

Burundi and Rwanda: The Same Imperialist Strategy

Nadine Nyangoma

Lost on the map of Africa, Burundi and Rwanda are classic examples of the underdeveloped world. Both nations together total scarcely 5 700 000 inhabitants and occupy an area of 54 172 km². To their little-known geography is, of course, added their little-known history: in the Western world very few can add anything to their state of economic appendage to Belgium.

The people who live in this part of the world nevertheless have a history worth knowing and, given their location bordering countries as highly coveted by the imperialists as the Congo and Tanganyika, they are called upon to play an important role in the future of the African continent.

The purpose of the present article by Nadine Nyangoma is to present for other peoples of the world an understanding of the political reality of these two small nations.

A young writer and journalist born in Belgium, Nadine Nyangoma is the widow of Gervais Nyangoma, progressive politician of Burundi, who was executed in his country on October 28, 1965 (when he was 28 years old) on the occasion of the bloody coup that brought the militarists to power.

BURUNDI and Rwanda, situated at the halfway road between the Cape and Cairo, form two of the smallest territories of Africa. Together, however, they have 7 000 000 inhabitants. Both are populated by the same people who speak the same language and have the same culture. Up until about 1956, the history of these two countries was relatively similar: Rwanda like Burundi had a feudal class composed of Tutsis, and a peasant class, more or less serfs, composed essentially of Hutus. (We have already explained before the ethnic origins of these two classes and how feudal relations between them were established.¹)

The separate existence of the two kingdoms of Burundi and Rwanda is explicable solely by the fact that two different dynasties organized their own separate power. The two similar feudal entities thus created were to be confirmed and even strengthened later by the German and the Belgian trusteeships which utilized them for their "indirect administration" and actually extended them to the isolated regions where they would not have been able to implant themselves.

Burundi and Rwanda have con-

tinued to be essentially agricultural. There has been almost no industrialization. Belgian capitalism took advantage of their high population density to draw from them the work force for its Congolese colony. Burundi served as a commercial center, sometimes as a strategic coordination point during the period of Congolese independence.² In fact, it was from there that the troops left to support Mobutu in his maneuvers against Lumumba, and it is from there that the "terrible" Katangese were dispatched to Yemen.

The actual difference between Burundi and Rwanda dates from recent times and is above all the result of foreign intervention. Both Burundi and Rwanda are agricultural territories with a dispersed population. In Rwanda there are no real cities in the true sense of the word. The most that exists is an old residential center converted into a capital, and some centers of trade and exchange. In Burundi, the situation is very similar, except that the country has a small port city on Lake Tanganyika.

The rapid demographic growth

¹ See *Partisans*, number 31, July-September 1966.

² J. P. Lash. *Dag Hammarskjöld, Ein Leben für den Frieden*, 1962, pp. 7-12.

represents a burden for the countryside that will not be compensated either by the exodus to the city nor the temporary or definite exodus to the Congo or Uganda. This burden on the countryside and the development of communications and other concurrent factors have given the Hutu peasant a particular dynamism. Of special importance among these factors is the formation, in the countryside itself, of a rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie. This rural petite bourgeoisie, represented by the small merchant and to a certain extent by the adviser, constitutes the fragile tie between the economy of subsistence and the economy of the market. The Hutu rural petit bourgeois sees his social aspirations and the development of his skills blocked by the feudal Tutsis, who segregate him socially and racially. There also exists a poor peasantry subjected to these feudal lords, which naturally hopes to eliminate them. The rural petite bourgeoisie will therefore become the spokesman for the peasants' antifeudal aspirations, serving as the vanguard of the antifeudal revolution. Around 1955, the tension between the Hutu peasantry and the Tutsi feudalists increased in Burundi as well as in Rwanda, where it was to culminate in the antifeudal revolution of 1959.

The Antifeudal Revolution in Rwanda

The political doctrine of those who opposed feudalism was confused enough as far as the new regime that took power. This doctrine will be represented by two parties: APROSOMA³ and PARMEHUTU.⁴ The former will emphasize all the economic problems and appears to have been the first to have committed itself to the revolution. The second will support it principally on

the ethnic existence of the oppressed class, through the instigation of the Christian syndicates. It will be much more reformist and will be revolutionary only when the revolution will already have begun; it is moreover an opportunistic party. Nevertheless in 1959, the difference between the two parties is minimal, each one has very moderate goals. In any case, because of the confusion there might have been concerning the political doctrine of both, before their official founding, the manifesto of the Bahutus of March 24, 1957, clearly marks the limits that this antifeudal revolution was going to have and up to what point it would be beneficial, especially for the rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie.

In particular, the manifesto proclaimed "the end of corvee," "the legal acknowledgment of individual property in the western sense of the word," "the promotion of the Bahutus to public offices (chiefs, subchiefs, judges)," as well as their eligibility for these functions.⁵ It also proclaimed the right of the Hutus to receive the same education as the Tutsis.

On the other hand, it begged the administration to resolve the problem and to do so with justice.

What did this Hutu petite bourgeoisie really want? It contented itself in practice with transforming the Hutu peasantry subjected to feudalism into small peasant owners, giving them the ownership of the land which they occupied due to their feudalized position or redistributing some feudal lands that the

³ Association for the Social Promotion of the Mass.

⁴ Party of the Bahutus Emancipation Movement.

⁵ *Rwanda Politique*, CRISP, pp. 25-56.

peasants had already begun to occupy. Moreover, it freed the peasantry from the injustices, cruelties and arbitrary actions of the feudal landlord living in the countryside. In other words, the rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie made for the peasantry all the reforms that it could make within the economy of subsistence, but without giving the peasantry the right to break out of this infernal circle of the economy of subsistence.

Thus the small excess product that the peasantry will try to exchange will oblige him, just as before, to depend on a whole circuit of intermediaries who in most cases are nothing more than speculators. At the most what will be done will be to develop "cooperatives" which already existed under trusteeship and which are nothing like socialist cooperatives since they do nothing but smooth over certain superficial and all too evident injustices, substituting for them a better organized robbery.

The Federation of Christian Trade Unions (CSC)

We easily see to what extent such reforms leave all the profitable part of the market economy advantageously in the hands of private enterprises without ever opposing the structure of international capitalism. The most enlightened representatives of Western capitalism and in particular the CSC will consequently not fail to be aware of all the advantage available to it in such a situation. This trade union was ideally situated so as not to overestimate the revolutionary character of the movement that would culminate in 1959, and above all to prevent it from going too far. In fact, since the epoch of the German trusteeship the Catholic church has

been rooted in both Rwanda and Burundi. It has utilized the cultural background of the country to impose its religion, up to the point of making it into the national religion, thanks to its alliance with feudalism.

The church, along with its army of missionaries, installed an entire network of missions in the countryside. It encountered a monotheistic religion: Imamite, with an oral tradition from Genesis. This religion easily lent itself to an assimilation with Christianity, and the church took advantage of this to interpret the term "imam" to mean Christian gods, thereby permitting itself to redefine it. On the other hand, the European church rapidly realized the great popularity of a negro cleric, of a church of local color, and its usefulness in case a change of heart should lead to the expulsion of some nationality.

The church had always been the perfect ally of feudalism: the high priests were Tutsis; the European clergy openly glorified the superiority of the feudal class and the Tutsi race. The day when Hutu peasant discontent threatened to compromise the future of the church to the extent that its destiny was joined to that of the feudalists, the Christian trade union hoped to hide its former compromises with feudalism. What the Christian trade union was trying to save was not feudalism but what used to be the capitalist regime.

Up until then capitalism considered feudalism its best instrument of domination. The Christian trade union, therefore, had to force itself to convince the capitalists not to use the feudalists any more, but to look for some other social section on which to rely. The limited protests of the rural petite bourgeoisie, which never evidenced any anticapitalism, made the Christian trade union

understand quickly that what this petite bourgeoisie really wanted was, in its turn, to be the instrument of Western domination, its local bureaucracy. The fact that many members of the people's parties were Christian trade unionists facilitated this understanding on the part of the trade union. Living in symbiosis with them made it easy, through aid of every kind, to place in power its most trusted members such as Kayibanda, present President of the Republic of Rwanda and leader of PARMEHUTU.

Nevertheless, since not all the Belgians in Rwanda were prepared to make a radical change so rapidly, the Christian trade union spent the whole time going and coming between the Belgian capitalists and the Hutu petite bourgeoisie, dedicating all its efforts to convincing the former that they had to hasten to tear down alliances so that the Hutu leaders were not left behind by the people's forces, and begging the latter to conserve their forces as best they could now that victory was about to arrive. With these multiple maneuvers of conciliation, the Christian syndicate is, among the people's forces, the representative of capital that seeks to limit the losses these people's forces could cause capitalism.

As always has been the case for all movements of the *Rerum Novarum*, the Christian trade union entered into action at the same time that the most oppressed social class was preparing to radically alter society. The Christian trade union wins over the movement, pretends to adopt its demands in order to deform them more successfully or remove their revolutionary content. We saw a similar maneuver in the Congo when the Christian trade union was the first to openly proclaim independence,⁶ permitting it-

self to give this word the meaning that would be most reassuring to capitalism. Thus, instead of clashing head on with the people's forces and affirming its position, the Christian trade union, like a clever opportunist, joins these forces in order to brake the movement from within its own ranks. And what makes it all the easier is that it is operating at a moment when the notion of revolution has in the people's minds a vague and confused significance, uniquely negative in that it means only "a great change" without revealing anything about the nature of this change.

The revolutionary aspect that the Christian trade union adopts permits it to live with the authentic revolutionary forces in formation, to sabotage this formation, and especially the directors of these forces that give evidence of an ability to become revolutionary leaders, and consequently harmful to capitalism. They are also able to denounce them to the capitalists, thus accelerating their "liquidation." In this way, within the bosom of the Hutu movement, the Christian trade union prevented the work of all those who tried to show that in maintaining feudalism, capitalism was doing nothing more than exercising a form of control over the masses and that, consequently, the true enemy is this capitalism. The advantage of this strategy for capitalism is that the Hutu movement in Rwanda attacked only feudalism, the agent of capitalism, and not capitalism itself. For capitalism to escape unhurt from the revolution it, therefore, need only change its tactics, abandon its former agent, feudalism, and

⁶ Other parties had already proclaimed it from underground.

accept the new candidate: the rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie. It appears that the Belgian capitalists acted in this fashion, with genuine efforts, so that this feudalism represented by UNAR⁷ began to be infiltrated by a capitalism that competed with it. Only a truly revolutionary party with theoreticians of international political culture could have foreseen the conservative role that this rural petite bourgeoisie was going to play, and carried the battle forward, in the entire territory under trusteeship, so that the political leadership of the revolution would belong to the masses and not to this petite bourgeoisie.

Another element acted in favor of this petite bourgeoisie: the limited ethnic-social feeling of the PARMEHUTU, which the Christian trade union tried to redirect as much as possible toward an ethnic sentiment and even a pure and simple racism. While APROSOMA had placed the emphasis particularly on the economic factor, PARMEHUTU limited itself to defending the cause of the Hutus, an ethnic group and at the same time the oppressed class. This ethnic-social restriction permits the view that problems are resolved the moment the society is in the hands of the Hutus, thus easily masking the social differences that can be created between the Hutu petite bourgeoisie, as it converts itself into capitalism's bureaucracy, and the peasant Hutu who will then be exploited by this petite bourgeoisie.

The antifeudal revolution thus will allow the rural petite bourgeoisie to cross the line between the people's forces and capital.

The Events of 1959

Around November 1959, in various

regions of Rwanda, certain Hutu peasants threw some feudalists off their lands, burned their houses and resolutely fought against the trusteeship authorities' efforts to reinstall them; but the authorities did not insist and preferred to abandon the rural nobility rather than worsen the situation.

In order to prevent the social tension from taking a revolutionary turn, the administration had tried to convince the mwami (king) to pacify the Hutu peasants with some superficial reform, trying, by means of these minor concessions, to save the basic content of the feudal structure. The trusteeship authority succeeded in imposing certain reforms between 1954 and 1959. But as independence neared, the most reactionary feudal elements regrouped around the mwami organized an extreme rightist party, the UNAR, in August 1959, and tried to annul the concessions made to the Hutus. This new boldness on the part of UNAR appears to begin with a stimulus provided by a potential rival of Belgium which the UNAR will always be content to describe evasively as the United Nations.

In reply to the first peasant rebellions, the UNAR sent punitive expeditions throughout the country assassinating even Hutu leaders who had maintained a fundamentally reformist and moderate attitude up until that time. The UNAR, in its blind feudal reaction, overestimated the revolutionary nature of these Hutu leaders who, instead of taking the leadership of the movement and giving it a more organized and revolutionary character, were content to multiply the calls directed to the administration requesting its intervention against the UNAR.

After having tried in vain to con-

⁷ Rwandan National Union.

vince the feudalists to moderate their actions at least in appearance, having been violently attacked by the UNAR, and fearing the encroachment of the people's forces, the administration decided to "dump" the feudalists and quickly place in power the most moderate elements of the Hutu parties in order "to limit the damage." The typical representative of these moderate elements is surely G. Kayibanda, who because of the events of November 1959, had placed himself under the protection of Belgian troops, which certainly did not transform him into any great guerrilla.

Working with great speed, the administration insured the essential: before independence, it installed a provisional government which cooperated with it and continued representing it in fact after independence. On the other hand, since the most advanced elements of the movement had proclaimed the liquidation of feudalism "throughout the entire territory of Rwanda-Burundi," and in Burundi the tension between the peasants and the feudalists had reached such an explosive point that the peasant rebellions had succeeded in taking the North of Burundi, the administration decided to divide the territory into two independent countries: the Republic of Rwanda, governed by the rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie which had become the local administration for Belgian capitalism; and the Kingdom of Burundi, maintaining the feudal apparatus intact. Both territories achieved independence in July of 1962.

Present-Day Rwanda

Rwanda, situated exactly in the middle of Africa, has no access to the sea and is choked off, surrounded as it is by various countries

which are for the most part bastions of US imperialism; such as Burundi and the Congo. Within the narrow limits of its national territory, it has no way of escaping any kind of imperialist pressure. It thus depends totally on foreign capitalism and its wishes.

From the international point of view, it is always aligned with openly reactionary positions, thus seeming to be less progressive than its feudal neighbor, which has been allowed (with the permission of the United States) to vote in favor of the admission of China to the United Nations.

From the internal point of view, Rwanda is more advanced than Burundi, which still has not had its antifeudal revolution, but on the contrary, has converted the youngest members of the Tutsi nobility into a military oligarchy, sometimes disguised behind a civil facade by the participation of a few functionaries or ministers.

The Question of the *inyenzi*⁸

The moderate and tearful attitude of the rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie in power in Rwanda is also explicable by the terror that Rwanda feels when faced with the idea of returning to feudalism. This terror is exacerbated because the regime in power has been obliged to reincorporate numerous intermediary groups belonging to feudal troops that joined the antifeudal cause at the final hour, and because the regime has in the countryside Tutsi peasant elements that the former regime had favored and was utilizing to control the poor peasants who are more or less serfs. Their late conversion made the new re-

⁸ Cockroach: nickname given the Rwandan counterrevolutionaries.

gime suspect the peasantry, viewing them as clandestine members of the UNAR, and many of them indeed were. The feudal return appeared even more real in the eyes of the peasants because the UNAR leaders united outside the country and organized the Tutsi refugees with an eye to an armed return to the country and the reinstatement of a feudal apparatus either under a monarchy or a republic. Among these leaders were the feudalists well known among the Rwanda peasantry for their cruelty and active participation in the massacres of Hutus in November 1959. For this reason the UNAR inspired only fear and hatred among the peasants. It actually achieved nothing beyond a negative and paralyzing effect, since a systematic propaganda organized by the missions, the Christians trade unions and the moderate Hutus tried to make all those who offered any criticisms of the regime — including the Hutus who blamed the regime for its lack of firmness in relation to foreign capital and its lack of solidarity with the Hutu peasants of Burundi — appear as collaborators of the feudalists.

The peasants' hatred for the UNAR is evidenced in the violent form in which the Hutu peasants reacted to the frontier incursions of the UNAR in 1964. When the Unarists arrived — and given the lack of sufficient government forces, whose reinforcements arrived after the action — the peasants defended themselves. After the feudalist retreat, the peasants, irritated by the attack and the losses they had just suffered, went into the nearby hills to look for everyone they suspected of collaboration with the UNAR and killed them.

This summary justice inevitably

provoked abuses and useless cruelties, but it illustrates, on the one hand, the extreme mobilization of the peasantry and, on the other hand, the total absence of a revolutionary party capable of organizing the mobilization and replacing its anarchistic character.

As far as the true significance of these incursions is concerned, we are too accustomed to Mobutu's literature to believe in the explanations of the UNAR which try to pass off these feudal razzias⁹ as guerrilla warfare and these internal complications as popular support.

The action of the UNAR can better be recorded within the framework of international capitalism and its internal contradictions. In effect, the intensive work that the CIA has carried out within the UNAR over the past several years, and possibly since its foundation, makes us believe that it serves as a means of pressure on the part of US imperialism against Belgian neocolonialism, which still has strong roots in Rwanda, where we find affiliates of the Société Générale, for example. This is not the case in Burundi, where the Belgian companies belong rather to financial groups such as Empain and Lambert, the latter known for its ability to live on good terms with the US financial world.

Present-Day Burundi

In the colonial epoch, Burundi, along with the Congo and Rwanda, was the extension of Belgian national capitalism which installed its own Belgian bureaucracy there. In Burundi and Rwanda, the Belgian administration used the Tutsi feudalists, in a Belgian technique, as

⁹ UNAR, up until the present, has undertaken to carry out assassinations, burnings and robberies by night, immediately seizing the spoils.

the repressive apparatus to contain the masses. This scarcely advanced form of capitalism unfolds toward a stage of greater concentration which is international capitalism, whose most aggressive representative is the United States, here allied with certain Belgian financial groups which have been incorporated into it. We saw that when the old feudal society was already in agony and the people's consciousness was increasing, capitalism was obliged, in order to maintain itself, to remodel its tactics of repression.

The antifeudal victory in Rwanda awakened the Burundi peasantry, which impatiently awaited the liquidation of its own feudalists and, unhappily, saw how its first efforts were neatly paralyzed by the trusteeship administration which divided the territory into two countries. Burundi differs from Rwanda in that it has a small port city: Bujumbura. One part of the rural exodus of course went to Bujumbura rather than to the Congo, but this usually achieved nothing more than a growth of the ranks of the "lumpen-proletariat." Bujumbura is above all a commercial center. Its industries are for the most part artisan. Moreover there is no true proletariat. There is an embryonic working class which is for the most part dispersed among different activities and which we can divide generally into two categories: on the one hand a working aristocracy of Tutsi origin, with some qualifications and a relative stability, joined in a trade union: the Federation of Workers of Burundi, or FTB, led by feudal Tutsis,¹⁰ and for this reason complete followers of feudalism and, today, of its militarist arm.

The second category of workers is composed of an unstable, semi-

proletariat work force of rural origin, in search of part-time work in the city which leaves its family behind to do the agricultural work in the countryside. This work force seldom joins a trade union and when it does so it is the Christian trade union, as a reaction against the feudal and frequently racist attitude of the FTB. This causes it to join a trade union as a peasant and not as a member of the proletariat. After the military coup of October 1965, the Christian trade unionists (Hutus) were jailed and some executed. Only the sell-out FTB of the UPRONA¹¹ party and the state was left and later became the UTB (Union of Workers of Burundi), the only trade union of the only party.

If it is true that this semiproletariat did not cause a development of consciousness in the city, on the other hand, it introduced a factor of dynamism and politicalization in the countryside, a very positive thing in the case of a people's guerrilla war. While in Rwanda the factor of politicalization was essentially the rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie, here we also see an embryonic social sector strongly integrated with the peasantry and with an objective anticapitalist potential that the rural Hutu petite bourgeoisie lacks.

Today in Burundi, capitalism uses a bureaucratic social sector being developed within the feudal class, and the UPRONA, the JR¹² and the UNEBA¹³, are its expression. This social sector, technically more qualified than its feudal predecessors and moreover frustrated

¹⁰ President A. Ntaramagara.

¹¹ Unity for National Progress.

¹² Rwagasore Youth.

¹³ National Union of Burundi Students, in fact in the hands of Tutsi students.

by not being able to use its qualifications due to the presence of Belgian technicians, is a useful instrument for international capitalism to change from the old Belgian neocolonialism, its former ally whom it has now left behind.

Unable to contain by itself all the hungry peoples of the world, the United States integrated Europe into its worldwide strategy in order to decentralize the work. Seen in this perspective, the Belgians, always deeply involved in Central Africa, performed a work of applied gendarmerie.

At the moment when capitalism saw itself menaced by a constantly more aware peasantry and one preparing to rebel, the CIA, in October 1965, entered into action, with its technical assistance on the side of Belgian capitalism; of the old feudalism and the bureaucratic militarism that developed from it, and unleashed against the people's forces an action of preventive repression supposedly to protect the endangered monarchy, killing hundreds of Hutu leaders and thousands of peasants rebelling against the provocative attitude of the feudalists and militarists.

With the peasantry smashed, international capitalism sets in motion the process of revamping its repressive apparatus, militarizing feudalism in two stages: first deposing the king to enthroned his son in order to finally install in power the military apparatus that had organized the massacre. Thus it succeeded in forming a military republic directed by the most reactionary feudal elements.

The fact that a few corrupt or terrorized Hutus are named ministers in order to deceive the peasantry does not in any way change

this fundamental fact. It was equally careful to remove Colonel Verwayen from the leadership of the army for having been a bit too much in view during the repression of October 1965, and thus give Burundi a more national aspect.

This repressive apparatus, imperialism's preferred form of operation, has all the advantage of making the presence of capitalism at once invisible and omnipresent, of making it more deeply rooted in the country and at the same time allowing certain charlatans in power to compensate for their reactionary activities with a democratic jargon full of flowery statements and dramatic scenes worthy of the theater.

There is no doubt that neither Burundi nor Rwanda are on stage today, as is the Congo or any other African country where capitalist competition sometimes allows some information to filter through. On the contrary, here the blackout is complete.

It is evident that world capitalism cannot tolerate any country making a revolution that can serve as a focal point for neighboring countries or encourage the fight against imperialism. This single fact is enough to justify preventive repression on capitalism's part.

Moreover, Burundi has the sad privilege of being able to act as a strategic central coordination point for blotting out any attempt at liberation in Africa. The improvement of the base and airport of Bujumbura will transform it into tomorrow's fortified strategic point, from which it will be possible to make rapid antiguerrilla interventions. The first foreigners implicated in this strategy are clearly the Congolese people. Whatever liberation attempt they make is directly menaced by the existence of a repressive base outside their bound-

daries. With this perspective, international capitalism demands that its security in Burundi be total. For this reason the country is regularly subjected to a total political clean-out.

For greater efficiency, Burundi, the Congo and Rwanda signed a military pact in 1966 for mutual aid in the repression of any "rebellion" and for exchange of "rebels."

Since the fascist military coup of 1966, Burundi has lived under a terroristic and arbitrary regime even more cruel than the feudal regime that preceded it. To prevent popular discontent from finding developed spokesmen, the regime takes care to punish severely any contact with the masses.

The Hutus (90% of the population) live persecuted by a Tutsi military caste. No Hutu with the slightest development, even post-primary, who lives in Bujumbura, where it is possible for him to acquire some knowledge of politics, has the right to leave the city without authorization. If he is seen in the rural area, he is automatically denounced, sent to the police and interrogated about his political activity. It is very possible that he will not be released. Any Tutsi active in the Rwagasore Youth — fascist youth in the service of the regime as a parallel police — has the right to arrest anyone he pleases. These agents of the regime enter private houses and listen to conversations without the people having the right to throw them out. In public places they act in the same way in order to overhear conversations.

Since 1965, arbitrary detentions have not stopped sowing terror in the countryside and have filled the provincial prisons.

On the other hand, a subtle policy is applied toward the Hutu elite. In fact, to prevent them from

organizing an opposition abroad and to draw back all the Hutu intellectuals that finish their studies outside the country, they have given a false impression of calm, allowing these intellectuals to occupy certain posts where, on the other hand, they can do nothing. The Hutus, pacified by this apparent four-year calm, have returned to the country. At the end of mid-September 1969, a wave of arrests strikes them, irrespective of the position they occupy.

Ministers and functionaries suffer the unfortunate luck of the iniquitous Burundi prisons. The arrests are clearly made clandestinely, as they were in 1965, and preferably at night. Everyone who denounces an arrest he has witnessed is given the same treatment.

The international importance of the operation is vouched for by the intervention of Congolese paratroopers to maintain order. These are designed to guarantee the protection of the military personalities of the regime. One can thus measure the effectiveness of the friendship between Mobutu and Micombero, the seriousness of the military pact which merits only a few lines in the press.

The position in this affair of the President of Rwanda, Kayibanda, is very delicate. In fact it is worthwhile noting that Rwanda made an antifeudal revolution against the Tutsi oligarchy and it is consequently delicate, if not politically dangerous, for her to openly play a policy of collaboration with Burundi. Rwanda cannot run the risk of sending a Hutu army to Burundi, which might be taken as a bad move and reach the point of creating a mutiny. And since Rwanda does many favors for

Belgium, not much is demanded of her. Even discontent at the diplomatic level is tolerated. Nevertheless this does not mean that the Hutus persecuted in Burundi will find security if they flee to Rwanda. Let us not forget that one condition of the military pact is concerned with the return of rebels, and that this can be done with much more discretion.

Beryllium

Officially Burundi represents nothing in the economic field and is not a strategic point. Coffee is its basic export product. Nevertheless Burundi, and in part Rwanda, participate in 6% of the world production of beryllium. On the other hand, discrete prospecting will have noted the discovery of zones rich in beryllium and easily mined, thus placing Burundi among the most important producers of the world.

Beryllium is a mineral of many uses, and therefore will never lose its importance. It is particularly significant that it is included among the important elements of the United States' strategic reserves.

This assures Burundi a very tragic political future.

Conclusion:

Revolutionary Perspectives

The situation of Burundi and Rwanda shows how a revolution cannot be victorious if it does not liquidate all the social sectors that are objectively the allies of international capitalism, whatever their grade of concentration may be. While just one of these sectors exists, the permanent risk will continue of opposition to the first popular gains, of the aggravation of economic underdevelopment and

above all of an advantageous period for capitalism to consolidate its positions, in detriment to the people. Rwanda's precarious economic situation indicates the no-exit passage-way in which the regime that has not attacked the capitalist economic system winds up.

In order to attack correctly and consistently the international capitalism to which they have been submitted, Burundi-Rwanda must overcome the narrow limits of their national territory. A revolutionary movement that wishes to be effective must, as a minimum, unite the population of Burundi and Rwanda, although this seems to us to be insufficient. In fact, Burundi, the Congo and Rwanda constitute one sole economic and political zone for certain large capitalist dynasties.

Burundi and Rwanda serve as the strategic base for the West and their political life is therefore intimately tied to that of the Congo. The bloody repression of October 1965 and that which is about to take place today demonstrate that imperialism will not allow these countries any popular progress. The organization of a military agreement for repressive reasons proves that no people's power will achieve peace while any form of imperialism exists in the Congo. And the revolutionary forces will quickly understand the need for paralyzing the imperialist forces in Burundi and Rwanda.

Faced with the coordination of imperialist forces, the revolutionary forces will necessarily be forced to respond with the coordination of theirs in this zone of Central Africa so coveted by imperialism.

Burundi and Rwanda, undoubtedly more than any other African country, will owe their salvation to the spirit of continentalization of the revolution.