SPECIAL NUMBER

V. b. b.

Endish Edition.

Unpublished Manuscripts - Please reprint

ERNATIO Vol. 6. No. 31 22nd April 1926

PRESS

Editorial Offices and Central Despatching Department: Berggasse 31, Vienna IX. — Postal Address, to which all remittances should be sent by registered mail: Postant 66, Schliessfach 213, Vienna IX.

Telegraphic Address: Inprekorr, Vienna.

Session of the Enlarged E. C. C. I.

Nineteenth and Twentieth Sessions.

(Detailed Report.)

Nineteenth Session, March 14th, 1926.

Chairman Comrade Geschke.

Comrade Dobrogeanu Gherea

made the following declaration.

At the XIV. Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the course of the discussion on the activities of the representatives of the Russian Party in the E. C. C. I., the attitude of the Communist Party of Roumania was referred to at the same time, by comrades Schumsky and Skrypnik. This question, and the question of the whole political activity of the Roumanian Party, is now being dealt with by a commission specially appointed by the E. C. C. I.

On the same occasion, and in the same connection, the incorrectly informed comrade Skrypnik reproached me with adopting a "Great Power attitude". As I was not present, I was unable to confute this accusation straightaway, so that it was published without any correction in the reports of the Congress, in Russian and other languages. The passage in question is as follows:

"Was the attitude of the leaders of the Comintern towards the Roumanian Party correct, as maintained by the previous speaker? Has the line followed by the Roumanian C. P. changed or not, has Dobrogeanu ceased to take sides for the Great Power, did Dobrogeanu not state at our Party Conference of the Moldavian Republic that the Moldavians must not look upon themselves as a separate people, but must regard themselves as a part of the Roumanian people? These

declarations were made. And when the E. C. C. I. discussed this Moldavian question, did it accept or reject the resolution drawn up by the Commission? It rejected it. The consequence has been that the Roumanian Party has remained stuck in the bog in this matter, and the antagonisms existing in Bessarabia have not been taken advantage of.'

To this I wish to say that I have never asserted, either at a Party Conference or anywhere else, anything to the effect that the "Moldavians must regard themselves as a part of the Roumanian people". All that I have done is to emphasise the identity of the Moldavian language with the Roumanian national language, and I have done this for the purpose of pointing out the possibilities of a greater amount of influence being exercised upon the Roumanian working people in a communist direction, on the part of the Moldavian Republic.

With regard to the rest of my "Great Power attitude", which appears to have been latent in me for some time, I may say that not only have I never adopted any such attitude, but that on the contrary I have invariably energetically contended against any such Great Power tendencies, and have even incurred the displeasure of the law on this account.

I can only regret that after comrade Skrypnik had brought a political accusation of this nature in such a frivolous manner, without carefully examining into his sources of information, he should not even have found it necessary to accede to my request that he should now state the truth, and withdraw his unjustified accusation here before this forum.

Report of the French Commission.

Comrade Humbert Droz:

The political theses state that in the French Party the main danger threatens from the Right. And yet in the French Commission much more has been spoken about the Left errors and the organisator errors of the Party. It may be asked if there is not a certain inconsistency here. This is however not the case, and for the following reason. The Right danger in the French Party is closely connected with the errors committed by the Central during the past year. The mistakes made by the Party have not created the Right tendencies, but they have aroused great dissatisfaction among the members of the Party, and prepared the soil for the growth of the Right.

In France the objective conditions calling forth Right dangers are furnished to a wide extent by the economic and syndicalist traditions of the French labour movement. Besides this, the wrong line of Party politics pursued during the past year was bound to contribute greatly to an increase of influence of the Right wing in the Party. It is true, that the errors of the leaders have been corrected to a very great extent during the last few months. The most serious errors of the leaders have been, in the first place, the failure to analyse the situation properly, the false view taken of Fascism, the belief that the revolutionary situation was immediately impending, the slogans shooting far beyond the possibilities offered by the situation, an under-estimation of the trade unions and a mechanical execution of the leading role played by the Party in the trade unions, and a wrong and too mechanical inner Party course.

On 1. and 2. December an extraordinary Conference of the Party took place. Here the Party criticised itself, and addressed an Open Letter to the Party in which many of the errors were condemned.

This self criticism exposed the following grave errors:

- 1. The errors in the application of the United Front tactics;
- 2. The errors in dealing with the trade unions;
- 3. The erroneous inner Party course.

It is incumbent on this Enlarged Executive Session to confirm this self criticism of the French Party.

The Open Letter sent to the members of the French C. P. by the above Party Conference permitted of various interpretations, and this vagueness must be removed. We must not permit the importance of this Conference to be in any way under-estimated. The resolution here submitted expressly confirms the self-criticism exercised by the French Party at this Conference, and extends the criticism thus commenced by the Party itself. Were the French Right thus right in attacking the Party? Most certainly not.

The present resolution contains a detailed paragraph directed

against the Right which is the best proof of this.

The present resolution, aiming at the enlightenment of the members of the French Party, deals in exact detail with the standpoint of the Right in France. Apart from the correct criticism of the errors of the Party, the standpoint of the Right involves very great and dangerous deviations, which must be energetically combatted. This standpoint has two roots:

- 1. The social democratic root;
- 2. The syndicalist root.

The Right utilise their two organs: the "Bulletin Communiste" and the "Revolution Proletarienne", which are published in France outside of the Party, for the purpose of carrying on systematic agitation against Soviet Russia and the International. It is desired to create an atmosphere of pessimism and defeatism. This object having been attained to a certain extent, the Right have gone on of late to sabotage every action taken by the Party. One of the worst instances of this was given on the occasion of the protest strike organised by the French Party, and then again during the 24 hours strike against the Morocco campaign.

The attitude adopted towards the colonial question and in the national question, has also been completely wrong and social democratic. The Right protested against the proclamation of the slogan of fraternisation with the Riff army. They first pointed out that the Riff population and the French soldiery belonged to very different stages of civilisation, so that a fraternisation would be senseless. Then they went further. The Right wrote of Abd-el-Krim that his religious and social prejudices must be combated,

and therefore we must not support him in his struggle against French imperialism. Morocco to the Moroccans, but not to Abdel-Krim. Thus says the Right, and thus Painlevé said too, with the object of paralysing the negotiations with Abd-el-Krim.

We see the same thing in the attitude adopted to Alsace Lorraine, already dealt with in comrade Zinoviev's report. The French Right, in its opposition to the 24 hours general strike, not only emphasised that it was badly organised, but rejected it entirely on political grounds.

With regard to the syndicalist deviations, Louzon's articles in the "Revolution Proletarienne" are especially characteristic. He takes up a peculiar attitude towards the questions of the day. He maintains that the taxation question is a conflict between the petty and the big bourgeoisie, and of no interest to the proletariat; the same applies in his opinion to the Allied debts and to the inflation, and the contention against high prices is again merely to the advantage of the petty bourgeoisie.

Above all, these syndicalists have an entirely deviating opinion as to the role played by the Party. A number of articles dealing with the Douarnez strike discusses in detail the role of the Party, and denies that the Party is the advance guard of the proletariat. It is even denied that the Party plays a part in the revolutionary education of the proletariat.

The Right are further in error in the question of the application of the United Front tactics. They maintain that where the United Front tactics are employed, we must not expect that we can divide the masses from the leaders.

Besides this, the French Right is entirely opposed to the reorganisation on the basis of the factory nuclei. As already stated, this ideology of the Right is entirely social democratic or syndicalist.

The Right is composed in the first place of a group of petty bourgeois intellectuals, who have the leadership in their hands, and who consist within the Party of the group around Loriot, and outside the Party of the group around the "Bulletin Communiste".

It is composed in the second place of the group of syndicalist trade unionists grouped around the periodical "Revolution Proletarienne". Both these currents join in a united front against the Party, and endeavour to defeat the Party.

It is recruited in the third place from the dissatisfied members of the Party, who do not share the false social democratic or syndicalist ideology of the first two groups, but have been pushed into the arms of the Right by the errors of the Party.

When the Party adopts a new course of policy this third group will desert the Right at once. Thus the first prerequisite for fighting the Right is a real and earnest change in the line pursued by the Party in general politique, in the relations to the trade unions, and in the inner life of the Party.

The Party must exert every effort to differentiate rightly among these various constituents of the Right. An earnest ideological fight against the Right has been begun by the Party, and must

be systematically continued.

If we ask ourselves which of these shades of Right tendency is the most dangerous, we must conclude that the syndicalist deviations form the greatest peril, since these deny the role falling to the Party within the masses and within the trade unions, and yet maintain to be the representatives of the old revolutionary traditions of the French working class. These deviations represent a great danger, not only in the sphere of politics. but at the same time in the trade unions, since the present situation, — a great industrial proletariat, struggle against the offensive of the employers, — forces the French working class to defend itself in great mass trade unions. The French working class can no longer content itself with small syndicalist organisations of the pre-war type.

The resolution states that those members of the Party who co-operate with the group around the "Revolution Proletarienne" and the "Bulletin Communiste" must be asked the plain question: Will you maintain Party discipline or will you leave the Party?

We may assume with certainty that the French Party Central, will solve the Right question unequivocally and energetically in the near future.

Report of the German Commission. Reporter Comrade Bucharin.

The structure of the resolution proposed by the German Commission is approximately as follows:

First an analysis of the general situation in Germany. This analysis shows the twofold nature of the present crisis: The tendency of a general decline in German economics on the one hand, and on the other the attempts being made by the bourgeoisie to combat this first tendency on a new technical basis, although under present conditions this second tendency leads to an aggravation of the crisis. Hence the distress and misery among broad strata of the working class, and among the masses of the people.

On the basis of this specific situation in Germany there is to be seen a development towards the Left in the German working class. The resolution characterises this phenomenon as one of the most important in German life, and regards political and social crises as the inevitable consequence of the present economic conditions.

The resolution then states the general tasks of the Party, and enumerates three of these as the most important:

firstly, work in the trade unions;

secondly, the United Front tactics, and

thirdly, the formulation of partial demands, this formulation being, of course, in strict accordance with the viewpoint of revolutionary tactics, that is, the partial demands must bear directly on the final aims of the revolutionary proletariat, the aim of the revolution itself.

The resolution then analyses the various currents within the Party. In connection with the most important task set the Party at the present time, the problem of winning over the broad masses, the resolution regards the ultra-Left deviations as the most detrimental disturbing element hampering the process of winning the masses.

The resolution then gives an analysis of these deviations, showing how the one time ultra-Left has crumbled away; then an analysis of the different currents within the one time ultra-Left. The resolution further deals with the Right deviations, and then concludes by laying down a programme of action for our Party.

I am of the opinion that the work done by the Commission has shown a further discussion in the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive to be necessary.

Of course Comrade Bordiga adopts an oppositional standpoint in principle to the resolution. Comrade Bordiga declares himself fully agreed with the estimate of the economic and political situation in Germany as given in the resolution, and also finds the optimistic estimate of the German situation as expressed by the resolution perfectly right. But comrade Bordiga maintains that there is no connection between the establishment of the fact of a Left development within the German working class and the tactical line designated by him as being a course towards the Right, I think that here his conclusion is wrong.

The resolution faces the problem in the light of the present critical situation. If it be an actual fact that the development towards the Left now going on in the German working class, that is, the process of revolutionising in the working class, has also seized upon that section of the working class which is in part organised in the Social Democratic Party, and in part belongs to no party at all, then it is obvious that our German Party has to react to this phenomenon. And how can it react most effectively? By the correct application of the tactics of the United Front! The United Front tactics are indeed justified up to the hilt in this connection. What is there illogical about this? Everything is in perfect harmony; precisely the development towards the Left among the social democratic workers impels us to adopt another tone towards these workers, and demands from us the correct application of those United Front tactics which are denied almost on principle by comrade Bordiga. I may thus state here that the tactical conclusions of the resolution are in perfect harmony with the analysis.

The second point in which comrade Bordiga apparently differs in principle from the present resolution, refers to the

methods employed by the C. I. Comrade Bordiga has expressed himself in the Commission as being opposed to the method of quotations, etc., and to the alleged employment of the method of ideological terrorisation — as comrade Bordiga expresses it — of the Left German workers.

I must here point out that every part of the resolution dealing with the combatting of the ultra-Left deviations sharply distinguishes between the deviations of the ultra-Left workers on the one hand, and those deviations which are naturally incorporated in their crassest form in various strata of the ultra-Left leaders.

The resolution speaks of the problem of **convincing** the Left workers as the most important task of the Party at the present moment, and it is almost ridiculous to speak of ideological terror in this connection.

With regard to the quotations, I scarcely think that comrade Bordiga will be able to discover a method of combatting the opinions of various comrades without resorting to quotations or something similar. Our comrades who are affected with this or that deviation are not deaf and dumb. When they speak we print what they have said. It is impossible to combat any deviation without quoting. I know of no other method; if comrade Bordiga will show us other methods, we shall be very pleased, and shall employ these newly discovered methods.

Comrade Bordiga has told us that we should study the matter thoroughly and then freely express our opinions about it. This is excellent advice. Study is a most useful occupation. But we must point out that here we are writing political documents, and it need not be emphasised that here we cannot follow every idea ad absurdum. Of course we must study, but we cannot carry this study to a point of absurdity, we must isolate and criticise the most important and leading factors. I for my part find the resolution framed in such terms that it is at once clear to everyone that the main point at issue is the ideological overcoming of these deviations. There is not even one word in the resolution on organisatory measures.

Comrade Bordiga adds the observation that this socalled "ideological" terror is as follows: When quoting comrade Korsch's arguments, for instance, we assert the opinions in question to be anti-Bolshevist, anti-Soviet, etc. Comrade Bordiga ands that in this manner we waste the political capital possessed by Soviet Russia and the Communist International in the confidence of the working class — a capital which is not unlimited. It is true that capital can be expended by wasting it, but it is equally true that capital can be so employed as to bring in interest. We believe ourselves to be following this second method. So far we have employed this method, and so far we have gained our interest, and have by no means wasted our capital. This has been shown us by experience.

What is the point at issue? For instance, such utterances as the assertion that our trade union policy, our campaign for trade union unity, are specifically Russian government policy. Comrade Bordiga considers that if we call such an assertion by its right name, we are so to speak wasting Soviet capital. We however are of the opinion that if we preserve silence on the subject we are failing in our duty, which is to combat this objectively extremely detrimental reformist, indeed almost social democratic, deviation. Is it true that such opinions are anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet? It need scarcely be said that it is absolutely true!

Such matters have to be discussed concretely, and it cannot be demanded that we study the collected works of comrade Korsch before we venture on a quotation. This kind of thing is entirely unsuitable for political parties and politically active organisations such as the Communist International.

Besides this, we had a slight dispute with comrade Meyer with reference to the introductory part of the resolution. Comrade Meyer requested the Commission to place the theses on relative stabilisation at the head of the resolution. In the discussion this appeared perhaps as a very slight shade of difference in the estimate of the importance of the present crisis in Germany. I am of the opinion, shared in I think by the whole Commission, that we have accorded the theory of the relative stabilisation its correct place in the general theses. What is

The economic situation in France is characterised by severe linancial and political crises, working gradually, through a zig zag series of temporary periods of stabilisation and relapses, to a state of aggravated economic crisis. The Party is thus set the mighty task of leading the impending struggle of the masses against the ruling capitalists.

Here the antagonism between the big and petty bourgeoisie is a factor of importance. The petty bourgeoisie, pillaged by the inflation, is already in conflict with the big bourgeoisie in the questions of the inflation, the taxes, the high prices, etc. The proletariat must interfere decisively, by means of a defensive struggle against the high prices, and in favour of the rise in wages rendered imperative by the daily increase in the costs of living.

Above all, the Party must extend its influence over the great unorganised masses of the French working people, for it is a peculiarity of the French movement that the proportion of workers organised politically and in the trade unions is very small. At the same time the United Front tactics must not be employed as a manoeuvre against the Social Democratic Party, but as an action for the mobilisation of the unorganised masses.

Further, the Party must be capable of leading the working class, conjointly with the masses of the petty citizens and small peasants, in the struggle against inflation, taxes, high prices, war, etc.

The resolution further deals with the other tasks facing the French Party at the present time, with the important task of developing the trade unions into mass organisations, with the work for trade union unity, and with the struggle against the colonial wars. The resolution further shows the manner in which the United Front tactics are to be applied to the socialists in the sense meant by the Conference held on 1. December.

The slogan of the workers' and peasants government is especially emphasised as our main political watchword.

The French Commission moves the acceptance of the present resolution by the Plenum. The first part of the resolution, containing political analysis and criticism, was passed in the Commission by all votes against the vote of Comrade Bordiga; the second part of the resolution, dealing with the fight against the Right, was passed by all votes against the vote of comrade Engler, who voted for a Right resolution and against the vote of comrade Bordiga.

It is imperative that in the future we work collectively in accordance with the lines laid down and the decisions passed by the Conference of 1. December, and in accordance with the resolution in the form here accepted. If the Central brings about united co-operation on these lines, then it will be in a position to purge the Party from the Right deviations, and to help the Party forward in the interests of the labour movement.

Declaration by Comrade Treint (France:)

The resolution on the inner situation in the Party, the section on ,the ultra-Left errors" contains the following passage:

"Comrade Treint's endeavour to convert the colonial war into a civil war, regarded as it was by him as a comparatively near possibility, was under the circumstances a grave political error."

I have already stated, in the discussion in the French Commission, the actual circumstances under which this opinion has been expressed. There has never been any thought of converting the Moroccan war or any colonial war into a civil war. The C. C. has expressed itself in agreement with the following views, which were also acknowledged later by the Conference in lvry:

Every colonial war can change into a war between imperialist States, and when this occurs the struggle against war demands the struggle for the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war.

In the C.C. I expressed the opinion that this standpoint should be made clear in our general propaganda, not only within the confines of the Party, but also among the masses.

There has been a great lack of clearness in the whole Party with respect to the difference between the United Front slogans on the one hand and the propaganda of the Party on the other hand, so that even in the C.C. there have been misunder-standings, and it was in this sense, and with a view to avoiding such misunderstandings; in this sense I formulated my concluding sentences in the speech held at Lens, at a large meeting of reformist and unitarian miners.

Comrade Kirsch, member of the C. C. was present at this meeting, and has borne witness to the C. C. that I did not speak of converting the colonial war into a civil war, but spoke solely of the possibility of a war between the imperialist states, and pointed out the instances of the Paris Commune and the Bolshevist Party, by whom the imperialist war was changed into civil war.

I point out, herewith, that the resolution submitted to the vote of the International contains a paragraph referring to me, and attributing to me a fault which I have not committed, and which thus cannot be proved against me.

which thus cannot be proved against me.

With this reservation I express myself in agreement with this resolution in its entirety, for it offers us an adequate basis upon whose foundation the totality of the sound forces of the Party will join closer and closer together, to continue the process of recovery of the Party commenced on 2. December 1925, and to work towards the solution of the problems set us by the French crisis.

The resolution moved by the French Commission was then passed by all votes against the vote of comrade Bordiga.

required in the German resolution is the specific features of German development. And it is precisely the state of crisis which is specifically characteristic for the development of German economics. We do not regard this state of crisis as a temporary condition, but as characteristic for the whole immediate future of Germany. Therefore the resolution takes this state of crisis, the economic crisis and the resultant social and political crisis, as the starting point for the whole subject and all the conclusions to be drawn from it.

In the Commission we had a disagreement with comrade Scholem. As you will be aware, the first draft of the resolution, in the section referring to the analysis of the various ultra-Left groups, stated that the Scholem-Rosenberg group was about to follow the correct path. etc. But in the Commission itself we had the opportunity of observing the manner in which the group composed of comrades Scholem, Rosenberg and Konrad were divided among themselves, and that comrade Scholem had separated from the original group. Comrades Konrad and Rosenberg declared that they would vote for the resolution, despite some differences of opinion, whilst comrade Scholem, on the contrary, has spoken sharply against the resolution. Comrade Scholem gives the reasons for this so-called "heroic deed" in the following manner:

He maintains that the whole resolution is written against the Left. He repeated that he had broken with the K, A. P.ist tendencies; but at the same time he declared: I should be a scoundrel if I were to vote against my own past."

I cannot see any great evidence of consistency or logic in comrade Scholem's attitude here.

First you say that you have formerly committed various errors. If you have formerly committed errors, these errors are a part of your past. If you break with your past, naturally you express yourself opposed to your past. And yet at the same moment you announce that you would be a scoundrel if you were to vote against your own past. Logically speaking you are thus — you will pardon me but I am only using your own words — already a bit of a scoundrel.

We have been pleased to observe that comrades Rosenberg and Konrad — and Comrade Konrad is a Berlin functionary who has behind him fairly large masses of the working people — have declared themselves in favour of the resolution.

Besides these, various other declarations have been made. One of the most important declaration made before the Commission was that of comrade Urbahns. Comrade Urbahns has thus finally joined the Ruth Fischer group. He declared to us that he, too, would vote against the resolution, and adduced approximately the following arguments: The resolution is written

against the Left, the Right — it appears — are coming into power. The political line of the resolution is vague and unclear; the resolution combats every Left element, and so forth. This comrade Urbahns followed up with the demand for the so-called Concentration Party conference, for every description of liberty within the Party, etc. I am not able to polemise against these observations, for no substantiation was given with them.

I do not see in what way the political line of the resolution is vague. I am of the opinion that this line is very plainly recognisable. How can it be asserted that the resolution is written against every Left element, when the resolution states quite openly, and proposes openly that all groups, including the Left groups, should co-operate on the basis of a certain political line? How can it be maintained that the fight is directed against every element of the Left, when Comrades Rosenberg and Konrad find in the resolution a basis upon which they can work? Comrade Urbahn's speech can only gain even a show of justification on the assumption that Urbahns regards himself and the Ruth Fischer group as the embodiment of all Left elements, which would be a great and entirely unfounded presumption.

Further, comrade Meyer declares that the resolution does not treat his group properly, etc. He has over and over again expressly put the question: what is required of the Meyer group, what further steps should this group take to approach nearer the Central, etc. etc. In the Commission comrade Meyer received the reply: these steps should consist in his one time group recognising it as their duty to conduct the fight against the Right danger, since this group was connected with the Right at one time, and possesses a certain tradition.

These are practically the most important comments to be made on the work of the Commission. We have accepted some corrections not involving principles. The resolution has been accepted in general by all the members of the Commission, with the exception of the declarations made by comrades Urbahns, Engel, Bordiga, and Scholem.

On behalf of the Commission I should like to ask those comrades who are opposed to the resolution, or are in any way in doubt with regard to any of its formulations, to come forward openly here in the Plenum and make their suggestions. I believe that a further discussion in the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive would be useful for the whole movement. The German question is somewhat important, for the German Party is one of the most important Sections of the Communist International. The questions of the German movement are also very instructive for the other Parties.

The Commission therefore recommends an open discussion in the Plenum. (Applause.)

Discussion on the Report of the German Commission.

Comrade Bordiga (Italy):

Comrade Bucharin's speech compels me to make an additional and more precise statement on the two points already mentioned by me in the Commission.

I protested against the methods of controversy employed in the Commission, against the method of selecting separate quotations from the writings of comrades, in order to prove their deviation from the right line. I consider that this method of fighting is not advantageous for the ideological enlightenment of the masses.

I also opposed, in the Commission, the exaggerated employment of ideological terror, that is, the practice, before giving them full information on certain political questions, of confronting the simple Party members on every occassion with the statement that if they declare themselves opposed to the political purport of the question as presented by the Central Committee or the Executive, they are enemies of the Executive, enemies of Communism, etc. etc. It is not sufficient to declare that a distinction is to be made between the Left leaders and the Left workers; every method of ideological terror must be abandoned, and the real political issues must be made clear to the workers.

I have never demanded that the works of the Left comrades should be exhaustively studied: I have merely warned against a superficial judging of quotations.

Comrade Scholem (Germany):

Comrades. I fully maintain the attitude which I have takenhere in the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive, and in the German Commission.

I have never had any K.A.P. tendencies. In the trade union question, for instance, which is a fair test of what stand-point is held with regard to German K.A.P. ist tendencies, I have fought with the utmost energy, and after the Frankfort Party Conference I exerted every effort, in the Central Committee, for the complete liquidation of those groups and tendencies incorporated for instance in our former Comrade Schumacher.

The mistake which I made was that after the close of the debate on the Oper Letter I did not at once break off every external or inner connection with people like Katz, so that it has been made possible for these elements, who hold opinions different to mine with regard to the future of the Comintern, to force me almost into a position, in decisive situations, in which it would not even be possible for me to fight in the ranks of the Comintern for my political views, which I have never denied for a moment and do not intend to deny for a moment.

I can well imagine that when anyone realises that the line of political struggle which he has been pursuing is wrong, then he can and must state this clearly and openly, as was done

by comrade Bucharin after his struggle against the Brest Litovsk peace treaty. Thus if I were of the opinion that the line taken by the Left in the German C.P. has been wrong, then I should state plainly here: the struggles of the Left have been an error, a tremendous mistake. And the matter would be settled with this. But though I am not of the opinion that the Left has been entirely free from error, still I continue to be convinced that the struggle carried on by the Left within the Party has been right, and I am thus unable to make any declaration condemning this struggle.

The greatest objection which I raise against the resolution is that it directs the whole course of the struggle against the ultra-Left ideology, which is represented as a disturbing element

hampering the winning over of the masses.

I am not so simple-minded as to suppose that I have to vote against a resolution on account of a word with which I am not in agreement. I am not of the opinion that when this or that sentence out of the past does not coincide with what I think, I am therefore forced to reject a resolution. I can well imagine that when I am in agreement with the general line taken in the most important points, I am still able to vote for a resolution, despite certain differences, which I can state in a declaration. But in this resolution there is one important point on which I am not in agreement, and that is the assertion that during the present period of relative stabilisation the ultra-Left dangers represent a disturbing element hindering the work of winning over the masses. I am, and always have been, of the opinion that in the period of relative stabilisation the greatest perils threatening, the Communist Party are the Right opportunist dangers. And since the resolution does not state this fundamental thesis, and because this resolution continues the false line taken by the Open Letter in this question have discussed this openly — I am opposed to the resolution.

Left in the past to have been in the right direction, in spite

of the various errors which have been committed.

For this reason I beg to make the following declaration

with respect to the present resolution:

"The present resolution on the German question demands the adoption of a clear and definite attitude before the whole Executive and I neither can nor will avoid this necessity. I therefore declare: The present resolution confirms the Open Letter sent by the Executive to the German C. P. I have opposed this Letter with the utmost energy, for the reason that it defines the struggle carried on by the Left in the German C. P. since the III. World Congress as a fractional struggle of an anti-Bolshevist group against the Comintern and against Soviet Russia. To agree to the present resolution would mean a subsequent approval of the Open Letter, and thus the abandonment of a struggle which has been going on for years for the formation of a revolutionary Bolshevist workers' party in Germany, a struggle which I am proud of having led, and which I shall never deny, either today or at any other time. For this reason I should vote against the resolution, were I a delegate entiled to vote.

In order to secure myself from malicious misinter-pretations, I declare expressly that I fully maintain the attitude adopted by me in the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive, and in the German Commission.'

Comrade Urbahns (Germany):

Comrades, On behalf of comrades Maslovsky (Berlin), Gramkov from the Hamburg Youth, Ruth Fischer, and myself, I must declare that we, had we been entitled to vote, would reject the resolution on the German question. I have to make the following declaration on the subject:

Declaration on the situation and tasks of the German C.P.

1. The undersigned share unreservedly the standpoint of the Report and of the theses of comrade Zinoviev, and are here in agreement with the majority of the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive.

2. The first prerequisite for carrying out the tasks set the German C. P. is the solution of the present crisis in the Party. The objective premises for the further development and pursuance of a United Front policy, free from the Right and

ultra-Left errors of the past, are given. In Germany a fresh period of acute class struggles is impending. The effects of the Dawes plan, expressed in the economic crisis, in increasing mass unemployment, and short time work, in the difficulties in the camp of the bourgeoisie, the discontent in the ranks of the middle class and not least in the ranks of the rural population, the awakening of the social democratic workers to the consciousness of their position, to consciousness of the utter hopelessness of the coalition policy pursued by the social democratic leaders for eight years, — the wave of sympathy for Soviet Uussia, - the widespread anti-monarchist movement — all these are signs of a situation offering the German C.P. the greatest possibilities for the winning over of the broad masses for communism, and for the preparation for fresh struggles.

3. If this objectively advantegeous situation is to be properly utilised, the Party must show a rapid adaptability of tactics, a capacity of making prompt use of every weakness and every split in the camp of the enemy. "Bread and butter questions" must be made the central point of the daily work of the Farty, and these daily questions must be approached in a manner making their ultimate bearing on our final aims perfectly clear, and showing that nothing but the proletarian revolution can solve the German

crisis.

The execution of these tactics involves a number of problems, which may be formultated, for the first time, as follows:

a) The utilisation of the Left tendencies in the masses of social democratic workers against their opportunist leaders, but without a repetition of the errors of 1923, that is, without the formation of an actual bloc with the Left of the German Social Democratic Party.

b) The combination of parliamentary work with mass work, in which preponderant importance must invariably be accorded to the work among the masses, and in which we must prove ourselves capable of making use of such situations as those existing at the present time in Prussia, Saxony, and the municipality of Berlin, in such manner that we practically demonstrate to the broad working masses the necessity of a rupture with the coalition policy pursued by the Central of the German Social Democratic Party.

c) The application of United Front tactics for winning

over the Catholic workers and the middle strata.

d) The organisation of a broad Left trade union wing, under the leadership of a real unity campaign, for the Angio Russian Committee and for the utilisation and connection of sympathy with Soviet Russia with our trade union movement.

These tactical tasks involve the following tasks as the

immediate duty of the German C.P.

e) The development and elaboration of the campaign for the expropriation of the princes into a general mass movement against all monarchists, especially against the monarchist administration, and against the attempts being made by the bour-geoisie to restrict the rights of the proletariat even further by means of alterations in the constitution.

Mass movements against unemployment, against the closing down of factories and against the wage cuts; support and promotion of the initiative of the unemployed, better combination of the demands of the unemployed with the campaign for the ex-

propriation of the princes.

At the present time, whilst the expropriation campaign is still going on, the general economic questions of interest to the workers should be brought more into the foreground: the protests against the closing down of works, the fight against taxes and duties.

The Drawing up of a Programme of Action.

4. The most importand organisatory tasks: The winning over of the workers of the German Social Democratic Party, the fight against the coalition policy, and the utilisation of the antagonism between the workers and the leaders in the German Social Democratic Party, and of the antagonism among the groups of reformist leaders.

Concentration upon trade union work.

5. The proper carrying out of these tactics demands a definite and decided combatting of the Right and ultra-Left deviations in the Party. The greater danger for the whole of this period is formed by the Right opportunist deviations: but these Right deviations can only be overcome if the fight against them is accompanied by a determined fight against the ultra-

Left deviations, as these can in many cases actually support the Right tendencies. The Right currents in the C. P. of Germany transform adaptability of tactics into lack of principle, they distort the United Front tactics from a method of enligthening and mobilising of the masses into a bloc with the German Social Democratic Party, they misrepresent the necessity of winning over the workers in the German S.P. to such an extent that the German S.P. is spoken of as the "other proletarian brother party", and finally they convert the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government into a parliamentary combination with the German S. P. The consequence of this viewpoint cannot but be a revision of Leninism, and in actual practice a liquidatory tendency. The roots of the obstinacy of the Right standpoint are as follows:

a) The objectively difficult situation, the retarded pace of the revolution, the relative stabilisation of capitalism.

b) The exploitation of the present situation by all the Right elements in the Comintern, threatening to end in the open revisionism, expressed in actual practice at the present moment in the call for a revision of the V. World Congress (speech held by comrade Clara Zetkin at the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive in March 1926; platform of the French Right under the Leadership of Loriot; the Norwegian Right, etc.) Unless a permanent and energetic fight is carried on against the Right danger, which remains the greater danger during a period of relative stabilisation of capitalism, the correct carrying out of the tactics of the Communist International is impossible; unless such a permanent and persistent fight is carried on, the revolutionary character of our Parties is endangered during the present period.

6. The ultra-Left deviations in the German C. P. have their root in a lack of faith in the possibility of solving the task of forming a Bolshevist mass Party without sinking into the bog. The ultra-Left of the German C. P. fancy that they are fighting opportunism by rejecting tactics which are right enough in themselves, just because these tactics can be distorted and misrepresented by the Right. The difficulties of the present position have partially strenghtened the ultra-Left tendencies, and have made the game easy for such open liquidators as Katz. At the present moment the energetic and determined combatting of the Katz group is the first premise for the continuation of work. There can be no doubt that those workers who have been taken away from the Party by Katz are lost for a long time to the proletarian movement. But it is only possible to win over the ultra-Left workers for the correct line of policy when they are seeing an earnest struggle on the part of the Central Committee against those fractionally organised Right who have not altered their views in any question, who only admit isolated errors in the question of October 1923, and who do not regard the Open Letter to the Party as a correction of the mistakes of 1924/25, but rather as a return

to the policy of 1922/23,

7. The present Central Committee of the German C. P., called into existence by the Open Letter from the Executive, has not carried out this Open Letter up to now. The Open Letter, instead of being made the subject of a real discussion on the errors of 1923/25, has been made the starting point of a purely personal agition. Inner Party conditions have worsened steadily since the Open Letter. In spite of an exceedingly favourable objective situation, which has enabled the Party to gain great external success in the referendum campaign, and in spite of the support lent it by the C.I. and by the Party, the Central Committee has not yet proved capable of really normalising Party life and solving the inner Party crisis. The case of Katz has assumed relatively large proportions because the Central Committee, instead of honestly admitting the errors of the whole Left before the Party, and instead of taking upon itself he corresponsibility of these errors, has misrepresented the questions and deviated the whole discussion into a series of personal cases (Scholem, Weber, Maslov, Ruth Fischer, etc.). This method has led to a complete atomisation of the Left, to ideological confusion and disintegration; has driven one section of the workers into the Katz group, against which the struggle must be taken up most energetically; has made another section entirely sick of the Party; and is calling up once more the immediate danger of a repetition of that policy which led to the breakdown of October 1923.

8. The Open Letter issued by the E.C.C.I. in September 1925 was perfectly right, Its purport was a warning to the Left to purify themselves of the ultra Left diseases of the past whilst holding fast what was good in the past, and to become the real inner core of the Party. The questions touched by the Open Letter, and still unsolved in the Party today, are as follows:

a) United Front tactics can only be actually carried out when Left phraseology has been overcome, and the past of the Left subjected to ruthless self criticism.

b) The Left has striven towards Bolshevism, but has not yet formed a Bolshevist group; up to now there has not yet been a really Bolshevist group in the German C. P.

c) The Left have been in the right: in figthing against the opportunists and revisionists (Ernst Meyer, Brandler, Leipsig

Party Confernce).

d) The struggle for the rôle to be played by the Party. The fight against the revision of the Leninist theory of the state by Brandler the fight against the defeat in October, and against its causes and consequences. In all questions of principle the Left has been in the right as opposed to the Right in the German C. P.

e) The Left have been in the wrong in general: in giving way to the anti-Bolshevist and anti-Comintern tendencies, especially as expressed in the great vacillation shown in the question of the United Front tactics, and more especially still in the trade union question at the Frankfort Party Conference; in their failure to cut themselves off from the KAPist tendencies in time, an omission placing the leadership of the Party on an unsound basis; in their failure to lay the antagonisms before the whole membership of the Party (Frankfort Party Conference, V. World Congress, trade union question, January National Council). These errors, and the fact that the necessary turn was made too late, in the National Council in May, plunged the Left into two further mistakes:

a) The correction of the Hindenburg error incurred Right slips and errors with respect to the application of the United

Front tactics among the Catholic workers.
b) The attempt, to maintain unweakened the struggle against the Right, caused the struggle against the ultra-Left to be carried on by means of damaging administrative methods, so that a number of Left workers were repulsed by the leaders.

9. The causes of the present Party crisis consist, it need not be said, in the continued existence of the difficulties of the objective situation, and in the fact of the rapid aggravation of class antagonisms in Germany, accompanied by continued relative stabilisation. The causes of the crisis are equally founded in the inner conditions obtaining in the Party, which has retained its old insecurity in dealing with both Right and ultra-Left deviations. The crisis is, however, being aggravated by the line taken by the Central Committee, which, instead of carrying out the Open Letter, has completed the process of atomising the Left, thus inevitably delivering over the leader-ship into the hands of the Right. This fact is not changed in the least by the game with comrade Rosenberg, who has been shipwrecked with his KAPist group, and concludes that he must run over to the German S.P. as fast as possible. Instead of separating the ultra-Left workers from the "ultra-Left" leaders, the alleged original object, the ultra-Left leaders have, on the contrary, been won back again, and the ultra-Left workers again repulsed. There can be no doubt that such a course is extremely likely to increase the distrust of the members to the leaders, and to weaken the prestige of the Party among the non-Party masses.

10. A return to inner soundness in the Party is only possible if the internal Party atmosphere is cleared of alleged personal "cases", if the consequences of the last discussion are removed, and all political questions definitely cleared up. This is the prerequisite for the creation of a really Marxist-Leninist centre, for the disappearance of all fractions and groups, and for the development of a body of leaders backed up by the real confidence of the members, and capable of steering a course towards the winning over of the social democratic workers, a course towards work in the trade unions, without following in the wake of Brandlerism, and without endangering the revolutionary character of the Party.

The necessary clarity can however only be attained by means of a free and open discussion, participated in by all the members of the Party both in speech and writing, all organisatory measures being set aside. This discussion must conclude with a Concentration Party Conference, which then forms a body of leaders enjoying the confidence of the majority, firmly established in itself, and possessing the will to convert the Party gradually into a Bolshevist Party, to combat ideologically all Right and ultra-Left deviations, and at the same time to bring into Party work every member willing to work, healing in the course of practical work curing them of their errors.

10. Two prospects open out before the Party and its present leaders. Either the above path is chosen, and a clear policy, a purification of the inner Party atmosphere, and a real solution of the problems opened up by the Open Letter, will enable the new leadership to gain the confidence of the Party, and will make it possible for the Centre to amalgamate with the Left to form a firm Bolshevist core, involving the gradual disappearance of the Right and ultra-Left groups, during which process our main forces are to be concentrated on winning over the ultra-Left workers; or the present leaders continue their application of mechanical organisatory methods, inevitably leading in the Party to a fight against all Left elements, and to a state of dependence on the Right, its ideology, its fraction, and its policy.

In this second case the crisis in the Party is bound to continue; the Left workers will be forced to offer the most energetic resistance to such a policy, and to take up the struggle against the Right and the groups supporting them.

Signed: Urbahns, P. Maslovsky (Berlin), Gramkov (Hamburg Youth), Ruth Fischer.

Permit me to add a few words to this declaration with reference to the resolution submitted here by the German Commission.

Comrade Bucharin stated in the German Commission that those who are in agreement with the analysis of the situation, and with the tactics in general, must declare themselves in favour of the leadership of the Party, and cannot have any doubts.

Now the decisions of the III. and IV. Congresses, and of the intermediate and subsequent sessions of the Enlarged Executive, are correct with respect to the United Front and the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government, but despite all correct analyses of correct tactics the United Front tactics, and even more the policy of the workers' and peasants' government, have been wrongly carried out.

Correct decisions therefore, do not necessarily imply a correct policy on the part of the Party. Not the political line alone, but the inner Party course in combination with this, is the real test of whether the Party is carrying out efficiently the tasks set it. If the Party continues its present inner Party course, this is bound to lead to fresh crises in the Party.

Signs of the Right danger are plainly visible in the inner Party course, and this is the more dangerous in that these same dangers are making themselves apparent in other brother Parties of the International. It is thus an urgent necessity to ward off by every available means anything which could contribute towards strengthening the Right in the German Party, and in this must be reckoned at the present time the inner Party course, which shows itself anxious for the atomisation and annihilation of all the Left, whilst at the same time building golden bridges for the Right.

Even though the Right danger may have apparently vanished from the surface, it is still there, and the secret of its power lies in the objectively difficult situation in Germany. And here it is necessary to recognise the fact that comrades Meyer, Frölich, etc., are not content with co-operating in the Central Committee wholesale, without even admitting the Right errors committed by them in the past. We shall exert our utmost efforts to prevent a course to the Right being taken in the Germany Party again.

Allow me to add a comment on comrade Stalin's speech in the German commission. He said:

"I can believe every word said by comrade Bordiga; comrade Scholem, who does not always speak the truth, I can believe sometimes; comrade Ruth Fischer I can never believe."

Comrade Lenin certainly sharply condemned many of his opponents, but I have never known him to pronounce such a judgment on an opponent, or to employ such a method. In

my opinion such action against political opponents is unallowable.

In conclusion a word on the political questions. We have been told that we do not come forward with any definite political line. To this I may reply: Up to now I have not found the political line followed by the Central in any of the resolutions, or in any of the speeches delivered in the Plenum or in the German Commission. It is thus difficult to take up any attitude to these questions. The resolution does not state any standpoint with respect to the important questions facing the German Party. I need only mention the question of our relations to the German S.P.; in connection with this the question of the Saxon government, and in connection with this again the government question all over the country. When the German Party is confronted with these questions in a practical form, I am afraid that further political differences will arise, causing the Central Committee to deviate from the Bolshevist line of the Communist International. These question will soon confront the German Party.

confront the German Party.

I should like to declare in conclusion: Whatever the decisions of the Enlarged Executive, we shall preserve discipline. We shall take our place in the fighting front of the Communist International, and of the Party, and, as soldiers of the Communist International, we shall carry out the decisions arrived at here.

Comrade Engel (Berlin):

made the following declaration:

I reject the resolution of the German Commission, but agree with the theses and report of comrade Zinoviev, which the German resolution contradicts.

I declare myself in agreement with the fundamental line of the declration made by comrade Urbahns and the comrades supporting him. I differ however from this declaration on the following points:

1. I continue to regard my rejection of the Open Letter to be correct, for this Letter means delivering over the Party into the hands of the Right group, and that the Enlarged Executive proclaims a one sided-fight against the Left in the Party. Besides this the Open Letter designates the Left as anti-Bolshevist, anti-Communist, and anti-Communer.

Bolshevist, anti-Communist, and anti-Comintern.

2. With reference to the Katz case I declare that the Central of the German Party is mainly to blame for it, as it treated the members of the Party inclining to the Left quite wrongly. The workers excluded from the Party with Katz must be won back again at once. The Party cannot afford to repulse revolutionary workers.

3. In the ultra-Left question I declare that there are undoubtedly KAPist tendencies in the Party, but that the ultra-Left are sincere communists and revolutionaries, anxious to save the Party from a repetition of October 1923, and determined not to allow themselves to be pushed out of the Party and out of the International.

4. I emphatically condemn the substitution of personal cases in place of a political fight against the whole ultra-Left, for such disciplinary measures simply serve to poison Party life. I consider that to take measures against persons is entirely wrong and tends to bring the Party to the verge of ruin.

Comrade Maslovsky (Berlin):

Before stating my standpoint with respect to the German resolution. I should like to make the following declaration on behalf of Comrades Urbahns and Ruth Fischer, and on my own behalf:

On the Declaration of the German Delegation regarding Comrade Zetkin's speech.

- 1. Comrade Clara Zetkin's speeches, both in the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive and in the German Commission, were an open advance against the V. World Congress and its decisions. Comrade Clara Zetkin, in the political part of her arguments, adopted the standpoint of Comrades Brandler, Thalheimer, and Walcher with respect to the events of October 1923, and openly demanded that the leadership of the Party should pass into the hands of the Right.
- 2. At the same time Comrade Clara Zetkin attempted to discredit the whole of the Left in the German C.P.,

both morally and politically, by means of a cannonade of abuse. Behind these personal attacks against the "Ruth Fischer-Maslov" group, which has nothing more in common with the standpoint of the Open Letter, we see the political hate against that Left which has systematically and unceasingly opposed comrade Clara Zetkin and her adherents of the Levi-Zetkin crisis. For the purpose of furthering the disintegration and atomisation of the Left, and for the purpose of confusing the workers, and thus throwing open the door for the Right leadership in the Party, comrade Clara Zetkin has employed fighting methods such as have never yet been known at any conference of a communist organisation.

3. If the German delegation rejects the political con-

clusions drawn by comrade Clara Zetkin, strictly speaking it is politically compelled to condemn the method employed against the Ruth Fischer-Maslov group. But it rejects the conclusion and approves of the premises, thus adopting an attitude so irresolute and ambiguous that it indirectly furthers the political intentions of Comrade Clara Zetkin.

Comrades, if we compare the declartion made by the German delegation regarding Comrade Clara Zetkin's speeches to the tone of the present resolution on the German question, thenwe need not be surprised that the resolution opens its arms so affectionately to the Right group. How shallow is the attitude, how slight the demarcation, towards the Right! The idea seems to be not to see them at all. But on the other hand the attacks on the Left are redoubled. The distrust felt among our sincere but confused workers towards the Party will be rather increased than lessened by this method.

I have nothing to add to comrade Urbahns' words. I share Comrade Urbahns' views, and declare that I shall continue to work on the basis of the decisions come to here, and shall take up my work on my return as I left it to come to Moscow.

Comrade Ernst Meyer (Germany):

Comrades! Firstly I should like, on behalf of myself and my political friends, to state our agreement with the present German resolution.

Many comrades laughed during the declarations made by Comrades Scholem and Urbahns. But although many sentences really were ridiculous, I for my part felt more ashamed than amused that there are comrades in the German Party who can speak thus at the present moment, and show so plainly that they have learnt nothing from the past, above all nothing from the recent past of the Party. Although these comrades admit that their policy has completely collapsed, still they come forward here and want to impart instruction to other com-rades, and to show us more efficient ways of solving the crisis in the German Party than the German resolution and the Comintern can propose.

All that it is necessary to add to these declarations is this: The German workers, the majority of the German Party members, are very much more experienced and better informed, and possess infinitely more political maturity and insight, than those comrades who have here defended the standpoint of the Left opposition. The comrade who spoke last stated that discredit had been thrown upon this Left opposition; to this we can only reply that nobody could discredit the Left opposition more than the four previous speakers have already done.

Now to comrade Bucharin's statements. He first points out a shade of difference which he considers exists between me and the majority of the comrades in the German Commission. In order that there shall be no mistake, I should like to make the following statement: I am in agreement with the diagnosis of the present crisis. All that I did was to lay emphasis on the fact of the relative stabilisation, which comrade Bucharin also mentioned as being contained in the other theses. The wish which I here expressed does not afford the slightest reason for drawing the conclusion of political differences.

Mention has further been made of the appeal made to the comrades of the oppositional Right to take further steps towards a rapprochement to the C.C. We replied to this in the Commission by stating that so far no one has told us what steps are to be taken. The errors of the past—this has been confirmed by comrade Zinoviev—have been dealt with in the many publications of the so-called Right comrades. We

should perhaps confess our errors of the present? But here too we must ask: what errors? In the insufficient fight against the Right? I do not know who has fought more energetically against the Right, we who in the Schönlank case voted for expulsion, or comrade Scholem, who abstained from voting, or

comrade Schwan, who even voted against it.

Comrade Scholem and his friends have come forward here and demanded that the fight against comrade Brandler must be carried on more energetically than ever. To this I should like to ask: Are comrades Scholem and Urbahns capable of leading a successful struggle against errors committed, or a successful struggle against the errors of the future? How can comrades holding the views here expounded hope to carry on a successful struggle against opportunist and Right dan-gers? They are incapable of it. They would like to see old conditions restored, they would like to have the old Left fraction back again, accompanied if possible by a repetition of the past errors pertaining to that Left fraction. And they are angry and disappointed because we state quietly and without exaggeration that here is not going to be any such repetition, that the members of the Party have meanwhile learned some-thing, and have no thought of obliging them by creating for them a new platform upon which to fight against the Right. We have declined to combat persons. What we have to combat is false political views, and we have to overcome every fresh danger as it appears; but we are not to be drawn into a false line of action by unsubstantiated cries of "Wolf!"

The comrades demand of us that we take a few further steps towards the C.C. We are ready to do this in the form that we request the C.C. to make more use of us and our friends for practical work — not so much in Berlin, as we set less value on work within the C.C. — as in the provinces. The best steps towards the C.C. and the Communist International will be made when the possibility is given of fighting by practical work against the Right dangers as they arise. And here we shall be pleased to leave to the comrades who have formed the ultra-Left the task of carrying on the fight against those former friends of theirs who are still

ultra-Left.

This co-operation, which has been an actual fact for the past six months, must, in our opinion, be further encouraged. As we have already stated, we are in favour of unconditional support being lent to the C.C. on the lines proposed and decided on by the Comintern. If we are desirous of closer co-operation, this desire is in the interests of the Party. We are anxious that the present objectively advantageous situation should be utilised to the utmost for the benefit of the Party, and for the achievement of as much political success as possible.

For this reason we vote for the resolution, although we are not in agreement with some of the formulations relating to us.

Comrade Hansen (Norway):

Comrades! I wish to state that in the following declaration I do not speak against the resolution in the name of the Norwegian delegation, but for the purpose of making my personal standpoint clear.

The Czech resolution of the Enlarged Executive contains

the following passage:
"The Right are endeavouring here, as in a number of other countries, to exploit the Open Letter to the German C.P. for fractional purposes."

Precisely at this time we have openly liquidatory tendencies in our Section in Norway, and this is objectively supported by the leading Right. The leading Right and our central organ not only fail to oppose the liquidators, but play fractionally with the German question, in order to strengthen these Right tendencies among us. In my opinion this will be the effect of this decision in the German question, not only in the Scandinavian countries, but in the various Sections of the Communist International

I am opposed to the resolution, not on account of all that is said against Ruth Fischer, but on account of what is not said in the resolution against the Right dangers in Germany, It is extremely characteristic that the great sensation of this Session of the Enlarged Executive is the German question.

The whole proceedings have shown me that the bone of contention here is the specific importance of the Right and Left deviations, and that there is a deliberate endeavour to characterise this specific importance in such a manner that at the present juncture sharper international measures must be taken against the Left than against the Right. I am in perfect agreement with the estimate of the situation in the Comintern, and with the estimate of the dangers confronting us, as stated in comrade Neurath's speech, and am fully convinced that the developments of the immediate future will confirm the rightness of these views.

The proceedings of the Enlarged Executive have demonstrated to me through the methods adopted in dealing with the French and other questions as compared with the treatment of the German question, that there are a fair number of comrades who regard the Right and liquidatory phenomena appearing of late as a kind of bad luck, an interruption hindering the concentration of their fire on the Left. If the total result of this session is in any way advantageous, then this is substantially due to certain recent events which perhaps occurred somewhat "unexpectedly".

I shall express my standpoint in the following brief

declaration:

"As I am of the opinion that the resolution on the German question takes a wrong line, in that it does not sufficiently realise the extent of the Right dangers in the coming period, and is thus calculated to encourage the political effect of the Right tendencies in the various Sections of the Comintern, I vote against the present resolution.

I reserve the right of stating my standpoint more precisely in a detailed declaration, of which a protocol may

be taken.

Moscow, 14, 3, 1926.

Arvid Hansen."

Comrade Blenkle (Young Communist League of (Germany):

Comrades, The declaration of Comrades Urbahns, Ruth Fischer, etc., was signed at the same time by a member of the Young Communist League. I have however been commissioned by the delegation of the German Young Communist League to make the following declaration on the standpoint of the Young Communist League with regard to the political questions in the German Party:

"1. The K. J. V. D. (German Young Communist League) was the first and only delegation to represent the standpoint

of the Comintern at the Berlin Party Conference.

2. The K. J. V. D. is united in supporting the line taken

by the Comintern and the Party leaders.

3. The opposition existing in the Young Communist League some months ago has been liquidated. At the League Congress held in Halle (Oct. 1925) five sixths of the delegates voted for the line of the Central Committee. Since this Congress the leaders of the districts then in opposition (Hamburg, Erzgebirge, Vogtland) have acknowledged in resolutions that the standpoint taken by them at the above Congress was wrong.

There is no opposition worthy of mention in the

K. J. V. D.

4. Comrade Gramkov, who has signed the declaration with comrades Urbahns and Ruth Fischer was not commissioned to do so by the Hamburg or any other organisation of our League, but thereby solely represented his own personal standpoint.

Comrade Gramkov is not the representative of the Hamburg organisation, but has been invited by the Executive of the Young Communist International, as advisory member of our delegation, in his capacity of member of the opposition

at the last Congress of the League."

Comrade Rosenberg (Germany):

The presentation of the past of the German Party, as given in the present resolution, differs in many and not unimportant points from the views which comrade Konrad and I have represented here, and still continue to represent. We are, however, both of us convinced that the political line taken by this resolution is the correct one, both with regard to the tasks facing the Party with reference to the bourgeoisie, and with regard to the inner Party course.

As I am entitled to vote, I shall therefore vote for the resolution, and comrade Konrad is here in agreement with me.

The chief objection to the platform of comrade Urbain's is that, if a few points referring to the present are deleted, then the whole might in all essentials have taken its origin in 1922. But what was right at that time is no longer right today, after the varied experiences undergone by the German workers since then. Nobody will deny the historical deeds of the German Left, and their achievements in the years between 1921 and 1924. This Left fraction came to a miserable end in 1925, chiefly owing to the People's Bloc theory proposed by comrades Ruth Fischer and Maslov. It is a corpse, and cannot be galvanised into life again.

As matters now stand in Germany, the masses of the German working people, both the workers employed in the shops and factories, and the part-timers and unemployed, want a positive policy; the experiences of the last few years have taught them that only the broad application of the United Front tactics can hope to form a real counterweight to the iron front presented by the German employers. The overwhelming majority of the German working class will support this real and positive policy, and will not permit themselves to be deterred by any fractional spectres. If anyone attempts to rake out his old suits of armour from the fractional lumber-room again, he will find himself very speedily crushed by that same armour.

The resolution here submitted is, in my opinion, well adapted to aid the German working class in its extraordinarily severe struggle. The serious responsibility borne by the Party functionaries towards the members of the Party, and further to the whole German proletariat, renders it necessary for us to collect all our forces to lead this struggle successfully; and to render the Party a united whole. I am therefore fully convinced that the overwhelming majority of the German Party members will declare themselves in favour of this positive work, and — quite apart from Katz — will determinedly and energetically thrust aside all this

game of fractions.

I am firmly convinced that the overwhelming majority of the German Party members will support the Party with the utmost determination, and will sweep aside all petty fractional intrigues.

Comrade Ruth Fischer (Germany):

The structure of the German resolution is such that it preserves silence on the political tasks, avoids the actual problems in Germany by means of general phrases on winning over the masses, which nobody denies, and then concentrates its whole force on the inner Party question, and this in a form which will and must render the crisis in the German Party more acute than it is already.

There is no contention in the German Party as to the fact that the present situation is favourable for us, much more favourable than at the time of the first period of the Dawes plan, and that we have today the opportunity of winning over broad masses for us. It is absolutely impossible to discuss this question, to seek for differences and antagonisms. The only differences existing here are perhaps the "shade" of opinion evidenced by comrade Meyer, who has touched upon the question of stabilisation in a manner which, however cautious, still lets everyone know that his analysis differs from that of the resolution. Nor is there any contention as to the necessity of concentrating our forces to win over the social democratic workers.

But silence is preserved on the important problems involved in the question of the United Front tactics. These are the concrete questions of the application of these tactics in Prussia, in Saxony, in the municipality of Berlin, in trade union work, and with regard to the collective effect of this policy as a whole, and in connection with the question of the plebiscite on the expropriation of the princes. These are problems of the attitude which we are to adopt towards unemployment, part time work, closing down of factories etc.

What is new in the situation is the necessity of carrying out these tactics in such a way that the Party finds the right line to follow after the acute ultra-Left and Right fevers of the past. But the resolution adopts a vague general standpoint, with the object of "concentrating fire on the Left".

The German resolution is not calculated to solve the inner Party crisis. This resolution no longer represents the stand-point of the Open Letter, in which the Left was the centre around which the whole party should gather, but stands in contradiction to the Open Letter. The inner Party crisis will

be aggravated by this resolution, and further aggravated by comrade Meyer's declaration. That comrade Meyer simply sets aside a trifle like October 1923 shows how complete the ideological collapse of the Central is. We took part in the German Commission, and heard comrade Meyer's declaration that it is petty and narrow-minded to discuss October 1923, and that we should do better to discuss the present position. He declared this wifth the agreement of the Central, and this means that the Central has no ideological basis.

These decisive questions are not dealt with in the resolution, but are replaced by a an excess artillery fire against the Left and the ultra-Left, without any other means being proposed against these ultra-Left beyond the "blood purification" of ultra-

Left workers as suggested by comrade Thälmann.

We are of the opinion, and once more emphasise this here, that if the social democratic working masses are to be won over for our party, the first prerequisite towards this is to win over the workers tending to the ultra-Left, and to enlighten them on the necessity of ridding themselves of the K. A. Pist deviations of the last few years. But we are not in favour of a "blood purification cure", which, though it would lose us only a few hundred workers — perhaps more — would lose us just those workers who are decisive for the character of our party.

Comrades, Opportunity has been taken here to reproach us with unfaithfulness to the Comintern and the like, and in reply to this I state clearly: I signed the Open Letter with the definite intention and conviction that it would be possible to correct the errors of the ultra Left deviations with the aid of an actual intervention on the part of the C. I., without shaking the basis of the Party. The German Central Committee has not carried out this Open Letter on the lines laid down by the C. I.: thas carried it out as an instrument, or semi-instrument, of the Right in the Party, who seized upon the Open Letter immediately. I am quite calm in this question. The future will show who is a faithful soldier of the C. I. and who is not.

Comrade Remmele (Germany):

Comrades, Although comrade Ruth Fischer has already developed her so-called programme by means of three lengthy written declarations, I did not think that it would be necessary for me again to touch upon the matter with which the German Commission has already busied itself for days. Comrade Ruth Fischer asserts that the Central Committee has "no ground under its feet", and is neither able nor willing to fight against the Right dangers.

When all the faults and deficiencies of the new Central Committee are pointed out to us as they are by comrade Ruth Fischer in all her speeches and writings, it becomes a matter of astonishment that this C. C. has none the less shown itself capable of warding off Right dangers. If we were concerned with a Party with less revolutionary experiences, it might come within the danger zone of the Right peril. But the rich store of experience gathered by the communists of Germany has done much to protect them from such Right dangers. Comrade Ruth Fischer sings her own praises again and again, and is convinced that as soon as she is away from Germany, and as soon as she does not lead the German C. C., then all these dangers will arise.

We do not want to gloss over matters, but to discuss them openly as they are. Comrade Ruth Fischer had the opportunity of working in the German Party, even after the publication of the Open Letter. But it has been established beyond contention, both in the Commission and in the Plenum, that comrade Ruth Fischer, after having signed the Open Letter, did her utmost in Germany to organise a rebellion against the C. C. and against

the C. I.

Comrade Ruth Fischer had further the opportunity of continuing to cooperate in the C. C. She abstained from all practical work, and when practical proposals were brought forward in the C. C., either she did not vote at all or voted against them, solely with the idea of securing for herself a platform without a political basis.

Comrade Ruth Fischer has here stated that the policy pursued at the present time by the C.C. and the Party is correct. She has no objection to raise against it. And yet she complains about the impossible state in which this policy is bound to land the Party. The Enlarged Executive is not a forum before which such contradictory statements should be brought.

It was not however comrade Ruth Fischer's speech which induced me to speak here, but the speech of another comrade,

who, in my opinion, indicates a danger for the whole C. I., a danger closely connected with the German question and with the problem of the Ruth Fischer group. Comrade Hansen feels himself called upon, precisely like comrade Ruth Fischer, to utter a warning in order to save the C. I. from the Right bog into which it is sinking.

I am of the opinion that in the Ruth Fischer group we are not dealing with a matter pertaining to Germany only, but that distinct indications of an international character are observable. I have therefore thought it necessary to add these few words, although the German question has already been discussed for

days in the Commission.

That the Right and ultra-Left deviations from the line of Bolshevism are of an international character, and make their appearance in every Party, is shown in every Session of the Enlarged Executive, and in all the proceedings of the Presidium of the C.I. This is not the danger. The danger lies in the attempt to connect all these groups together in a common effort to oppose in all countries a definitely different line to the Bolshevist line.

Comrade Hansen has attempted to combine the question agitating the German Party with those of the Norwegian Party. I must ask however: What right has comrade Hansen to take up

arms against the Right danger?

I should like to mention one fact. Comrade Hansen addressed an Open Letter to the Norwegian labour party, Transmael's party, offering to withdraw the communist candidates to the town council, provided a certain number of conditions named by comrade Hansen were granted. I ask the conference if comrade Hansen is the proper man to conduct the struggle against the Right danger.

I repeat that the Communist International is here faced by a problem which it will have to take very seriously. I should like to make it quite clear to contrade Hansen where this road leads, for we have had experience enough of it in Germany. The comrades are aware that the Open Letter refers to the attempt made by the Ruth Fischer-Maslov group in Germany to oppose Communism with a "West European" communism, the commercial traveller for the article being Katz, who went from one country to another endeavouring to push West European Bolshevism. The whole International knows where Katz ended.

I should like to mention once more what occurred before the Commission. Katz, with his West European Bolshevism, had played traitor to the Party in the Fischer-Maslov group long before he was excluded from the Party. In Germany we have an anti-Bolshevist organ, "Die Aktion", published by Pfempfert, and in this Katz published the vilest slanders against the Communist Party and against the International.

This is the path at which those arrive who dream of opposing a "West European" line of Bolshevism to the Bolshevist line

of the Comintern.

Comrade Ferguson (Great Britain):

Comrades, I listened to the speech of Comrade Fischer and Comrade Urbahns, and frankly, to me it is not a question any longer of double book-keeping, or any other term; it is a question that here you have the proper germ of a new factional struggle in Germany which is going to disrupt and sabotage mass work, a germ which is setting out deliberately to disrupt the German Party and the success it has achieved.

Comrade Fischer gets up here and states that the Central Committee is politically bankrupt; then she goes on to say that this resolution which is being placed before the Plenum is in contradiction to the Open Letter and that it won't settle the problems that exist in Germany. I think we are entitled to ask Comrade Fischer if she means that she is going to interpret this resolution as a Right Wing resolution, and on the strength of that interpretation, either herself, or by the agency of her group, go back to Germany and commence a new factional fight to break the unity of the German Party.

Just as the speeches of Comrades Fischer and Urbahns have been totally devoid of any question of political analysis and political wisdom in the past, so her present speech is of the same kind. Not a solitary word about the problems, the line, or the political tasks that confront the Central Committee of the German Party. I think we are getting sick and tired of dragging out that old skeleton in the cupboard — what Brandler did in 1923. It is like King Charles' head, dragged out on every occasion, in order to cover up what Ruth Fischer didn't do in

1924 and 1925. And I simply want to put it to this Plenum that this harping on 1923 is merely a bogey man. We have got to discuss politics, and judging by results, as all Communists do, we find that Comrade Ruth Fischer and Comrade Urbahns and the ultra-Left comrades in Germany, are the most politically backward infants that the mind of anyone can conceive.

They have done nothing for international trade union unity. We had the right to expect the support of the German comrades. If we had had the German Party solidly behind us in fighting along with the Russian Trade Unions and the British, we should have managed to drive such a wedge into the Amsterdam leading caucus that we could have split the reactio-

nary bureaucracy from top to bottom.

I think the Plenum has got to take into consideration the statements that have been made, not only in the open question to these comrades, as to whether or not, if this resolution were

carried, they were prepared to work for it and loyally support the Central Committee. Comrade Scholem gets up and repeats a series of evasive sentences which mean nothing — Comrade Ruth Fischer says nothing — and Comrade Urbahns, who usually blurts out what the other people are thinking — gets up and says "I am going back to get the whole question raised once more". I think it is, high time that we stop this kid glove policy of dealing with these people.

submit that the resolution which is being placed before the Plenum is of a character that we ought to suport wholeheartedly, and that we ought to take definite drastic steps with those comrades who are not prepared to line themselves up behind the resolution and loyally work and carry it out to

the full.

Comrade Langseth (Norway):

I should like to say a few words on behalf of the Norwegian delegation with reference to the declaration made here by comrade Hansen. The attitude taken by comrade Hansen here somewhat resembles that of a naughty boy who comes forward with a kind of bravado and says: I am one of the same company too, and want to be punished along with the rest. Which punishment has now been administered by comrade Remmele.

Comrade Hansen asserts that the Norwegian Central is

equally incapable of meeting the Right danger. The latest protocols and reports will, however, suffice to demonstrate to the Scandinavian Commission that our Central will be capable of

warding off both the Right and the Left dangers.

The value to be laid upon comrade Hansen's words may be better judged by the comrades when they hear that our Central too has had its putsch affair, somewhat similar to the Katz affair, and that the Scandinavian Commission has considered comrade Hansen to have been responsible. I scarcely think that comrade Hansen has the right to play the part of judge in this matter.

On behalf of the Norwegian delegation I make the following

declaration:

Declaration:

I am commissoned to declare on behalf of the Norwegian delegation that the delegation is unanimously in favour of the resolution moved in the German question, and that comrade Hansen's declarations are only to be booked to his private account.

Haavard Langseth.

Comrade Doriot (France):

This evening we have witnessed a manoeuvre of the international ultra-Left. Comrade Scholem, in his first utterances, made a sharp attack on comrade Ruth Fischer, and here the majority of the comrades were in agreement with him. But today he has directed his fire in another direction; today we find him lining up in one front with comrades Ruth Fischer and Maslov, reinforced by comrades Hansen and Bordiga, and only Comrade Domski is missing. Today the ultra-Left agreed very well among themselves, much better than hitherto.

There is absolutely no necessity to resort to diplomacy: there exists here a distinct attempt to build up an international ultra-Left. And it is not the first time. Comrade Ruth Fischer sent a delegate once before, to comrade Susanne Girault in France, for the purpose of organising an ultra-Left. These attempts were frustrated. And when comrade Ruth Fischer today denies having made such attempts, we have no reason to attach

any importance to her denial.

The attempt at forming an ultra-Left international is not accompanied by the presentation of any definite political standpoint. The sole political standpoint represented is the fight against the "Right danger", and against the alleged Right course in the Comintern.

There is a great distance between the Right as we have them in France and the Comintern. A wide chasm separates Loriot, Souvarine, etc. from the Executive of the Comintern. And the Comintern is helping us, as this Conference has shown, to defeat the Right in France, and has greatly extended our possibilities of struggle against the Right. We are determined to defeat the Right, but the basis upon which we do this is that of Leninism, of the V. World Congress. It is impossible to contend against the Right on the basis of Maslov's teachings, on the basis of a "West European Leninism.

Comrade Ruth Fischer complains that she has been out off from all connection with the German masses. But the connection which she had in Germany was never with the masses, it was merely a fractional connection. Comrade Ruth Fischer has cut herself off from the masses by her sectarian policy. She does not possess the confidence of the German Working masses.

The errors of Ruth Fischer's policy are having results beyond the boundaries of Germany. For instance, the last municipal elections in France took place at the same time as the Presidential Elections in Germany. And the policy pursued by the then German Committee, the rejection of the United Front, was disastrous in its effect on the policy of the French Party in these elections. Mistakes have been committed by the French Party as well, but the essential error was the action of the German Party at the Presidential Election.

We declare that all attempts made by comrade Ruth Fischer to regain a leading position must be decidely repelled by us. It would be a crime against the proletariat to permit comrade Ruth Fischer to take a leading position again. When she comes forward here as the saviour of the International, we tell her plainly: We do not want such saviours. She is not a saviour of the International, but a worker of the International.

The ultra-Left must be as completely destroyed and exterminated as the Right must be in France. To achieve this demands a Leninist inner core in the International, contending with equal energy against the deviations of the ultra-Left and of the Right.

Declaration by Comrade Hansen (Norway):

With reference to comrade Remmele's speech I may point out that this does not contain one single world against the liquidators and their Right helpers in the Norwegian Party, although these have openly and directly proposed nothing less than the dissolution of the Party. I must further point out that the decisions referring to the tactics employed at the municipal elections in Oslo were accepted against four votes by a members' meeting in the capital city, and were unanimously confirmed by the Political Bureau.

I protest energetically against the unheard of comparison

with Katz.

In reply to Comrade Langseth' statement I only wish to sav that his assertion, that the Scandinavian Commission holds me responsible for a putsch attempt à la Katz, does not correspond with the truth.

Declaration by Comrade Remmele (Germany):

Comrade Hansen does not seem to know where he is. This is not the place to discuss Norwegian problems at this moment, in connection with the German question. Comrade Hansen knows perfectly well that the Right deviations and liquidatory attempts in the Norwegian Party were energetically condemned both by me and by every other member of the Commission, and if he nevertheless, has the face to declare here that I do not fight against these dangers, then he is doing so against his better knowledge.

Comrade Hansen further complains that I have compared him with Katz. But the fact, is, anyone treading this path runs the objective danger of landing where ex-comrade Katz has landed.

Close of the 19th Session.

Twentieth Session, 15th March 1926.

Continuation of the Discussion on the German Question

Chairman: Comrade Geschke.

Comrade Ercoli (Italy):

The resolution on the German question has here been utilised in order to take up a position of fundamental opposition to the line of the Enlarged Executive. It is therefore necessary to reply with the utmost clearness to those comrades who have taken part in the discussion on the resolution on the German question.

There exists absolutely no contradiction between comrade Zinoviev's theses and the resolution submitted by the German commission. We have therefore observed with the greatest surprise that whilst no opposition has been shown to the estimation of the Right and Left dangers as stated in comrade Zinoviev's theses, an opposition is now being raised at the moment when these theses are to be practically applied. It is absurd to accord approval to comrade Zinoviev's theses in general, and then to adopt another political standpoint as soon as the practical application comes in question.

Comrade Hansen has pointed out that it is precisely in Norway that the Right danger is great, and he represents the Right danger to us as an ever present spectre. But he forgets that we cannot simply fight against an abstract Right danger, and that it is our task, as already stated in the theses and laid down in the resolutions passed by all the Congresses of the Comintern, to understand and analyse every deviation from the line of the C. I., in accordance with the objective situation in the country itself and the conditions obtaining in the Party, and then to choose the most suitable means for combatting the deviation. We must not lay down a fixed rule that we are to combat the Right danger only, but must rather fight against every danger threatening the Parties. The Enlarged Executive pronounced a severe enough judment on the Right in the resolution on the French question, and made correct analysis of the character of the Right which exists in France.

Much has been spoken on the formation of an ultra-Left fraction, but this should not be taken so tragically. We must try to analyse the actual facts. A single ultra-Left comrade, comrade Bordiga has developed here a standpoint. The discussion has shown that he remains isolated. If we follow the declarations which he has made here in the course of the deliberations, we may observe that the tone of his declarations has gradually become milder. We must therefore conclude that an international Left standpoint does not exist, it is merely a question of individual opinion, of personal questions, of questions concerned with the composition of the C. C. etc., and not of actual political questions. The ultra-Left bloc does not represent any great danger from the point of view that it can be politically dangerous to the C. I., but because it sows doubt in the Parties as to the fundamentals of Bolshevism.

In the course of the political discussion we have analysed the present situation and set the tasks for the immediate future. We cannot permit the work now lying before us to be hampered in any way. We must develop into mass Parties, extend our influence over the masses, consolidate this influence by organisatory methods, and apply the tactics of the United Front more systematically than hitherto, so that we are able at any moment to exploit any objective situation for the successful development of the Parties. We must thus demand that, in the future as in the past, every deviation from the line of the C. I. is to be combatted with an energy adapted to its importance and impetus, to the end that the line laid down by the C. I. may be strictly followed.

3. P

Comrade Dorsy (United States):

I want to express my agreement with the Resolution prepared on the German question and particularly my support of the new leadership of the German Party.

Comrade Fischer complains of the bitterness of the opposition which has been directed against her, but in my opinion this opposition is thoroughly justified. Comrade Fischer has made a number of most serious mistakes and these she refuses to correct. She has participated in a definite attempt to revise the main lines of Leninism and has not corrected this mistake. That not even admitted it. The attitude of the Fischer-Maslow Group, particularly regarding the Russian Revolution, must be categorically condemned.

Comrade Fischer has also followed systematically the wrong policy of failing to speak openly both with the German Party and with the Comintern. Take her position with regard to the Open Letter. Comrade Fischer in Moscow signs the Open Letter; she then carries on her propaganda in Germany.

Now we see in her attitude with regard to the present Resolution on the German situation, a similar attitude of open opposition. Ruth Fischer says that the Resolution is wrong, that it contains a false analysis and that the tasks oulined do not fit the German situation. What is the basis of this? The basis of this is that Ruth Fischer, in my judgement; is seeking the development of an International opposition to the Comintern. But there is one good feature about this situation, and that is that Comrade Fischer will at last vote against this Resolution. The German Central Committee will finally have Comrade Fischer in the position where she has to make a clear-ideological defence of her position, and this I am sure she will not be able to do before the German Party. One other failure that she has made and which in my judgement is very important, is the complete failure to recognise the greatest problem confronting the German Party. What was the problem? It was to organise a fight against the ultra-Lettists. Comrade Fischer did not say this, does not say it to-day, and anyone presuming to be a leader of the German Party who its not able to see that greater danger - is in my judgement, not qualified to lead the German Party, and she must take such criticism as has been directed against her.

At Frankfurt she refused to follow the lead of the Comintern in fighting the ultra-Left, especially on the trade union question. She refused to accept the line of the Comintern in the Open Letter to fight the ultra-Leftists. Her attitude now is still a failure to recognise this danger as being the necessary one to combat at this particular time in the German Party. Comrade Fischer stood on this platform and admitted a number of minor mistakes, but this means absolutely nothing in the practice she has followed to correct these mistakes. She says the ultra-Lefts must be combatted, but her attitude will be to organise and strengthen the ultra-Leftists in Germany as against the line of the Comintern. In my judgement, the situation in Germany is such that Comrade Fischer must stand aside and let the comrades lead the German Party, who are really capable of understanding the problems of the German Party and leading it in the struggles that confront it.

We see this in connection with the present leadership of the German Party. Not only has the present Gentral Committee of the German Party got the support of the official machinery of the Comintern in Moscow, but it has got the support of every Section of the Comintern as well, and I am sure it is the widespread opinion in the Comintern that the Open Letter in Germany was a masterful move in the direction of strengthening the leadership in the German Party. I would say this about the German situation, it would be a mistake for the Central Committee to devote their attention too much to the ultra-

Left, comrades Scholem, Fischer and others. The chief attention of the Central Committee must be directed to gain those who are still standing behind them.

In the debate every effort has been made to bring these comrades to the line of the Central Committee; that has failed, and the Central Committee must go without them.

Comrade Bordiga (Italy):

The discussion on the report of the German commission has become so exceedingly prolonged, that I find myself obliged to make a second very definite declaration, the more so as Ercoli asserts that the tone taken by Bordiga has become milder and milder in his successive declarations.

I declare myself of the opinion that a Right danger actually exists.

Comrade Ercoli maintains that this Right danger was ade quately stignatised during the political discussion in the judgment pronounced on the French Right, and that Hansen is wrong in representing the Right as a phantom threatening the whole International. I must really ask whether this analysis, which even gives us the exact address of the international world danger, which appears to have taken up residence in one definite locality: Quai de Jemmapes 26, or Rue Montmartre 123, with the "Revolution Proletarienne" or the "Bulletin Communiste", is to be taken as a serious application of Marxist methods. Perhaps we shall hear next that the Right danger is at home daily from 6 to 8 in the evening. This analysis must be carried out in a very different manner. The Right danger requires the adoption of a suitable policy, not only in resolutions brought to paper, but above all in actual facts, and in the political attitude of the C. I. This I already laid down in my speech in the political discussion.

The danger has been revealed in the resolution here passed, both with regard to the general political line and to the questions here discussed with respect to various Parties, for

instance the German and French questions.

It is highly desirable that a certain opposition on the part of the Left — I do not say of a fraction, but of the Left should be developed on an international scale against similar Right dangers. But I must state openly that this reaction, in itself sound, useful, and necessary, should not be permitted to take the form of manoeuvres and intrigues, of rumours spread behind the scenes and in the lobbies. I am fully in agreement with Ercoli when he finds it absurd when comrades who were entirely in favour of the report and the theses during the political discussion, now make an attempt at the last moment to adopt an oppositional attitude in connection with the German question. These comrades, who have no desire to raise any objection against the general political line, take up this oppositional attitude because they are not satisfied, in their capacity as group, leaders, or former leaders, with the resolutions regarding their Party or their country. For this reason I cannot declare myself in agreement with this so-called extreme Left opposition. I am not saying this for the purpose of winning the sympathies of the majority, for I lay the responsibility for this system precisely at the door of this majority, which at one time supported as the best of leaders the opponents of today, and which continues to work on the same methods of a double attitude, one for the official declarations and another for the reports spread behind the scenes and in the lobbies.

With reference to the German question, I consider it extremely necessary to warn the revolutionary German workers of the Left of two dangers: both of the danger of defeatism, of mistrust in the International and in the Russian revolution, however well concealed behind declarations of complete agreement, and of the danger of that blind optimism which rejects any discussion whatever. I have already shown that this second attitude is no less dangerous than the first for the security of the ties binding the world proletariat with the Russian revolution. The Russian Party and Soviet Russia alone are enriched by the actual experience of the greatest and uniquely successful revolution, but the German revolutionary, workers have mone the less had experiences of their own, and they must learn the lessons of their own struggles and even of their own defeats. Their traditions and class feeling must be brought to bear on the Right dangers by which they were overtaken and injured in their last struggles. This vanguard of the German working class must adopt a definite standpoint with

regard to the tactical line of the Party as revealed today in somewhat doubtful manoeuvres in its relations to social democracy, in the notorious referendum campaign, and in the general line laid down by the C. I.

Comrade Pepper (On behalf of the American delegation):

The American delegation is in perfect agreement with that which comrade Dorsy has brought forward here on the ultra Left. Truly the ultra-Left danger is great. And the arguments given by comrade Dorsy are excellent, and have been submitted several times during the discussion here. We greet them with much pleasure and full unanimity as old acquaintances, but should like to carry the discussion a little further.

Comrade Dorsy has attempted to throw light, from the American point of view, upon the policy of the Communist International, and especially upon the situation in its German Section. The American delegation is of the opinion that when the Left danger is combatted from the American viewpoint, the Right danger should not be forgotten. Comrade Dorsy has not mentioned the Right danger by so much as a single word.

Is it possible to forget that at the present time the whole labour movement in America is making a great swing to the Right? Today this is the fundamental factor in the American labour movement. What is the situation obtaining for the Communist Party of America?

In the first place an exceedingly intense ultra-Left danger. Why? The danger arises that, when the whole labour movement marches to the Right, the communists stand still in desperation and hopelessness, or they run away from the labour movement, and to the Left. This danger is certainly most imminent for the communist movement of America. But are we therefore to forget the other danger? Is there not a danger that the communists simply join the general turn to the Right in the labour movement of America, that they succumb to the influence of the workers' aristocracy, and simply form the rearguard of a labour movement marching to the Right? If we analyse the policy of the Sections of the Comintern from the American standpoint, we must not forget that not long ago we had a struggle in our American Party against influential social democratic leaders, and that we were obliged to exclude Lore and his adherents from the Party. America has had its

And now to the main problem which occupies us here. There is no doubt whatever that the ultra-Left danger is the chief danger in Germany. And I believe it to be an important sign of the process of clarification going on in the Communist International that the discussion on the German question has become a broad and really political discussion. It must be especially emphasised that the International is perfectly conscious of the extent of the ultra-Left danger, and that the International is fully prepared not only to take up the struggle against this ultra-Left danger, but to carry it through with the utmost determination. This if the whole meaning of the discussion here. The International now expresses its readiness to liquidate

Lore, just as Czechoslovakia its Hula, Norway its Sundby, and

France its Souvarine. I should like to make these supplementary

the ultra-Left danger completely, ideologically.

remarks to Comrade Dorsy's declaration.

I should like to touch upon one point in the discussion. Comrade Scholem stated that the International is of the opinion that the ultra-Left now form a disturbing element, for the reason that at the present time we are passing through a period of relative stability. Is this assertion correct? It is somewhat remarkable that comrade Scholem, as a German comrade, simply fails to see the starting point of the German theses. The starting point of the theses is the statement of the fact that in Germany today and tomorrow it is not the relative stabilisation which forms the main factor, but the acute and profound economic and political crisis.

Scholem says that the International regards the ultra-Left as a disturbing element. But the International says precisely the contrary. The theses state that the ultra Left is a disturbing element, for the very reason that we are passing through a political and economic crisis in Germany, and for the reason that the ranks of the social democratic workers are, too, being shaken by a prolound crisis. And truly, the ultra-Left is a disturbing element at the present time, since there is a crisis in the

social democratic party, and since opportunity now offers to break down the Chinese wall separating the social democratic from the communist workers. The International does not say that the ultra-Left is a disturbing element because we must pursue a "sensible" or "moderate" policy during the period of relative stability. But it says that the ultra-Left forms a disturbing element because it prevents us from making full use of the economic and political crisis, and of the crisis

among the social democrats.

How are we to interpret the arguments of comrade Scholem? Either as a vulgar speculation on the feelings of the workers in the German Party who favour the Left. Or as a proof that comrade Scholem has grasped neither the purport of the German theses nor the actual situation in Germany. Scholem speaks here of a relative stabilisation, whilst in reality the actuality is the crisis. Despairing and hopeless he sighs pessimistically, with old Master Anton in Hebbel's drama: "I understand the world no longer". It need not be said that we are all aware that a relative stabilisation obtains at the moment all the world over. The recognition of this fact forms indeed the basis of our political theses. But in Germany we have perhaps the weakest point in this relative stabilisation.

Comrade Scholem does not comprehend this, he no longer understands things as they are in Germany. He does not understand the latest important processes going on among the social democratic workers. We may even say that he does not understand the latest processes going on among those communist workers who are really anxious to win over the masses of the social democratic workers for the revolution, for the class struggle. Yes, comrade Scholem, this is the process for winning over the social democratic workers for the revolution. And here we find the ultra-Left a disturbing element. We do not maintain that the ultra-Left are good for a revolutionary period of relative stabilisation.

Comrade Zinoviev characterised these new ultra-Left currents in the International correctly when he stated that at the III. World Congress we had a Left group actuated by revolutionary impatience causing it to commit errors; but the present ultra-Left group has nothing more to do with revolutionary impatience. It has something rotten about it. The new ultra-Left is not a child of revolutionary impatience. On the contrary, it is a product of non-revolutionary impatience. On the contrary, it is a product of non-revolutionary hepelessness. If anyone can fail to observe the crisis through which Germany is going and if anyone overlooks the profound crisis among the social democratic workers, this can be attributed to one of two causes only: either to physical blindness or — and here we must speak politically — to a non-revolutionary hopelessness. In pointing out this fact I hope to show the capital sin of the ultra-Left group.

It is this non-revolutionary hopelessnes, and not lack of character, which is the cause of the remarkable spectacle here offered us, of ultra-Left comrades changing their opinions several times before our eyes. First came comrade Ruth Fischer and said: Mea culpa, forgive me, I am a great sinner. This was most effective, comrades. It was almost staggering. Then came comrade Scholem and said: Mea culpa, ten times mea culpa, I am an even greater sinner. This was equally effective. We had the feeling that here errors were being sincerely and earnestly recognised. But note the sudden change. The penitent sinners of two days ago have become abruptly converted, before our very eyes, into public accusers. Only the day before yesterday they did penance, but today we find them claiming to be the best revolutionaries in the International, and entrusted with the mission of saving the Communist International from the perils of the opportunist Right.

If the latest speeches and declarations made by comrades Ruth Fischer, Scholem, and Urbahns, contain any import whatever, then this is their import.

These chameleons have changed their colour here, quite publicly, before our eyes, before the whole Communist International, and not only once, but several times. The change has been effected rapidly and skilfully, but still it has been possible to ascertain the ground colour: the colour of non-revolutionary hopelessness.

A great danger lies in ambush behind the arguments of these contrades.

What is the actual thought concealed beneath their viewpoint? Comrade Scholem has admitted quite openly that the thought

behind it all is that one should never acknowledge past errors. In other words: The making of errors is converted into a revolutionary virtue, into a heroism of obstinacy.

Scholem declared: How can I repudiate my past now, how can I deny my old contentions? I should be declaring myself to be a renegade! This is an idea entertained by the ultra Left comrades, and even by many of the Right—that it is possible to become a renegade within the International.

What does this mean? Is it really possible that a comrade within and on the basis of the Communist International can become a renegade? I believe this assertion to be the greatest possible slander against the International, and a complete demial of the revolutionary role played by the Communist International. The International must tell these comrades that precisely the contrary is the truth, that the Right and ultra-Left comrades, having had their errors corrected by the Communist, and having acknowledged these errors, are not thereby made into renegades, but on the contrary to real Leninists, to citizens with full rights in the Communist International.

Comrade Semard (France):

After the speeches made by various of the ultra-Left who insist upon maintaining their standpoint, the French Party is compelled of definitely expressing its standpoint with regard to the German question, and with regard to those ultra-Left elements in the various Parties who are attempting to carry on their false policy and their fractional struggle within the ranks of the International.

Last night our comrade Doriot stated the point of view held by our Party with respect to the German crisis. I must emphasise that our C. C. condemned the double book-keeping carried on by the Fisher-Maslov group at once, on the day following the X. Congress of the German C. P., that further this condemnation was extended to all ultra-Left elements in the C. P. by our General Secretary who was delegated as representative of the C. C. to two session of the German National Council and to the X. Congress; and that finally by voting for the resolution of the German commission our Party expressed its confidence in the C. C. of the German C. P. that it will conduct a correct policy in the spirit of this resolution and of the Open Letter of the E. C. C. I.

The C. P. of France has energetically condemned every ultra-Left attempt to constitute a fraction, and to carry on a fractional struggle within the International.

Let us now consider the character of the Left danger within the C. P. of Germany. It is true, that a certain Left tendency exists among the communist masses which were trained in this spirit for a year by the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group, and among which the remembrance of the events of 1923 has not yet died out. It is thus incumbent on the C. C. not only to defeat the Left deviations of certain leaders from the political standpoint, but to eradicate these errors from among the members as well. The political defeat of the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group is the imperative premise providing for the present central body the possibility of carrying on their work well, and securing a successful development for the German C. P. For the tendency permeating this group is the same as that of Souvarine - it is the same defeatist spirit, the same under-estimation of the importance and the power of action in the working masses. In view of the present position of the German Party, and of the political and economic crisis in Germany, this defeatest tendency must be combatted with the utmost energy.

Does a Right danger exist in Germany? Yes, it exists among some few non-assimilated elements, who withdrew after the defeat of Brandlerism, and enwrapped themselves in silence. But without doubt the greatest danger is the ultra-Left.

The manoeuvres aiming at distracting us from the actual question, made here by various obstinate ultra-Lefts, must not be permitted to influence the decisions arrived at by this Executive Session with respect to the combatting of the Left danger in Germany and the Right danger in France.

Does a Left danger exist in France? Yes, it exists in the ranks of the communist masses themselves. Here the anarchist tendency has not vet completely disappeared, and may be enhanced by events. Some of our active members have such a tendency to commit such errors.

We shall combat this Left error as energetically at home as we do this on an international scale. But there is no doubt, whatever, that in France it is the Right danger which is the greater, and we here lay special emphasis upon this fact. I must seriously object to Bordiga's tendency to irony, and to his manner of criticising the International and our Party in its fighting methods against the Right. For the International and for our Party it is not a question of designating the houses No 96, Quai Jemmapes and 123 Rue Montmartre, and of saying: Here we have the Right, break down their doors! For us it is a question of the necessity of carrying on an ideological struggle against the Right danger in the International and in the whole Party, from the top to the bottom, to the end that the opportunist peril may be clearly recognised. Bordiga has not helped us in any way towards the attainment of this object by his speeches. It is plain that he under-estimates the power of that Right opposition which stands outside of the Party in every country, and which finds support in many directions, nationally and internationally. The International must not content itself with pointing out the danger, it must cauterise the wounds with a burning iron.

It would, for instance, be highly interesting to learn who advised our comrade Engler during his stay in Moscow.

I repeat that we shall combat every ultra-Left tendency, every attempt at the constitution of an ultra-Left fraction, but that none the less an international Right fraction exists, and we must not permit this fact to be pushed into the background by the manoeuvres of some few obstinate ultra-Lefts.

Comrade Bordiga has discovered a certain uneasy feeling in this Executive. To a certain extent I agree with him. Our International must accustom itself to an "open game". Some ultra Left elements are chattering about that Radek, Thalheimer, and Brandler are to be given responsible positions again, and these ultra-Lefts see in this a Right deviation for which they blame the responsible leaders of the International. We declare ourselves in favour of cooperation, and for the employment of comrades of all trends of opinion, so long as these declare themselves sincerely desirous of working on the basis of the decisions of the C. I. We are of the opinion that if the German C. P. wants to prove to us that its leadership is a united and firmy welded one, then these comrades must really be placed in the service of the Party, for the International has no superfluity of competent and active members.

We have full confidence in the present leaders of the German Party, and are assured that these will prove capable of deciding, conjointly with the C. I., whether the sincere cooperation of these contrades for the promotion of the successful development of our brother Party really comes in question here.

We are in favour of the employment in the International of all those forces, who are honestly and loyally ready to cooperate on the basis of the decisions and resolutions of the Congresses already held. We distrust only those who proclaim the victory of their former opportunist politics, and try to lay the blame for all the present errors to the Left tendency of the Parties and of the International.

It cannot be denied that in all Parties the Left has had a history, and that it has played the leading role in the formation of the greatest parties. Neither can it be denied that the separate tendencies within the Parties are still noticeable, and that differing currents exist even among those who declare themselves in agreement with the decisions of the C. I., but interpret these decisions in various ways.

In France we have for instance a Right, a Centre which has just been formed, and Left elements. The active members, those pursuing the line laid down by the International and determined to work on the basis of the decisions arrived at at our December conference, are thus pressed automatically into the Left wing. There is no doubt that the centrist elements will interpret the decisions of this Executive in their own way, especially those regarding the application of democratic centralism. It must be emphasised that comrade Engler, who voted for the resolution submitted to the French commission — with the exception of those sentences condemning the policy and methods of the Right—will proclaim tomorrow his agreement with the International, but will fight against the Party leaders in co-operation with those sharing his opinions.

The assimilation of the various elements, and the striving towards unity within every leading body in the Parties, cannot exterminate the various currents which declare themselves in full agreement with the decisions of the International, but at the same time interpret these decisions in their manner. The fight against the ultra-Left currents and against the errors committed by the ultra-Left comrades does not lessen the importance of the role already played in the International, and to be played in the future, by the Left.

We must raise a most decided protest against those who represent Comrade Zinoviev, for instance, as an adherent of the ultra-Left tendency, and attribute a preference for the Right to others, for instance comrades Stalin and Bucharin. It appears to us that assumptions of this nature are extremely dangerous at the present juncture, for they tend to create a poisoned atmosphere around the active Bolsheviki of the Old Guard, who play the leading rôle in the U.S.S.R and in the International. We shall do our utmost to prevent the spread of ideas so prejudicial to the Old Guard, and we are confident that the members of the C.C. of the C.P. of the Soviet Union will be able to maintain discipline within the Party.

We are fully convinced that the fight against the Right is being carried on by the whole of the International, and that the decisions here resolved upon correspond to the spirit of the Congress resolutions hitherto passed, and pursue the line of genuine Leninism and Marxism. We shall carry out the decisions in this sense, we shall work for the establishment of closer relations with the broad masses of workers and peasants, and for the building up of strong mass Parties for the last decisive battle against capitalism.

With this aim in face of us, we shall combat both nationally and internationally not only the Right danger, but the Left dangers which have shown themselves here in this Session of the Executive, and have attempted to take a definite form. The International and its Sections will fight against both of these dangers, will conquer them, and at the same time enhance the power and influence of communism all over the world. (Applause.)

Comrade Kilboom (Sweden):

Comrades, I believe that our Swedish Party has a certain right to protest against the ultra-Left assertions that the Right danger is not fought with sufficient energy. For 3 years we have been fighting against the Right danger, and under the most unfavourable conditions. We have split the Party and sent the Right leaders to the devil. I believe, that this is a sufficient proof against the assertion that the E. C. C. I., which has supported us energetically in the struggle, does not fight against the Right perils.

The ultra-Left are continuing the factics which they have hitherto pursed. When the Open Letter was published in Germany, it was said that the Party was delivered over into the hands of the Right in Germany. Now comrade Hansen says that the decision arrived at in the German question, will strengthen the Right currents in all the Sections. Thus first the German Party was delivered into the hands of the Right, and now the whole International. But may I ask, delivered over to whom? In what questions does the Right peril exist? Not a single question has been pointed out from the side of the ultra-Left. In the United Front tactics, in the trade union question, in the work in the municipalities where are the Right perils?

The ultra-Left comrades are merely showing that they are in reality against the United Front tactics.

Comrade Hansen expresses himself against the resolution because it contains nothing against the Right danger in Germany. This is a new method. A resolution is rejected because a certain point is not touched upon in this resolution. Would it not be more correct for a communist to say: This resolution is deficient, but still I will vote for it?

I can only find here an additional proof of the poverty of real arguments among the ultra-Left comrades.

The ultra-Left have shown, as comrade Pepper rightly remarks, that they have no faith in the revolution, nor in the working masses.

Comrade Scholem, I must tell you that you embody a certain type in our labour movement, one which has nothing to do with the labour movement and has never been rooted in it. This is the truth. We see this type in every Party, but especially in Germany.

The ultra-Left are entirely similar to the Right in this lack of faith in the workers and in the revolution. Why is Höglund a social democrat, why Frossard and Levi? Because they do not believe in the revolution nor in the working class, just as the ultra-Left do not believe in them.

Comrade Bordiga has stated here that it is necessary, to fight against the Right on an international basis. This means nothing more nor less than suggesting the formation of an ultra-Left fraction on an international scale. I should like to ask comrade Hansen whether he is in agreement with this, and if he would work in this fraction. I shall not ask comrade Scholem, for I believe that he has already got a certain amount of experiences in this work. He has learnt something from Ruth Fischer.

Comrades, I believe that we here place the utmost emphasis on the necessity of annihilating the very last traces of ultra-Left ideology. I believe it to be possible that this fight cannot be carried to a successful finish until Scholem has left the movement. It is possible. We shall see how events will proceed in the immediate future.

I believe the sole correct tactics to consist of a determined fight against the ultra-Left danger, whilst at the same time not overlooking the perils threatening from the Right.

What have we seen in Norway? Comrade Hansen was a member of the Party Central for a long time. Was any brilliant success achieved? The masses gradually left us. The same was the case in Germany. Comrades Ruth Fischer and Scholem were the leaders of the German Party. What victories can they record, where are masses whom they led to join the Party? Here, too, the ultra-Left have been the organisers of decay, and this they are everywhere. Therefore we must put an end to this evil.

Comrade Lominadse:

Comrades! I should like to say a few words about comrade Bordiga. Comparisons have here been drawn between him and the other ultra-Lefts, and he is represented as a straightforward, sincerely convinced and honest Left oppositional. These are all extremely agreeable and praiseworthy characteristics, and it seems to me as if comrade Bordiga has himself become hypnotised by all these compliments. However this may be, it is obviously his endeavour to play the rôle of lovely "enfant terrible", whose faults are all to be condoned because he always tells the truth openly. But everything has its limits. Lenin once said that: "A virtue can become a serious fault before our own eyes, here during this session. Bordiga's first speeches were merely comical in character. Bordiga spoke for 4 hours on Zinoviev's theses, and criticised the policy of the Comintern with severity, but he made no definite suggestions, he brought forward no line of his own, no original thesis, no resolution.

Various ultra-Left comrades have attempted, more or less openly, to oppose the resolution on the German question to the theses and report of comrade Zinoviev. What do the attacks on Stalin and Bucharin mean when accompanied by the simultaneous declaration of agreement with the political theses? They are a trivial and petty attempt to exploit the Russian Party discussion for fractional purposes. Both the resolution on the German question and Zinoviev's theses were approved by the Russian delegation. Do you suppose that the Russian delegation resembles Ruth Fischer in thinking one thing and saying another, or that the Russian delegation and our Party change their opinions and their line every other day?

What has comrade Bordiga to oppose to Leninism? I have been so fortunate, or so unfortunate, during the Italian Party Congress as to have the opportunity of reading comrade Bordiga's theses. A piece of utterly confused philosophy, with a few quotations taken at random from Marx and Bergson, in which there is neither materialism nor dialectics.

What is the objective rôle played by Bordiga at this Plenary Session? What do we see here? First the whole of the ultra left have come forward, and have all, Ruth Fischer,

Domski, Scholem (with the exception of Engel, the only one with sufficient courage besides Bordiga), thade the most repentant speeches, have abandoned their standpoint, and have cried "mea culpa" with all penitence. This is a fact which not only demonstrates the complete political, organisatory, and ideological bankruptcy of the ultra-Left leaders, but at the same time their complete personal bankruptcy. In the case of the German comrades Ruth Fischer, Scholem, and Engel, we see that the ultra-Left have nothing to oppose to the political line followed by the German Party except petty organisatory gossip. This proves the degeneration of the ultra-Left, their complete lack of a single ideological, political, or even organisatory foundation, upon which they could fight; all that is left to them is personal squabble and gossip, and the intellectual resources of the ultra-Left are exhausted in Ruth Fischer's flight of imagination that the Soviet Union appears to want to join the League of Nations.

At the beginning of this Plenum there was a rush of confessions. At its close we are unexpectedly confronted with a hasty and badly managed attempt to unite the ultra-Left on an international scale. Scholem and Ruth Fischer — sworn enemies — come forward with the same words upon their lips. Engel repeats their words. Then Bordiga speaks, and declares himself practically solid with them. What has forced all the varying shades of ultra-Leftism to join forces at the last moment? What are their common aims inducing them to make common cause? Their aim is the attempt to unite the ultra-Left on the basis of the fight against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern. It is a threat to form an international Left fraction, it not a new International. It would be extremely interesting to see this International, with Ruth Fischer, Scholem, Maslov, and Bordiga. Only I cannot imagine who would be president, for each of these supermen is entirely convinced of being a genius in the leadership of the international communist movement.

There can be no doubt that such an attempt is being made by the ultra-Left.

This danger need not however be exaggerated, so far as I can see.

None of the ultra-Left who have spoken here meet with support worthy of the name in their own Parties. Bordiga is no power in Italy; he has lost the youth League and the great majority of his adherents; the best revolutionaries, his former friends follow him no longer. We need not deceive ourselves, all that he represents is himself and the small discontented group behind him. Ruth Fischer and Scholem, too, have no masses backing them up. The same applies to Hansen and Domski. (Domski: And who is backing you up?) I do not pursue any independent policy, and therefore I do not require the support of special masses. You, on the other hand, represent a special standpoint; you have not the courage to say what you think, and imagine yourselves to represent the masses.

What does the lack of ideological basis of the ultra-Left signify? It signifies that both the German and the other Parties have been compelled during the last two years to adapt their fighting methods and tactics to the changed conditions, and that the petty bourgeois revolutionary elements in the ranks of these Parties have become rebellious. This circumstance has been at the bottom of the crisis in Poland, Italy, and Germany. But the period of crisis is over, the petty bourgeois revolutionary tendencies have been overcome, and nobody will succeed in awakening the appearance of a fresh crisis. It is the duty of the Plenum to reply to these comrades, both in the resolutions and in the discussion, in such a manner that the Communist Parties and our enemies may clearly recognise that there neither can nor will be any fresh crisis.

I should like to add a few words on the necessity of fighting the ultra-Left not only on ideological lines, but on organisatory ones. The ideological fight is of first importance, and furnishes the basis. But let us imagine the German Party, performing an enormous amount of work, and Ruth Fischer, who will organise a correspondence with her former and present friends in every town. Can we limit ourselves to an ideological struggle? The greater the lack of actual ideas in the opposition, the greater the need of organisatory fighting methods. The same applies to every other Party. (Applause.)

Comrade Kuusinen:

Comrades, I had not intended to speak on the German question here in this Plenum. But after the declaration read here vesterday by comrade Urbahns, I feel obliged to say something

Of the various questions contained in the German resolution, I shall refer to one only: the problem of the leadership of the German Party. I have already publicly declared, on several occasions, that the German Party Left — despite all its faults and errors — has carried out a historically valuable mission in the German revolutionary movement, especially in the year 1923. It has greatly contributed to the Bolshevisation of the German Party. But, comrades, the Left fraction has shown itself incapable of wielding the power in the Party placed in its hands by the Frankfort Party conference. The Left fraction has proved the Frankfort Party conference. The Left fraction has proved too narrow for a position of power. As leader of the Party it has not pursued a Party policy, but has continued its fractional policy. Somewhat later, especially in 1925, the leadership exercised by this fraction, headed by comrade Ruth Fischer, degenerated into that system which has been designated by the leaders of the C.I. as the "Ruth Fischer Regime".

The word "regime" means "rule". And I believe that even today compands. Buth Fischer, does not rightly understand the

today comrade Ruth Fischer does not rightly understand the difference between "ruling" and "leading". A few words upon these two conceptions. In the course of the 3. Congress the follo-

wing passage occurred in one of our resolutions:

"The democratic centralism in the communist Party organisation is to be an actual synthesis, an amalgamation of centralism and of proletarian democracy. This amalgamation is only possible on the basis of continuous common activity, of continuous common struggle, in the whole Party organisation.

The centralisation of the communist Party organisation does not mean a formal and mechanical centralisation, but a centralisation of communist activity, that is, formation of a powerful, ever ready, and yet adaptable body of leaders.

A formal or mechanical centralisation would mean the centralisation of "power" in the hands of a Party bureaucracy ruling the other members or the outside masses of the revolutionary proletariat. But it is solely the enemies of communism who can assert that the Communist Party is desirous of ruling the revolutionary proletariat by means of the function of leadership in the proletarian class struggle and by means of the centralisation of this communist leadership. This is a lie."

I know that comrade Lenin, too, was in complete agreement with this view.

Now, I repeat that the Ruth Fischer clique has never grasped the difference between leading the Communist Party and ruling on the surface of the Party. Rule, as object in itself, has been the basis of the lack of principle shown by this clique. The disastrous results have been evident enough both in the loss of mass influence of the Party, and in the inner life of of the Party. As a result of this we have seen in the Ruhr area, and in the trade union movement, the great decline of communist influence among the masses. And in inner Party life almost every trace of inner Party democracy and of Party vitality was wiped out. The Executive was obliged to interfere; for what would have been the consequences if such regime had been carried on much longer? The Party would have been utterly destroyed by a continuation of this regime. The Executive intervened, and our German brother Party rapidly collected its forces and was successful in normalising the Party leadership. Ruth Fischer's resistance was broken.

After this Ruth Fischer entered a new phase, the phase of book-keeping by double entry, the phase in which she could sign the Open Letter from the Executive and simultaneously maintain a secret correspondence with Germany, the phase of open and of secret book-keeping. And now Ruth Fischer enters upon another new phase. She has again signed something, read here by comrade Urbahns. This new fractional platform adopted here is the last phase of the double game.

We must accord the closest attention to the new position thus taken. We look a bride in the eyes, a horse in its mouth -but such politic-mongers must have their fingers examined to see what they are going to do next. This "declaration" is a political action of a peculiar nature. Comrade Ruth Fischer once stated in the German Commission that it was not worth while

to discuss anything in this Commission, for no improvement would be brought about by the Commission. Yesterday, at the last meeting of the Commission, she would not divulge anything of the contents of this so-called declaration, this new fractional platform. This was to explode like a bomb in the Plenum. This in itself was characteristic. But the contents of the document are even more characteristic, perfidious as they are. The document contains frequent references to a "crisis" in the Party. It is asserted, that the German Party is passing through a crisis at the present time. No, comrades, there is no crisis in the German Party. The crisis has been overcome. But they continue the cry of "crisis, crisis!" in the hope that a crisis will arise in the Party. This document further maintains that: "There is no doubt that such a course (the course pursed by the present Party Central) is calculated to increase the mistrust felt by the members for the leaders, and to weaken the prestige of the Party in the nonparty masses." Mistrust on the part of the members for the present Party leaders, this is just what this new fraction would like to increase.

(Interjection from Heinz Neumann: crisis Speculators!)

The authors of this document cannot assert that the present Party leaders are pursuing a Right policy. They can scarcely venture to make such an assertion. But what do they say instead? They say that there is a danger that the present Central Commitee "is bound to deliver over the leadership to the Right group". This is nothing more nor less than sowing the seeds of mistrust among the members of the Party. The present Party leaders will perhaps deliver over the Party to the Right. The endeavour to awaken the mistrust of the members by this assertion is the object of this platform taken by the Ruth Fischer

Further "The recovery of inner soundness in the Party" (this is written by Ruth Fischer!) "is only possible if the inner Party atmosphere is cleared" (we observe that she is striving to clear the inner Party atmosphere) of all alleged personal "cases". "The removal of the results of the last discussion, and the real clarification of the political questions, are the prerequisites for the development of a Marxist Leninist Centre" (this is to be developed, and can you guess who is to be the leading person in it?) "for the disappearance of all fractions and groups, for the development of a body of feaders really possessing the con-tidence of the members" (that is, Ruth Ficsher's leadership), etc."

All this is fairly transparent, it is not by any means so clever

as it is intended to be; the real object can be seen in every

sentence, and thus it is not so dangerous.

Further: "The necessary clarification can only be obtained by means of a broad and free discussion, really participated in in speech and writing by the whole of the members, all organisatory measures being set aside."

This is what comrade Ruth Fischer signed yesterday. But we are well aware to what she gave her signature in this question some time ago, and what policy she has pursued. In the resolution of the German Commission the following statement was made on the Party discussion:

"Discussions which serve to deepen and to consolidate our ideology, and not to confuse or disintegrate the Party, are entirely favourable for the development of the Party."

But the fractional work done by Ruth Fischer serves solely the purpose of disorganisation and disintegration in the Party. And this is what she calls a "recovery of soundness in the Party", a "clearing of the atmosphere", "concentration", etc. Comrades, I have never seen a more insolent double game played in the world.

I shall read another passage from the resolution of the German commission:

"The sound development, the normalisation, and the growth of the German C. P. therefore demand the most rapid possible liquidation of the Ruth Fischer fraction, with its system of double book keeping in politics, and with its practice of saying one thing and doing another.

Its lack of principle, it diplomacy so injurious to the

Party, have shaken the confidence of the Party members to the leaders, of the leading cadres to one another, and of certain sections of the Party to the Comintern."

I consider this to be one of the most essential points in the resolution of the Commission, and I may say one thing to this new fraction: You will not succeed in what you are attempting. You will not succeed. The Comintern and the German Party will

not permit it. We do not ask much of comrade Ruth Fischer and those sharing her opinions. We do not ask that she signs all the resolutions. She has already given her signature often enough, and will do better to stop signing. We ask no more of her than she can actually fulfill. We ask her to cease with fraction mongering. And this we demand unconditionally. If she does not do this, if she continues her fractional mongerings, then she will be thrown out of the Comintern. The Committern will possess sufficient inherent power to prevent the spread of these fractional machinations in the ranks of the Comintern. The Comintern will not permit work to be done in its ranks for the promotion of a Ruth Fischer group.

Favourable prospects are opening out before the German movement. As emphasised in the resolution, the situation in Germany is favourable for the development of the revolutionary movement. If American capitalism demonstrates at the present time the stability of the relative stabilisation, then Germany at the present time demonstrates to at least an equal extent the relativity of the temporary stabilisation of post-war capitalism. The leaders of the German Party are assuredly capable of leading the revolutionary movement in Germany on really Leninist lines.

Yesterday, in the Commission, comrade Thalmann made a proposal which we unanimously rejected. He proposed that the resolution should not state that the present Party leaders represent a centre of really Leninist leadership. He expressed himself of the opinion that this was saying too much, for these leaders are merely in one of the stages of development towards Leninist Party leadership. We replied that it is precisely characteristic of a Leninist that he is in a constant state of development, and penetrates ever further into Leninism. In my opinion this revolutionary and Leninist capacity for development is one of the best characteristics of the present leaders of the Party. In the name of the Communist International we shall call upon not same time upon every member of the German Communist Party, but at the same time upon every sincerely revolutionary worker in Germany, to gather round these Party leaders.

Comrade Manuilsky:

The discussion on the German question which arose on the last day of the Session of the Enlarged Executive assumed, somewhat unexpectedly, the character of an organised attack on the part of the international group of the ultra-Left. This discussion has revealed aspects of the ultra-Left position which render it worth while to accord them detailed attention. I should like to deal with one of these aspects, which has not been touched upon in the speeches of the previous speakers. The fact cannot be contested that we have to combat Right and ultra-Left deviations in the various Parties of the Comintern at the present time. In Germany we have the ultra-Left devi-ation, in France the Right. But these deviations in various directions lead in reality to the formation of one single defeatist fraction or rather of a small defeatist group within the Comintern. We do not know whether the regrouping in these two currents will take place so clearly and openly as for instance in the case of the Hervé group in the IL International, or of the Gorter group in the III. International. But there can be no doubt whathever that the ideological basis exists for even such an organisatory "translocation".

The attitude adopted by Ruth Fischer or by Korsch have already many points of contact, in all fundamental questions, with the French Right. And the objective situation promotes this "confusion of tongues". The history of the labour movement teaches us that such shiftings from Left to Right are likely to occur with specially catastrophic speed during periods in which events follow one another in rapid succession. At other times the transition takes the form a slow "evolution", finally determined by changes in the labour movement itself.

At the present time we are living in just such a period of rapid change. The labour movement has to overcome that European reaction which arose as a result of the defeat of the revolutions in Central Europe. The Communist Parties are entering into the new phase of increased permeation of the masses. At this moment Right and ultra Left groups of a sectarian character split off from the main body, and continue to regard the new phase with the measure applicable to the previous stage of the labour movement. The French Right do not comprehend that the political and financial crisis in France is driving them to acute class struggles, which are bound to

take a revolutionary form. The ultra-Left in Germany are not capable of grasping the new tasks imposed at present on the Communist Party of Germany by the work of winning over the masses. These two groups play a conservative rôle. They hinder the advance of the Party, and must be ruthlessly combatted. During such periods a radical phraseology serves as cloak to cover what is in reality a very opportunist passivity. It is the task of the Comintern to reveal ruthlessly the actual opportunist meaning of such ideological positions. There are three points which specially tend to bring the German ultra-Left very close indeed to their colleagues of the Right in France. And we must remind the comrades that allies of the ultra-Left, Souvarine, Rosmer, and Monatte, now adherents of the Right, were at one time representatives of the Left wing of the French labour movement.

These three points are as follows:

Firstly, lack of faith in the Comintern; secondly, lack of faith in the power of our revolution; thirdly, lack of faith with respect to their own Party.

We only need to remember Souvarine's attitude towards the Comintern, for instance. Here there is not a ray of light, everything is as black as night, he sees nothing but crises in every direction. Even in England, where our Communist Party has been able to record great and universally recognised success of late, the defeatist Souvarine sees nothing but the shady sides which are the expression of his own depression. If we compare this attitude with that expressed in the speeches of Ruth Fischer, Urbahns, and Hansen, which we have heard here, we find the same lack of faith, the same philosophy of depression; for these comrades the spectre of the Right deluge which is going to submerge the Comintern, is solely an ideological cloak for the deluge of their own scepticism in which they themselves are submerged.

Ruth Fischer frightens the Comintern by pointing out the inevitable turn to the Right, with a species of "Brandlerisation" of the Comintern. Why has Ruth Fischer made no attempt to determine the exact geography of this danger? For the simple reason because in accordance with her classification, the Right does not begin, for instance, with the Loriot group in France, since in her opinion our whole international communist movement, in so far as it exists outside the limits of the small group around Ruth Fischer, Hansen, and Urbahns, represents the Right. The Right consists of the C.P. of the Soviet Union, of the whole of the present German C.P. And Ruth Fischer is anxious to save the Comintern from this "Right". You, Ruth Fischer in the rôle of saviour of the Comintern! You, Ruth Fischer, who almost destroyed the Communist Party in Germany! What was left of the German C. P. after your rule? In the Ruhr basin, where the organisation is of the utmost importance, only 4000 Party members remained. After Ruth Fischer was gone it was possible to raise the number of members to more than double within a few months. Now, we have 9000 members organised in the Party in the Ruhr area. The number of subscribers to our newspaper has also more than doubled. This, of course is but a small success, but it bears witness to the fact that the Party is recovering gradually from the catastrophic conditions left as legacy by Ruth Fischer. Further, what did you do with our organisation in such mighty undertakings as for instance the Siemens concern in Berlin? Here, too, we lost our positions under your leadership. But without you, after the Open Letter, and despite a severe inner Party crisis, the Party was able to gain 40,000 votes at the last municipal elections in Berlin, whilst the social democrats lost 150,000. Can Ruth Fischer register even one small success out of the time during which she was at the head of the German C. P.? And was it not Ruth Fischer who sent her agents to the European Communist Parties, (Katz, for instance, who represented the German C. P. in Czecho-Slovakia) and thus undermined the authority, of the German C.P. in our brother Sections? It is only now that the proletarian core of the Party, and its leaders, have succeeded in gaining the authority actually due to a Party which is in reality firmly established and proletarian in composition.

The second point in which the German ultra-Left and the French Right approach each other ideologically is the similarity of their attitude towards the Russian revolution. Souvarine, in an article devoted to the 8. anniversary of the Russian October revolution, expresses doubts as to the achievements of the Russian proletariat.

He is seconded by Marthe Bigot, who declares that the October revolution has not fulfilled the hopes it awakened, has failed to create the "social rhythm", its strength has been that of its destructive work, and the "cult of civil war" still governs it. Regarding Lenin's grave Souvarine wrote that this grave reminded him of the "tomb of Tamerlane or of Mohammed, and not of a leader of the workers an dpeasants". It suffices to compare these articles, not in their various phrases and expressions, but in their general trend, with what has been said by the German ultra-Left on the Soviet Union and on the C. P. of the Soviet Union, to recognise that the standpoints are Siamese twins. Professor Korsch repeats the old threadbare phrases on "red imperialism", borrowed from the bourgeois press. In what does Souvarine's cynical Tamerlane legend differ politically from the legend of the "red Tamerlane" which is going from East to West? When Ruth Fischer fabulises on the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations, what political aim dose she poursue? She is endeavouring to give to the workers of Berlin the impression that the Soviet Union and the C. P. of the Soviet Union are no longer what they were, that they have degenerated, and are following in the wake of general European capitalist politics.

In connection with this judgment of the Soviet Union, and of the rôle played by the C. P. of the Soviet Union in the International, we find the conception of a specially genuine "West European communism", which is opposed to the "peasant communism" of the C. P. of the Soviet Union. These people do not observe that they take up a position identical with the Locarno of the "West European" bourgeoise, and that despite their "Left" phraseology they are just as much a tool in the hands of bourgeois politics, with regard to the masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet Union, as is Souvarine in France in the

hands of French capital.

The third point is the defeatism expressed with respect to their own Party. The objective situation of a group of this kind, cut away from the labour movement of their country, prepares the soil for defeatist ideas. Whatever the Party may do, it is bound to turn out badly. This group will pounce upon the smallest error, and remind the Party of its existence by its loud outcry of "complete collapse". Both in France and in Germany this group speculates on difficulties arising. This is its sole political capital, upon the interest of which it expects to live until better times come. The Comintern must put an end to this speculation on the part of Ruth Fischer in Germany, and of the

Rightein France.

Comrades, I should should further like to deal with comrade Urbahns' speech, especially with his attack upon comrade Stalin. Urbahns states that Stalin openly declared in the German Commission that he has no confidence in Ruth Fischer. Is it the custom, asks Urbahns, for leading Russian comrades to grant patents of confidence or lack of confidence? This was not done during Lenin's lifetime, says Urbahns. I should, however, like to put another question to comrade Urbahns. How long has the Comintern been in a position to form an actual judgment on the real views held by the deputy member of the E.C.C.I., Ruth Fischer? Only since the C.C. of the German C.P. was able to submit convincing written material showing that the whole of the declarations hitherto made by Ruth Fischer have been an unbroken chain of untruths. It has hitherto been the custom for all comrades to state their views openly to the Comintern. We only need remember the II. and III. Congresses. The Italian comraides who persisted at that time in an ultra Left standpoint contended against comrade Lenin at the Congress. There was an open ideological struggle, and no double book-keeping. We have a perfect right to state our distrust in Ruth Fischer, for she is trying to make book-keeping by double entry a custom of the Comintern. During Lenin's lifetime a political school of this description was unknown to us. And now it must be exterminated, root and branch.

Such judgments as are now being passed in connection with Maslov's conduct at his trial have also been unknown among us hitherto. When Brandler took up a wrong line at his trial, the Party and the Comintern condemned Brandler's conduct before a bourgeois court of justice. The International Control Commission has declared that Maslov did not behave in a manner worthy of a revolutionary at his trial. Hundreds of average workers, now serving terms of penal servitude in German prisons, could give Maslov a lesson in elementary revolutionary ethics. It would be a crime on the part of the Party to pass over Maslov's undignified conduct in silence. In this connection there can be no two opinions among communists. Why has Maslov's

unworthy conduct at his trial found unexpected defenders in Ruth Fischer and in the ultra-Left Hansen? In what Left traditions of the Comintern do they find a justification for such an opportunist Right deviation? And you call this a revolutionary standpoint? No, comrades, you have fallen into a bog of hopeless confusion. And the sooner you find your way out of it, and admit your errors openly, the better it will be for you. No worker will believe that you defend a revolutionary position so long as you express agreement with Maslov's conduct at his trial. We confront this your "new tradition" with the old revolutionary tradition held by Hibner, Knievsky, and Rutkovsky, three Polish proletarians who were shot by the Polish bourgeoisie almost at the time of the Maslov trial. For us there can be no doubt which of these two standpoints the communist masses of the Communist Party of Germany and of the other Sections of the Comintern will choose.

Comrade Ognjanovitsch (Yugoslavia):

On behalf of the Yugoslavian delegation I beg to express my full agreement with the attitude taken by the other delegates of the Enlarged Executive against the attack of the ultra-Left and against deleatism. It is not the first time that the ultra-Left has found international expression. But we have never before seen an ultra-Left fraction like this one, bare of any programme or principles. There are two factors specifically characterising this fraction: complete lack of clearness, and lack of faith in the success of the International.

As very rightly formulated in the resolution submitted by comrade Bucharin, we are here faced by a danger closely resembling that threatened by the K. A. P. (Communist Labour Party), and we must exert every endeavour to avert this danger of Kapism. The resolution furnishes us with the required basis. The ultra-Left has not stated, here in the Plenum what it really wants. Even comrade Scholem, the most candid of the ultra-Left, has submitted no programme, for he is well aware that as soon as a programme is brought forward here by the ultra-Left, the power of the Communist International would immediately crush it.

In our own Party we have had considerable Right deviations, the Right disagreeing with the policy pursued in the national question, and taking sides with the Greater Servian annexationism. In the trade union and peasant question, on the other hand, there were Left deviations on the part of these same elements. In the question of the Open Letter of the Communist International they have adopted the same standpoint as the German Left. We thus see that the Right in Yugoslavia are playing with the policy of the Left.

Comrade Ruth Fischer should be asked what she has done

Comrade Ruth Fischer should be asked what she has done towards carrying out the Open Letter. The successful work accomplished towards carrying it out has been done against comrade Ruth Fischer. The Communist Party has been able to record considerable success of late, and must at the same time spare no effort to liquidate the fractions completely, in order to be able to carry on the struggle successfully along the path already trodden. We are fully convinced that the Communist International will succeed in promoting the evident swing to the Left of the working class of Europe, and in finally overcoming the ultra-Left deviations.

Comrade Dimitrov:

(Declaration on behalf of the Bulgarian Delegation):

The Bulgarian delegation fully supports the proposed resolution on the German question. This resolution is in perfect harmony with the political theses of the Plenum. We are of the opinion that at the present juncture the greatest danger in the German Party is the ultra-Left, which hampers the development of the Party as a proletarian and Bolshevist mass Party. This danger must be finally overcome in the immediate future, at any price. The unproletarian, ambiguous, and disorganising policy pursued by the Ruth Fischer-Maslov-Scholem group must be put an end to once and for all. This is the imperative prerequisite for the further proper development of the German Party. The present leading proletarian group of the C. C. of the German C. P. must receive all possible support from all the Sections of the Comintern.

The assertions made by contrades Bordiga and Hansen, that the Comintern is going over to the Right and is abandoning the struggle against the Right danger, must be energetically rejected,

as they are entirely without foundation. The instances afforded by France and Czechoslovakia, where the main fight is against the Right, show plainly how unfounded these assertions are. And here we may add Bulgaria as another instance. It is precisely this "Right" Comintern which has helped us to overcome more rapidly and easily the disastrous Right errors which we committed on 9. June 1923, during the bourgeois upheaval against Stambulijsky's peasant government, when the leaders of our Party declared themselves neutral.

Now, after the severe defeats which we have suffered, the Right liquidatory deviations in the Bulgarian C. P. represent an immediate danger. We are fighting against the Right danger, because it is the greatest peril. And in this struggle we have the unreservedly given help of the Comintern, and especially of the C. P. of the Soviet Union.

Comrades, that which is going on now, at the last moment before the close of the Plenary Session, shows with the greatest clearness that we are confronted by an organised attack upon the unity and the Bolshevist character of the Comintern, made by petty bourgeois intellectual, ultra-Left groups. The Russian question is being made the subject of most unworthy speculation (Voice: Hear, hear!), and these groups are endeavouring to join for a common fight against the Communist International. The whole Communist International must rise in energetic protest against this attack, and hold fast its revolutionary unity and its Bolshevist character. We are firmly convinced that the Left workers of Germany, Italy, and Poland, will not follow Ruth Fischer, Scholem Bordiga and Domski but will put their faith in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, already steeled in revolutionary struggles. (Applause.)

Comrade Bogutsky:

(Declaration of the Polish Delegation):

In full agreement with the resolution of the Comintern on the German question, and with the estimate made of the ultra Left deviation and of the not yet removed Right danger, the Communist Party of Poland declares:

1. With reference to the ultra-Left tendency headed by comrade Domsky, our delegation maintains the same standpoint

which it adopted after the report of the Executive.

2. Our delegation declares that the attitude taken by the ultra-Left against the decisions of the Commission in the German question constitutes a danger for the Comintern, which is threatened by the ultra-Left wing. This wing will make an attempt at undermining the imperiatively necessary unity of the Communist International and its Sections.

3. The latest action of the ultra-Left demonstrates their intention of continuing their anti-Bolshevist activity, directed against

the Comintern.

4. The fact that comrade Domsky admitted, at the beginning of the Plenum, the errors which he has committed, does not mean that comrade Domsky has fundamentally revised his ultra-Left standpoint and that he fully and unreservedly adopts the standpoint of the Comintern, which is in entire agreement with the resolutions passed at the IV. Conference of the Communist Party of Poland. On the contrary, the attempt to make of a question of principle a question of individual errors is at bottom a masking of the fundamental question, and may as such be designated as the Polish edition of the book-keeping by double entry.

The delegation states that comrade Domsky has not only failed to oppose the international ultra-Left, but is still, in the firm opinion of the delegation, also now solid with the ultra-Left. Just as comrade's Domsky's attitude against the Comintern, and against the actions of our brother Sections in June has been maintained in close contact with the international ultra-Left groups, in the same manner his present attitude is in

reality assistance lent to these groups.

5. The Polish delegation will vote unanimously for the resolution of the Commission. (Applause.)

Comrade Thälmann (Germany):

Comrades, Yesterday's debate on the report of the German commission shows the German question to be of the greatest importance, not only in Germany, but internationally. The position taken up by the German Party in the recent past, the

decisions arrived at during the last few weeks and months, the decision of the German Commission, and the discussion at this Plenum of the Enlarged Executive, must inevitably take their effect upon the development of the whole international. We have seen in yesterday's and today's debates that all the representatives of the most important delegations have declared themselves in favour of the decision of the German Commission. And on the other hand there has been, like a red thread the attack made by the ultra-Left fractions, which endeavoured to exploit the differences in the German Party for their international fractional

I remind you of the discussions at the III. World Congress, where comrade Lenin commenced to oppose those revolutionary and impatient elements just emerged from the fire of battle. (In Germany after the March action, in Czecho Sloviakia after the great struggles, in Italy after the struggle caused by the occupation of the factories.) This opposition possessed a certain justification, it had scarcely left the heat of battle, and did not yet understand the situation at the time. But the "Left" opposition of today is very different; it is an opposition of bourgeois ideology and Philistinism.

Should the methods adopted by the opposition become common property in the Comintern, the consequence would be disorganisation and disintegration in the development of the Comintern. Therefore it is not alone the German delegation which opposes a group which has effected such destruction in the Party in Germany, which has undermined and hindered the development of the Party, and which has even attempted to carry its anti-Bolshevist tendencies into the Communist International. We have seen that the representatives of all the delegations have comprehended the intentions of this group, and have dealt with the German question as a matter of serious international importance.

The organised fractional attack undertaken by the ultra-Left yesterday, and the methods selected, demonstrate the lack of character and the helplessness of this group.

The group around Ruth Fischer, Urbahns, Scholem, and Engel, declare themselves to be in agreement with the report and with comrade Zinoviev's theses, which are not alone comrade Zinoviev's theses, but are the theses of the Russian delegation and probably of the whole Conference - perhaps against comrade Bordiga's vote.

The Ruth Fischer group has carried on a double game here, declaring on the one hand that it is agreed with the theses submitted by comrade Zinoviev, and on the other hand opposing the political resolution passed in the German Commission.

Comrades, the resolution of the German Commission and the theses of comrade Zinoviev are parts of one whole. political resolution was accepted in the German Commission with the approval of comrade Zinoviev. Comrades, is it really possible to carry a double game to such a point as to attempt to separate the resolution on the German question from the purport of comrade Zinoviev's theses? Here in this Plenum the German delegation emphatically rejects this double game, because the attempt has been made to abuse the name of comrade Zinoviev as president of the C. I.

Some of the ultra-Left comrades have even gone so far as to exploit for fractional purpose the differences discussed at the XIV Party Conference of the C. P. of the Soviet Union.

We declare: that the attack being made on the Russian Party is not only an attack upon the Russian Communist Party, but also an attack against the C. I., and thus at the same time an attack on the West European revolution. In the attitude which has here been adopted we can clearly observe the tendencies of a K. A. P. (Communist Labour Party) nature which exist in the different capitalist countries.

It would merely exaggerate the importance of comrade Ruth Fischer to waste any more words on her personally. The whole Congress, and, I am fully convinced, the German members as well, have expressed the utmost disapproval and condemnation of the political standpoint and the conduct of Ruth Fischer. We have seen that her double book-keeping, her lack of character, her fractional methods, not only involve her personal collapse, but the collapse of her whole group.

I believe that the connection between comrade Ruth Fischer and Scholem is fairly close. The last few minutes have shown how both are closely bound up in their fraction.

With regard to the declaration made by comrade Urbahns, it signifies a fractional standpoint on the basis of which these comrades are attempting to oppose another political standpoint to the political resolution.

Various comrades have already pointed out that this is

1. a vague standpoint;

2. a standpoint in opposition to the Comintern,

3. a standpoint revealing an entirely false judgment of the course of development in the inner life of the German Party since

the publication of the Open Letter.

Comrade Stalin declared, in the German Commission, that comrade Urbahns has to choose between the Central and the Katz clique. Comrade Urbahns showed his choice in his declaration of yesterday, in which he opposed another line to the political line accepted by the German Commission.

And yet comrade Urbahns endeavours to maintain that on

the whole he is in agreement with the political course taken,

only not with the inner Party course.

Comrades, is it possible to separate these from one another? Is the inner Party course not closely bound up with the political course? The inner Party measures are decisive for the develop-

ment of the Party.

Comrade Urbahns declares that the inner Party course is driving the workers to the K. A. P. The German delegation, on the other hand, is unanimously of the opinion that it is this group of comrades who are tending towards the K. A. P., and that in various places the workers have been brought into a K. A. P. frame of mind by these comrades. It is only a few months since Katz, now expelled from the Party, was in the company of Rosenberg Scholem etc. Now after Katz has been excluded, he has been abandoned by Rosenberg, Scholem, and the others. Here in the Plenum Scholem has separated himself from Rosenberg and Konrad, and we see a fresh split. And at the same time Urbahns declares: "Rosenberg approaches the Central Committee; he will soon enter the social democratic Party." With this he means to express the Maslov theory that the German C.P. is directing its course towards Nuremberg, towards social democracy. This opinion of comrade Urbahn's is an accusation against the C.C., and shows a complete lack of comprehension for the development of the German Party and for the policy of the C.C.

Comrade Scholem declared that the resolution to be submitted for decision today, is the continuation of the Open Letter. Of course it is the continuation of the Open Letter, adapted to present circumstances. It is the perfecting touch put to the Open Letter because we have advanced a step further. We have already reached the second stage, in which it is our endeavour to promote the process of consolidisation in the Party, and to set to work seriously on the accomplishment of our tasks.

The Plenum should be informed that in the German Commission a declaration was made by comrade Kühne and that this declaration is of extreme interest to the whole of the Sections.

This declaration was as follows:

'Comrade Scheer, in his discussion speech, accused comrade Scholem of having been aware of the anti-Party measures taken by the former member of the Party Katz. Comrade Scholem, in an interjection, denied the truth of this

assertion. To this I should like to state:

During a conversation between Rosenberg, Scholem, and myself, I expressed my opinion that the contents of a series of articles appearing in a periodical entitled "Die Aktion", published by Pfemffert, and containing the most despicable denunciations against members of the C. C. of the German C.P. and unheard-of slanders against the Comintern, could only have become known to Pfemffert by means of a breach of confidence on the part of Katz. had not only replied that Katz Scholem Pfemffert the information, but had written the articles himself. In reply to my interjection that Katz was incapable of writing such articles himself, Scholem declared that I was in error, and that there could be no doubt whatever as to the authorship of the articles, as he had himself seen the manuscripts of the articles, written by Katz

Scholem did not even find it necessary to inform the C.C. of this base betrayal of the Party. It is thus clearly established that comrade Scheer's assertion with regard to Scholem's being informed of Katz's anti-Party actions is perfectly in accordance with the facts."

To this I should like to add the comment: If comrade Scholem knew, months ago, that Katz was writing articles for a

K. A. P.ist periodical which has been contending openly against the Comintern, against Soviet Russia, and against the Communist Party for years, and did not inform the Party Central of this fact, then this plainly characterises comrade Scholem's attitude to the C. C., to the Party, and to the Comintern. The arguments and vote of comrade Scholem in the German Commission, and his arguments here in the Plenum, show how double tongued comrade Scholem, is. We shall thus combine this political declaration with the information to the masses in Germany that in a serious situation, when it was most necessary to lend support to the C.C., comrade Scholem gave his help to an agent of the bourgeiosie.

Comrade Engel has not openly withdrawn from Kratz, either in the German Commission or here in the Plenum. He embodies all the symptoms of this K. A. P. ist tendency. On the one hand we see comrade Engel solid with comrade Ruth Fischer, and on the other hand that Ruth Fischer is tacitly solid with Engel. These relations show us the closeness of the ties binding the K. A. P. ist tendencies. Katz is an agent of the bourgeoisie, and thus the golden bridge has already been built which leads from Ruth Fischer to the agents of the bourgeoisie. Many companies have told us that we should tru to promptice Party life in rades have told us that we should try to normalise Party life in the German Party, and should then go forward to introducing

fresh life into the whole Party.

We shall conduct an acute ideological struggle on the basis of the political platform. We shall try to eradicate all the poisons which have been brought into the German Party. We shall wrestle for every single member of the Party, and the ideological fight will be a desperate one, to the end that the Party may be united and welded firmly into one homogeneous whole. Yesterday we had the opportunity of observing that differences of opinion exist as to whether in the period of relative stabilisation Right dangers may arise. The C. C. will be found competent to deal with the struggle both against the Right and the ultra-Left; we feel ourselves strong enough to not only combat the Right dangers of the present period, but also to correct and remove them.

With regard to the position taken up by comrade Meyer both in the German Commission and in the Plenum, we declare that we are prepared to co-operate with comrade Meyer, but not by means of diplomacy; entirely without diplomacy. Comrade Meyer has taken every opportunity, both in the German Commission and here in the Plenum, of speaking in a certain diplomatic manner of a general support to be given to the Central Committee. With reference to the conditions submitted by comrade Meyer, we declare that it is not comrade Meyer who has to submit conditions to us, but we to him. If he is prepared to co-operate with the C.C., this is only possible on the following basis: Firstly co-operation with the C.C. without diplomacy; secondly, readiness to carry on an open struggle, conjointly with us, against all those comrades who are still supporting Brandler today; thirdly, readiness to make common cause with the C.C. against the Right danger; and fourthly, readiness to work for the dissolution of all fractions and relics of fractions, even should this entail an open fight against all those who are unwilling to do this. On this basis co-operation with comrade Meyer is possible.

With respect to the ultra-Left group, I believe that it will only be possible to overcome this group by means of serious and determined struggles within the Party. We have already declared, in the German Commission, that we are anxious for the normalisation, that we shall endeavour to induce every working class element to participate in earnest and active work, and that we shall take up fraternal discussions with the ultra-Left workers. But we shall discuss no longer with comrade Ruth Fischer, for she has shown herself unworthy of further discussion, and our aim is not such discussion, but the formation of a powerful communist movement and a powerful Communist Party. We are thus fully agreed with the words of comrade Kuusinen, who here expressed clearly that if Ruth Fischer continues her present methods she will be expelled from the Communist International. We declare, not only here before the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive, but as a signal for our future work, that we are now going to put an end to the fractions of the various Ruth Fischers, that we may be able to go forward towards the development of the Party, forward on the road leading to real unity in the Communist Party of Germany.

Long live the united Communist Party of Germany! Long live the united Communist International!

Comrade Bucharin's Concluding Speech.

First a few preliminary observations. Comrade Bordiga has here repeatedly referred to an alleged "ideological terror" in the Comintern. Yesterday we were given the opportunity of observing how little foundation there is for this rumour of ideological terror. The most various standpoints have been represented here, the most various declarations made, groups with the most widely differing opinions have expressed their views. I do not know how more freedom of opinion than this is possible. Demonstrative attacks have been made by the various groups and grouplets within the German Party. The object of these attacks has been to create the appearance of a certain "crisis" in the Communist International. We must not permit ourselves to be terrorised by these attacks. For in reality there is a very great discrepancy between the long speeches held by the compades here, and the actual relations of forces within the Parties concerned. It would thus be simply ridiculous to speak of an acute crisis, or of any crisis at all, in the Comintern or in the German Party.

Another instance may be given of our alleged terror, or of the terror exercised by the Central Committee of our German Party. Had the Central Committee of the German C. P. wished it, it could have been absolutely homogeneously represented here in this Plenum. But it deliberately preterred in the interest of a thorough clarification of the point of contention to make it possible for every group, however small, to be represented here, thus demonstrating that the Central Committee of the German Party is not afraid of the open discussion, here in the Plenum, of the points at issue.

Comrade Bordiga, in his arguments, brought up twice or thrice the problem of Party democracy, both in its national and international aspects. It is superfluous to deal with this at any length here. Both in comrade Zinoviev's theses, and in the special resolution, we have laid down the course to be taken towards Party democracy both within the limits of the separate Parties and with reference to the relations between the Communist International and the various Sections. We must adhere to this course more closely than before. I must, however, observe that our conception of Party democracy differs somewhat from that of comrade Bordiga and some other comrades, Scholem for instance. When it is proposed that we annul everything and convocate a "concentration Party Conference", at which every group expresses its views and a new Central Committee is elected, then this proposal shows that the comrades making it have not grasped the problem of continuity in leadership. Bordiga really imagines it to be possible for there to be a moment at which there is no Party leadership, no Party apparatus, and no Party function. That the whole business can then be freshly constructed from the beginning, that out of this chaotic struggle of fractional forces a real Party Conference and a real Party Central can emerge. Bordiga would then again confront this Party Central with the same problem: no Party apparatus, etc., and so on indefinitely. To put a problem in this manner is

inadmissable, and is entirely inconsistent with Leminism.

Comrade Bordiga and certain of the comrades from the German opposition carry on a permanent discussion on the possibility of a discussion, but they are not actually wanting any real discussion. Thus, for instance, after my statements in the German Commission on Korsch and the Ruth Fischer letters, comrade Bordiga replied that we should study the matter and discuss it seriously. Then why do they not discuss, why do they not say that the quotations are falsified and that we have falsified them, or that the comrades who have said this or that have committed errors. We stated that Korsch showed liquidatory tendencies in speaking of "red imperialism". He gives expression to the bourgeois influence upon the proletariat. The same applies to various utterances made by comrade Ruth Fischer. Do they actually discuss these questions with us, whether they or we are right? But they find it more comfortable to discuss solely the possibility of holding a discussion. We, however, take no interest in such an abstract and empty discussion.

How can we combat the various wrong opinions? I believe, that we can do this by means of quotations. If there is no other possibility of reaching our aim, we must use this means of proving the inner unsoundness of the comrades in question, in the interests of clarification. Some comrades maintain that what they have written in this or that letter is merely a sentence torn from its original context. Truly it is possible to write

a very short sentence, or only one single word, but if this sentence or word is wrong, then it must be confuted. And it is only possible to do this by means of quotations. It is, however, peculiar that Bordiga and the other comrades do not waste a single word on the actual contents of these quotations. This means that it is in reality we who are the defenders of real Party democracy in the Communist International. We propose an open discussion of this question and this is one of the most important constituents of democracy. If they refuse to discuss, and remain silent as to their opinions on the material import of things, then they are in reality opposed to the discussion.

Comrade Bordiga's way of putting the problem of the struggle against the Right is equally incorrect. His manner of approaching this question harmonises with his whole mentality. He lives exclusively in a shadow land of abstractions, and as soon as something concrete comes in question he flies with all possible speed from this earthly world. It is not the giving of certain geographical addresses for the Right danger, for instance in Paris, Hamburg, Berlin, etc., which is ridiculous. On the contrary, what is ridiculous is the endeavour simply to cross, out Paris, Hamburg, Berlin, etc., and thus to fight against

the Right.

The German ultra-Left have attempted, in the most petty manner, to make use of the discussion in the Russian Party for their own fractional purposes. They have here declared themselves in favour of comrade Zinoviev's theses, but opposed to the theses in the German question, and this although all the comrades here present are perfectly aware that the whole Russian delegation has approved not only comrade Zinoviev's theses, but at the same time the resolution of the German Commission. Do the German ultra-Left comrades follow an honest political course in doing this? I am of the opinion that they are playing a game, and not a very honest one. At a joint meeting of the Russian and French delegations, the Russian delegation declared unanimously that the exploitation of the Russian differences for fractional purposes is most severely condemned by them.

fractional purposes is most severely condemned by them.

With regard to German Party life, no one can deny that after the Open Letter of the Executive to the German C.P. our

German Party reached a certain turning point.

The "principles" of the ultra-Left are well characterised by their attitude towards the Open Letter. Comrade Hansen, for instance, states: "I was in favour of the Open Letter, and I have carried out its instructions in my Norwegian Party." Heaven be praised.

Scholem declares that he is opposed to the German resolution because it represents a continuation of the Open Letter. Comrade Ruth Fischer was in favour of the Open Letter,

but is opposed to the resolution of the German Commission.

Comrade Scholem asserts that the Open Letter delivered the Party over into the hands of the Right. Thus from Scholem's standpoint Ruth Fischer aided in thus delivering the German

working class over into the hands of the Right.

Comrade Engel's declaration is peculiarly unique. He says: "I am perfectly in agreement with the fundamental line of the Ruth Fischer-Urbahns declaration. But a few words further on he rejects the Open Letter quite decisively. Is the Open Letter then such an unimportant document? Does it not deal with the most important questions of German politics? Engel rejects the Open Letter, but is on the other hand in agreement with the fundamentals of Urbahn's declaration, although the axis upon which comrade Urbahn's declaration turns is the recognition of the Open Letter.

Further. In Urbahn's declaration we read:

"The difficulties of the present position have tended to strengthen the ultra-Left currents, and have made the game

easy for such openly liquidatory elements as Katz."

If openly liquidatory elements exist, I should like to ask where the concealed liquidators are? (In reply to an interjection from comrade Ruth Fischer): Comrade Ruth, I shall let you look into a mirror for a moment.

Ruth Fischer and Urbahns designate Katz as an open liquidator. Engel, on the other hand, though solid with Urbahn's

declaration, says:

"With regard to the case of Katz, I declare that the Central of the German Party is chiefly to blame, for it has treated in an entirely wrong manner those members of the Party who tend towards the Left."

Ruth and Urbahn's declare one of the great errors of the Left to have been their failure to cut themselves off immediately from the K. A. P. tendencies. But again we find in Engel's declaration:

"In the ultra-Left question I declare that though there are undoubtedly K. A. P.ist tendencies in the Party, still the ultra-Left are sincere communists and revolutionists.'

Taken from the moral standpoint, this is right. But we put the question as it is to be judged from the political standpoint. We see that the conditions obtaining among the ultra-Left are thus entirely chaotic. One declaration contradicts another, one sentence another.

Comrade Scholem, in his second declaration, contradicted even himself. He declared that he had never any K. A. P. ist tendencies, and that his faults have not been in this direction.

He then enlarges on this thesis as follows:

"The mistake which I made was that after the close of the debate on the Open Letter... I did not immediately break off every external or inner connection with people like Katz.'

On the same page of the stenographic report of Scholem's declaration he speaks of his political views, which he has never denied for a moment. Candidly, I confess I do not understand this. Your first thesis is that you have never had any K. A. P. ist tendencies. Your second thesis is that you were closely connected with people like Katz. You speak of "external and inner connections with people like Katz". Of what can these outer and inner relations consist? If comrade Scholem should accidentally happen to live in the same house as Katz, or were to go for a walk with him in Unter den Linden, this would not concern us here. It would be foolish to mention such things in a political declaration. What is here spoken of can thus only be the political ties binding comrade Scholem to Katz. And this means that he has had K. A. P. ist tendencies.

So then, comrade Scholem, you declare that the K. A. P. tendencies really are injurious. Yet your next utterance is that: "My political views remain unchanged".

It need not be said that here it is not solely a question of comrade Scholem's logic; the whole thing is a kind of political manoeuvre, and is consistent with the whole trend of comrade Scholem's development since the beginning of the session of the Enlarged Executive up to the present session. These comrades have not the courage to fight openly for their standpoint; they have not the courage to seek for real political aims; they have not even the courage to openly admit their errors. And yet the pressure of the whole Comintern makes them feel that something is out of order with them, and they awkwardly wriggle.

Thus, when we analyse the new born ultra-Left from Urbahns to Engel, we find a complete contradiction between the various constituents of this group. And the group even contains masterpieces in which one and the same person holds contradictory views. This is the expression of the ideological breakdown of the ultra-Left. Yet this group feels itself called upon to drag the whole Comintern out of the "opportunist bog".

With regard to the platform of comrades Urbahns, Ruth Fischer, etc., I maintain that everything which is correct in this standpoint has been copied straight out of our theses. And everything which has not been copied is politically wrong. Comrade Ruth Fischer has declared here that our resolution is entirely vague, and that the burning political questions have not even been touched upon. She regards as the greatest deficiency of our resolution the fact that we do not touch upon the question of the Prussian government, and of the policy in Saxony. We are prepared to add a paragraph on Saxony to the theses. But let us see how these comrades solve the problem which they regard as of greatest importance:

"The combination of parliamentary action with mass work, in which the chief stress is to be laid upon the work among the masses, but in which we must at the same time prove ourselves competent to make use of such situations as those obtaining in Prussia, in Saxony, and in the municipality of Berlin, in such a manner that we demonstrate practically to the broad masses of the workers the necessity of breaking away from the coalition policy of the Executive Committee of the German social democratic party."

That is all. And this is nothing more than a platitude, a mere phrase. น้าให้สำเนิดเกิดใส่ สิงค์ สายข้อง

With regard to all other points our resolution can simply be compared with comrade Urbahns's declaration. It will be seen that it has been copied from our resolution. The Ruth Fischer Urbahns group has merely forgotten to copy the letters of Ruth Fischer's with the rest. This would have been excellent for the purpose of drawing a comparison, for the benefit of the German workers, between what is contained in the theses and the phrase-mongering of the letters. Thus, for instance, the declaration of sympathy for Soviet Russia in the theses, and the declaration on Russia falling to pieces as contained in the letters; the declaration of fidelity to the International in the theses, and the idle chatter of the letters about the International supposed to be almost lying in ruins. Such a comparison would enable everyone to realise the lack of principle of this

I already made mention, in my first speech at this Session of the Executive, of the necessity of not forgetting that we commenced the United Front tactics by clearing the Comintern of the Right elements. Comrade Urbahns has here attempted to put forward a theory according to which the Right danger becomes increasingly acute during a process of stabilisation, rendering it imperative for the Right danger to be fought with special energy. I should, however, like to put the question in another form. I shall take, for instance, the well known case of the events of the year 1923. Which danger was greater at that time, the Right or the Left? Undoubtedly the Right on the Left? we fought it to the uttermost extent of our power. It is thus impossible to state categorically that during a period of revolutionary activity the Right danger becomes smaller than the Left danger, but again comparatively greater during a period of stabilisation. This question depends on multifarious factors in the different countries, and it is our duty to subject the different countries and the individual situations to an accurate analysis. During the revolutionary situation existing in 1923 in Germany it was the Right danger which was greater, whilst now, during a period of relative stabilisation, the ultra-left danger in Germany is greater. At the same time the Right is the greater danger at the present time in France, in the midst of stabilisation.

Why is the Right danger not so acute as the ultra-Left in Germany? For the reason that during the preceding period the Right was thoroughly beaten back, in which work the Left played their part. I fully share the opinion that it is not permissible to mark the whole past of the Left in black ink. But the fact that the whole Left defeated the whole Right at that time renders the ultra-Left peril greater at the present time. When the ultra-Left comrades now maintain that in Germany the Right danger is greater, then they are throwing doubts upon the work accomplished by the Left. This work consists in the successful combat against the Right. In France the position is entirely different for here the Right have never suffered such a decisive defeat as in Germany. The situation will presently arise in which the Right will be defeated.

But the ultra-Left does not want any concrete analyses, it does not want exact addresses or anything definite, it only wants to raise the outcry that we are delivering over the Party into the hands of the Right. And nothing can be more injurious to any Party than working with mere empty words, without placing any living import into these words.

We are accused of demanding the "blood" of the ultra-Left workers. I think it is time to put a stop to such nonsense. What do we propose in the resolution? We propose to convince the ultra-Left workers. Then why spread rumours that we are intending to expel these comrades from the Party? This method of contention proves that they have no political argument, but only demagogy. The Communist International and the leaders of the German Party regard it as one of their most important tasks to convince the ultra-Left workers. This task can only be accomplished when a ruthless ideological fight is conducted against the ultra-Left deviations. We fully appreciate the value of the ultra-Left workers, but we are not demagogues of the worst description, we are not prepared to win over the workers by making concessions to their prejudices, but on the contrary, by raising these strata to a higher political level. This is a task set the Party which is sincerely anxious to be the leader of the working class. But this is absolutely beyond the comprehension of leaders of the Ruth Fischer type. Such comrades have frequently declared that they have done this or that for fear of the Right danger, but they have said nothing on actual principles. The same applies to the present cooperation in the newly born ultra-Left fraction. It has no definite political line to pursue, though this is the first essential for a really revolutionary fighter and politician.

From the organisatory viewpoint comrade Ruth Fischer has developed into the greatest "democrat" in the world. But we know from experience the kind of democrat Ruth Fischer is in reality. She herself acknowledged her democratic virtues when she signed the Open Letter. And afterwards? What became of the democratic virtues? Perhaps they were incorporated in the double game with the letters?

With reference to the so-called moral aspect of the question, personally I am perfectly in agreement with comrade Stalin when he says that he has not an atom of confidence in comrade Ruth Fischer. We base this conclusion of ours on experience. And if the assertion is founded on proofs, has comrade Stalin not the right to express it? Or should he rather adopt the methods of book-keeping by double entry favoured by Ruth Fischer? What do you demand? You have put the question of confidence, and comrade Stalin has given the right answer.

Permit me to add a few words on the present leaders. The declarations of Comrades Ruth Fischer Urbahns the assertion that the Party contain present leaders. These comrades specuruined by the late on this idea. But the fact should not be for-gotten that under the rule of Ruth Fischer we had nothing but failures to record. And what has such an antagonist of the Party Central as comrade Scholem to say on the present situation in Germany? At one of the first sessions of the Executive Scholem declared that:

"It is the first time for a long time, indeed I believe the first time since the German C. P. came into existence, that a great mass movement is developed and led by the Communist Party.

A body of leaders can be best judged by its successes and failures. And when such words are expressed by an opponent of the Party Central, this suffices to enable a positive balance to be drawn. But what is the strategy adopted by these comrades? Though they themselves declare that this Central is taking a place as leader of the people, of the proletariat, for the first time in the history of the Party, yet they take up arms against this Central. This means that they form a factor of disturbance hindering the work of the Central in winning over the masses. When we compare the misgovernment of the Ruth Fischer Central with the acknowledged successes of the present one, the conclusion to be drawn is very plain.

The Communist International should support the present Party Central by every means available, and should support it,

too in its struggle against all such disturbing elements.

Is it herewith intended to imply that the present Party Central is an ideal one? Not at all. It still leaves much to be desired in respect of ideological training, of greater politics, of trade union work, of propaganda of consistency in Party democracy, etc. But we are Marxists and as such must view all these things as part of the "process" as comrade Thälmann is always telling us. The process, the dynamics of evolution, have now brought us to conditions within the Party which are beyond all comparison better than those obtaining under the Ruth Fischer Central. The leading rôle now played by the Party in the proletariat, to quote comrade Scholem's amiable words, far surpasses the importance of the part hitherto played by the Communist Party. This is perhaps an exaggeration. But what we ask is: are you going to support this Central or not? No, they are not going to. It would be an excellent thing if the German opposition could carry on their fractional work along some definite political line. But this political line does not exist.

I believe that the Party Central and the Communist International fully grasp the extent of the tasks facing the German C. P. The Communist International lends its support to the present Party Central, for this Central represents a standpoint completely in agreement with that of the Communist International. And we shall support this Party Central in its struggles against all injurious deviations; against the Right, against the ultra-Left, and against the most unprincipled of all groups, the Ruth Fischer group.

(Enthusiastic applause.)

After comrade Buchanin's concludine speech, the resolution of the German Commission was passed by all votes against the votes of comrades Bordiga and Hansen.

Comrade Urbahns, Ruth Fischer, Scholem, Maslovsky, and Engel, who were present at the deliberations with advisory vote, declared that if they had had the right to vote they would have voted against the resolution.

Report of the American Commission

Comrade Farguson (Great Britain):

Comrades, I think that the report of the American Commission will at least be distinguished for its brevity. I think that the discussion which will ensue will be a very marked contrast to the discussion which has just taken place on the German report and in presenting this resolution to the Plenum, I want only to make one or two points.

First, that it was agreed to unanimously, without exception, by the various factions in the American Party. We had no squabbles such as we have just witnessed in the German Commission refusing to give their assent and support to the Commission finds. I want simply to point out that the American Party has got a very significant role to play in the world politics even in some cases a decisive role so far as the struggle is concerned.

I also want to point out to the comrades that this trouble which has existed for some time in our Party in America is not simply due to any personal squabbles between individuals, but is mainly due to the very difficult conditions which our brother Party has got to work in. In America they have a very strong and powerful capitalist class which is taking active measures in order to strangle the labour movement in America and in addition you have a labour movement, a trade union movement in America dominated by the most reactionary trade union officials that the mind of anyone could conceive.

Taking these two facts into consideration, there is at least a very large explanation of the difficulties which have confronted our brother Party in America. This resolution which has been agreed to takes a very definite stand and assesses these facts at their true value. I simply want to indicate that there is

one addition and one amendment which have also been agreed to unanimously and which ought to be incorporated in the reso-

The one amendment is to the existing paragraph 5 in the resolution and it reads:

"The Enlarged Plenum finds correct the basic line of the trade union resolution adopted unanimously by both tendencies at the last Convention of the Workers (Communist) Party. This resolution finds its further development in the present resolution of the Enlarged Executive Committee."

This in place of the present paragraph 5 in the resolution. There is another addendum to be added which is:

"The Party must extend its activities among the proletarian women for the purpose of drawing them into the

trade unions and into the class struggle."

I simple want to tell the Plenum that we believe that this resolution is going to lay the basis for the ending of the very deep-rooted fractional strife that has prevented our brother Party in America from pulling its full weight in the struggle. This resolution offers an opportunity to both the tendencies in the American Workers Party to work harmoniously, to cooperate with each other and by mutual cooperation and work to build a real mass Communist Party in America. I also want to say that the resolution takes a very definite and drastic stand against fractionalism and the regrudescence of fractionalism. It also offers or makes more explicit several of the tasks of our brother Party. Notably, the question of more intensive work among the farmers, a more insistent taking up of the problem of the Negroes, the greater stand for the independence of the South American countries, and in this connection, the American Workers Party has already to its credit several very notable achievements. No less a person than the president of the Mexican Republic has sent a telegram congratulating the Workers Party on the fight it has been making against American imperialist intervention in Mexico.

I want to point out that both the fractions in America are going back resolved that there shall be no more of this fractional struggle. Also, that the American comrades are going back to rally around the Executive Committee to carry out the tasks which have been laid down in the resolution and to build up in America a real mass Communist Party that shall bring the American working class under its banner and under the banner of the Communist International.

Declaration of Representative of the Minority of the C. C. (Foster-Group):

Comrades, before casting my vote for the adoption of the resolution, and in order to help to facilitate the liquidation of the mistakes in our Party I think it is necessary to make the following statement:

"The resolution submitted by the American Commission is of such a nature as to make it possible for us to accept it and to concentrate all our efforts on the carrying out of the decisions contained in it. We fully agree with the basic line and ideas of the Resolution.

The Resolution specifically endorses and develops the main line of policy and Trade Union work adopted by the IV. Convention of the Workers (Communist) Party. The Resolution of the IV. Convention of our Party provides for a correct policy for widening the basis of the T.U.E.L. (Trade Union Educational League) and for building it into a mass Left-Wing movement. It also provides a correct policy towards the centre, or so-called Progressive Group in the trade unions and outlines the united front tactics that the T.U.E.L. must apply towards the centre group. It stresses the vital importance of trade union work, and provides, the means for bringing every Party member into the trade unions and the Party as a whole more actively into trade union work. By endorsing the basic line of the trade union resolution of the IV. Convention of our Party, the resolution on the American question submitted by the Commission rejects the proposed revision of this correct line and strengthens the undersanding and determination of the Party to proceed along the right road in the trade union work,

Secondly, the resolution on the American question expresses confidence in our loyalty. This expression of confidence, we hope, will put an end to the factional charge of "disloyalty" on the basis of which a broad campaign has been conducted in the Party against us. The resolution on the American question will go a long way towards repairing the serious damage inflicted upon our Party by this campaign against us.

Thirdly, the resolution before the Plenum corrects a number of serious mistakes in trade union work made by the Party since the last Party Convention, such as the mistake in the Anthracite strike, tendencies to under-estimate the struggle for power in the unions, and dual unionist tendencies. The resolution will serve undoubtedly to guard our Party from a repetition of such mistakes.

Fourthly, the emphasis that the resolution places on the importance of revising the general programme of the T: U. E. L. and bringing it into accord with the demands of the united front policy, the insistance upon widening the base of the T. U. E. L., bringing into its organisations and committees the largest possible number of non Party workers, and the general instruction to concentrate the energies of the Party upon building up a mass Left Wing in the American trade unions, all of these are in full conformity with our views. This is the position we are taking consistently in the Party. We are fully determined to do all in our power to carry these policies into effect.

Fifthly, we agree with the proposal contained in the resolution which provides for a certain division of work, giving to our group the leadership in the trade union work of our Party. We view this proposal in the light of the special situation which prevails at present in our Party. We understand this as in no sense establishing artificial divisions among the Party members excluding one group from participation in the trade

union work, and the other group from the general Party activity.

Sixthly, we fully agree with all the other specific tasks laid down for our Party in the resolution, such as the organisation of the unorganised workers, more concentration upon the heavy industries without neglecting the light industries, the struggle against the company unions, intensive work among the negroes, full assistance to the building up of the Youth Movement, utilisation of the agrarian crisis for more effective work among the farmers, intensification of the work among the women, systematic attention to the struggle against imperialism and the establishment of organic connection with the labour and liberation movements of the colonies.

Finally, we fully agree with the categoric demands of the resolution that all factionalism, from which ever side it may come, shall cease immediately. We believe that the sincere and conscientious efforts by the Central Executive Committee to put this resolution into effect will enable the Party to concentrate its energies for the successful carrying out of the important tasks before it. Upon the basis provided by the resolutions of the Plenum we declare and support the Central Executive Committee.

Declaration of Representative of Majority of C. C. (Ruthenberg-Group):

Comrades, I think it is necessary to briefly outline the issues which were before the American Commission, how these issues arose, and the settlement which has been made in this resolution.

At our last Party Convention a new leadership came into control of the Party. Comrade Foster was in opposition to this leadership and was permitted to come before the Comintern to appeal against the leadership and the Central Committee. Comrade Foster came to Moscow proposing that the Central Committee of our Party be revised and that a new Central Committee giving him a majority of 13 against 8 be established. This demand of Comrade Foster has, of course, been rejected in the present resolution.

The comrades here have heard a great deal about the factionalism in the American Party, but I must establish now that this factionalism has not been a fight between individuals, but a struggle in regard to political questions in which the future of our Party is concerned. In the last Plenum here, we had the question of the Labour Party. In this Plenum we have had the question of the development of our Trade Union movement in the United States as the principal issue. Both these questions have been decided by the Enlarged Executive Committee, in a way that will make possible greater results from the work of our Party. We believe also that so far as the inner Party situation have stengthened our Party, clarified it, and made is possible in the future to pursue clear political lines for the upbuilding of the influence of the Party. In the present resolution we have established first that no change shall be made in the Central Committee, and secondly, the Communist International through the Enlarged Executive Committee, calls upon the entire Party to give its entire support to the present Central Committee.

Comrades, we from the very beginning, in taking over the leadership of the Party, considered as our chief task the unification of the Party. We knew that after 20 months of bitter fractional struggle our Party could not stand further lighting if it was to grow and strengthen itself. And the Central Committee pursued the policy of breaking down the factional struggle, of endeavouring to unify the whole membership behind the Central Committee and, as is established in the present resolution, it did make achievements in accomplishing this end.

Turning to the question of trade union work, I must take issue with the statement read by Comrade Foster in relation to the resolution of our Convention. The present resolution which you are asked to adopt endorses the basic line of the Convention resolution with the further development which had been made in the resolution of the American Commission. And, comrades, these further developments are of the most vital importance in our trade union work. What was the situation so far as our efforts of building a Left wing in the United States was concerned? We had an organisation for that purpose, — the T. U. E. L., which in effect was a duplication of our Party organisation. Is consisted of the Party members and the nearest sympathisers. Its programme was the programme of the "Dictatorship of the

Proletariat" and support of the Communist Party in the United States. The Central Committee when it considered this problem, said that we could not build a Left Wing in the trade union movement on this programme. And if there have been differences in our Party, these have arisen on the trade union question because the Central Committee knew that it could not succeed with a programme, with the character of the T. U. E. L., with constitution of its committees and that it was necessary to make a change in these respects.

The resolution in the American Commission sets forth these changes. It establishes the fact that many errors were made in the programme of the T. U. E. L., it declares it necessary to fundamentally revise the programme, it declares it necessary to draw new elements into the leadership of the left wing movement, and it states in regard to the name of the T. U. E. L. that this question is one in which it is not necessary to make a change immediately. We believe comrades, that these declarations of this resolution fully endorse the struggle which the Central Committee made for a revision of our past activities in this respect, and that this resolution, as it now stands, will lay the basis for the development of a Left Wing in the American trade unions; and since this development has been made of our Convention resolution, we can accept and endorse the resolution.

On the question of factionalism within our Party, the resolution demands of Comrade Foster and his supporters that they desist from further factional struggle and that they must support the Central Committee of the Party in its work. On the basis of the acceptance and carrying out of this demand by Comrade Foster and his followers it will be possible to liquidate the remains of factionalism in our Party, and for the Central Committee. I pledge here, that we will do our utmost to achieve

this end, that we will be ready even to make concessions to Comrade Foster, because, with the support of the Comintern as established in this resolution we can make such concessions in order to eliminate what remains of the factional struggle.

In this Plenum there has been more discussion of the role of the United States than in any past Congress or Plenum in the Comintern. We realise the importance of the role that the United States is playing today in the capitalist world. We realise, as emphasised in this resolution, the importance of the fight which our Party must make against the mighty American imperialism. We realise that for this purpose we must have a united Party, that can carry out the lines of the Comintern, that this Party cannot be a guild Party which centres its attention upon one phase of the struggle, but as set forth in this resolution, it must take up every phase, must mobilise the exploited workers, the agrarian and Negro workers, to back up the struggle against American imperialism in the South and Central American countries, and we pledge ourselves here that we will do our utmost to carry out this decision, that we will endeavour to begin to build a strong Party that can grow into the leader of the American protetariat and in the future challenge the mighty imperialism and all together with the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries and the Comintern, deal the final blow to this imperialism.

The resolution of the American Commission was passed unanimously.

The chairman, comrade Geschke, then moved the acceptance of comrade Zinoviev's political theses. The theses were unanimously accepted.

Concluding Speech of Comrade Zinoviev.

Comrade Zinoviev, who was greeted with prolonged applause, said:

Comrades! I am perfectly agreed with that estimation of the work done by our Plenum which comrade Ercoli gave in his speech to-day. He was perfectly right in saying that we have here worked out our main resolution on the basis of an attentive study of the situation in Europe and America, and have indicated the marching route for all the leading Parties of the Communist International. We may maintain with a clear conscience that we have exerted ourselves to the utmost to study every important section of the fighting front, every expression of the European labour movement of the slightest importance, and the revolutionary movement of the whole world. We have collected and analysed the most important facts. We have carefully examined the errors which have been made by our Sections during the past period, and have attempted to lay down the line of further struggle on the basis of the theory and tactics of Leninism.

We need not conceal the fact that events of a somewhat serious nature preceded the opening of this Session of our Enlarged Executive. Several of our most important Parties have passed through severe ordeals, and all of us gathered together here viewed the opening of the present Session with the greatest anxiety. I will not maintain that our work here has been accomplished with perfect ease and smoothness, without hindrances, without difficulties, and without several undesirable phenomena. But none the less it appears to me — and I believe that I here voice the general opinion — that despite these difficulties and despite the ordeals passed through before the Executive Session, we have succeeded to at least the same extent as in past years in solving successfully the most important of the problems confronting us at the moment.

The Shaky Stabilisation and the Firmer Establishment of Bolshevisation.

In my introductory speech I stated that the feature of the present Session of the Enlarged Executive is the characterising of the present period as a period of "shaky stabilisation of capital'sm". These words suffice to characterise the present situation in the most important capitalist countries and in the East.

The unsteadiness, the wavering of the stabilisation of capitalism, is an actual fact. This is the fundalental fact at the bottom of that analysis of the world situation which we have set forth in our resolutions. But we say little when we speak of the "shaky stabilisation of capitalism". The essential point is that the Comintern has been able to establish the fact that the shaky stabilisation of capitalism is accompanied by a perfectly steady advance in the Bolshevisation of our parties.

A shaky stabilisation of capitalism, and a steady advance

A shaky stabilisation of capitalism, and a steady advance towards the Bolshevisation of the Comintern, this is the main feature of our Session.

The Fight for the Unity of the International Trade Union Movement.

The most important tactical problem set our Session has been the search for methods for realising the rapprochement of our revolutionary vanguard and the broad masses of the workers. It is comprehensible, therefore, that at our Session the question of the United Front tactics, and especially the question of the unity of the international trade union movement, has played a decisive part.

Comrades, it is only a year ago since we discussed whether the sean desirable to form the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee. Some of our leading comrades in the German and French Parties had their doubts, fearing that these tactics might lead to opportunism. We now have the proof that we here found the right way. The Anglo-Russian Committee has become one of the bridges connecting the revolutionary vanguard with the masses. And now we find people going to the opposite extreme. Those who at one time were inclined to doubt the utility of the Anglo-Russian Committee, now tend to speak of the necessity of the isolated affiliation of the Soviet trade unions to Amsterdam. We reject both exaggerations with equal emphasis.

The Anglo-Russian Committee has played, and continues to play an important rôle. I must, however, remind our comrades that the right wing of the Amsterdamites is not asleep, that it is working against us with all its might, and is displaying special energy in England. It is endeavouring to destroy that bridge to unity formed by the Anglo-Russian Committee. Many signs go to show that the work thus being done by the Right wing is not entirely failing in effect. But our friends in England, the

friends of international trade union unity, are working with equal energy. Here the leaders of all our Partes are gathered. They must however realise that the further growth of the international trade union unity movement is dependent on our endeavours, and is above all dependent on the success of our struggle in England. We must be on our guard, and follow with the greatest attention the events of the next few weeks and months. We appeal to all the friends of international trade union unity, and call upon them to increase tenfold their efforts for our cause; for the enemy is not asleep, and is working more energetically than ever to break down the bridge which we have already built for the realisation of international trade union unity.

The Right wing of Amsterdam reveals great diplomatic talent, especially in England. But the question at stake is not one to be decided by petty diplomacy. The decisive rôle is played by the course of the class struggle. In England severe struggles between labour and capital are impending. These battles will decide the further development of the English labour movement. The general situation in England is developing favourably for us. The treacherous character of the Right reformist wing is becoming clearer to the masses day by day. The English working class will join hands with the proletarian advance guard of all the other countries, over the head of the Right Amsterdam wing. Attempts will be made on every side to throw obstacles in the way of international trade union unity. This is a question which will enevitably arouse many passions, for it represents one of the most important questions of the present day. The struggle for international trade union unity continues to be our most important slogan. We shall work with the utmost energy in every country for the actual realisation of the United Front. When the enemies of international trade union unity attempt to destroy one of our bridges, then we shall exert our utmost efforts to protect this bridge with our own bodies, and at the same time to build three further bridges.

Leninism and the Fight against Deviations.

We have not been able to avoid sharp polemics here, especially in the last two sessions. It is true that it is not usual to make a concluding speech a polemical one, a certain formality generally being observed. But our comrades will comprehend that in the present situation it is necessary to depart from this tradition.

Seen from outside, it may easily appear that the differences in the German question have suddenly given rise to a serious crisis at the end of our session. Doubtless our enemies will interpret the import of the last two sessions in this manner. I am, however, in perfect agreement with comrade Bucharin when he points out that these are matters which need not be exaggerated, and which are not to be regarded as involving a serious crisis. This must not, however, prevent us from gaining a clear idea of the significance of the discussion held at the last two sessions.

It is entirely incomprehensible to me how anyone can vote for the Zinoviev theses — these theses emanate from the whole of our Russian delegation, they were approved by our Pol-Bureau and umanimously accepted by the whole Executive — and in the same breath condemn the Open Letter issued by the Executive in August 1925, or reject the German resolution here proposed, which is solely a further development of the Open Letter. My theses contain a direct confirmation of the Open Letter. The line taken by the theses is 100% identical with that of the Open Letter. Those who vote for the theses must support the Open Letter, and cannot oppose the line laid down in the German resolution—otherwise they adopt a completely contradictory and impossible standpoint.

There has been talk here of the necessity of a "blood purification". I am opposed to the use of such "frightful" terms. It is of much greater importance to think of how brains are to be cleared of many errors in principle.

We shall have to fight for years against the Right and ultra-Left deviations. New social and political situations are arising before our eyes, fresh groups are forming in the Parties, new strata of the proletariat are coming to us; and thus it often happens that we have to return to the very beginning of questions which appear to us to have been long since solved.

Is it necessary for us to seek any new fundamental standpoint at this Session! In my opinion it is not necessary. All that is most essential and most important in this question has already been said by Lenin. The attitude which the Comintern adopts towards the Right and ultra-Left deviations is not purely accidental, not a position taken up for a certain season, for a month or a year. It is the basis, the foundation of Leninism, the foundation of the Comintern. And when we look we see that as a matter of fact Marx himself was obliged to adopt a more or less analogous standpoint. The ultra-Left deviation of that time went by the name of Proudhonism, etc. During the whole course of its development Marxism has had to contend both against opportunism and anarchism. The Comintern stands on precisely the same trinciples. Lenin as a Marxist, fought against both deviations from the first moment of his political activity, both within the Russian Farty and in the whole International.

Is there any necessity to establish a new standpoint in this respect? Not the slightest. Does it suffice if we adhere to the old standpoint of the Comintern? Entirely. Has this been our line of action at this Session? It has indeed. Have we held fast to those fundamental principles of the Comintern, established by Lenin? In my opinion we have done this. Have we fought here against the ultra-Left deviations and errors? Yes, we have. Have we conducted this fight as it should be conducted? Let others judge, but I believe that on the whole we have not fought badly. We have permitted no revision of the decisions of the V. Congress. At the same time we have emphasised and placed in the foreground those most important decisions of the III. World Congress, so peculiarly applicable to the present period. We have dealt fairly severe blows to both the ultra-Left and the Right groups, and have adapted the number and severity of these blows in accordance with the actual conditions obtaining in the countries and Parties concerned.

It has already been pointed out here that the ultra-Left of the period 1925/26 are not the ultra-Left of the period 1921/22. The same can be said of the Right. They are no longer the same as the Right of the year 1921/22. Both have become worse. Comrade Thälmann has very rightly pointed out that in 1920/21 the ultra-Left came over to us after hard struggles with the class enemy, bringing with them the smell of gunpowder. They came to us full of sincere illusions, and believed that the victory depended only upon us. At that time there was something fresh and revolutionary in these ultra-Left relanse is neither fresh nor revolutionary, and its errors today are much more injurious.

nor revolutionary, and its errors today are much more injurious.

The present Right too differs in many respects from the Right Communists of 1920/21. At that time one section of the Right, backed up by considerable masses of the workers, honestly sought a path from social democracy to Communism. This is no longer the case in 1925/26. Today the Right are often elements who have no real belief in Communism whatever. They are frequently politicians who are gradually relapsing into social democracy. And it often enough occurs that these people remain for a time in our ranks, pursuing their aim of of undermining the Comintern from within.

What is the greatest peril involved by the ultra-Left and Right deviations?

The ultra-Left, even their best representatives, divide us from the masses by their obstinate standpoint; they prevent our reaching the masses. The Right attain the like object by other paths. We may say that the ultra-Left, as they are today, divide the communists from the masses, whilst the Right divide the masses from Communism. One is as bad as the other. We must fight energetically against both deviations.

The Lessons learnt from the Struggle carried on up till now against both Deviations.

Here we have already had much experience. We could paint a whole gallery of portraits of the political figures which have embodied these deviations. In a certain sense this would be more interesting and instructive than all the theses. Think of all those ultrative who have left us. Among them such men as Gorter and Panneckoek, at one time excellent Marxists. And again a number of workers belonging to the K. A. P. D. (German Communist Labour Party) who were honest revolutionary fighters. It was worth while to try to convince these people. And then another "Pleiades" arose — Schumacher, Katz. A certain number of workers followed Schumacher. We shall doubtless win many of them back again.

Any one of these personalities could be made the subject of an excellent and instructive political pamphlet which would be helpful to us in finding our way through these differences of

Even now we have a fairly large collection of ultra-Lefts in our ranks. We hope that these comrades will not separate

from us, but will profit by the lessons of the past. It would be superfluous to mention names; they are generally known.

If we turn to the gallery of those Right leaders who have left us, we again find a goodly number: Levi, Frossard, Friesland, Höglund, Tranmael; and now Souvarine and others. I need not mention such types as Bubnik, who sold himself right out to the bourgeoisie. This makes a fairly large gallery of leaders who have separated from us. There have been many among them who could have rendered great service to the international labour movement. A number of Right leaders still remain in our ranks. Those of them who are sincerely anxious to develop into communists must give their whole hearted support to the Comintern.

We must not forget that among the Right there have been comrades who have shown themselves capable of recognising their errors and returning sincerely to communism. In this connection we may refer to comrade Serrati. The Comintern was obliged to fight him energetically. How many sharp letters were exchanged, how many battles fought, how many blows dealt, and how great were the errors committed by comrade Serrati at that time. And yet, as soon as he showed signs of recognising his mistakes, the Comintern and the Italian Party did their utmost to facilitate his return. And how many one time ultra-Left comrades are there in the Italian, the German, and other Communist Parties, who have now returned to a perfectly correct standpoint, and have recognised their mistakes. It is incumbent upon the Comintern to smooth the path of their return.

But nothing very great will be attained by merely talking of golden bridges. We must state, clearly and decisively: we are a Communist World Party, we have set ourselves the task of overthrowing a powerful enemy, the world bourgeoisie; we are therefore striving to gather together all forces which are prepared to light with us for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this giganic struggle we must make use of all forces which we can induce to work for the Comintern. We must not waste our powers. We must not forget that we have not enough functionaries. We must carefully collect every crumb, we must make use of every force capable of aiding the cause of the international proletariat. The errors and deviations from the line of Leninism must be ruthlessly combatted, but at the same time we must do our utmost to accord due consideration to those sincere revolutionaries who have strayed away, and to help them to return to the correct Party standpoint.

At this Session we have faught against the Right in France, in Czecho-Slovakia, in Norway, and in part in Germany. We are fighting against the ultra-Left, especially in Germany. This fight has not been thrust upon us by any personal considerations, by any move dictated by diplomacy, by compromises to this or that Party Central, but by the general situation of the class war in Germany, France, and other countries. We have also had to fight against the ultra-Left in Italy (Bordiga), in Norway, in Poland, and in other countries. This we shall continue to do in the future.

Comrades it is quite understandable that those comrades who are the object of the struggle are anxious to avoid the blows. Each one thinks to himself: Ah yes, the ultra-Left "in general"! Why not? For my part let the blows fall upon them: I am not an ultra-Left. It is always someone else who is the ultra-Left. And the same applies to the Right.

Here sits the French Right comrade Engler. He has shown himself different from the German ultra-Left in not making any particular fuss here in the Plenum; he has not excited himself like comrade Scholem. It has not been necessary to direct our polemics against him to any extent. And yet he embodies a danger which is by no means less than the ultra-Left danger in Germany. He adheres obstinately to this standpoint; he continues to defend Souvarine, and will not acknowledge the errors of his group. Instead of supporting the absolutely correct and substantiated resolution of the French commission, directed against the Right, Engler had the brilliant idea of proposing that the whole of the resolution of the French Commission should be cancelled, and replaced by a brief resolution of two lines, to the effect that solely the errors of the C. C. have led to the formation of the oppositional group. This would be equal to a complete amnesty. The German ultra-Left would have liked such an arrangement. No doubt they would have been pleased with a resolution mentioning neither names nor facts, a mere so-called "objective" resolution, accentuating solely the mistakes of the others. In both cases the Comintern refused to adopt this method, and it has done rightly.

I believe it to be equally impermissable and extremely detrimental when comrades attempt to cling, as some of them do, to the coat-tails of this or that comrade, and to exploit the serious differences of opinion in the C.-P. of the Soviet Union. It need not be said that every communist should study the fundamental problems to be faced in every country, and especially in the country of the victorious proletarian revolution. But it is not permissible to exploit for petty aims the differences of opinion within the Russian C. P. This does not serve the interest of any group or tendency in the Comintern. What is of importance is to recognise our own political errors, and to learn the resultant lesson.

The Enlarged Executive has maintained its Leninist standpoint, and has contended against both the ultra-Left and the Right deviations. Actual facts refute all attempts to represent the present Session as having fought on one front only. It suffices simply to enumerate the resolutions passed here to see that the Comintern has pursued its course of determined struggle against both Right and ultra-Left deviations, and has made no concessions to either one side or the other. The line taken by the Comintern has remained unchanged. The Comintern retains its Leninist standpoint, and will continue to retain it in the future.

The Strengthening of the Cadres.

The discussion of the errors committed by this or that Section or leading comrade is always a difficult and disagreeable matter. It is thus easy to understand the pessimistic tone of the voices which have been raised in the commissions. But despite this an objective examination shows that our Parties have nevertheless become stronger, and that they are gradually developing into really Bolshevist fighting parties. We are still lacking in sufficiently tried and trusted cadres. At first we were etremely badly off in this respect. We can however now state without exaggeration that our cadres are growing, that the political level of the average Party member has been raised, and the social composition of our Parties has improved. Of late new leaders have risen from the ranks of the working class. All this shows that we are advancing successfully, despite all difficulties.

We cannot mete out praise to those comrades who have made grave mistakes. If we make an unprejudiced estimate of the resolutions which have been passed, we cannot but say that the blows which we have dealt the individual representatives of the ultra-Left and Right deviations are justified in the present Situation. The blows against Ruth Fischer and against those Comrades grouped around her who have adopted the same or a similar standpoint are perfectly justified. It must be admitted that the blows dealt the French Right were exceedingly severe,

but they were just and necessary.

The Growth and increasing Strength of the Communist Parties.

The Plenum has declared that some of our Parties have attained important successes.

What, for instance, was the Communist Party of Great Britain a year ago, and what is it now. Has it not made a tremendous stride forward.

And the Italian Party? Compare its position a year ago

and now. Has it not likewise made a great advance?

The same can be said of the German Party, despite all the difficulties which it still has to overcome. It is on the right road to the masses. It has learned to emerge from its isolation, it has learned how to force a breach through the wall dividing it from the social democratic and non-party workers. I do not by any means say that the wall has been broken down. But that it will be broken down is certain. As chance would have it, the matter of the referendum on the expropriation of the princes came to our aid, and facilitated the accomplishment of our task. At the preliminary plebiscite more than 12 million signatures were collected. Our Party marched at the head of the movement. Comrade Thalmann has told us that the circulation of the newspaper: "Roter Frontkämpferbund" has increased from 145,000 to 180,000 copies. That is of course only a trifle, but still it is a sign of the times, a proof that we are on the right way to the masses. Or let us take, for instance, the Red Women's and Girls' League". This is growing steadily, and is gradually extending to the non-party masses. Each of these facts, taken by itself, does not signify much, but the sum of these facts shows that we are on the right path.

The French Party will meet with great successes in the

The French Party will meet with great successes in the immediate future if it only proves capable of overcoming its internal difficulties. The recent election in a Paris constituency

shows that we are gaining influence, while the socialists are losing it. In itself this success is not great, but it is a sign of

the growth of the French Party.

The American Party appears to be at last on the way to overcoming its differences of opinion. I much regret that at the last minute the representatives of the Majority and of the Minority brought forward their declarations. Before beginning my concluding speech, I proposed to the authors of these two declarations to cancel them, to strike them out of the protocol, and to authorise the chairman to declare the matter to be settled. Unfortunately, I failed to convince the representative of the Minority. The representative of the Majority was prepared to accede. Thus the two declarations finally remained.

The enormous tasks confronting the American Party induce to follow with the intensest interest the course of events in the American Party, and cause us to strive for complete unity at all costs. We must not forget for a moment the rôle played by American capital today. We must openly admit that at the present time the objective pre-conditions for the development of Communism in America are not particularly favourable. If the subjective factor is to be equally lame, then a state of affairs may be arrived at in which America will have no communist mass movement for years. The Communist Party of America is confronted by a mighty enemy. A comparison is frequently drawn between the privileged position of American capitalism today with the former power of English capital. This comparison is however not quite accurate. American capital is today a great deal more powerful. And reformism is stronger and more impudent in America. The people we have to deal with in America are no Sidney Webbs, no Fabians. The present leaders of the American Federation of Labour are the disciples of Gompers. They are not Fabians, but a band of the most audacious servants of capital, the representatives of an agressively anti-Communist movement; they are men who will develop rapidly into actual Facists, and are not by any means scrupulous in the choice of their weapons against the Communists.

One cannot therefore regard the objective situation in America at the present time as especially favourable for the development of a communist mass movement. If our Party does not become at once united in itself, if it does not close its ranks, if it does not cease its fractional struggles, then it may vanish completely from the scene for a time. I state this openly, however disagreeable it may be, in order that our comrades may not be left in doubt as to the actual situation. Our Party in America must be united at any price, or it will cease to exist at all. I believe that the presidium will be authorised by you to suppress energetically any outbreak of fractional strife in America.

I cannot pass over in silence the situation in China. I have already stated that the strategic position of the Chinese revolution has become more unfavourable of late. The people's armies have suffered a certain defeat. The pressure exercised by the forces of the enemy is steadily increasing, and the enemy is becoming more and more audacious. And yet I am confident that the situation will presently improve. We must follow events in China with the greatest attention.

The Acceleration of the Pace of Revolutionary Development.

The Communist International certainly cannot work miracles. Where the objective prerequisites of revolutionary development are lacking, the Communern cannot create these pre-requisites all in a moment. But when we look back on the past, we see that the Communist International has done much to help our Parties, and has not seldom aided them to overcome the most difficult crises. Let us compare the present period with the last one. After the fall of the Paris Commune in 1871, the French working class had to wait almost a whole decade before a more or less socialist mass movement could again be formed. We may compare this with the situation in Italy today. Do you think, comrades, that the victory of Fascism was a smaller defeat for the Italian proletariat than the suppression of the commune for the French? I do not think it was. But the Italian working class will not need a decade to get on to its feet again and to gather once more around its Party.

Or let us take Bulgaria. No one doubts that the Bulgarian defeat was as severe as the blood-letting in Paris in 1871, or that the physical destruction of the Bulgarian Communist Party was not as disastrous as the extermination of the Communards. Our Bulgarian Party is still in a very difficult situation. But one thing is certain, it will not require a decade before it gets on its feet again.

What is the reason of this comparatively accelerated speed of recovery of crushed class movements today? In the first place the speed of development in general has become more rapid and energetic. But the subjective factor also plays a considerable rôle. The experience gained in the Russian revolution of the Communist International is the most precious treasure possessed by the Comintern. How is it that the Comintern has been successful in lending aid to the Italian workers, to the Bulgarian workers, and to a number of the troops of the vanguard of the international proletariat? Our experience, our international unity, the existence of a proletarian state in Russia itself, have helped us, and will continue to help us to accelerate the awakening and progress of the working class in this or that country.

The Impending Class Battles in Great Britain, France, and Germany.

What is the position in the most important countries of Europe, from the standpoint of the prospects of revolutionary development in the future? We must all realise, comrades, that England is on the eve of a mighty struggle, and this struggle will take the form almost of a social catastrophe. (This does not mean, of course, that it is a matter of days or weeks.) I must once more return to the question of the coming struggle in the coal mining industry. When this strike breaks out, then the first, the main task of the Comintern will be the organisation of international support for this strike on every section of the European and world front. It is highly probable that the English communists will have to cross swords in this question with some of the socalled Left trade union leaders, and with their wavering groups. Some of these leaders are hiding their heads in the sand in view of the coming social tempest. They are still dreaming of so-called "normal" development without great strikes, without catastrophes, without risk, without upheavals. And yet the situation in England is such that the working class is obviously being driven forward to such struggles and catastrophes. We must all follow the English events with the most careful attention, and as soon as the strike breaks out we must display an energetic initiative on an international scale.

In France the crisis is gradually maturing. Those comrades who have hitherto been sceptical as to the correctness of our French diagnosis will now be convinced by our arguments, and by the events themselves, that the crisis in France is really approaching. The slogan of the workers' and peasants' government is much more in place in France than anywhere else at the present time. The doubts felt by many comrades are entirely unfounded. We must of course effectually combine this slogan with the daily struggles of the masses, with the intermediate political and economic partial demands. But the nearer the crisis approaches, the more confidently must the slogan of the workers' and peasants'

We have already spoken of Germany. With respect to the importance of the German crisis, we are all perfectly agreed with the statement given by the reporter for the German Commission. In Germany we are not merely faced by an insignificant episodic crisis, which will vanish in few months without leaving a trace behind it. No, it is a perfectly new chapter which is opening before us. This crisis has been correctly characterised in the resolution of the German Commission. We must not over-estimate it. We do not find the present situation in Germany identical to that in 1923. But we must clearly recognise that the present crisis is not a temporary one, that it is not a petty episode, that it cannot

be liquidated in a short time. The curve may rise or fall, but in general the crisis will deepen.

government resound in our agitation.

What is most important, comrades, is that the line of development in the three most important European countries — England, France, and Germany — is essentially the same. Capitalism

is declining in all these three countries.

In 1923 the Comintern rightly pointed out that under certain circumstances the external dangers threatening the proletarian revolution in Germany can be stronger than the internal dangers. In 1923 the inner difficulties were considerable. We lost the battle, But at bottom the aid lent by Anglo-American capital to German capitalism had an extremely decisive effect.

Had the proletarian revolution been victorious in Germany in 1923, it might easily have been confronted by direct English and French intervention. Today the foreign political position of the German revolution would be better. It is possible that Amenican capital will save the German bourgeoisie once or twice more. But if we take a general survey of developments we recognise that at the present time the foreign political situation

is much more advantageous for the developing proletarian re-

The upward movement of the revolutionary curve in England, France, and Germany, is accompanied by a simultaneous maturing of revolutionary events in the East. All this, taken together, shows us to be on the eve of a fresh advance. We are revolutionaries, and as such even the steadiest and most objective of us are inclined to over-estimate what is revolutionary in the situation. This is part of the profession of a revolutionist, so to speak. But none the less we can and must maintain that a change is maturing in the international situation. We all feel the approach of the uplift in the labour movement. A revolutionary uplift in the narrow sense of the word is not yet observable. But the fresh wind blowing in the labour movement can already be felt. The gradual transition from the defensive to the offensive is making itself felt.

A change is coming over the decisive countries of Europe, and of the Orient. It will not find expression in a few weeks or months, but it is in the air, it is coming. The window has not yet been thrown open, but is already ajar. The fresh air is streaming in, and we breathe it eagerly.

The Soviet Union and the Revolutionary World Development.

We must study our own part, for it is very instructive. But it is the future which is of the greatest importance. The Russian revolution has never before exercised such a an attractive force upon the working class of the whole world as it does at the present time, now that we are overcoming the many difficulties laid in the path of the Soviet Union, and are advancing successfully in the process of constructing a socialist state of society. The true class instinct has helped the workers of the whole world, including even the social democratic workers, to the formation of a correct judgment on the events in the Soviet Union. This does not mean that there are no difficulties, that our inner struggles were unnecessary, that the conflicts have been about trifles. Not at all. The questions have been problems of tremendous importance to the proletarian revolution. We are all perfectly aware that we are living in the epoch of socialist construction, that this epoch has its own peculiar difficulties, and that the constructive work towards the realisation of Socialism is striding forward despite these difficulties.

There are many bourgeois professors who like to discuss mass psychology. It would do them no harm to take lessons of the Revolutionists in this respect, especially from those Russian revolutionists, who have personally gone through three revolutions. The mass psychology of the present day social democratic workers is indeed an interesting subject. Their attitude towards the present stage of the Russian revolution is extremely characteristic. For many years the social democratic leaders tried to poison the minds of the social democratic workers by means of slanders against the Russian revolution and the Soviet power. And what is the result? The first real success attained in constructive Socialism has none the less been recognised by the true class instinct of the social democratic workers. This is an exceedingly interesting contribution to the history of mass psychology. The Russian revolution has now become a powerful magnet to all honest social democratic workers. This is one of the most highly important factors in

the whole work of the Communist International.

The difficulties in the path of the Russian proletarian revolution, surrounded as it still is by bourgeois states, are still great. Lenin is no longer with us. Fresh problems are arising, and will continue to arise. But in spite of everything the force of attraction centered in the proletarian revolution of the Soviet Union is steadily growing, and will continue to grow, not only amongst the communist proletariat, but among the proletariat of the world.

We must study the Decisions of the Comintern.

Comrades, it is my profoundest desire that the decisions here come to should not only be accepted, but that they should also be

1. well studied, which is by no means always the case, 2. well carried out, which is unfortunately again not always

It is not a question of the Comintern having drawn up such and such a number of new theses and resolutions. What is of importance is to concentrate the attention of all Party members on the actual practical elaboration, application, and execution in every single country of the decisions here accepted.

We must now introduce new methods of work in many respects. This has been sufficiently discussed here. We must begin with the preparations for the VI. Congress. The best preparation will be, however, the study and the execution of the decisions accepted, their practical test in the light of the experience of the whole of our Parties, and the participation of all our fractions in the carrying out of these decisions.

The time is past when we merely proclaimed the principles and theses of communism. We have grown to be a world Party. We have gained wide experience. We have already succeeded in many respects with regard to the selection of the leading cadres

of our Parties.

We must now prepare carefully for the VI. World Congress. We are of the opinion that the preparations for this Executive Session in the present situation, which is known to all of you, were insufficient. During our preparations for the VI. World Congress we must greatly develop inner party democracy, not in words but in deeds. We must realise a really comrade-like cooperation both in the Executive of the Com-intern and in every separate Communist Party. This will not remain a mere pious wish. Our cardres have been reinforced, they are now much better prepared than formerly. In the present period, in which there is no direct civil war, and in which a number of political errors have been corrected, we can courageously attack the work of carrying into effect the principles of "normalisation" and inner Party democracy. It would, of course, be preferable to all of us to have less inner Party democracy, if only we already had the civil war against the bourgeoisie. But unfortunately at the present time there are a large number of countries in which there is no immediately revolutionary situation. We are living in the period of preparation, in the period during which the fighters polish up their weapons and make ready for the fray. We must so act that not a minute passes away unused.

The necessity of altering the regime within the Com-intern has been spoken of here. It need not be said that we have our weak points. Our leading organs have not always shown themselves masters of the situation. The connection with the separate Sections have not always been kept up properly. There have been occasions when this or that crisis could have been avoided if the advice of the Comintern had been followed at the right time. And on the other hand the bow has sometimes been drawn too tightly so as to amount to an "intervention". I am not in the least inclined to idealise the situation. It is our task to work unremittingly for the improvement of the organisation of the Comintern, and for the removal of all shortcomings.

Comrades, the Comintern, as we have already told you, is fighting against both deviations. When it becomes necessary to deal blows, it often seems as if the fist descends perhaps more often than needful. Those who have followed attentively the work of our Session and of our commissions, and who have heard attentively the fundamental reports, theses, and resolutions, will acknowledge that the Comintern is doing its utmost to overcome both deviations. No Leninism is possible unless these deviations are combatted.

We have drawn two perspectives of the future development. It was impossible to act otherwise. There is no doubt our analysis is correct.

Given such a situation, what is the task of a revolutionist, of a revolutionary Party, a revolutionary leader? Their task lies in making an objective estimation of the situation, of seeing both perspectives clearly, and of doing everything which depends on the subjective factor, that is, on their own Party, towards the realisation of the shorter or more favourable perspective. We must solve this task. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy, and the Central Committee of the other parties, can fully rely upon the full support of the Executive of the Comintern in their further work.

The Comintern will overcome all Difficulties.

We cannot promise that our future work will pass off without crises. There will certainly be such crises. Those who have not grasped the spirit of the communist movement will always fall into despair at every fresh crisis, or difficulty or note it with malicious joy. We have already overcome dozens of crises, and shall overcome those to come. We are an organi-

sation comprising over 50 Parties, carrying on the struggle all over the world. When we recollect how different the actual political tasks are in the various countries, then we comprehend the difficulties. But you must bear in mind at the same time, comrades, that we have collected great and multifarious experience in the period between the I. and the VI. World Congresses. Thus, when one of our Parties, or this or that group of functionaries, in this or that Party comes a cropper, then we have to mobilise the whole of our international experience and help these comrades.

I may state confidently that Communism is a sturdy youth; it will survive everything. Its organism is strong, it will be able to overcome every sickness. This does not mean that we are to regard past errors and impending crises and difficulties with indifference. By no means. But we must not be intimidated

or plunged into despair by this or that crisis.

Now, after some years of capitalist reaction, we feel the fresh air again. We have already conquered one sixth of the surface of the globe, and even our enemies are at last convinced that they cannot take this away from us. We are at the commencement of a great national revolutionary movement in the East- especially in China, where almost half a milliard of human beings are living. We have already gained real foothold in the trade union movement, in the United Front tactics, especially in the struggle for trade union unity.

In the largest capitalist countries of Europe, and especially in England, our movements will grow incessantly. I hope that the other Parties will follow the example of the English Communist Party in reporting their successes, and not their crises, at our Congress. I hope that at the next meeting of the Enlarged Executive not only one, but two or three Parties will come

forward with such reports.

Comrades, what has been said has been said. The polemics which have been heard here, and the blows which have been dealt, cannot be taken back again. But we will not expend too much of our time on this. We close our ranks and march

forward for the cause of the Comintern. The next generation will not be the first to witness the victory of communism in Europe, but our own generation (applause), and we hope that the victory will not be confined to Europe. The proletariat will rise, the proletariat will seize the bourgeoisie by the throat; it is already stretching out its hand. The Comintern continues to grow in power despite all difficulties. It is a Marxist Leninist, Bolshevist International. It does not over-estimate it successes, it is fully aware of the weak points of its work, but it is firmly resolved to overcome these deficiencies, and to work for the perfecting of its organisations, of its inner regime, and for the improvement of its connections, its propaganda, and its work. The Comintern will employ its rich stores of experience in aiding its Sections, and preventing the repetition of errors already made by other Sections.

We are inspired with one hope and one certainty: the world proletariat will arise, the world proletariat will conquer. The life aim of each one of us is to help the world proletariat to the most rapid possible victory. (Prolonged and enthu-

siastic applause, singing of the International.)

Chairman Comrade Geschke:

Comrades, we close the VI. Session of the Enlarged Exe-

cutive with the appeal:

To the work for the execution of our decisions, for the fulfilment of our tasks, for the establishment of the United Front. Forth to the fight! Warmest revolutionary greatings to the international working class, and before all to the fighters now lying in prison. Forward to the fight of the revolutionary proletariat!

Long live the Communist International! Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live Soviet Russia!

(Enthusiastic applause.)