.

⁵ *West Africa*, October 6, 1962, p. 1105.

⁶ *Economic Survey of Nigeria*, Lagos, 1959, pp. 22-23.

⁷ *Nigeria Trade Journal*, 1962, No. 2, p. 78.

⁸ M. Herskovits, *The Human Factor in Changing Africa*, p. 266, New York, 1962.

	Years	Population, thousands
Dakar, Senegal	1926—1955	30—230
Conakry, Guinea	1936—1951	13—50
Abidjan, Ivory Coast	1936—1955	17—127
Ibadan, Nigeria	1931—1952	387—459
Leopoldville, Congo	1930—1955	39—299
Nairobi, Kenya	1927—1948	13—75
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	1931—1956	25—167

There was a demand in the cities for manpower to serve the public utilities, European officials and businessmen; there were also some enterprises of the manufacturing industry. But this was not the only and even not the main reason for the growth of the African urban population which increased faster than the demand for manpower; chronic unemployment of a considerable part of the urban population was an indication of this discrepancy. The colonial authorities kept no record of the unemployed; moreover, no record could give a correct picture. The existence of strong clan survivals and big families enabled many adult men to get along somehow without earnings of their own. Most of the women engaged in petty hawking. In Dakar,⁹ according to 1955 data, only 27 per cent of the African urban population had some kind of a definite occupation (if we take the able-bodied population alone, the percentage of employment rises to 42).

The town guaranteed the newcomers neither a livelihood nor shelter. Nevertheless, many, especially young people, fled from the village to the town. There were ample reasons for it. To begin with, they were driven by the chronic undernourishment afflicting the rural population. In the town even negligible, chance earnings and support of the working relatives ensured a better diet compared to the village. *Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar) noted that even the low-paid Senegalese worker earned in two months more than a peasant during the entire year. In the town there was some kind of medical service, while the village had practically none. However poor the educational system, in the town there were greater opportunities to learn how

to read and write. In Mali, for example, on the eve of independence 75 per cent of children of school age studied in the administrative centre of Bamako, while in localities far removed from Bamako the corresponding figure was not more than 3 per cent.¹⁰ Young people who had received an education in the village, tried to move to the city to get some kind of work "worthy" of a literate person. Here is a feature characteristic of all peoples with a low level of literacy: physical work is considered to be a low occupation for a literate person, it is the lot of the illiterate; he regards himself as an aristocrat belonging to the "white collar" group. Lastly, young people fled to the town to get rid of the patriarchal customs prevailing in the village, to escape from conservative traditions.

That was the case in the colonial period, but it is the same even after the abolition of the colonial regime. Not one of the enumerated factors has disappeared, and their operation has increased rather than decreased. The abolition of the colonial regime and the rise of sovereign states has, in addition to everything else, exerted a tremendous psychological impact, particularly on the younger generation. The exchange of people between Africa and other continents has increased many times over. A different, hitherto unknown world with its higher culture, specific social and political institutions opened up before the Africans. The sense of human dignity of people, insulted and degraded by the colonialists in the past, has immeasurably risen.

Many things have changed with the abolition of the colonial regime. But no essential changes have occurred so far in the village. Chronic undernourishment, meagre and monotonous food persist. The low cultural level has remained; progress in this field is noticeable only in the cities. Patriarchal order has been preserved so far in the family and in the way of life. The town attracts the village youth even stronger than during the colonial period, but the town is still unable to give them employment and living quarters. The flight of young people from the country to the town is, in fact, not a specifically African, but a world problem, common to all countries. Africa, however, has to face it

⁹ *Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer*, 1961, No. 56, pp. 383-385.

¹⁰ *Présence Africaine*, 1962, XV, p. 35.

with an extremely backward economy and culture and, therefore, it is especially acute here.

The unusually swift growth of the urban population continues. In Ghana, for example, it amounted to 13 per cent of the entire population in 1948, while in 1961 the share was 23 per cent. The population of Libreville rose from 19,000 in 1958 to 31,000 in 1962; the population of Brazzaville increased from 99,000 to 135,000 respectively. The population of Mogadisho reached the 100,000 mark in 1962 as against 60,000 in 1959. The population of Dakar more than doubled between 1948 and 1960, rising from 171,000 to 383,000. The supply of manpower is outstripping the demand and unemployment is on the increase. According to data of the Senegalese Labour Ministry, in May 1961 there were 10,000 unemployed in the country, of whom 6,000 were in Dakar. About 25,000 people worked part time; these were primarily young people from 17 to 30. In Western Nigeria 650,000 young people of the 800,000 who finished school had no jobs.¹¹ Some statesmen consider the exodus of the youth from the village a very grave problem. The only radical solution is to basically change the working and living conditions of the rural population. S. L. Akin-tola, Prime Minister of Western Nigeria, stated that "although rapid strides towards industrialisation are being made in West Africa, it will be many years before industry can hope to absorb even a fraction of the rapidly mounting number of young people who have acquired an education and are now swelling the labour market. Agriculture must absorb them and farming in a large portion of West Africa hasn't changed much in centuries. It still is a tedious, poorly-paying proposition that often employs the most primitive of methods. Somehow West African farming must be transformed into an attractive way of life, one that is comparable in social status and economic return with industry and trade."¹²

Compared with the industrially developed countries of other continents, the share of the urban population in the countries of tropical Africa is small, but account must be taken of the extremely low labour productivity in African agriculture. "In Great Britain it has been shown that one

agricultural worker is capable of producing food for at least ten people," F. Sachs noted. "In Australia the labour of one male worker can supply an optimum diet for 25 people. In New Zealand one man in farming can produce an optimum diet for 40 people. In South Africa it is doubtful whether one man engaged in agriculture can produce enough food for two people."¹³ This estimate applies to the Republic of South Africa, while the situation in tropical Africa is even worse: at the present level of labour productivity in agriculture one worker cannot feed even two people—naturally, if a normal diet is meant and not the starvation ration characteristic of the present-day African village. According to estimates of Oyenuga, a Nigerian agronomist, eight men engaged in agriculture produce food for ten people.¹⁴ Ghanaian specialists calculated that one man working in agriculture produced in 1960 enough food only for one and a half occupied persons.¹⁵

The situation is further complicated by the unfavourable ratio of age groups. Average longevity of Africans, owing to poor food and the absence of medical aid, is very low: from 30 years (Guinea, 1958) to 40 years (former Belgian Congo, 1950-1952), while average longevity in Europe is about 60 years. This means that the non-productive population in Africa comprises a bigger share of the entire population than in Europe. In France, for example, there are 100 children per 250 adults, while in Upper Volta only 87 adults; in other words, an adult African in Upper Volta has to feed three times as many dependents as an adult Frenchman.¹⁶ In Ghana children under 15 comprised 44.2 per cent of the population in 1960. "Every other Ghanaian was less than 20 years, every fourth Ghanaian was of school-going age, and every fifth Ghanaian was an infant under five years old. The preponderance of youngsters in the population imposes severe handicaps on the economy. The proportion of potential workers is small, and on their shoulders they must carry a heavy burden for the feeding, the keeping and education of large numbers of children."¹⁷

¹³ E. Sachs, *The Choice before South Africa*, London, 1952, p.113.

¹⁴ V. Oyenuga, *Our Needs and Resources in Food and Agriculture*, Lagos, 1960, p.31.

¹⁵ *West Africa*, April 20, 1963, p.20.

¹⁶ *West Africa*, October 6, 1962, p.1105.

¹⁷ *The Economic Bulletin*, Vol.VI, No.2, Accra, 1962, p.5.

¹¹ This figure is expected to rise to 800,000 in 1966.

¹² *Commonwealth Development*, Vol. VIII, 1961, No. 1, p. 23.

To meet the needs of the population diverse manufactured goods have to be imported. In future, African countries will produce a considerable part of such goods themselves, but in the meantime they have to buy abroad not only machinery but even matches. At some future date these countries will export manufactured goods, like most other states, but so far the export of agricultural commodities remains their main source of foreign exchange. Here are figures showing the share of agricultural produce in the value of exports of some countries in 1960 and 1961 (per cent):

Mali	100	Tanganyika	86
Sudan	100	Senegal	77
Upper Volta	97	Ivory Coast	75
Chad	97	Nigeria	75
Somaliland	95	Cameroon	67
Ethiopia	93	Ghana	63
Uganda	92		

In future, Africa's position in the international system of division of labour will change. But today the immediate possibility for increasing foreign-exchange reserves is to expand the production and exports of agricultural produce.

All these factors make the advance and reconstruction of agriculture a burning and extremely difficult problem. To end backwardness and bring agriculture in line with their needs, the peoples of tropical Africa have to accomplish three main tasks: to extend the cultivated area; to change the pattern of agricultural production—the relationship between livestock raising and crop growing and the proportion of different crops; to increase the productivity of agricultural labour.

The prime task is greatly to extend the cultivated area, that is, to plough up virgin land. There is no shortage of virgin land. In Somaliland, for example, not more than 900,000 hectares are cultivated, while the country has about 63,800,000 hectares.¹⁸ In Tanganyika¹⁹ and Senegal²⁰ not more than 9 per cent of the land is cultivated.

But the development of virgin soil entails great difficulties. Vast stretches of the savannah are covered with

dense shrubs, the uprooting of which requires huge outlays. In Tanganyika, for example, stumping is needed on 60-70 per cent of the territory; its cost ranges from 8 to 25 shillings per acre, depending on the nature of the shrubbery.²¹ In other areas farming is impossible without the development of irrigation systems. In Mali, for example, farming without irrigation is possible only on an insignificant part of the territory.²²

Development of large tracts of virgin soil is impossible with the hoe and other primitive implements. The peoples of tropical Africa have to cope with a task of historic significance: to go over from hoe farming to ploughing. Without this it is impossible to solve any of the economic problems facing them. But the introduction of the plough in tropical Africa almost everywhere demands mechanical traction, which is inaccessible to small-scale peasant farming.

The advance and reconstruction of agriculture involves another no less intricate task—a change in the pattern of agricultural production. This in particular implies eliminating the dependence of most African countries on the export of one or two crops, for example, the dependence of Ghana on the export of cocoa, Liberia, on rubber, Senegal, on groundnuts, etc.

What makes the problem difficult is that in the immediate future neither Ghana nor Senegal can afford to cut the production and exports of cocoa or groundnuts; this applies in equal measure to other countries. On the contrary, to obtain more foreign exchange, they are compelled to expand the exports of these commodities. The production of cocoa beans in Ghana in 1961, three years after the winning of independence, reached the record figure of 432,000 tons; subsequently the crop is to be brought up to 500,000 tons without increasing the area under cocoa plantations. The groundnut harvest in Senegal is to be raised to 1,150,000 tons annually under the plan for 1961-1964 as compared with 975,000 tons in 1961-1962. The problem, consequently,

¹⁸ See *Production Yearbook 1961*, Rome, 1962, pp. 2-7.

¹⁹ *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, Baltimore, 1961, p. 461.

²⁰ *Industries et travaux d'Outre-Mer*, 1961, No. 86, pp. 6-12.

²¹ *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, Baltimore, 1961, p. 150.

²² *Enquête de la FAO sur l'Afrique. Rapport national République du Mali. Problèmes et perspectives du développement rural*, Rome, 1962, p. 48.

can be solved by a swifter growth in the production and exports of other farm produce.

A change in the pattern of agricultural production should bring about an improvement in the diet and a reduction in food imports. Many valuable products are lacking in the diet of the people in tropical Africa; this not only reduces the caloric content of the food but makes for its inferior quality, which adversely affects the human organism. The well-to-do section of the population, mainly urban dwellers, supplement their diet with imported foodstuffs. But for the majority of the peasantry this is an inaccessible luxury. In view of this, greater variety of the cultivated crops is absolutely essential.

In Mali, for example, successful experiments in wheat growing are conducted. Its crop is to be brought up to 500,000 tons. The growing of sugar cane has also been started; the building of a refinery is planned in Markala to produce more than 2,000 tons of sugar annually.

In Ghana the area under onions and other vegetables, rice and maize is increasing and the planting of mango, avocado and citrus fruit is being expanded. The production of tomatoes is swiftly growing, too. So far the country had only one factory for the processing of tomatoes; the building of a few more factories is planned. Here the task of developing agriculture links up with the building of an industry to process agricultural raw materials.

The raising of livestock in farming areas where there is none, or of increasing the herds where they are insufficient, is of special significance for improving the diet. The solution of this exceedingly important problem involves combatting the tsetse fly and developing new breeds of livestock immune to diseases transmitted by this insect. In livestock areas the main problem is to raise productivity.

The advance and reconstruction of agriculture, lastly, requires the settlement of nomads on the land—Tuaregs in the districts of Mali and Niger adjoining the Sahara, the Masai in Kenya and Tanganyika, and others. This is particularly important for the Somali Republic where nomad stock raising is the main occupation of the majority of the population.

Mechanisation of agriculture and an improvement of the diet in combination with the spread of literacy and knowledge of proper cultivation methods should ensure the solu-

tion of the third main problem—raising the productivity of agricultural labour.

The colonialists have widely circulated the myth about the "intrinsic laziness" of the Africans. Bourgeois ethnographers have wasted mountains of paper to prove this false claim. Actually the low productivity of labour is explained not by the "laziness" of the population, but by objective factors, such as the primitive implements, the climatic conditions and the low-quality food. Oyenuga, prominent Nigerian agricultural scientist, raises the well-warranted question about the relationship of the calory content of the peasant's food and the quantity of energy he expends. Drawing on researches of B. Platt, Professor of the University of London, conducted in Dahomey, Oyenuga arrives at the staggering conclusion that during the period of field work an African peasant, working in the open air under the blazing sun, expends more energy than the European farmer, while the food he eats restores only 60 per cent of the expended energy.²³

Such are the main tasks in advancing and reconstructing agriculture in tropical Africa. Their accomplishment is evidently impossible on the basis of present-day small peasant farming; a radical social reconstruction is needed, transition from small-scale peasant production to large-scale farming. The governments of various tropical African countries approach this task differently; they are exploring various ways of establishing large-scale mechanised agricultural production; in some countries the growth of private capitalist enterprise is encouraged; others lay emphasis on drawing the peasants into producer cooperatives and setting up large modern state farms.

The rates and methods of reconstructing agriculture naturally differ in various countries. It is still too early to sum up results. Ghana has been an independent state for only seven years, Guinea, six years, and all the other countries only three or four years. During this brief period, of course, not much could have been done. So far it is possible to speak only of the prospects and the general line of development. But it is becoming clear that higher rates of reconstructing agriculture are planned in countries whose governments have chosen as the main means of reconstruction the

²³ V. Oyenuga, *Our Needs in Food and Agriculture*, p. 32.

setting up of large state farms and the combining of small peasant farms in cooperatives.

In a number of countries big plantations of export crops were set up during the colonial period by state organisations of the metropolitan countries, by so-called development corporations. The colonial administration organised model experimental farms. After the abolition of the colonial regime these plantations and farms became fully or partly the property of the young states: in Ghana, for example, 20 state farms with a total area of more than 40,000 hectares were set up on the basis of the model experimental stations organised during the colonial period. They will continue to function as model experimental farms, but at the same time they have to contribute now a maximum of produce for the market. Experimental grain farms in Togwajala, oil-bearing crops in Villabruzzi and rice in the Hawai area set up by Italians became the property of the Somali state. The British Cameroons Development Corporation had large banana plantations (6,000 hectares in 1959) in the southern part of the former British trust territory of the Cameroons (now the western regions of the Federal Republic). The corporation has been turned into a mixed company: the controlling block, 51 per cent of the shares, is held by the government of West Cameroun, 35 per cent remains with the British Corporation, 10 per cent passes to the Federal Government and 4 per cent to local private capital.²⁴

The question of French state property in Niger was settled along the same lines. The colonial administration set up three experimental stations. The station in Yantala (near the capital Niamey) conducted experiments in the growing of fruit trees; the Kolo station (near Maradi) worked to increase the yield of groundnuts and the Tarna station, also near Maradi, experimented with several other crops. The Kolo and Tarna stations have now been turned into mixed Niger-French state farms. By agreement between the governments of Niger and France, they will be managed by the French Institute of Agricultural Studies in the Tropics and the expenditure of maintaining them (16.5 million African francs annually) will be equally shared by the two governments. The Tukunu experimental station which worked on improving zebu breeds became the property of the Repub-

lic of Niger. The Three-Year Economic and Social Development Plan of Niger (1961-1963) provided for extending the experimental farming stations and the livestock station in Tukunu, the organisation of a station for improving the breed of Niger goats, a poultry-breeding farm and a large mixed private-state ranch for 100,000 head of livestock.²⁵

The government of the Sudan has nationalised the cotton-growing farm in Gezira district which had been organised by Britain. In some countries the governments are buying the plantations owned by private foreign companies. The government of Somalia, for example, bought for 30 million Somali shillings the sugar plantations of the Italian Società alimentare Italo-Somala, which as far back as 1920 seized 25,000 acres of land in the Scidle area, mostly under irrigation. The Soviet Union is assisting the Somali Government in the establishment of state cotton and oil-bearing plant farms.

The Government of Mali has nationalised Office du Niger, an enterprise set up by France. Private peasant farms remain here, but the state has taken over the irrigation system, the available agricultural machinery and the credit and marketing system. This enables the government to plan agricultural production in the Niger Valley, directing its development along lines the country needs. At the same time the Mali Government is planning to set up large state farms in the same area.

The Three-Year Economic Development Plan of Guinea (1960-1963) called for the organisation of 15 large state farms for the production of rice, bananas, pineapples, groundnuts and other crops and seven livestock farms.

State or mixed private-state farms will undoubtedly play a big part in the advance and reconstruction of agriculture. But they cannot be the main means for solving this intricate problem. The conversion of millions of peasants into hired workers of state farms and their provision with the means of production is a task beyond the strength of any single state. The way out is to organise agricultural producer cooperatives. The existence of the system of communal land ownership, traditions and experience of collective labour provide favourable conditions for the development of producer cooperatives in agriculture.

²⁴ *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, 1962, No. 867, p. 1338.

²⁵ *Plan du développement économique et social 1961-1963*, Vol. II, pp. 119-200, 251-253.

Marketing and credit cooperatives were the main forms of cooperation in agriculture during the colonial period. Today, too, these forms are the most widespread in the independent countries of tropical Africa. In the colonial period there was a long chain of trading intermediaries between the producer and the organisation exporting his output; all of them waxed fat at the expense of the direct producer, the peasant. The governments of the independent countries are out to reduce this chain of intermediaries and ultimately to abolish it completely. The difference between the price received by the producer and the export price, formerly shared by the intermediaries, can in one or another way be returned to the producer, used for improving his welfare or utilised in other ways for the country's economic development.

State or mixed private-state organisations engaged in the buying and exporting of farm produce have been set up in all the independent countries. In the former British possessions such organisations had been established during the colonial period, but these were organisations of British state-monopoly capital. In independent Ghana the Agricultural Produce Marketing Board engages in exports and the United Ghana Farmers' Council, in purchasing operations through affiliated agricultural cooperatives. Ghana has thus practically abolished completely the stratum of private buyers-up of peasant produce; all buying and export operations are done by the state which relies on a ramified network of cooperatives. In Guinea and Mali the system of buyers has also been abolished. But marketing cooperatives in these countries are much less developed and for this reason in Guinea, for example, purchases are made by state district procurement centres.

In Senegal, during the colonial period farm produce was bought up by French trading companies through numerous buyers. In 1960, a state Office for the Marketing of Farm Produce was set up. In the 1960/61 agricultural season it bought up 23 per cent of the groundnut crop. The main part of the crop, however, was, as hitherto, bought up by French firms and private Senegalese merchants. By decree of August 8, 1961, the government greatly extended the powers of the Office. The activity of French and other private purchasing organisations was not abolished but placed under its control. The Senegalese Government is paying much atten-

tion to the development of agricultural marketing cooperatives: at the end of the 1960/61 agricultural season there were 696 marketing cooperatives and at the end of 1962, 1,125. The Office bought half of the groundnut crop through these cooperatives.²⁶ It is expected that in the near future the Office will buy through the cooperatives the entire agricultural output for the market.

A National Board for the Marketing of Agricultural Export Commodities was organised in Cameroun by the law of June 9, 1962.²⁷ The purpose of the law is to introduce radical changes in the handling of the country's main export commodities in the interests of the people and the state. The main aim of the reform is to abolish or at least curtail the network of intermediaries. But the plans of the government are resisted by French firms and local merchants, and even many marketing cooperatives controlled by big local merchants spoke up against the establishment of the state monopoly.

Foreign companies offer understandable resistance to state interference in the system of buying and marketing farm produce. Some sections of the national bourgeoisie act in league with them. But economic necessity is compelling the governments to follow the road they chose. This was clearly stated by Hamani Diori, President of Niger: "If Niger does not create in the immediate future a single country-wide organisation for the marketing of groundnuts it risks facing dangerous competition on the foreign market from African states who for a number of years have had powerful state and semi-state organisations which ensure a reduction of production costs."²⁸

In 1962 a state-private organisation for the buying and exporting of groundnuts, the Niger Groundnuts Marketing Company, was organised: 50 per cent of its shares are held by the state and 50 per cent by French firms which have six of their representatives on the 12-men administrative board of the company. Niger has no agricultural marketing cooperatives and the entire purchasing machinery belongs to French firms which utilise local buyers as their agents. This makes the government greatly dependent on French compa-

²⁶ *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, 1962, No. 860, p. 997.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 870, p. 1523.

²⁸ *Afrique nouvelle*, 1961, No. 749, p. 10.

nies. The organisation of marketing cooperatives would be a powerful means in the struggle for economic independence from French capital. The Government of Niger has repeatedly spoken up for the organisation of a network of such cooperatives but so far no practical steps have been made; possibly this is a result of resistance by French companies.

In many African countries agricultural marketing cooperatives also discharge the functions of credit cooperatives. In the colonial period credit cooperatives were little developed and were absent in many countries. Neither do the governments of independent states develop special credit cooperatives, entrusting their functions to marketing cooperatives. A general tendency to integration, to have one cooperative perform the functions of marketing, buying and extending credits, and in some countries also engaging in production is characteristic of the present stage of the cooperative movement in tropical Africa. In view of the extreme economic backwardness of the African village and the lack of the necessary personnel, the policy of establishing "integral" cooperatives is justifiable.

Agricultural marketing cooperatives—and in most countries marketing is so far the main or even only function—can thus be utilised as a powerful instrument in solving a number of economic problems. Monopolisation of the purchase of agricultural produce through marketing cooperatives enables the state to apply an incentive system of purchasing prices, setting higher prices for commodities whose output it wants to expand most. In view of the prevalence of communal land ownership and the extreme poverty of the peasantry the issue of credits to peasants runs into the problem of securing the credits. Extending loans to peasants through marketing cooperatives settles this problem. The development of marketing cooperatives makes it possible to eliminate or at least substantially restrict the activities of foreign companies in internal trade and to weaken economic dependence on foreign capital. That is why foreign companies are doing everything to prevent the development of marketing cooperatives, relying at times on the local bourgeoisie.

For all their great importance, marketing cooperatives cannot become the main means for advancing and reconstructing agriculture. Small-scale private peasant farming is the basis for marketing cooperatives in tropical Africa to-

day. But, as noted by President Sékou Touré of Guinea, "the African peasant who has nothing except the meagre products of his labour sufficient merely to replace the old hoe when it is worn out and somehow to clothe and feed his family, is unable to modernise his own labour with his measly resources. The state must help him. The state cannot render assistance to the 2.5 million peasant men and women in Guinea by giving each one individually a plough, harrow, seed drill, thresher, cart, and even less so a tractor. But it can provide an entire village with everything necessary for cultivating 700, 800 or 1200 hectares."²⁹

In August 1960, the government of Guinea promulgated a law on the establishment of agricultural producer cooperatives. The Three-Year Economic Development Plan (1960-1963) called for the organisation of 500 agricultural producer cooperatives. In the first year 228 cooperatives uniting 48,000 members were set up;³⁰ a year later, in November 1962, there were 424 cooperatives embracing 50,000 people.³¹ Their share capital ranges from 6,000 to 160,000 Guinean francs. By November 1962, Guinean cooperatives had bought 52 tractors and the necessary number of ploughs.³² But so far these are merely embryonic forms of producer cooperatives. The transition from small-scale individual farming to large-scale collective farming will be effected gradually.

At first each cooperative has a small collective field jointly tilled by all members—as a rule, with the simplest implements. The main source of income of the cooperative members at this stage is the individual plots, the income from their individual farming. The crop from the collective field frequently serves merely as an insurance fund; when the peasants do not have enough food, the common reserve is distributed among the cooperative members. A certain part of the crop is usually sold and the money received goes for the common expenses of the cooperative. Such collective fields are quite widespread in the African village. Some cooperatives even at this stage buy new machinery or rent it from

²⁹ See Sékou Touré, *La révolution Guinéenne et le progrès social*, Vol. VI, Paris, 1962.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

³¹ *Horoya*, November 13, 1962.

³² Sékou Touré, *La révolution Guinéenne et le progrès social*, Vol. VI, p. 407.

the state; for definite pay it is used by all cooperative members to till their individual plots. The further evolution will consist in the gradual increase of the collective fields; the pace of this evolution will be in the main determined by the possibilities of mechanising agricultural production.

The Three-Year Economic Development Plan called for providing the Guinean village with 1,000 tractors, 50,000 ploughs and other agricultural equipment. The government did not intend to hand over this equipment directly to the cooperative. In 1960, when the law on the development of agricultural producer cooperatives was promulgated, it was also decided to set up state agricultural modernisation centres in each of the 28 administrative districts. Each centre is to have a machine-and-tractor station and repair shop and also an experimental field for demonstrating modern scientific cultivation methods; it is to supply cooperatives with selected seed, fertiliser and pedigree livestock. The modernisation centres are regarded by the government as the main instrument for promoting production cooperation among the peasantry.

As the income from the cooperative fields increases, the role of individual plots of cooperative members will gradually decline and at the last stage of the evolution, they will turn into auxiliary kitchen gardens. Such are the plans. The Guinean village is now at the beginning of this long road.

In Mali, the situation is about the same as regards producer cooperatives. Rural cooperatives are officially named rural production and mutual aid associations. All the householders of a village are members of the association and it is managed by the village council. Outwardly, there is almost no difference between the rural cooperative and a peasant community. The cooperative performs such functions as the organisation of public works, social aid to members of the community, the supply of goods, the provision of agricultural credit and the tillage of collective fields. The collective field is the embryo of the producer cooperatives. The resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Sudanese Union Party said: "Every effort should be exerted to consolidate the collective fields which are an embryo of producer cooperatives."

Today not all Mali villages have collective fields and they are usually small in size. The Sixth Congress of the Sudanese Union set the task of bringing up by 1965 the area

of collective fields in each village to one hectare per family and turning them into model plots, "into schools of higher productivity". A regular team is to be set up in each village for tilling the collective field. So far this is merely the beginning. The individual plot remains the main source of peasant income. The bringing up of the collective field to one hectare per family will be a big step forward, although it is insufficient for the transition of the Mali peasants to socialist collective farming. Such a transition will be the aim of future stages.

At the end of the colonial period Ghana already had a developed cooperative movement. In addition to marketing cooperatives, there were credit and consumer cooperatives and artisan associations. But cocoa-marketing cooperatives were the backbone of the cooperative movement; of the 514 cooperative societies registered in 1958, 389 engaged in cocoa marketing. The experience accumulated by the cooperative movement facilitated its further development after the winning of independence. But the grip of capitalist elements in the cocoa-marketing cooperatives created considerable difficulties.

In Ghana, just as in Guinea and Mali, cooperative production is promoted not instead of individual private peasant farming, but as a supplement to it, not through the socialisation of private peasant production, but the establishment of cooperatives on new lands.

A characteristic feature at the present stage of agricultural producer cooperation in all countries of tropical Africa is that existing private production is not socialised. The explanation is that in many areas there is practically nothing to socialise. The land is communally owned and the question of abolishing private land ownership does not exist. The main land tracts are not cultivated; these are either virgin soil or disused lands, therefore it is not difficult to set up cooperative fields without abolishing the individual peasant fields. In many areas there is no draught cattle and in general no productive livestock at all. The overwhelming majority of the peasants do not have even such simple farming implements as a plough or a harrow. That is why cooperative production is set up not on the basis of old private peasant farming, but parallel with it.

The situation, however, is not as simple as it might seem at first glance. In the vast sea of small and dwarf peasant

farms there are rich farmers and planters who employ wage labour. In Mali there are large cotton-growing farms on the irrigated lands in the Niger Valley. They hire workers for cotton picking. In Guinea there are large privately-owned coffee and banana plantations. No few capitalist plantations are operated in the cocoa-growing areas of Ghana. The question of the attitude to this category of farms has not been raised so far. The programme of the Convention People's Party adopted in 1962 suggested a study: "Shall our agriculture, fishing and animal husbandry be undertaken by government farms, or by cooperatives or by the encouragement of individuals to increase their farming, their cattle herds and poultry stocks? Or shall we combine all three?"³³ There is no reply to this question in the resolutions of the recent congresses of the Democratic Party of Guinea and the Sudanese Union (Mali). Apparently the time is not yet ripe for deciding this question. It is a matter for the future.

In other countries the governments are looking for different ways for advancing and reconstructing agriculture. During the colonial periods so-called *paysannats* were set up in French and Belgian colonies. These were more or less typical producer cooperatives of a capitalist type; they were most of all developed in countries of former French Equatorial Africa and the Congo (Leopoldville). Today, in conditions of independence, the governments of these countries intend to follow the same path. The Government of the Congo (Brazzaville) has planned to double the number of *paysannats* (from 10 to 20) and the number of peasants they unite from 18,000 to 35,000 in five years (1960-1964); the sum of 450 million African francs has to be spent for this purpose.³⁴ In Nigeria during the colonial period several so-called cooperative villages were set up which in effect in no way differed from the *paysannats*. The government of independent Nigeria intends to continue this practice and in this way develop virgin land areas.

Western Nigeria already has 13 new settlements, each of them with 50 households, and the number is to be brought up subsequently to 200. A settler receives 12 hectares of land on a lease for 49 years: the rent is 2.5 shillings per hec-

³³ *Programme of the Convention People's Party*, Accra, 1939, p. 16.

³⁴ *Notes et études documentaires*, 1960, No. 2732, p. 10.

tare annually. The government advances him credits for organising the farm, which are to be repaid within 15 to 25 years. Each settlement has a cooperative in which membership is obligatory for all settlers. The cooperative assumes marketing functions. It has to build and maintain the roads, water mains, the electricity supply and rents out tractors and farm equipment. In future each settlement is to have a school, church, medical station, post office, canteen and other service establishments.

At present settlements of this type have altogether 650 households. The government intends to bring up their number to 2,600 in the next few years and also build new settlements. The settlers have to undergo a course of study in agricultural schools, specially set up for this purpose. In 1961, there were five such schools. They give a two-year course during which students receive a scholarship.³⁵

A similar programme is being carried out in Eastern Nigeria; the economic development plan for 1962-1968 calls for setting up villages of this type for 5,000 families.³⁶ All these are costly projects and it is impossible to provide such cooperative villages for all the peasants. Nigeria has several million peasant households, while the plans for 1962-1968 provide for the "settlement" of only 11,000-12,000 families.

Cooperative farming settlements undoubtedly are centres of efficient farming, a few oases in the ocean of extremely backward peasant farming. The presence of such oases will exert a definite positive influence on the peasantry around them, will stimulate their adoption of better cultivation methods. But this cannot solve the problem of advancing and reconstructing the country's entire agriculture. In the socio-political aspect such projects signify the implanting of private capitalist enterprise in agriculture, using national budget funds for this purpose.

The countries of tropical Africa approach in different ways the advance and reconstruction of agriculture, and their initial results, too, are different. But for all the diversity of ways and methods, rates and results, they have one thing in common: everywhere the government actively intervenes in the development of agriculture. Economic development plans include targets for the expansion of agricultural

³⁵ *Commonwealth Development*, 1961, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 24-25.

³⁶ *National Development Plan 1962-68*, Lagos, 1962, p. 222.

output and measures ensuring this expansion. For all the limited scale of state capital investments in economic development, a sizeable part is channelled into agriculture. A system of crediting the peasantry is being evolved; in some countries special banks have been set up for this purpose as, for example, the National Bank for Agricultural Development in Guinea (since 1961); a ramified system of machine-renting stations, repair shops and other centres for promoting the mechanisation of agriculture is being organised; the imports of tractors, farm machinery, fertilisers, insecticides and herbicides, etc., are increasing.

Livestock raising commands special attention of the governments everywhere. Extensive work to combat epizootias has been carried on in the Guinea Republic under the three-year development plan. In 1960, for example, veterinaries examined more than three million head of cattle and more than one million sheep and goats; over one million inoculations were made.³⁷ The Animal Husbandry Board of the Central African Republic has set up farms for developing breeds of livestock resistant to the tsetse fly, to be introduced in peasant farms. Ghana has bought in Guinea 1,500 head of cattle more resistant to the tsetse fly.

The Republic of Niger, where animal husbandry is a major sector of the economy, suffers big losses from epizootias: in 1960, 185 outbreaks of rinderpest, 89 of anthrax and 63 of other animal diseases were registered. Struggle against epizootias is hampered by the shortage of veterinaries and medicines. There is only one small laboratory for the production of vaccines in the entire country, and only one school, graduating 30 people annually, which trains veterinaries and livestock experts. The country's economic development plan calls for various measures to advance animal husbandry: extension of personnel training, production of vaccines, the establishment of vaccination centres, improvement of pasture lands, digging of wells, development of new breeds of livestock, etc. The governments of Cameroun, Chad, Nigeria and Niger drew up and adopted a joint plan for measures to eradicate the rinderpest in the area of Lake Chad.

Livestock development calls for the solution of two problems outside the sphere of agriculture. The main live-

stock-raising zones are in the interior of the continent and are far removed from sea ports and big cities, the main centres for the consumption and processing of meat, milk and dairy products. In view of the absence of roads livestock has to be driven for hundreds and even thousands of miles. There are no cold storages, no milk and meat canneries on the periphery. Animal husbandry is thus connected even to a greater extent than crop-growing with the general economic development of the countries in tropical Africa.

Extensive development of irrigation has been launched in many countries. A project for developing the Awash River valley is being drawn up in Ethiopia. Preliminary surveys brought out the possibility of irrigating at least 400,000 hectares suitable for growing cotton, oil-bearing plants, rice and other crops. This development will make it possible to settle in the Awash valley about 500,000 people. An Awash Valley Board headed by a director with the rank of Deputy Minister has been set up to guide the development. In future the Borkenna valley is also to be developed. Two big projects are being carried out in the Somali Republic—irrigation of large areas in the Bullo Mererta and Descek Uamo and also the building of an irrigation complex on the Scebeli River between the towns of Afgoi and Merca and of irrigation canals from the Falkeiro and Karpalan reservoirs. The Sudan is also engaged in extensive irrigation work; the building of a large dam on the Atbara will make it possible to irrigate an additional 500,000 feddans of land.

In most countries the people are participating in the digging of wells, building of dykes and small irrigation systems. In the northern district of Ghana, for example, in 1960 alone 113 small dykes were erected which made it possible to irrigate 2,600 hectares.

One of the bottlenecks in the governments' efforts to modernise agriculture is the acute shortage of personnel. Somaliland, for example, did not have a single Somali agronomist at the end of the colonial period. The situation was about the same in many other countries. Since most countries in tropical Africa so far have no colleges or universities, the training of agricultural specialists is not organised properly. A limited number of young people get a higher education abroad, but their training does not sufficiently take into account the specific features of agriculture in Africa's tropical areas.

³⁷ *Horoya*, November 13, 1962.

This lack of personnel with a higher education results in that there is very little or no research at all in problems of tropical farming and livestock raising. Specialists from the former metropolitan countries work in all the countries. Most of them are paid by the governments of the former metropolitan countries or the managements of European plantation companies, and they naturally study first of all problems of interest to their masters. At times this may coincide with the national interests of the African states, but this by far is not always the case. This is a serious difficulty in advancing and reconstructing agriculture, which is not easy to overcome.

The training of farm machine operators, livestock experts and propaganda of modern farming methods is assuming a wide scale: various schools and courses and model experimental stations are set up, and special literature is circulated. In some countries the radio and cinema are used for these purposes. Greater literacy everywhere is creating more favourable conditions for the spread of modern farming methods among the mass of the peasantry.

This diverse range of measures, carried out by the governments of independent African states, should in future bring about decisive changes in the agriculture of tropical Africa. Today, however, these changes are little noticeable both in production and especially in agrarian relations. Agrarian relations in Africa continue to remain extremely involved.

The development of the productive forces demand a reconstruction of the land tenure systems. Speaking of pre-revolutionary Russia, Lenin said that it was necessary to clear the whole land of all "medieval lumber."³⁸ The governments of the African states have to solve this problem.

No noticeable changes have occurred so far in land relations within the African village. The main land tracts are owned by peasant communities; almost all statesmen have declared their intention to preserve communal land tenure, although there is no country where this intention has been legislatively formalised. Land relations in the community, as before, are regulated by traditional rules of customary law and outside the community, by laws introduced by the

authorities of the former metropolitan countries. The Government of the Ivory Coast has proclaimed uncultivated lands the property of the state, i.e., nationalised them, but so far it is not clear how this will affect the traditional land tenure system.

Lands which in the colonial period had been declared the property of the metropolitan countries, specifically "crown lands" in the British colonies, are now the property of the corresponding African states, i.e., are formally nationalised. This, however, has in no way affected the rules of land ownership and tenure.

Lands seized by European plantation and mining companies and settlers still remain their property. This category of land is the biggest in the former British East Africa colonies (Kenya, Tanganyika), in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and also in the former Belgian Congo. Of the independent governments so far only the Government of Tanganyika has promulgated a law abolishing private ownership of the land and turning land holders into leasees of the state. In the countries of West Africa, foreign companies own large tracts of land in the Ivory Coast and Cameroun; after the abolition of the colonial regime, there has even been a certain increase in this category of lands.

Private feudal land ownership remains intact. The emirs of North Nigeria, the obas in West Nigeria, the rulers of the lamidates in the northern districts of Cameroun, the omanhene in Ghana, the ruler of Barotseland, and others, preserved their privileges: without their consent governments cannot dispose of the land, of which these rulers are considered the nominal owners by tradition. Only in Ghana was the president enabled by the Land Act of 1962 to annul decisions of the omanhene pertaining to the land reserve.

Private land ownership by Africans is on the increase, though on a very small scale so far. The establishment of paysannats in countries of Equatorial Africa and virgin land settlements in Nigeria has increased the private land-holding sector of Africans. The National Assembly of Niger has legalised the procedure of endorsing the property rights to plots received under the rules of customary law, which actually means the transfer of land into private ownership.³⁹

³⁸ В. И. Ленин, *Полное собрание сочинений*, т. 16, Москва, 1961, стр. 406.

³⁹ *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, 1961, No. 521, pp. 2006-2007.

Three countries—Ghana, Mali and Guinea—promulgated laws setting ceilings on private land holdings. Thus, on October 20, 1959, the Republic of Guinea promulgated a law giving the right of land ownership only to persons who work the land themselves. This limits the size of private landholding and to a certain extent hampers the class differentiation of the peasantry. The law, however, forbids neither lease nor sale of land and even fixes the price of land. The state reserves the right to regulate land transactions; for example, the permission of the appropriate state agencies is required for the lease and sale of land. In pursuance of the main principle of this law, a new law was adopted on February 28, 1961, stipulating that land privately owned and not utilised productively for five years shall become the property of the state if the owners do not begin to cultivate it within six months after the promulgation of the law.

The preservation of the principle of communal land ownership is associated here with the building of socialism. "The land is the property of the nation," Sékou Touré stressed. "The right to exploit the land exists in our country, but the right to ownership of the land no longer exists."

The changes in the social structure of agriculture are more noticeable, though they, too, are limited so far. A state sector has appeared in agriculture and in some countries it apparently will acquire great importance in the next few years. The role of agricultural cooperatives has risen substantially. In some countries agricultural producer cooperatives are being developed which, together with the state sector, may become the main producers of agricultural commodities in the near future. Today, however, small and tiny peasant farms remain the main producers everywhere.

No noticeable changes in the economic condition of the peasantry have occurred so far. As a result of winning independence, the peasants have received political rights and, consequently, constitutional opportunities of influencing the policy of their governments. There are improvements in education and the public health services. But the profitability of the peasant plots has not risen; in some areas the drop in prices of export commodities produced by the peasants has worsened their economic conditions. In countries like Cameroun and Madagascar there has been an increase in tax arrears in recent years which may be an indi-

cator of the growing impoverishment and a form of protest against government policy.

The African village has greatly fallen behind in agricultural cultivation methods, in the economic and cultural spheres. A radical reconstruction of the peasantry's entire way of life is needed. There are two possible ways of development, capitalist and socialist. The African peasants have to choose one of them and make their governments act accordingly. They have to make a choice—with whom to side, whose support to enlist: of the capitalist elements of their countries who are connected with the imperialist powers, or of the working class, their own revolutionary intellectuals and the world socialist system.

LEGACY OF COLONIALISM IN AFRICA

The discrepancy between state frontiers and ethnic boundaries is part of the burdensome legacy of colonialism in Africa. It is the cause of territorial disputes, tension in relations between states and, in some areas, threatens military clashes. Nearly all African states are faced with this problem, and the continent would be steeped in blood if they tried to settle the resulting territorial disputes by attacking their neighbours. Africa naturally welcomed the Soviet Government's proposal to conclude a treaty renouncing the use of force in settling territorial disputes.

Most African states are young. They emerged on the ruins of the colonial system of imperialism, within boundaries established by the European imperialist powers in their division of Africa. Of the African states, only five—Ethiopia, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco—were in existence when the imperialists began to carve up the continent. It was then that names like Upper Volta, Gabon or Kamerun, first appeared on the map of Africa.

This does not mean that there had been no states in tropical Africa before the arrival of the European colonialists. We find many great and small states on the map of Africa at the time of the Middle Ages in Europe. The mighty Empire of Ghana existed on the vast expanses of West Sudan from the 4th to the 13th centuries. It gave way to the Mali Empire, which in face of an armed Moroccan invasion in the 16th century broke up into a great many petty states. To the south of these territories, a number of Hausa states had existed from the 8th to the 10th century; somewhat later came the states of the Congo basin, etc.

As was the case of other continents, the development of

the African peoples was uneven: in the Middle Ages a considerable part of them continued to live under a primitive-communal society, without being organised into states. But on the whole the Africa of that period could not be considered a backward continent.

The end of the European Middle Ages coincided with a great expansion of the African slave trade. In Europe, developing capitalist relations gave a mighty boost to the productive forces and led to the formation of nationalities and nations, and the establishment of a system of bourgeois states which were, as a rule, uninational. Meanwhile, Africa was greatly retarded in its development by the slave trade, which continued for more than four centuries.

The end of the slave trade and the start of European colonisation found Africa "atomised". The slave trade involved more than just the export of slaves. The hunt for slaves bred endless wars; the chiefs of one tribe sought to capture men from others, village attacked village, neighbour fought neighbour. Such a state of affairs ruled out the possibility of the tribes merging into nationalities and nations and forming large centralised states.

When the conditions for the formation of such states in some areas did eventually arise in the 1820's-1840's, their emergence was blocked by the troops of the European colonialists. Let us take a few examples. In the 1820's, Zulu chief Shaka united all the tribes inhabiting the present province of Natal in the Republic of South Africa and set up a united Zulu state. Bryant, a specialist in the history of the Zulus who spent many years among them, summed up the results of Shaka's activity as follows: the independent tribes ceased to be so and became part of a vast amalgam which could be called the Zulu nation headed by Shaka.¹ In the late 1820's, Shaka led a campaign into the lands of the Tembu, Pondo and Xhosa tribes, with the aim of integrating them in his state.² These are the very territories on which the Verwoerd Government has set up the Transkei,

¹ See A. T. Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, London, 1929.

² Together with the Zulus these tribes actually constituted one people, and spoke dialects of one language known as Nguni, the name by which these tribes were known among the Tsonga, their neighbours in the north. Cf. A. T. Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary*, Maritzburg, 1905, p. 430.

the first Bantustan, in furtherance of its reactionary plan for setting up phoney Bantu states.

Shaka's campaign could have led to the formation of a vast state, including, at the very least, the whole of the south-eastern coast of Africa between the Limpopo and the Great Fish River. But the British authorities in Cape Colony sent their troops against the bold African chief and drove him back. Ten years later, the Zulu state fell under the combined blows of the Anglo-Boer colonialists.

Another state was being set up in the mountains of present-day Basutoland in the thirties and forties of the last century by the efforts of chief Moshesh of the Bakwena tribe. The French missionary, Casalis, who settled in Basutoland in 1833, testified that these tribes were "all looking to the one who stood for their common interests; ... the idea of the tribes uniting to resist the foreigners is gaining ground among them from day to day". Casalis reported his conversation with a Bakwena chief who spoke about the need for unity. "Pointing to the windows of the room in which we sat, he added: 'If you break one window the cold will come into the house, even if the other window remains intact.'"³ This rings very true even for our own day.

Moshesh set up a state (the present Lesotho) but the greater part of the territory inhabited by the Basuto tribes remained in the hands of the Anglo-Boer colonialists, and was not included in the state. The Basuto people now number 1,800,000, but only 685,000 of them live in Basutoland, the rest inhabiting the adjacent areas of the Republic of South Africa.

Let us look at another part of the continent, West Africa. The south of modern Ghana, bounded by the Volta River on the east and the north and by the Tana River in the West, is inhabited by the Akan people, whose main elements are groups of the Fanti tribes on the coastal strip, and the Ashanti, who live in the hinterland to the north of them. The Ashanti tribes united in a state in the late 17th century, and in the first half of the 19th century repeatedly tried to extend its boundaries to include the Fanti coastal strip.

This was an attempt to heal the tribal and feudal divisions among the Akan people and to set up a united national state. But the British, who were already entrenched on the

coast, frustrated all these attempts, and the Akan people never really succeeded in setting up a national state, while the Ashanti state fell in the late 19th century under the blows of the British colonialists.

There are any number of similar examples in various parts of the continent. The peoples of Africa were going through the same processes of overcoming tribal and feudal divisions and the establishment of large centralised states, but these were taking place at a later period than similar processes in Europe. This natural historical development was violently disrupted by colonialist intervention.

The imperialist powers completed their final division of Africa at a rapid pace. In 1876, the territories seized by the European powers constituted only 10 per cent of the African continent, and were mere bases dotting the coast. By the end of the 19th century, only two African countries—Ethiopia and Liberia—remained independent, the latter only nominally until quite recently.

Commenting on the events in the final quarter of the 19th century, Lenin said that it was in this period "that the tremendous 'boom' in colonial conquests begins, and that the struggle for the territorial division of the world becomes extraordinarily keen".⁴ Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and Spain took part in the carve-up of the African continent. By then the USA had control of Liberia.

Each Western power was afraid to be late, and tried to seize as much territory as possible. The African peoples fought the invaders heroically, but the forces were unequal. The imperialists literally tore the continent apart. The territory of Africa is striped and checkered by artificial and arbitrary boundaries. Emperor Haile Selassie told the Conference of African Heads of State and Government of independent African countries which was held in Addis Ababa in May 1963.

The political map of Africa just before the collapse of the colonial system shows 52 territorial units with political boundaries on the continent proper, not counting the various offshore islands. Of these Britain held 20; France, 18; Portugal, 5; Spain, 4; Italy, 3; and Belgium, 2. The population of most of these territories was extremely small: 16 had a

³ Eugène Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1860, p. 267.

⁴ В. И. Ленин, *Полное собрание сочинений*, т. 22, Москва, 1962, стр. 375.

population of less than one million; and 22, from one to five million.

France got the lion's share. Her colonial possessions with the exception of a part of Somali territory, lay in a single unbroken tract from which the other imperialist plunderers tore hunks of various sizes.

Here is a picture of Africa's Atlantic seaboard in the early 20th century. First, there was French Morocco, with the tiny Spanish enclave of Ifni (1,500 sq.km.; 1960, population 54,000) in its side; the Spanish Sahara, or Rio de Oro; and the French possessions of Mauritania and Senegal. Britain had secured a footing on the banks of the Gambia, which flows through Senegal, and there set up her colony of Gambia (10,400 sq. km.; 1960, population 284,000). Then came French Guinea, in which Portugal had an enclave with the offshore islands (36,100 sq. km.; 1960, population 571,000). British Sierra Leone, Liberia, the French Ivory Coast, the British Gold Coast, German Togo, British Nigeria, German Kamerun; French Gabon, in which Spain had the enclave of Rio Muni (together with the offshore islands it is part of the colony known as Spanish Guinea); Portuguese Angola, cut by the Congo River corridor with a broad riparian strip belonging to Belgium; German South West Africa, and the South African Union—the British dominion.

Thus was Africa divided in the heyday of colonialism, and thus is remained when the present sovereign African states were set up; they have no natural-geographic, economic or ethnic justification. They sprang from the balance of power among the imperialist states of Europe in the last quarter of the 19th century, and were inherited by Africa as she threw off the chains of colonialism.

A look at the physical map of West Sudan will show that the boundaries of climatic and floral zones run from west to east: tropical forest, savannah and arid plain. Ethnic boundaries in the main coincide with these zones, but the boundaries of all African colonies run from north to south, cutting right across ethnic bodies.

As a result, the Mandingo people, numbering several million, found themselves in Senegal, French Guinea (now the Guinean Republic), the French Sudan (now the Republic of Mali), the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Portuguese Guinea and Liberia. And accordingly, the population of each colony, and now of each state, is a kind of ethnic sand-

wich: the coastal strip is inhabited by tribes or nationalities speaking languages of the same family or dialects of the same language; to the north of them live nationalities or tribes belonging to another language family, and further north, those of a third.

No modern African state is linguistically uniform. The ethnic sandwich is illustrated by the following table showing a number of neighbouring countries on the Guinean coast.⁵

Language Groups in Countries on the Guinean Coast⁶
(,000)

Languages	Liberia	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Ghana	Togo	Dahomey
Semito-Hamitic group	—	—	10	—	—	—
Hausa group	—	1	1	35	6	2
Central Bantu group	—	710	3,036	1,372	555	420
Songhai	—	—	85	—	—	16
Western Bantu group	185	1	265	14	10	110
Mande group	985	650	332	30	—	17
Guinean group	800	1,710	—	3,378	523	1,155

Things were made much worse by the fact that the colonialists prevented the formation of nations in their colonies, for it was in their interest to preserve the tribal divisions. "If the system breaks down and tribal discipline disappears, native society will be resolved into its human atoms, with possibilities of universal Bolshevism and chaos. Such a breakdown should be prevented at all costs,"⁷ Field-Marshal Jan Smuts told future colonial officials in his lectures at Oxford University. The division of peoples into small tribal communities or groups of tribes was preserved artificially.

While preventing the formation of wider ethnic entities, the colonialists denied the peoples the right to independence

⁵ There is as yet no generally-accepted scientific classification of African languages and the reader may find different classifications in other sources.

⁶ Б. В. Андрианов, *Население Африки. Приложение к карте народов*, Москва, 1960, стр. 62—63.

⁷ J. C. Smuts, *Africa, and Some World Problems*, Oxford, 1930, p. 87.

on the plea that the colonies were an ethnic patchwork. An ex-Governor of a French colony in Africa, Hubert De-champs, said "political chaos" had existed before the arrival of the colonialists in Africa, and declared that "independence in Africa may lead to disintegration into tribes—that is, return to chaos."⁸

The British author of a book on Kenya argues that because "the native population consists of many quite distinctive races", it was almost impossible to unite it into a single "democratic community", so that the colonialists' withdrawal from Kenya would amount to "great shameful betrayal of the backward races."⁹ Many more such statements are available but there is no sense in quoting them all because the peoples of Kenya, like those of other former colonies, have already given a practical demonstration that sovereign states can exist even within artificial boundaries.

Let us return, however, to our main topic: the question of frontiers and territorial disputes in modern Africa.

Let us examine one example taken from the north-eastern part of the continent. In 1891, Britain and Italy signed a protocol demarcating their spheres of influence in East Africa.¹⁰ Under it, the line of demarcation ran from the Indian Ocean along the Juba River to the point of intersection with latitude 6° N., then on along this parallel to longitude 35° E., and farther on along this meridian to the Blue Nile. This line splits the territory inhabited by the Somalis, with Britain getting that part which later became the Northern Province of the British colony of Kenya, and which is now a bone of contention between the governments of Somalia and Kenya. This line ran along territory which now is part of Ethiopia.

By the time of the Anglo-Italian Protocol, Ethiopia, surrounded by colonial plunderers on every side, had twice to take up arms to beat them back (Britain in 1867-1868, and Italy in 1887-1888). Emperor Menelik II and the people of Ethiopia were naturally concerned over their country's secu-

rity. On April 10, 1891, a fortnight after the signing of the Protocol, Menelik sent a letter to the heads of a number of European states (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) in which he defined his country's frontiers, and announced his intention to restore Ethiopia within her ancient frontiers, from Khartoum in the west to Lake Nyanza (Lake Victoria) in the south.¹¹

Hardly anyone knows the exact line of Ethiopia's ancient boundaries. She is successor of Axum, which is generally recognised as one of the largest states of antiquity. It is known that in 350 A. D. the Axumite King Esana conquered the Meroë kingdom which lay in the valley of the Nile on what is today the Republic of the Sudan. In the 8th-7th centuries B. C. an Ethiopian dynasty ruled Egypt (the XXV dynasty).

Take another example in West Africa, namely, the boundaries of the Federal Republic of Cameroun. Kamerun, using the German name, was seized by Germany. To the east of it lay the French colonies of Gabon and Ubangi Shari, now the Central African Republic, and to the west, the British colony of Nigeria. Its boundaries with the French possessions were established by the Franco-German agreements of 1885, 1894 and 1908. The first of these defined the frontier as follows: the mouth of the Campo River, along the Campo River to its intersection with longitude 10° E. (7° 40' east of Paris) and further on along the parallel until its intersection with longitude 15° (12° 40' east of Paris).¹²

The colonialists were not in the least concerned with what this line did to the peoples living in those parts. As a result, 750,000 of the Fang people found themselves in Kamerun and 120,000 in Gabon; 210,000 of the Maka people in Kamerun, and 10,000 in Gabon.¹³ The frontier line between Kamerun and Nigeria was demarcated in a similar way. In fact, almost all boundaries were drawn this way: a point of reference was taken on the coast and a line traced on the graticule.

During the First World War, British troops from Nigeria and French troops from Gabon and Ubangi Shari moved

⁸ *New Commonwealth*, January 24, 1955, p. 59.

⁹ C. J. Wilson, *One African Colony*, London, 1945, pp. 4-6.

¹⁰ Protocol between the British and Italian Governments for the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, from the River Juba to the Blue Nile. Signed at Rome, March 24, 1891. *The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives*, published by the Information Services of the Somali Government, 1962, pp. 87-88.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹² *Protocol Relating to the German and French Possessions on the West African Coast*, Berlin, December 24, 1885; E. Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, Vol. II, London, 1909, p. 653.

¹³ Б. В. Андрианов, *Население Африки*, стр. 64—66.

into Kamerun. The German colony was divided between the victorious powers and the boundary between the British Cameroons and French Cameroun was established along the line of meeting of their troops. Of what ethnic value was this new frontier?

The British ethnographer, Meek, who had a good knowledge of this part of Africa and had for many years been Government anthropologist in Nigeria's colonial administration, gives the following picture: 1. A group of Higi tribes inhabit a number of villages on either side of the boundary line. 2. The villages of Maiha, Paka, Hudu, Ligudira, Nguli, Furkwai and Ndeekwe in the British Cameroons are inhabited by the Njai people, the bulk of whom live in French Cameroun across the border. 3. The villages of Muvi, Muda, Gela, Kwoja and others in the British Cameroons are inhabited by the Cheke people; across the border, in French Cameroun, they live in the villages of Bukura, Zakura, etc. 4. The population of the villages of Woga, Wemgo and Vizik in the British Cameroons belongs to a tribe the bulk of which lives in French Cameroun.¹⁴

Let us see what the Cameroonians themselves think of this boundary.

Here is an excerpt from a petition submitted by the National Federation of the Cameroons to the U.N. Trusteeship Council on December 9, 1949. It says: No greater injustice has been perpetrated by the European rulers in respect of the Cameroonian people than the division of the Cameroons between Britain and France, which was carried out without consulting the people immediately affected by this division.... Tribal and even family ties were severed by this division.... The frontiersman has to travel dozens of miles to the headquarters of the Administering Power to obtain a passport making it legal for him to visit a relative or friend who lives across the border a few yards away from his home.

The Cameroonian peoples fought long and hard to reunite the two parts of their country in a single Cameroon state and were supported in their just cause by the progressive forces of the world. The part of the Cameroons which was under French rule became a sovereign state on January 1, 1960. The British Cameroons was divided into two parts,

South and North Cameroons, and the latter was illegally integrated as an administrative part of Nigeria when she was still a colony.

Under a decision of the 14th U.N. General Assembly, a referendum was held in both parts of the British Cameroons on February 11 and 12, 1961, to decide either for joining Nigeria, which had by then become a sovereign state, or the Republic of Cameroun. There was a separate count in the two parts. In the southern part, where the national-liberation and unity movements were especially strong, the majority were in favour of joining Cameroun. In the northern part, the majority opted for Nigeria.

The Government of the Republic of Cameroun questioned the correctness of the returns in the northern part of the British Cameroons. On May 31, President Ahidjo issued the following statement: "On June 1, a part of the Cameroun nation will be separated from the motherland contrary to the will of her inhabitants. We express our profound regret to our brothers in the Northern Cameroons and assure them that we shall do everything to end this brutal separation."¹⁵ On October 1, 1961, Cameroun became a Federal Republic; it filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which the latter refused to examine.¹⁶

To get a correct understanding of the essence of this issue of Cameroun's boundaries, we must look at the one established between the northern part of the former British Cameroons and Nigeria. The most numerous people in the northern part of the British Cameroons is the Bura (665,000), of whom 275,000 live in Nigeria, 315,000 in the northern part of the former British Cameroons, and 75,000 in the Republic of Cameroun. Another people, the Kanuri, numbering 1,994,000, is divided as follows: 1,503,000 in Nigeria; 135,000, in the northern part of the former British Cameroons; 21,000, in the Republic of Cameroun; and the rest in Niger and Chad. The Fulbe people and several other peoples are dismembered in a similar way.

It follows that integration either with Nigeria or Cameroun could not in itself settle the problems arising from the discrepancy between political frontiers and ethnic boundaries. Any arbitrary north-south line is bound to cut across the body of a people.

¹⁴ C. K. Meek, *Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria*, Vol. 1, London, 1931, pp. 252, 282, 293, 320.

¹⁵ *Afrique nouvelle*, June 7, 1961.

¹⁶ *West Africa*, December 14, 1963, p. 1403.

The boundaries between former French colonies show how the colonialists ruled Africa. I said above that these French colonies stretched in one unbroken tract. On the coast, French possessions alternated with the possessions of the other colonial powers, which prevented France from changing boundaries arbitrarily, but she certainly made up for it in the hinterland. Here are a few examples.

The Upper Volta colony was separated from the Ivory Coast colony only in 1919 and became a separate administrative entity in the vast colonial federation known as French West Africa. The federation did not yield enough profit and during the world economic crisis of 1929-1933 it was decided to abolish Upper Volta as an independent entity; a part of its territory went to the Ivory Coast and the rest, to the French Sudan. In 1947, Upper Volta was reconstituted as a separate colony.

In 1900, the colony of Niger was called "military district" and constituted a part of the so-called Upper Senegal-Niger area. A few years later, the district of Gao in the French Sudan (the eastern part of the present Republic of Mali) was joined to the colony, but in 1911, Gao was returned to Sudan, and in 1922 Niger became a separate colony.

The boundaries between the present Republic of Mali and Mauritania were repeatedly altered at the whim of the colonialists. The line between Morocco and Algeria was never defined at all. Only along the short stretch of 165 km. from the Mediterranean coast to Teniet-El-Sassi was the border precisely defined and fixed by the Treaty of Lalla-Marnia in 1845.¹⁷

There is no point in going over the whole history of boundaries in France's colonial possessions in Africa but it should be stressed that most of them were the product of arbitrary administrative decisions and have now become the state frontiers of young sovereign states.

The artificial lines have given rise to two acute problems: relations between neighbouring states, and relations between peoples within the boundaries of a single state. The first of these is especially acute. The artificial boundaries have already led to armed clashes between Morocco and Algeria, Somalia and Ethiopia, and tensions in relations between Morocco and Mauritania, Somalia and Kenya, and Ghana and

Togo; they may lead to dangerous tensions in other parts of the continent as well; they hamper the strengthening of African unity. The most serious obstacle to African unity, President Aden Abdullah Osman of the Somali Republic said at the Addis Ababa conference, was the artificial political boundaries forcibly established on vast areas of the continent by the colonial powers.

This question of artificial boundaries has long worried political leaders in Africa. The first All-African Peoples' Conference in 1958, that is, when the disintegration of the colonial system in the tropical part of the continent was just beginning, devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of frontiers. A special resolution said that boundaries separating peoples of the same origin were unnatural and their preservation did not lead to peace. The conference urged the neighbouring governments to co-operate in seeking a final solution of the problem of frontiers.

The conference recommended the establishment of regional federations as a radical means of eliminating this burdensome legacy of colonialism. This would undoubtedly be a great step towards the solution of this thorny problem and would have a beneficial effect on the solution of many other problems.

The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity adopted at a Conference of African Heads of State and Government in May 1963 provides for the peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues through negotiation, mediation, reconciliation or arbitration. This procedure for the settlement of territorial disputes was successfully applied in the Algerian-Moroccan conflict: the dispute has not yet been resolved but a cease-fire has been arranged, and this is a great victory for the forces of peace.

The same is true of the armed clash between Ethiopia and Somalia in February 1964.

Armed clashes between African states may open the door to armed intervention by imperialist powers and may result in the loss of the independence they won at such great cost. That is why the Soviet Government's proposal for an international agreement which would include an undertaking to resolve all territorial disputes exclusively by peaceful means is of especial importance to Africa.

The problem of relations between various African peoples who find themselves within the boundaries of a single

¹⁷ *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 316.

state goes beyond the framework of the present article, but I must stress that the difficulties this may produce could also give rise to armed conflicts and imperialist interference in the affairs of African countries. A successful solution of this problem could mitigate the frontier problems, and eliminate them altogether in the future. There is only one way to this goal: it is all-round help in bringing different peoples within one state closer together and merging them in one or several national entities.

A revision of existing state frontiers in Africa is, I think, possible only in some areas, but not for the continent as a whole. In West Africa, for instance, it would require the elimination of all existing states and the establishment of new ones, with boundaries running along parallels instead of meridians.

In the long run new ethnic entities, nationalities and nations, may take shape within existing state boundaries. In the light of this historical prospect, solution must be found for this other question of state system: are the states to be unitary or federal? This was the subject of a keen exchange of opinion in many countries during their transition from colonial status to sovereign state.

In spite of the ethnic patchwork in most of the countries of tropical Africa, I think, all tribes and groups of tribes could merge in single nations, in which case the establishment of unitary states would be fully justified and would promote national consolidation. But in such a big country as Nigeria, which had several national entities even in the colonial period (Yoruba, Ibo, etc.), the establishment of a unitary state could harm good relations between peoples and lead to national strife.

Whatever the solution of this question of relations between the various peoples within a single state, the *sine qua non* is free will and inadmissibility of any coercion in respect of peoples, whether great or small.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE STRUGGLE OF THE TWO IDEOLOGIES

The African continent has in recent years become the scene of a bitter ideological struggle. Never before has there been such ferment in African minds as there is today. The bitterness of this struggle can be easily explained.

The majority of African peoples have liberated themselves from colonial occupation and set up their own national states. The imperialists, forced to abandon direct political rule, have tried to take advantage of their former colonies' economic dependence in order to maintain indirect political control and thus keep them within the capitalist orbit. But history has its own logic. Now that the African countries have attained sovereignty, they naturally wish to conduct an independent policy which differs from that of their former rulers and indeed very often cuts right across the latter's interests.

To a differing extent and in various ways African governments are trying to restrict the dominating position held by the former metropolitan countries in their economic affairs. Many have firmly resolved that, with the backing and assistance of the socialist countries, they will put an end to their economic dependence on imperialist powers and thereby free themselves of political pressure from that quarter.

The African countries are intently searching for the quickest ways of overcoming economic and cultural backwardness. Soviet experience in transforming economically and culturally backward Russia into a great, leading socialist power is of great interest to Africans.

Because the imperialists are seriously disturbed by the Africans' determination to choose their own way forward

without consulting them on the matter they are now more than ever supplementing economic fetters with ideological persuasion. Never before have they retained such a large staff of ideological servitors as in the independent African countries today. Never before have they dumped such a tremendous amount of propaganda material onto Africa.

The struggle between the two principal ideologies of our day, the bourgeois and the socialist, lies at the heart of the ideological struggle in Africa and throughout the world. In Africa, however, due to certain historical peculiarities and the existing social structure, this struggle is exceptionally complicated by a host of other factors of the people's spiritual life, such as nationalism, which sometimes takes the form of anti-white racialism, tribalism (the ideology of patriarchy and tribal separatism), etc. The social outlook of most African intellectuals, who constitute the leading force in most African countries because of the weakness of the working class and the bourgeoisie, is marked by eclecticism, an odd mixture of different and even contradictory, basically idealistic views on society, the laws of its development and man's inner world. It is worth noting in this connection a statement made by Mburumba Kerina, a political leader from South West Africa who used to live in the U.S.A. and represented his country at the U.N. "Our aim," he wrote, "should be Pan-African socialism, justice and prosperity for all the people of our country... African leaders should welcome and use ideological contributions in their efforts, just as we welcome material contributions. We must seek ideological strength wherever it can be found, in the social and economic teachings of Islam, and Christianity, in the economic analysis of Karl Marx and in the experience of the Soviet Union, America and Cuba. As dedicated leaders we must take from all quarters what is valuable to Africa, adding it to the considerable mental capital of Africa acquired over the centuries."¹

The state of mind of African intellectuals, particularly in the tropical countries peopled by Negro Africans, is reflected in the policy and ideology of Pan-Africanism.

Pan-Africanism started as a political movement with its own ideological basis at the end of the 19th century and has since followed a very complicated, contradictory course. It

originated in America. The 19th century was a bloody period for the Negro people. In Africa, people died in their thousands, upholding their right to an independent way of life. In America, the descendants of Africans who had been transported there by the slave-traders rose up in a succession of revolts against slavery. The African peoples were mercilessly crushed and turned into colonial slaves in their own homeland. Their descendants in America, in alliance with the white anti-slavery campaigners, were victorious: on January 1, 1863, President Lincoln declared the Emancipation Proclamation.

The slaves became free, but the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling of 1857 in the case of Dred Scott, a Negro, remained in force. This ruling made in a particular case, proclaimed a principle of general validity: Negroes were inferior to whites and, even if freed, could never become part of the American nation. This racialist declaration was formally annulled by the adoption of the 13th (1865) and 14th (1868) Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, but the outrageous practice of discrimination against Negroes continues to this day.

The events of 1963, a hundred years after emancipation, showed that the ruling of 1857 is no dead letter for modern American society, that same society which imperialist propaganda holds up as a "model". All over the country, reports Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, Negroes are beaten up, kicked, shot at and killed. A hundred years had passed since emancipation, noted American Negro leader Martin Luther King, but they had to acknowledge a tragic fact: Negroes were no freer than before; as in the past, the life of Negroes in the U.S.A. was crippled by the fetters of segregation and the chains of discrimination. A hundred years later, he protested, Negroes were pushed into the corners of American society and felt themselves alien in their own land. Negro-baiting has, indeed, become a dangerous political weapon in the hands of the fascist-minded reactionaries. They are responsible for increasing tension between black and white so as to undermine America's democratic institutions and clear the way for a fascist dictatorship.

No other race has suffered so many insults to its human dignity or such humiliation under capitalism as the Negro. For the sake of capitalist business Negroes both in Africa and in America were declared inferior people. In conditions of

¹ *Freedomways*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1962, p. 464.

the existence of colonial empires it becomes urgent to refute the "theory" of white racial superiority and show that the Negro is a human being and that black-skinned people are no worse than white-skinned people. Research had to be done into African history of the time Africa was free, when the great empires of Ghana and Mali existed, and when African craftsmen created exquisite works of art. As Frantz Fanon of Martinique, who fought in the Algerian revolution, wrote, Negroes were faced with the urgent task of "proving to the white world at all costs the existence of a Negro civilisation".² The first to tackle this task were the American Negroes who, besides having a vital interest in this question, had greater opportunities than the enslaved peoples of Africa. In the 19th century, the American Negroes produced a considerable number of talented historians, the most notable being the late Dr. William Du Bois, grandson of a slave, member of the American Communist Party and Lenin Peace Prize winner.

Africans were only able to get down to this task after they had won political independence. The idea of the African personality was propounded at the First Conference of Independent African States in 1958; this idea means recognising that Africa has its own personality, its own history and its own culture and that it has made valuable contributions to world history and world culture. It is the same idea that was developed by American Negro historians in the 19th century: to restore the dignity of the Negro peoples which had been trampled underfoot by the American slave-owners and the European colonisers. It is a great liberating idea. In order to round off the struggle against colonialism, the imperialist-dominated peoples had to find renewed inspiration and become aware of their own strength and ability to build their life anew. Guinean President Sékou Touré calls it "supiritual decolonisation". Pan-Africanism is therefore a reaction to colonial enslavement in Africa and racial discrimination against the descendants of African slaves in America; it is an ideological and political means of fighting racialism and colonialism.

At first the Pan-African movement was really a Pan-Negro movement, centred in America, to unite the Negro people of Africa and America in the fight against racialism

and colonialism. The first Pan-African Conference was called in London in 1900 by H. Sylvester-Williams, a Negro from Trinidad. Between 1919 and 1927, four Pan-African congresses were held on the initiative and under the guidance of Dr. Du Bois. Few delegates came from Africa, most being American Negroes. In fact, no Africans at all attended the Fourth Congress held in America. The independence movement had not yet assumed a mass scale in Africa, the nationalist organisations at that time limited their demands to a reform of the colonial administration rather than putting forward the slogan of independence. The resolutions on African questions adopted at the first four Pan-African congresses reflected this moderation but, all the same, the Pan-African movement then played a useful role in drawing the attention of world opinion to African problems.

The Fifth Congress held in Manchester in 1945 under Dr. Du Bois's chairmanship helped broaden the tasks of the Pan-African movement. In fact, the composition of the Congress made it a really African affair. Besides Du Bois, such leaders of the national independence movement as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Nnamdi Azikiwe took a prominent part in it. Moreover, the Congress was strongly anti-colonial and anti-imperialist. It called on the peoples of Africa to fight "by all the means at their disposal" for the abolition of colonial regimes and the attainment of political independence. "...The struggle for political power by colonial and subject peoples is the first step towards, and the necessary prerequisite to, complete social, economic and political emancipation," the delegates affirmed in their Declaration to the Colonial Workers, Farmers and Intellectuals. "The Fifth Pan-African Congress therefore calls on the workers and farmers of the colonies to organise effectively. Colonial workers must be in the front of the battle against imperialism. . . . We also call upon the intellectuals and professional classes of the colonies to awaken to their responsibilities. . . . Today there is only one road to effective action—the organisation of the masses. . . . Colonial and Subject Peoples of the World—Unite!"³ This was the first Congress to make a call for African unity and the uniting of all countries and peoples of the continent in the fight against colonialism

³ G. Padmore, *History of the Pan-African Congress*, Manchester, [s.a.], p. 6.

² Frantz Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs*, Paris, [s.a.], p. 46.

and imperialism, and to advance the idea of a union of African states.

When the African leaders proclaimed the slogan of unity they were quite aware that it would be a very difficult thing to put into practice. The imperialists had carved the continent up into 50 pieces of colonial territory whose administrative boundaries bore no relation to ethnic distribution. This still remains a bone of contention between some countries. The people of Africa belong to several races and a great many linguistic groups; besides three world religions—Christianity, Islam and Judaism—there are several local religions. The African countries usually have practically no economic relations with each other; on the other hand, however, they are still firmly tied to traditional markets in the former metropolitan countries. The imperialist powers are doing everything they can to prevent African unity. The association, under imperialist pressure, of 18 African countries with the European Common Market puts additional difficulties in the way of promoting inter-African trade. Furthermore, African statesmen themselves hold different views on what form unity should take.

Yet, despite all the obstacles, the idea of African anti-imperialist unity is making headway. The movement for unity draws support from a wide variety of social groups: Pan-African organisations of workers, peasants, young people, women, journalists and students have already been set up; and in 1963 a Pan-African conference of clergymen was held in Kampala. Disruptive elements from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions obstructed the establishment of a single Pan-African trade union association with the result that two union bodies were formed in 1961. But the working class will ultimately have its way and overcome this difficulty too. Representatives from the two bodies met in Dakar in November 1963 and set up a committee to prepare a united Pan-African trade union conference.

The adoption of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity by the Conference of the Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa is a great victory for those fighting colonialism and imperialism and is welcomed by all true friends of the African peoples. In a message to the heads of state and government attending the Conference, the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers said that "the idea of unity and solidarity of the African countries and their desi-

re to unite their efforts in the fight against colonialism, for strengthening political and economic independence, and for the advancement and well-being of their peoples is keenly felt and understood by the Soviet peoples. The high and noble aims set by the Charter find wholehearted support in the Soviet Union." The future will show what success the Charter principles will have in practice. But the first steps taken by African states to eliminate the last remaining colonial regimes (particularly in Angola) and to put an end to the hapless lot of the Africans in South Africa give grounds for hope.

The political aspect of Pan-Africanism underwent a great change when slogans on Africa's liberation and unity and the subsequent fight to implement them were brought to the fore. As we saw above, this had previously been a Pan-Negro movement formally uniting Negroes throughout the world, particularly in the United States and Africa. Now Pan-Africanism became a movement of the African peoples irrespective of race. Besides the black, Negro race, the African continent is inhabited by the white race (Arabs, Berbers, etc.), the Khoisan race (Bushmen, Hottentots), etc. Both Arabs and Ethiopians have actively joined the fight for Pan-African unity alongside the Negro peoples.

The Pan-African movement became truly African and swept the entire continent. The old idea of the Pan-Negro movement, however, was taken up by others who gave it a completely different slant. Before the Second World War two Negro poets, then living in Paris—Léopold Senghor, now President of the Republic of Senegal, and Aimé Césaire, from Martinique, advanced the concept of Negritude.

Negritude is first and foremost a reaction against the humiliation suffered by black intellectuals and their fellow countrymen in Paris; it is a protest against the imperialist policy of assimilation and suppression of African culture. "Negritude is an idea born in us from the awareness that throughout the whole of history we have been robbed," wrote Alioune Diop, General Secretary of the Society of African Culture. "Negritude is our modest but resolute striving to restore the victim's rights and show the world what it has particularly insistently denied—the dignity of the black man."⁴ But Negritude like the nationalism of an oppressed nation, has

⁴ *Présence Africaine*, 1959, XXIV-XXV, p. 42-43.

two sides to it: a just desire to restore the dignity of the black man, and the reactionary counterposing of the black race to the white, which is dangerous for the progress of the Negro peoples. The opponents of Negritude who sum it up as anti-racial racialism are quite right.

According to the concept of Negritude, white and black people have a different way of thinking: "the European's way of thinking is analytical and logical, while the Negro-African's is intuitive." This implies two methods of cognition, and "cognition by means of comparison and intuition is Negro-African cognition." These anti-scientific ideas lead to absurd political conclusions. Hence, Marxism is said to be unsuitable for Africa and "the romantic theme widespread in Europe" about "the so-called solidarity of the European proletariat and the colonial peoples does not stand up to criticism."⁵ There can be no alliance between the European workers and the imperialist-enslaved peoples of Africa, affirms the advocate of Negritude, turning a blind eye on the valuable contribution made, for instance, by the French workers and their Communist Party towards the liberation of the French colonial peoples.

After the Second World War, attempts were made to boost the idea of a single Negro-African culture and Negro-African literature including literature created by all Negro writers regardless of where they lived or worked—in the Congo or the United States—and on this basis to organise a new Pan-Negro movement. In 1947, a group of Negro intellectuals from French colonies in Africa and the West Indies started to put out a magazine in Paris called *Présence Africaine* intended to "vindicate the unity of Negro culture".⁶ In 1956, they convened an International Congress of Negro Writers and Artists, which decided to form the Society of African Culture (formally founded on March 9, 1957); the word African is here used as a synonym for Negro. Jean Price-Mars, a doctor from Haiti, was elected president of the Society. A second Congress was held in Rome in 1959. The Society's activities were useful in that they made many people familiar with problems connected with the renaissance and development of African culture which the colonialists

⁵ L. S. Senghor, *Nation et voie africaine du socialisme*, Paris, 1961, p. 95.

⁶ *Synopsis and Catalogue of Présence Africaine, 1947-1962*, Paris, 1963, p. 8.

had pronounced primitive and unworthy of attention. On the political level, however, it was not and could not be successful.

The concept of Negritude did not win recognition in Africa or among the American Negroes. The best minds of the continent refuse to attach any importance to the colour of a man's skin and to introduce racial considerations into politics. Speaking about Garveyism (a Negro movement in the 1920's) Dr. Kwame Nkrumah has stated quite categorically that black nationalism was the opposite of African nationalism. Ghana's Permanent Representative at the United Nations Alex Quaison-Sackey frequently observes in his book *Africa Unbound* how stupid it is for a Negro to emphasise his blackness. On the subject of Negritude he wrote that it "is a dangerous creed: why should the colour of a man's skin mean anything? ... What is truly important is the self-respect and mutual understanding among all human beings of whatever colour."⁷

Negritude implies justification of colonialism as an historically unavoidable evil. Its proponents admit that colonialism is an evil, but "let us cease uttering reproaches and be more attentive to the contribution made than to the damage done", they cry. Europe "brought us a higher technique than our own; ... having destroyed the old Negro-African animism, it offered us Christianity—a more rational religion", and so on, and for that reason "let us stop cursing colonialism and Europe and making them the cause of all our ills."⁸ In order to justify their stand, they allege—as Léopold Senghor did, for instance, when opening a seminar on "African Socialism" (Dakar, December 3-8, 1962)—that Marx and Engels "were not anti-colonialists."⁹

Events in recent years have shown that the advocates of Negritude prefer alliance with imperialist France to Pan-African unity. Ruling circles in African countries, formerly part of the French colonial empire, who have given their allegiance to Negritude have not participated in the all-African peoples' conferences, the direct continuation of the Pan-African congresses. And they did not attend the three Afro-Asian solidarity conferences held in African capitals

⁷ A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound*, New York, 1963, p. 161.

⁸ L. S. Senghor, *Nation et voie africaine du socialisme*, Paris, 1961, p. 95.

⁹ *Africa Report*, May 1963, p. 15.

(their countries were either totally unrepresented or were represented by opposition organisations and leaders). They refused to take part in the third conference of independent African states, scheduled for Tunis in 1962, preferring instead to convene separate conferences (Brazzaville, December 1960; Yaoundé, March 1961), as a result of which the splinter Afro-Malagasy Union was set up. They were to blame for the fact that the projected third conference of independent African states did not take place. Public opinion in support of African unity compelled them, however, to attend the Addis Ababa Conference and sign the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. Even so, they immediately announced their intention of continuing with the Afro-Malagasy Union, whose activity, as President Sékou Touré of Guinea has rightly said, "is aimed at emasculating the African Charter adopted at the Addis Ababa Conference of its dynamic content."

This is the short, as yet unfinished, history of a contemporary movement founded on a racial concept: it started with anti-racialism and condemnation of French colonial policy and ended in alliance with the imperialists. One reason why the advocates of Negritude find themselves in this unnatural alliance with the oppressors is because they reject an alliance between the oppressed peoples of Africa and the European workers.

A wide range of historical experience convincingly shows that racial considerations have always been introduced into politics by reactionary forces (slave-owners, colonialists, German fascists, Japanese militarists, etc.) to justify their repugnant anti-popular policies. History shows that popular movements having a racial basis have always arisen as a reaction to racial oppression. Although in the first instance these movements are usually progressive, they always have some features which can be and in fact are used to a reactionary end. A member of such a movement may make up his mind, or may be persuaded, that all people of another race are his enemies and the enemies of his people. The case of the Pan-Africanist Congress in South Africa is an instructive example.

For a number of years before it was banned by the Government, the Congress of Democrats in South Africa grouped together English and African supporters of the progressive, anti-imperialist organisations of the non-European populat-

ion—the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, and the Coloured People's National Union. When all these organisations formed a common front of struggle against Verwoerd's fascist policies, a small group of A.N.C. members split away, complaining that the A.N.C. had fallen under white influence, and set up their own organisation, the Pan-Africanist Congress, as a purely racial organisation allegedly "free" from white influence. The P.A.C. leadership immediately came out with violently anti-communist statements and soon attracted the support of the white Liberal Party also engaged in vicious anti-communist propaganda. The leader of its Right wing, Patrick Duncan, a rabid anti-communist, became a particularly enthusiastic champion of the P.A.C. After having left the A.N.C. for the alleged reason that it cooperated with progressive whites, the P.A.C. fell into company with white reactionaries. This is, of course, quite natural: the main contradiction in bourgeois society is not between races but between antagonistic classes, between the forces of progress fighting for the socialist transformation of society and the forces of imperialist reaction striving to save the outlived, decadent capitalist system.

The P.A.C. leaders are no exception. There are political figures in other African countries who counterpose black to white, and with the same result: in turning their back on friends, they find themselves bound in a shameful alliance with the enemies of African freedom.

The idea of "ideological independence" has gained considerable ground among certain Africans. We cannot accept the ideology of either West or East, they say, for we have our own ideology and we must develop it further and improve on it. There are a number of factors behind the appearance of this idea.

The whole thesis rests on the concept of "African exceptionalism" which claims that Africa is developing in ways different to other continents. African society, it is alleged, is by its very nature classless; elements of private ownership and exploitation were brought in by the colonialists and are alien to African society; before the colonialists arrived, African society was already socialist, but the colonialists destroyed it and now it is necessary to restore the former socialist institutions. The general laws governing the development of human society are said not to extend to

Africa, which apparently has its own laws and should therefore have its own ideology.

At the same time, the concept of "African exceptionalism" is a reaction to the humiliation suffered by the Negro peoples at the hands of the colonialists. Over the centuries the colonialists had maintained that the Negro peoples were incapable of independent creative action; they were perhaps able to take over the achievements of white peoples but, because of their mental inferiority, they could not create any new spiritual values themselves. Hence the natural desire to create something of their own, something original and in this way give the lie to the insulting inventions of the racialists and restore the dignity of the Negro peoples or, as Pan-Africanists would say, the dignity of the "African personality".

But is ideological independence possible? African society includes large numbers of petty commodity producers, private property owners, and petty bourgeoisie; in many countries a bourgeoisie has already appeared and is exploiting the labour of others. Consequently, bourgeois ideology finds fertile soil within African society. For a long time Africa has been subjected to strong ideological influence from the bourgeois countries of Europe and America. The colonialists implanted bourgeois, and not some other kind of ideology. As a result, bourgeois ideas are more widespread in Africa today than socialist ideas which have only recently begun to filter through, although they are today spreading quickly. The attempt to conduct a policy of ideological independence can in practice mean only one thing: to prevent the spreading of socialist ideas and strengthen bourgeois ideas. Small wonder that both the local, African, and the foreign, imperialist, bourgeoisie approve this policy.

Bourgeois journals throughout the world support "African Socialism" or, to give its other variant, "Pan-African Socialism" in the belief that this theory will not lead to socialism. For this reason those African statesmen and political figures who really are striving for socialism have lately begun to use the more exact term "scientific socialism". Thus the ruling party in Mali, the Sudanese Union, had given up using the term "African Socialism"; at its sixth congress in 1962 the theory of scientific socialism was proclaimed as its ideological foundation. At the colloquium on

"African Socialism" in Dakar, the Mali representative, Minister of Development, Seydou Kouyate, spoke out in defence of the scientific theory of socialism. When President Sékou Touré opened the 6th Congress of the Democratic Party of Guinea on December 27, 1962, he said: "There is a lot of talk in Africa about African Socialism as if there were such a thing as Chinese Socialism, American Socialism, Yugoslav Socialism, Bulgarian Socialism, etc. If we go any further along this path, then we shall begin to speak of the Nigerian or Togolese road to socialism, about Senegalese chemistry or Moroccan mathematics."¹⁰

There is no single concept of "African Socialism" but a great many different ones. A careful study of them all shows that in some cases they arise from confusion in the minds of people sincerely striving for socialism, while in others they reflect the interests of the rising African national bourgeoisie who are willing to employ certain socialist methods (economic planning, establishment of a state sector, etc.) in order to overcome economic backwardness but do not intend to allow any infringement on their own class interests. But no matter how theorists in Africa and elsewhere interpret "African Socialism", the African popular masses regard it as firm rejection of the capitalist way of development and the end of man's exploitation of man, as well as of imperialist exploitation, that is, as authentic scientific socialism. The working people link all their hopes for a better life with the idea of socialism, that brand of socialism which has already set one-third of mankind on the road to happiness, freedom and justice; this is the great achievement of our age.

Some African leaders claim that Marxism cannot be applied to their countries because the proletarian and bourgeois classes are not yet fully formed there. But Marxism offers, among other things, an explanation of the most general laws governing any society, including a precapitalist one. What it means by a non-capitalist path is that countries where the proletarian and bourgeois classes have not had time to form can take a way of development which can lead to socialism, so bypassing the capitalist stage. The idea of non-capitalist development has won wide recognition in Africa, which provides further confirmation that

¹⁰ *Africa Report*, May 1963, p. 27.

Marxism is applicable to all continents and countries, including Africa.

Anti-communist propaganda tries to convince Africans that if they accept the theory of scientific socialism, this means they must blindly copy the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and disregard specific African conditions. These specific conditions are very real and substantial and will inevitably affect the tempo and methods of transition to a socialist society, but scientific socialism in fact demands a thorough analysis of conditions in a country building socialism. This truth is becoming more widely understood in Africa. At the Dakar colloquium Maurice Adoum from the Republic of Chad said that he did not think the term "African Socialism" very suitable since "the theory of socialism, being a scientific theory, cannot be African just as it cannot be Chinese or Russian". Nevertheless, he further remarked, "the great masters of revolutionary practice show us by their own experience that there are many ways of approaching socialism". He called upon Africans to get rid of "intellectual flabbiness" and find the means of implementing the ideas of scientific socialism with due regard for African reality.¹¹ This interpretation of "African Socialism" as the search for ways and means of building socialism with the material available to Africans does not contradict the scientific theory of socialism, although the term itself is rather dubious since it is open to false interpretation.

As a political movement, Pan-Africanism has made a positive contribution to the struggle to liberate Africa from colonialism, but the fight is far from finished. The first stage of the national, anti-imperialist revolution—the winning of political independence and the establishment of national states—has not yet been completed since a number of countries still lie under the colonial yoke. Construction of a balanced national economy ensuring economic independence and strengthening state sovereignty is the next stage in the anti-imperialist revolution. Experience has shown that this is not an easy task. If all the peoples of Africa were united around a common anti-imperialist platform, it would be easier to complete this revolution. "Africa's salvation lies in unity," Telli Diallo of Guinea told the O.A.U.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 17.

foreign ministers conference. In this sense Pan-Africanism's historic mission is not yet accomplished.

The ideology of Pan-Africanism is diffuse and can be interpreted in quite opposite ways. Consequently, the enemies of African unity, the enemies of her really independent development can sometimes hide behind the flag of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism is not a single, integral whole either in the political or the ideological sense. A fierce battle between the forces of reaction and progress is being fought around the concept of Pan-Africanism. Some understand Pan-Africanism as unity of the African peoples in the struggle against imperialism, for abolition of the vestiges of colonialism, and for economic and social progress. Interpreted in this way, Pan-Africanism deserves every support from the forces of progress. Others regard Pan-Africanism as counterposing black to white—a view which only plays into the hands of Africa's enemies, the imperialists.

By interpreting Pan-Africanism in the way that suits them best, the European and American imperialists are trying to isolate Africa from its true friends, to strengthen their own ideological influence and make it an instrument for retaining political control in order to ensure their further, essentially colonialist, exploitation of Africa. The people of Africa are repulsing these attempts and, although they are not yet always strong enough to expose all imperialism's ideological diversions, they will ultimately be victorious, for the truth of life is on their side.

STUDY OF AFRICAN HISTORY: PRESENT STATE AND MAIN TASKS¹

The peoples of Africa have traversed a long and winding path of historical development. Latest archeological and paleoanthropological finds show that Africa is the only region of our planet where all the stages of man's development—from the *Australopithecus* to *Homo sapiens*—have been recorded in chronological sequence and without interruption. Many scientists now arrive at the conclusion that it is Africa that was the birthplace of man, and if that is so the oldest history of man must begin with Africa.

So far we know very poorly the history of Africa. We are very far from being able to present the process of the African peoples' historical development as a single, harmonious picture. But when this picture is drawn historical science will be so much the richer.

There are sufficient grounds for asserting that the smelting and treating of metals was first practised on the African continent. A. P. Talbot, British historian, who studied ancient metallurgy in Nigeria, considers fully possible the assumption that the world learned this art from the Africans. Franz Boas, American ethnographer, writes: "We may safely say, that at a time when our own ancestors still utilised stone implements, or at best, when bronze weapons were first introduced, the Negro had developed the art of smelting iron; and it seems likely that their race has contributed more than any other to the early development of the iron industry."²

¹ Report made at a general meeting of the Section of Historical Sciences, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, June 22, 1961.

² F. Boas, *Race and Democratic Society*. New York, 1946, p. 55.

Africa has given the world one of the oldest civilisations. The role of ancient Egyptian civilisation in the development of science and culture of other continents is generally known. But Egyptian civilisation is African civilisation, the product of the Africans' hands and brains. "The tribes from which the ancient Egyptian people were formed belong to the native tribes of North and East Africa,"³ Prof. V. I. Avdiyev writes.

The Nile Valley was not the only seat of ancient civilisation on the African continent. The history of the peoples of the Sahara at the time it was inhabited (the drying up of the Sahara began in the 5th-4th millenniums B.C.) is still shrouded in mystery. In 1958 Henri Lhote, French explorer, published the rock paintings he found in the Sahara. The world beheld splendid drawings of animals, scenes of battles on chariots, images of gods, masks and figures. Many of these pictures date back to the 4th millennium B. C. Study of the rock drawings published by Henri Lhote, proves that the Africans domesticated the horse approximately twelve centuries before our era.⁴ The Axumite Kingdom which existed east of the Nile Valley on the territory of present-day Ethiopia was one of the largest states in the first centuries of our era.

The ancient history of a huge part of the continent south of the Sahara desert is so far unknown to us. The efforts perhaps of more than one generation of scientists will be needed, above all colossal work by archeologists, to reconstruct this history. The medieval history of this part of the African continent is better known. For this we are indebted above all to Arab scholars, merchants and travellers of the 9th-14th centuries—al-Bekri, Ibn Haukal, Ibn Battuta—and also the first European travellers.

In the Middle Ages, many states, large and small, and great empires, existed on the African continent. Today, thanks to the victory of the anti-imperialist national revolution, the names of these medieval states have reappeared on the map of Africa. The former British Gold Coast colony has become the Republic of Ghana. The medieval empire of Ghana was founded probably in the 4th century A. D. and it reached its zenith in the second half of the 11th century.

³ В. И. Авдиев, *История Древнего Востока*, Москва, 1953, стр. 163—164.

⁴ H. Lhote, *A la découverte des fresques du Tassili*, Vichy, 1958.

We know that crafts flourished in Ghana, that lawyers and scholars were much respected and there was a brisk trade in copper, gold and textile fabrics.

The former French Sudan, on winning independence, assumed the name of another medieval state, Mali. The name Mali appeared on geographical maps published in Europe for the first time in 1339, but the state of Mali arose much earlier, we do not know exactly when. It is known that Baramandana, the emperor of Mali, embraced Islam in 1050. Songs, stories and legends of the great emperor Sundiata, who ruled the country from 1230 to 1255, are still current among the Mandingo people.

The splendid specimens of Benin bronze castings are known the world over. What Benin was like in the 17th century we learn from the Dutch geographer Olfert Dapper. He relates what he had been told by a merchant named Samuel Blomert, who lived in Africa:

"Fourteen or fifteen leagues from Gotton, as one travels North, lies a town which the Dutch call Great Benin, because in fact there is no town so great in all those regions. The palace of the Queen alone is three leagues round, and the town five; so that the town and the palace taken together have a perimeter of eight leagues. The town is enclosed on one side by a wall ten feet high, made of a double palisade of trees with stakes in between interlaced in the form of a cross, thickly lined with earth. On the other side a marsh, fringed with bushes, which stretches from one end of the wall to the other, serves as a natural rampart to the town. There are several gates, eight or nine feet high and five feet wide: they are made of wood, all one piece, and turn on a stake like the hurdles which enclose meadows. The King's palace is on the right side of the town, as you leave by the gate of Gotton. It is a collection of buildings which occupy as much space as the town of Harlem, and which is enclosed with walls. There are numerous apartments for the Prince's ministers and fine galleries most of which are as big as those on the Exchange at Amsterdam. They are supported by wooden pillars encased with copper, where their victories are depicted, and which are carefully kept very clean. The majority of these royal houses are covered with branches of palm-trees, arranged like square planks; each corner is adorned with a small pyramidal tower, on the point of which is perched a copper bird spreading its wings.

"The town is composed of thirty main streets, very straight and 120 feet wide, apart from an infinity of small intersecting streets. The houses are close to one another, arranged in good order; they have roofs, verandahs and balustrades, and are covered with leaves of palm-trees and bananas—for they are only one storey high. Nonetheless in the houses of gentlemen there are long galleries within and many rooms whose walls and floors are of red earth. These people are in no way inferior to the Dutch as regards cleanliness; they wash and scrub their houses so well that they are polished and shining like a looking-glass..."⁵

The history of the Hausa states is sufficiently well known. Here is a description of the capital of one of them, Kano, given in the works of the German traveller and philologist H. Barth and pertaining to the mid-19th century. Barth travelled for several hours through the residential quarters and was thus able to observe different scenes of public and personal life, pictures of well-being and happiness, luxury and poverty, diligence and indolence, in the streets, markets and courtyards. He thought it was a very animated picture of a little world outwardly different from anything one can see in European cities but internally absolutely identical with them.⁶

Here is one more testimony penned by Leo Africanus,⁷ describing one of the biggest cities in the Songhay state: "In Timbuktu there are numerous judges, doctors and clerics, all receiving good salaries from the king. He pays great respect to men of learning. There is a big demand for books in manuscript, imported from Barbary. More profit is made from the book trade than from any other line of business."⁸

⁵ O. Dapper, *Description de l'Afrique*, Amsterdam, 1668; quoted after Th. Hodgkin, *Nigerian Perspectives. An Historical Anthology*, London, 1960, pp. 122-124.

⁶ H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, Vol. II, London, 1857, pp. 107-108.

⁷ The Moor Hassan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Zayyati was born between 1489 and 1495. He studied at the university in Fez. At the age of 17 he accompanied his uncle on a diplomatic mission of the Moroccan Sultan to the ruler of Songhay. About 1518 he was taken prisoner by pirates who were Christians, and sold to Pope Leo X. The latter christened him in 1520 and named him Giovanni Leoni. Subsequently he was called Leo Africanus. His *History and Description of Africa* was first published in 1550 in Italian.

⁸ Quoted after B. Davidson, *Old Africa Rediscovered*, London, 1959, p. 91.

This applies to western tropical Africa, too. If we turn to East Africa we find here first of all remnants of the remarkable Zimbabwe culture in the basin between the Zambezi and the Limpopo (on the territory of the present Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia). These are the remains of ancient buildings of huge size, abandoned mines, remnants of furnaces for smelting metal, diverse articles made of iron, copper, bronze, tin and gold, clay moulds for casting copper coins, wells, canals and piled-on terraces. A highly developed civilisation existed here at one time beyond any doubt. The exact dating of the Zimbabwe culture has not been established yet. Basil Davidson, British journalist, who has studied the literature on this subject, writes: "In this long time of slow and yet successful material and social growth among peoples remotely isolated from the outside world, the ruins of Great Zimbabwe as they exist today may have had their beginnings much more than 1,000 years ago, though as simpler structures long since vanished; and these simpler structures may in turn have had their foundations upon the debris of still older buildings of wood and straw and mud; and these earliest dwellings may have taken their rise as long ago as the 5th or 6th century A. D."⁹

Davidson thinks that the Zimbabwe buildings of which we now see the ruins were completed in 1700-1750. L. A. Fadeyev, a Soviet student of the Zimbabwe culture, dates its origin to about the same epoch.¹⁰

Many things are still unclear and further investigations are needed, but it is indisputable that a higher culture existed here at one time. There are grounds for assuming that it spread far to the north, up to present-day Kenya.

The imperialists haughtily treat the peoples of the young Republic of the Congo as backward and needing international trusteeship. But it is well known that prior to the appearance of Europeans in the Congo basin, there had existed the states of the Congo, Lunda (Muata Yamvo), Kasongo and Baluba, whose peoples reached quite a high development level for those days.

As in other continents, not all the peoples of Africa marched one rank. Some advanced, others fell behind in their development, but on the whole Africa was not a backward continent in the pre-capitalist epoch.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁰ Cf. «Советская этнография», 1960, № 2.

The gap in development levels began in the period when the main European powers entered the stage of primitive accumulation of capital. The New World was discovered at the end of the 15th century. The establishment of the plantation system and the working of mineral deposits required manpower. Trade in African slaves began and it continued up to the second half of the 19th century, i.e., for more than 300 years. The slave trade and the wars to capture slaves brought incalculable suffering and misery to Africa. Slave trade not only retarded and arrested the development of the African peoples; it hurled them back for centuries. According to some estimates, Africa lost about 100 million people from slave traffic. The continent was depopulated and it degraded economically. Slave trade exerted a staggering psychological impact: the ever-present fear of the slave traders' raids, uncertainty of the future and the loss of relatives—all this depressed the people and deprived them of all creative stimuli.

Next came the period of endless colonial wars caused by the imperialist partition of Africa. Devastated and weakened by the slave trade, Africa could not resist the onslaught of the imperialist powers. Nevertheless, Africa's seizure was bitterly and staunchly resisted. For several decades African soil was drenched with blood. The finest people, the wisest statesmen and soldiers were slaughtered: Dingaan, Lobengula, Samory, Behanzin. . . . Historians still have to find many other such leaders and relate the truth about them.

There is no need to describe all the horrors colonial enslavement brought the peoples of Africa. The imperialist monopolies brazenly robbed Africa and plundered its natural resources. For many decades the wealth created by the labour of Africans flowed in a golden stream into the European and American banks. The upshot of it all was to turn Africa into the most backward area in the world. In Britain the national per capita income was £268 (according to 1954 data), while in Nigeria it was £20, Kenya—£14 and Tanganyika—only £18.¹¹ Staggering poverty and almost total illiteracy are characteristic of all African countries.

Africa is entering a new period of its development, casting off the chains of colonialism. The greater part of the African continent has rid itself of the direct political rule

¹¹ *World News*, Vol. 3, No. 25, 1956.

of the imperialists and it will undoubtedly be abolished in the rest of the continent in the near future.

The peoples of Africa have joined the family of equal peoples and, with their fraternal support, will have to accomplish an extremely difficult history-making task: to bridge the gap in development levels caused by the slave trade and colonial bondage.

The historical destinies of the African people have predetermined the nature and trend of the study of their history. The Africans were deprived of the opportunity to study their own history: the colonialists closed the road to science to them. Prior to the end of the Second World War, there were no higher educational establishments in Africa, except Egypt and the Union of South Africa. Only a few individuals received a university education abroad.

Study of African history was a monopoly of scholars of the European colonial powers. Special scientific institutions for the study of the history, ethnography and languages of the African peoples were set up in Germany, Britain, France and other European countries and then in the United States.

Many West European scientists have accomplished a great deal of work. There is a vast literature on the history of Africa. But this is a history not of the African peoples, but of the colonialist activity by the European imperialist powers in Africa. With very few exceptions the works of West European scientists propagate the idea that the history of the African peoples begins from the "historical moment" when the first European set foot on African soil.

In line with the needs of the colonialists, Western scientists declared that the peoples of Africa supposedly have neither a history nor a culture of their own. Let us take, for example, the fundamental nine-volume *History of Mankind* prepared by German scientists at the end of the 19th century, and edited by Dr. Hans Helmolt. In the volume on West Asia and Africa we read the following: "Huge and cumbersome, Africa with its inhospitable shores mostly scorched by the rays of the tropical sun ... looks gloomy and mysterious, like the sphinx in the Egyptian desert. Like the land, like the people. Hardly known to the mobile races of Europe and Asia for centuries, they by the very colour of their skin seemed to be an outcast among a number of noble peoples and lived in seclusion countless years, not emerging beyond their natural boundaries either for friendly contacts

or hostile attacks. ... If we can compare the history of European races to a bright sunny day, the history of Africa is only heavy slumber: it either calms the sleeper or disturbs him so that he restlessly tosses on his bed; but the others are unaware of it and, on awakening, soon forget about it." ¹²

Dr. Heinrich Schurz, who wrote the section "Africa", does not consider it even necessary to study the history of the African peoples. "Will we advance far in our knowledge," he asks, "if we learn that such and such a Negro tribe with a strange-sounding name moved in such and such a year to a neighbouring region, that in some other year it was dispersed and annihilated?" ¹³

This *Weltgeschichte* was published at the end of the 19th century. But here is what was written in 1951 by Margaret Perham, well-known student of African problems: "Until the very recent penetration by Europe the greater part of the continent was without the wheel, the plough or the transport-animal; almost without stone houses or clothes, except for skins; without writing and so without history." ¹⁴

Such was the generally recognised thesis of bourgeois historiography. There were, of course, scholars who tried to tell the truth about the past of the African peoples, but their view was drowned in the turbid stream of racialist ideas.

The information about the African peoples gained by earlier European travellers and published in the pre-colonial period, however, ran counter to the reactionary idea which denied the historicity of the African peoples. The discrepancy between such assertions and the facts had to be explained somehow. It was at this stage that the falsification of history began.

After the British colonialists looted Benin and specimens of Benin bronze castings appeared in the museums of European capitals, the question arose, who produced these splendid works? It would seem that the answer was simple: they were fashioned by the people of Benin. But to admit this obvious fact would undermine the entire concept of history created under the influence of colonialism's policy and ideology. At first the assumption was voiced that Benin bronze casting owes its origin to the Portuguese who were the first

¹² Cf. *Weltgeschichte*, Leipzig-Wien, 1899-1907.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX, 1951, No. 7, p. 638.

Europeans to appear on the West coast of Africa in the 15th century. But before long this version was blasted because it was established that neither the Portuguese nor any other European peoples had achieved such high skill in bronze casting at that time. Other sources were then sought: some ascribed this art to India, others to Roman cities in North Africa, still others to the Arabs, and so on.¹⁵ Infected by racialist ideology, bourgeois historians could not conceive that peoples of the Negroid race could have created such masterpieces.

Neither could they concede that Africans were the creators of the Zimbabwe culture. Here is what G. I. Bent wrote about it in 1895: "We may consider that the builders of these mysterious structures were well versed in geometry and studied carefully the heavens ... and this quite excludes the possibility of any Negroid race having more to do with their construction than as slaves ... for it is a well accepted fact that the Negroid brain never could be capable of taking the initiative in work of such intricate nature."¹⁶

The first European explorers discovered a few small but highly organised states in the Eastern part of Africa. Speke, Grant and Stanley, the first Europeans to visit the state of Buganda, were struck by the splendour of the palace of the Kabaka (title of the Buganda ruler), the harmonious organisation of the administration, the existence of an army and navy, good condition of the roads and developed trade. The European travellers and scientists could not conceive that all this had been created by Africans without the aid of other, non-African peoples. It was then that the so-called Hamitic theory appeared.

According to this theory, the Hamites are the African Aryans. Africa, from the standpoint of the Hamitic theory, was at one time inhabited by prehistoric agricultural peoples, uncultured and passive. The stock-raising Hamites came from Asia. They brought with them a higher civilisation, subordinated the aborigines, imposed their culture on them and founded states. All the cultural treasures, of which the Afri-

can peoples can boast, were allegedly created under the influence of the Hamites, who held a dominating position in all African states. It is asserted that the African peoples themselves created nothing, have nothing of their own, and so on and so forth.

The Hamitic theory gained the widest currency in the works of Western scholars. Everything was explained by the influence of the Hamites. The British historians Palmer and Jeffreys credited Benin bronzes to the Hamites. The German historian Westermann ascribed to the Hamites the founding of medieval states in the West Sudan. The French geographer Maurette considered the Hamites the founders of the ancient Egyptian civilisation. C. G. Seligman, well-known British scholar, in his book *Races of Africa*, published in London in 1957, asserts that the Hamites from a relatively early period were the great civilising force in Black Africa.¹⁷

No historian denies the fact that the Zulu people played an outstanding role in the history of South and East Africa. The Zulus founded their own state in the early 19th century, subjugated a number of other peoples and offered greater resistance to the British invasion than anywhere else in South and Equatorial Africa. But this in no way tallied with the concept of African peoples' passivity. A way out was found, however: the Zulus were declared semi-Hamitic and their active role in history was explained by the presence of Hamitic blood.¹⁸

But perhaps one of the most curious conclusions drawn by students of world history is that Egypt was an Asian, and not an African country. Since the 19th century Egypt was no longer regarded as part of Africa and its history and culture as part of African history and culture. Karl Niebuhr, well-known German historian, asserted in the above-mentioned *Weltgeschichte* that "Egyptian culture cannot be called African."¹⁹ This viewpoint was generally recognised in Russian historical studies prior to the 1917 Revolution. Unfortunately it has not been fully eliminated to this day: some men still consider that Egypt is not Africa. An end must be

¹⁷ See C. G. Seligman, *Races of Africa*, London, 1957.

¹⁸ The reactionary nature of the Hamitic theory is revealed in: «Народы Африки» (edited by D. A. Oldenogge and I. I. Potekhin), Москва, 1954; Д. А. Ольдерогге, *Древности Бенина*, «Сборник Музея антропологии и этнографии», т. XV, XVII, Ленинград, 1953—1957.

¹⁹ Cf. *Weltgeschichte*, Leipzig-Wien, 1899-1907.

¹⁵ For criticism of all these theories of the origin of Benin art see: Д. А. Ольдерогге, *Древности Бенина*, «Сборник Музея антропологии и этнографии», тт. XV, XVI, XVII, Ленинград, 1953—1957.

¹⁶ Quoted from *West Africa*, 1953, No. 1881, p. 225.

put to this view. Ancient Egyptian civilisation is African civilisation. Present-day Egyptians are the descendants of the ancient Egyptian population; they have assimilated the language and religion of the Arab settlers. The exclusion of ancient Egyptian civilisation from the history of the African continent strengthens the positions of the proponents of the racist concept which denies the independent role of the African peoples in the world historical process.

The history of the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, i.e., the period of the colonial division and enslavement of Africa, is the one most rudely falsified. The historical events of this period have been distorted beyond recognition. In reality, the European powers waged piratical colonial wars on the African continent, while the peoples of Africa heroically resisted the invasion of the colonialists to the utmost of their strength and abilities. In bourgeois pro-colonialist historical literature, everything is misrepresented: the African tribes allegedly waged internecine devastating wars and the European powers had to intervene to introduce order and bring peace to the peoples.

In the struggle against the colonialists, the African peoples produced a galaxy of talented statesmen and soldiers—Samory, Behanzin, Dingaan, Lobengula and others. The apologists of colonialism hastened to portray these national heroes as bandits, tyrants, fanatics and even madmen. The Somalis, for example, revere their national hero Muhammad ben Abdille Hassan who headed the national-liberation movement from 1899 to 1920. But in British pro-colonialist literature he is known only as the "Mad Mullah". On the other hand, reactionary bourgeois historiography elevates European colonialists like Cecil Rhodes, Gordon, Gallieni and their ilk to the rank of great leaders.

The history of the African peoples, except Egypt and to a smaller extent the Maghreb countries, has not been written yet. Scientists of African countries and progressive historians of all other countries have before them the great and honourable task of writing such a history, of filling in this huge blank spot in the history of mankind.

The peoples of Africa casting off the chains of colonialism and developing their national statehood show a lively interest in their history. For centuries they were degraded and offended by the European colonialists. Particularly hard was the lot of the Negroid peoples. No human race has been

ever subjected to such indignities. The racist colonialists declared black skin to be the sign of an inferior race. Africans were deprived of human dignity and treated like cattle. When trade in African slaves assumed a sweeping scale and public opinion had to be mollified in some way, the Reverend Thomas Thompson issued in 1772 a booklet under the characteristic heading *Comment le commerce des esclaves noirs sur la côte d'Afrique respecte les principes d'humanité et les lois de la religion révélée*. In 1796 a philosophical society in Britain heard a report on the hierarchy of human races and different species of animals and plants and the transition from some to other. The author of the report alleged that the Negro stood closer to the animal than any other representative of mankind.²⁰

In our own time, A. L. Geyer, High Commissioner of the Union of South Africa to Britain, stated after visiting the Belgian Congo in 1955, that the Africans are children and Europeans must act as their parents; they are "children entrusted to the care of the Belgian Government, who need to be looked after and guided and educated, but who, like all children, require discipline and cannot as yet be entrusted with powers that adults enjoy and know how to use."²¹ The colonialists worked hard to develop in the Africans a sense of their inferiority and make them recognise the superiority of the white race. This could not but leave an imprint on the mind of the people. That is why one of the tasks of the national anti-imperialist revolution in Africa is "spiritual decolonisation", as progressive Africans say: spiritual emancipation. President Sékou Touré of the Republic of Guinea wrote in his message to the second International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists held in 1959: "Decolonisation consists not only in getting rid of the colonial reality; it necessarily should be complemented by full emancipation from the colonialised spirit, i.e., from all the grave moral, intellectual and cultural consequences of the colonial regime."²²

Foremost Africans regard the restoration of the truth about the historical past of their peoples as one of the main means for spiritual decolonisation and restoration of the national dignity of the peoples of the Negroid race.

²⁰ Quoted after *Расовая проблема и общество*, Москва, 1957, стр. 125.

²¹ Quoted from *African World*, January 1955, pp. 7-8.

²² *Présence Africaine*, 1959, XXIV-XXV, p. 105.

African historians see their main task now in exposing the colonialist myth about the non-historicity of the African peoples and cleansing the history of Africa of falsification. Prof. Onwuka Dike, rector of Ibadan University in Nigeria, splendidly described it: "The point is not that Africans have no history but that there is profound ignorance concerning it, and an almost pathological unwillingness to believe the evidence of it when presented."²³

Saburi Biobaku, Professor of Ibadan University, writes: "If an African historian shows that Africa has its own culture, he will be met with incredulity by those who think that only they are the bearers of culture in Africa or with scepticism by those who see in his statement a manifestation of African nationalism. African historians run up against the resistance of those for whom Africa had no history at all." Prof. Biobaku urges historians to expose the myth about the absence of a history of their own among the African peoples.²⁴

Such is the simple and at the same time very intricate task: to restore the truth about the history of the African peoples, expose the myth of their non-historicity and to cleanse the history of Africa of falsifications.

What is the state of historical science in Africa itself?

The prolonged colonial rule of the European powers naturally retarded the development of historiography in Africa. Even in Egypt with its Cairo University, the oldest on the African continent (founded in 1908), and ancient cultural traditions, historical studies were not properly developed although Egyptian medieval scholars and thinkers left a great manuscript legacy. Europeans have studied this heritage. The history of ancient Egypt has likewise been studied by European specialists. Egyptian historians, however, have already made a big contribution to the history of modern and contemporary times. The best-known among them is Abd ar-Rahman ar-Rafiyyi, author of a series of books on the history of Egypt beginning with the end of the 18th century. Works of Egyptian historians have been appearing more frequently in recent years, but they study primarily the history of their own country or the history of the Arab world.

Historical studies are less developed in the Maghreb

countries, although their peoples, like the peoples of Egypt, produced in the Middle Ages a number of well-known philosophers who left a big literary legacy: historian of the Maghreb countries Ibn Khaldun of Tunisia; among the contemporary scientists, Hassan Husni Abd al-Wahhab, director of the Tunisian Institute of Archeology, and Muhammad al-Fasi, President of the Moroccan University in Rabat.

At the other end of the continent, in the South African Republic, there are no few European historians. They have issued many interesting books, but these are almost exclusively studies of the history of European colonisation, the history of the South African Republic as an imperialist state. They have published quite a number of ethnographic studies which can be successfully utilised for reconstructing the history of the Bantu people. Of great interest are the works of the British missionaries R. Moffat and A. T. Bryant. Of the African historians in South Africa, mention should be made of Solomon Plaatje and Prof. Tengo Jabavu who study the contemporary period.

Works written by Africans in countries of tropical Africa began to appear at the end of the 19th century, but they are a rare exception in the general stream of historical and ethnographic literature. Gold Coast Africans Casely Hayford, Atto Ahuma, Edwin Samson and John Mensah Sarbah published a number of ethnographic and sociological studies at the turn of the century. A Nigerian clergyman named Johnson wrote *The History of the Yoruba* at the end of the 19th century. This book was published only in 1921.

Between 1920 and 1940 there were published the works of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Alyaka Taye of Ethiopia, de Graft Johnson, J. B. Danquah and Annor Adjaye of the Gold Coast, Apollo Kagwa of Uganda, Alexis Kagamé of Ruanda and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya.

Under the pressure of the national-liberation movement after the Second World War, the colonialists had to open a few university colleges in their African colonies and to draw some local men into their faculties. Historians' societies arose in the university colleges of the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Institutes for social and economic studies were set up at the Ibadan university college and the Makerere College (Uganda). The scientific activities of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia, founded in 1938, were noticeably enhanced. IFAN, French Institute of Black Africa founded

²³ *West Africa*, 1953, No. 1882, p. 251.

²⁴ *Présence Africaine*, XXVII-XXVIII, 1959, pp. 97-98.

in 1938, conducted research in the French colonies of tropical Africa; after the war the main centre of its activities was the University of Dakar, Senegal (founded in 1948) which opened branches in almost all the colonies.

All these institutions were set up by the colonialists, and their scientific activity was subordinated to the needs of the colonial administration. They were directed by European scientists and staffed almost exclusively by Europeans or Americans. As before, there were few African scientists. A. Ayache described in his book the organisation of research in Morocco: "In fact, it is no secret at all that in recent years, to a greater extent than ever, all research in history, sociology, geography and economy was oriented on justifying and extolling the colonial regime in Morocco. All Moroccan research institutes were staffed by French specialists and there was not a single Moroccan scientist in them."²⁵

This was true of all the research institutions in the African colonies. Nevertheless, their establishment opened before the Africans some possibilities for penetrating the world of learning which still was a monopoly of scientists from the colonial states.

The birth of African historical studies pursued by the Africans themselves began only after the victory of the national anti-imperialist revolution. In recent years things have greatly livened up at the African section of historical studies. New names appear more and more frequently and new institutions and scientific journals are founded. The first school textbooks on the history of the African peoples have been published. The first textbook, to the best of our knowledge, was written by Jean Suret-Canale, Director of the Institute of Scientific Studies and Documentation of Guinea,²⁶ in co-operation with Djibril Tamsir Niane, a young Guinean historian; the second textbook was written by Hampaté Ba, well-known Mali historian.

There are very few African historians to this day and much time will be needed to train them. When we speak of the development of historical science in Africa we have in view the radical change in the direction of historical research: a sharp turn has been made from studying the acti-

vities of the colonial powers to studying the past of the African people. African historians have proclaimed at the top of their voice: "The peoples of Africa have their history and it is the task of scholars to study it."

African historians are now concentrating attention on distant times, on the historical epoch when the African peoples lived a life independent of the European powers—the epoch of the great empires of Ghana, Mali and others. They rightly see in a description of the great deeds of their forebears a means of restoring the national dignity of their peoples trampled into the dust by the colonialists. In this noble undertaking they at times go to extremes, a mistake made by scientists of many other peoples who bore the colonial yoke and the consequent national humiliation.

Many African historians are trying to prove the genetic ties of their peoples with other peoples who inscribed bright pages in the annals of world history. Prof. Biobaku genetically links his people, the Yoruba, with ancient Egypt.²⁷ The historian Mbonu Ojike, who died at an early age, asserted that the forebears of his people traced their origin from the Egyptian Pharaohs.²⁸ Dr. Danquah thinks that the forebears of his people, the Akan, came to the territory of present-day Ghana from medieval Ghana whence they arrived from Egypt and perhaps even from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates—from ancient Sumer.²⁹ This viewpoint is backed by de Graft Johnson,³⁰ Cheikh Anta Diop³¹ and others.

These predilections of young African historiography are fully understandable. Future ethnogenic studies will show how justified they are scientifically. What is important now is that African historians have raised this problem and it is the duty of all progressive scientists to find a proper solution.

The turn in the study of African history made by African scholars has met with response among progressive West European scholars. Jean Suret-Canale published in 1958 a book on Africa,³² in which he gives an ethnographic descrip-

²⁷ S. O. Biobaku, *The Origin of Yoruba*, Lagos, 1955, p. 5.

²⁸ Mbonu Ojike, *My Africa*, London, 1954, p. 14.

²⁹ *West African Review*, 1955, November-December, pp. 968-970, 1108-1111.

³⁰ J. C. de Graft Johnson, *African Glory*, London, 1954, pp. 84-86.

³¹ Cheikh Anta Diop, *Nations nègres et culture*, Paris, 1955, pp. 15-16.

³² J. Suret-Canale, *Afrique Noire. Géographie. Civilisation. Histoire*, Paris, 1958.

²⁵ A. Ayache, *Le Maroc*, Paris, 1958, p. 390.

²⁶ Djibril Tamsir Niane, J. Suret-Canale, *L'Histoire de l'Afrique Occidentale*, Conakry, 1960.

tion of the peoples of the West Sudan, their medieval history and the history of French colonisation. The latter part is especially valuable because the author, drawing on hitherto unknown archive sources, describes the resistance of the African peoples to French colonisation and conclusively exposes the atrocities of the French colonialists. Another French historian, Mme. Andrée Clair, published in 1959 a small popular book on the history of medieval Mali.³³ A monograph on the history of Madagascar, published in 1958, was written by Pierre Boiteau, well-known French Marxist historian.³⁴ Basil Davidson, prominent British author, published a large popular work, *Old Africa Rediscovered*.³⁵ These are merely some of the more important works testifying to the new approach to African history.

A definite turn is perceptible among West European scientists of the old school, too. This is shown by the publication since 1960 of two new journals on problems of African history: one of them in Britain, edited by R. Oliver and J. D. Fage,³⁶ another in France, edited by G. Balandier;³⁷ and also the publication of anthologies on the medieval history of Ghana and Nigeria.³⁸

Speaking about the historiography of Africa, mention must be made of Prof. W. E. B. Du Bois, outstanding American historian who dedicated his entire life and great talent to the noble struggle against oppression of the Negroid peoples. As early as 1896 he published his first scientific study, *Suppression of the Africa Slave Trade*. An indefatigable worker and inquisitive scholar, Du Bois made a major con-

³³ A. Clair, *Le fabuleux Empire du Mali*, Paris, 1959.

³⁴ P. Boiteau, *Madagascar, Contribution à l'histoire de la nation Malgache*, Paris, 1958.

³⁵ B. Davidson, *Old Africa Rediscovered*, London, 1959.

³⁶ *The Journal of African History*.—The announcement about its publication stated: "African history is essentially the history of a continent and its people rather than the history of European empires formed there during the last few centuries and now for the most part dissolving. A considerable and growing number of people are concerned, as teachers or as students, in the attempt to see African history as a whole, and to view the recent colonial period in perspective with the remoter pre-colonial past. For schools and universities in Africa itself the 'regional' approach is axiomatic, and in European, American and Asian universities the future of African history, as of Asian history, is seen to lie with the 'regional' as opposed to the 'imperial' approach."

³⁷ *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, Paris.

³⁸ F. Wolfson, *Pageant of Ghana*, London, 1958; Th. Hodgkin, *Nigerian Perspectives. An Historical Anthology*, London, 1960.

tribution to the history of Africa. He summed up the results of his many years' research in his book published under the title *Africa. An Essay towards a History of the Continent of Africa and Its Inhabitants*.

Soviet scientists have made a big contribution to the study of the Ancient East (V. S. Golenishchev, B. A. Turayev, V. V. Struve, V. I. Avdiyev and others), published a number of valuable monographs on the medieval history of the African Mediterranean and Red Sea coast countries. The book *Northern Africa in the 4th-5th Centuries* by G. G. Diligensky was issued in 1961. Until recently our scholars did not study the history of the peoples in tropical and South Africa. Some work was done on the history of the 19th and 20th centuries along the lines of exposing the colonialist policy of the imperialist powers.

The first attempts to present a general picture of the history of the African peoples from ancient times to our days was made by a group of Africanists of the Institute of Ethnography, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, who published in 1954 a large collective work *Peoples of Africa*. Next came monographs by D. A. Olderogge, *West Sudan in the 15th-19th Centuries* (1960); A. B. Davidson, *The Matabele and Mashona in Struggle against British Colonisation* (1958); A. S. Orlova, "The Malagasy Social System in the 19th Century. From the History of Madagascar" (*African Ethnographic Collection*, No. 11, 1958). A monograph on the *Mahdist Rebellion in the Sudan* was published by S. R. Smirnov back in 1950.

In recent years, following the collapse of the colonial system, the interest in Africa has risen considerably. New books on Africa, written by Soviet authors or translations, appear quite frequently in bookshops.

Soviet Africanists are faced with the important and difficult task of giving the reader profound studies about separate peoples and countries of the African continent, beginning with ancient times. Special attention should be paid to such questions as the ethnic origin of the African peoples, the great migrations on the African continent, medieval states and civilisations, the slave trade and its effect on the development of the African peoples and the heroic struggle of the African peoples against European colonisation in the 19th century. Main attention, however, should be concentrated, as before, on the break-up of the colonial system because

this subject is now the pivot around which the ideological struggle between the forces of progress and the forces of imperialist reaction is fought.

The main difficulty in writing the history of the African peoples is the extremely meagre source material. Written sources penned by Africans are available chiefly in Arabic and Amharic. The main sources are archeological and paleoanthropological data, the works of medieval Arab travellers and scholars, descriptions of Africa by the first Europeans to visit it and materials in the archives.

The archives of the colonial powers are so far closed to us, nor are their materials made public by West European historians. Something is being done as regards publishing early Portuguese archives. The works of Arab travellers and scholars have to some extent been made available. On the initiative of D. A. Olderogge publication of a many-volume edition of Arab sources has been undertaken in the Soviet Union.³⁹

Oral historical traditions are quite developed among African peoples, as among all peoples who have no written language. Though this source is not reliable it must be utilised to the full. Some collections of folklore have already been issued by West European ethnographers and linguists. But the task of collecting and publishing folklore can be set and accomplished only now when the peoples of Africa are creating their national statehood. African historians have already raised this problem. Prof. Biobaku in his report to the Second International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists stated: "An African historian must believe in the value of oral legends but his task is to select from the huge stock of traditional legends with their giants, spirits and super human heroes such material as could provide authentic evidence. He must work out not only the methods of collecting data from which information could be derived but also the methods of checking and comparing them so that they could conform to the strict critical demands of history. Otherwise the historian will create not history but legends."⁴⁰

³⁹ «Древние и средневековые источники по этнографии и истории народов Африки южнее Сахары», вып. I, «Арабские источники VII—X веков», Москва — Ленинград, 1960.

The second volume («Арабские источники X—XII вв.») was published in 1965. — *Editors.*

⁴⁰ *Présence Africaine*, XXVII-XXVIII, 1959, p. 97.

Archeological studies have been extended recently and much data have already been made public. The work of summarising archeological data obtained by West European scholars has been started in the Soviet Union.

Study of African history demands the pooling of effort by scholars in different fields. The history and present level of social development of African peoples have a number of specific features. Many African peoples, for example, have preserved the matrilineal right of inheritance to this day, in conditions of a developed commodity economy and capitalist relations. This ancient custom restricts the accumulation of wealth by individuals and hampers the development of private national capital. A study of the genesis and development of private African capital requires the cooperation of historians, lawyers, economists and ethnographers.

Here is one more example. Tribal leaders who are the carriers of patriarchal-feudal relations possess sacral power. A historian is unable to understand the development of social relations and the role of tribal leaders in contemporary society without the help of specialists on the history of religions of the African peoples. The use of folklore as a historical source requires the cooperation of the historian and the folklorist. It is impossible to understand agrarian relations in the countries of tropical Africa without good knowledge of customary law, which again requires cooperation with ethnographers and lawyers. All this taken together means that not only history but also contemporary social relations must be studied as comprehensive problems. African historians think the same way. Prof. Biobaku said: "The African historian needs cooperation with specialists in allied branches. He needs the assistance of an ethnographer who studies man in contemporary society. . . . The African historian also needs the assistance of the archeologist because, studying Africa's past, the latter can find important evidence confirming basic points of traditional legends. The geographers, ethnographers and other scholars can also render the African historian great help in his general studies of Africa's past. He must seek their cooperation, their support, if he aims to recreate the true historical past."⁴¹

Such in general outline is the purpose of studying African history. The writing of a truthful history of Africa is a great

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

and honourable task. It has not only a scientific but also a political aspect. European and American imperialists are increasingly employing their poisoned weapon of racialism, are still trying to convince world opinion, and first of all the African Negroid people, that Africans cannot stand on their own feet without outside support. The colonialists in professorial garb continue to harp on some kind of special features of the Negroid race and special way of Africa's historical development. On closer scrutiny these recommendations of "special ways" prove to be merely recommendations to follow in the wake of the highly developed imperialist powers.

The truth about the historical past of the African peoples is a powerful means for exposing the ideological camouflage used for covering up the "latest" forms of colonialism. A study of Africa's history is therefore part and parcel of the struggle for genuine independence and free choice of roads for further development.

Иван Изосимович Потехин
ПРОБЛЕМЫ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ АФРИКИ
(на английском языке)
Printed in the U.S.S.R.

This volume presents works written by Ivan Potekhin in the last years of his life. They are a product of his analysis of Africa's present and thoughts about the continent's future. The subjects treated are as diverse as the problems facing the young African states—involved land relations, ways of gaining economic independence, and ideological questions (Pan-Africanism, socialist ideas in Africa).